


VOLUME 97 • NUMBER 4 • OCTOBER 1992

The American Historical Review

AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION



AHA DIRECTORIES



Directory of History Departments and Organizations in the United States and Canada

Over 780 entries are included in this concise, comprehensive reference publication for historians and humanities scholars. The *Directory* includes all Ph.D.-granting institutions in the United States and Canada; affiliations, degree information, rank, and specializations of more than 13,000 historians; recent doctoral recipients and their dissertation titles; enrollment statistics and more.

832 pp. 1992 Currently Available
\$45.00 members \$60.00 nonmembers



Grants, Fellowships, and Prizes of Interest to Historians, 1992-93

This annually updated directory contains more than 400 sources of potential funding for historians at all levels. Each listing contains valuable information on application requirements, deadlines, addresses, stipend amounts and also included is an expanded section on book and essay prizes.

250 pp. 1992 Currently Available
\$8.00 members \$10.00 nonmembers



Directory of Federal Historical Programs and Activities

Over 1,500 public historians, archivists, and librarians in government offices are indexed along with more than 250 programs and agencies. Listings include program descriptions, contacts, and a current personnel rosters. The *Directory* is a joint publication of the American Historical Association, the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, and the Society for History in the Federal Government.

88 pp. 1990 Currently Available
\$7.00 members \$10.00 nonmembers

Available from the—

American Historical Association

Publication Sales Office, 400 A St., SE, Washington, DC 20003

(202) 544-2422 FAX (202) 544-8307

Orders must be prepaid

The American Historical Review

AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
Founded in 1884. Chartered by Congress in 1889.

Elected Officers

President: FREDERIC E. WAKEMAN, *University of California, Berkeley*
President-elect: LOUISE A. TILLY, *New School for Social Research, New York*
Vice-Presidents: BLANCHE WIESEN COOK, *John Jay College, CUNY, Research Division*
SUSAN SOCOLOW, *Emory University, Professional Division*
ROBERT A. BLACKKEY, *California State University, San Bernardino, Teaching Division*

Appointed Officers

Executive Director: SAMUEL R. GAMMON
AHR Editor: DAVID L. RANSEL, *Indiana University, Bloomington*
Controller: RANDY NORELL

Elected Council Members

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Immediate Past President

SUZANNE WILSON BARNETT
University of Puget Sound

CAROLE K. FINK
Ohio State University

BARBARA A. HANAWALT
University of Minnesota

ROBERT L. KELLEY
*University of California,
Santa Barbara*

NELL IRVIN PAINTER
Princeton University

SAM BASS WARNER, JR.
Brandeis University

Cover illustration: Painting of a characteristic street scene in Eastern Europe before World War II, by Romanian artist Carol Popp de Szathmáry (1812–1888), entitled “Bărăția din Cîmpulung” (The Church in Cîmpulung), circa 1860. The small town of Cîmpulung lies north of Bucharest in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains.



The American Historical Review appears in February, April, June, October, and December of each year. It is published by the American Historical Association, 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 (202-544-2422) and is printed and mailed by Byrd Press, 2901 Byrdhill Road, Richmond, Virginia 23228. The editorial offices are located at 914 Atwater, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405 (812) 855-7609.

The AHR is sent to members of the American Historical Association and to institutions holding subscriptions. Membership dues: For incomes of \$60,000 and above, \$85.00 annually; \$50,000–\$59,999, \$75.00; \$40,000–\$49,999, \$65.00; \$30,000–\$39,999, \$55.00; \$20,000–\$29,999, \$45.00; below \$20,000, students, and joint memberships \$25.00; associate (nonhistorian) \$35.00; life \$1,200; teachers of K-12 \$70.00, K-12 without *The Review* \$45.00. The proportion of dues allocated to the *AHR* is \$17.00. Subscription rates effective for volume 97: Class I, *American Historical Review* only, United States \$48.00, foreign \$56.00. Further information on membership, subscriptions, and the ordering of back issues is contained on the two pages—1(a) and 2(a)—immediately preceding the advertisements.

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS

Manuscripts should be sent to the Editor, *American Historical Review*, 914 Atwater, Bloomington, Indiana 47401. Texts, including quotations and footnotes, should be double-spaced with generous margins. Submissions sent from the North American continent should include four copies of the complete text (two copies if from abroad). Footnotes should be numbered consecutively throughout and should appear in a separate section at the end of the text. The editors prefer to work with manuscripts that are no more than 30 pages in length, not counting notes, tables, and charts. Especially helpful are submissions that are IBM compatible. These include word-processing programs on 5.25 or 3.5-inch diskettes supported by MS-DOS and, in particular, WordPerfect. To check if your disk is compatible, call our Production Manager at (812) 855-0024.

No manuscript will be considered for publication if it is concurrently under consideration by another journal or press or if it has been published or is soon to be published elsewhere. Both restrictions apply to the substance as well as to the exact wording of the manuscript. If the manuscript is accepted, the editors expect that its appearance in the *Review* will precede republication of the essay, or any significant part thereof, in another work.

Other guidelines for the preparation of manuscripts for submission to and publication in the *AHR* will be sent upon request. Articles will be edited to conform to *AHR* style in matters of punctuation, capitalization, and the like. The editors may suggest other changes in the interest of clarity and economy of expression; such changes are not made without consultation with authors. The editors are the final arbiters of length, grammar, and usage.

Unsolicited book reviews are not accepted.

Postmaster: Please send notification (Form 3579) regarding undelivered journals to: American Historical Association, 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003. Publication identification number: *American Historical Review* (ISSN 0002-8762).

The *AHR* disclaims responsibility for statements, either of fact or opinion, made by contributors.

© AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 1992

All rights reserved

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.



The American Historical Review

AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

Editor: DAVID L. RANSEL

Associate Editor: LEAH SHOPKOW

Assistant Editors: WILLIAM V. BISHEL
ALLYN ROBERTS

Contributing Editor: ROBERT A. ROSENSTONE

Assistant to the Editors: VIRGINIA D. OLLIS

Production Manager: GUTA DAVIS

Editorial Assistants: ANDREW R. DAVIES, STEPHEN L. HARP, PATRICK LEARY,
STUART J. LITTLE, CYNTHIA NELSON MEYER, RONALD H. PETERS,
WILLARD SUNDERLAND, SIN-KIONG WONG

Part-time Copy-editor: THOMAS PRASCH

Advertising Manager: EMILY FRYE

Board of Editors

THOMAS BENDER
New York University

MARCIA COLISH
Oberlin College

PAUL W. DRAKE
*University of California,
San Diego*

LINDA GORDON
*University of Wisconsin,
Madison*

THOMAS C. HOLT
University of Chicago

ISABEL V. HULL
Cornell University

PHILIP NORD
Princeton University

CAROLE SHAMMAS
*University of California,
Riverside*

JONATHAN D. SPENCE
Yale University

PETER STANSKY
Stanford University

In This Issue

From shortly after the close of World War II to 1989–1990, the six major countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans were governed by Communist regimes. With the exception of Yugoslavia, all the countries lay within the military sphere of the Soviet Union and initially had to conform to Soviet demands in regard to the character and staffing of their political and economic institutions and determination of their foreign policies. The death of Stalin in 1953 created conditions that permitted the regimes of these countries more latitude in their domestic affairs (and Romania eventually adopted an independent foreign policy by playing off the USSR against its communist rival China). However, governments that strayed very far from Soviet requirements, such as those of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, were subjected to direct intervention in their domestic affairs either by Soviet military force or by the forces of neighboring Communist regimes coordinated from Moscow.

The academic and cultural institutions of these countries fell into the hands of Communist ideologues who turned scholarly research and teaching to the task of promoting a unified view of historical development based on the vulgarized Marxism of Soviet historiography, even while each East European country cultivated its own national perspective and sometimes produced interpretations that were in conflict with those of its neighbors. The overall effect was to isolate Eastern Europe from the West and break the historiographic traditions that prior to World War II had been developing along lines similar to those in Central and Western Europe.

The recent fall of the Communist regimes of the region has been accompanied by a burst of activity by scholars wishing to reknit the torn fabric of their historiographic traditions and to rejoin the discussion with their European and American colleagues, in short, to become again a part of the larger cultural world to which they had belonged. (This is not to deny the existence of strong nativist intellectual movements that seek their cultural roots in other directions, for example in Eastern Orthodoxy, but these too have always been part of the European cultural debate in these countries.)

We thought that it would be helpful to specialists on West European, American, and world history to know more about the historiographic traditions of the East European countries and their fate in the period of Communist rule as a means of assisting the reintegration of East European history into research and teaching elsewhere. We enlisted the assistance of six leading scholars of the countries in question and asked them to sketch the background of their country's historiography, discuss the changes that it underwent during Communist rule, and tell us, if possible, what influence the fall of the Communist regimes is having on historical research and writing today. We gave our authors some leeway in deciding to which of these facets they wished to allocate the most space. Some have spent more time on the pre-war period, others on the post-war period, or, as in the essays on Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, much attention is given to events of the past decade. Although references are for the most part in the languages of the countries being treated, all the authors cite literature in Western languages that readers may wish to use to deepen their knowledge of the historical literature of the region.

The pitfalls of organizing a dedicated issue on a region in which the tempo of change is unusually rapid include being confronted at the end of the process with essays whose titles designate territories that either no longer correctly identify the place in question (as in the case of Yugoslavia) or will soon not do so (as in the case of Czechoslovakia, which is now officially known as the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic and is shortly to divide into separate republics). We thought it best nevertheless to leave the titles as we had initially planned them.

In addition to the essays on Eastern Europe and our usual October film review section, this issue features a review article by Ben Kiernan on recent books about the Vietnam War. Kiernan's evaluation of these new books includes the observation that further knowledge and analysis of the conflict in Southeast Asia require studies based on sources from within Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe

Poland	
BY PIOTR S. WANDYCZ	1011
Czechoslovakia	
BY JIŘÍ KOŘALKA	1026
Hungary	
BY ISTVÁN DEÁK	1041
Romania	
BY KEITH HITCHINS	1064
Yugoslavia	
BY IVO BANAC	1084
Bulgaria	
BY MARIA TODOROVA	1105

Review Article

The Vietnam War: Alternative Endings	
BY BEN KIERNAN	1118

Film Reviews

Introduction	
BY ROBERT A. ROSENSTONE	1138
<i>Mapantsula</i> , written and directed by Thomas Mogotlane and Oliver Schmitz	
REVIEWED BY WILLIAM H. WORGER	1141
<i>Wend Kuuni</i> , produced and directed by Gaston Kabore;	
<i>Zan Boko</i> , directed by Gaston Kabore; <i>Yaaba</i> , directed by Idrissa Ouedraogo;	
<i>Tilai</i> , directed by Idrissa Ouedraogo	
REVIEWED BY CLAIRE ANDRADE-WATKINS	1143

<i>Ju Dou</i> , directed by Zhang Yimou and Yang Fengliang REVIEWED BY ANAND A. YANG	1146
<i>Mirch Masala</i> [Spices], directed by Ketan Mehta REVIEWED BY WENDY SINGER	1148
<i>Snakes and Ladders</i> , produced and directed by Mitzi Goldman and Trish FitzSimons REVIEWED BY BARBARA ABRASH	1150
<i>The Navigator: A Medieval Odyssey</i> , directed by Vincent Ward REVIEWED BY KATHLEEN BIDDICK	1152
<i>La vie et rien d'autre</i> [Life and Nothing But], directed by Bertrand Tavernier REVIEWED BY MAARTEN L. PEREBOOM	1153
<i>Mein Krieg</i> , directed by Harriet Eder and Thomas Kufus REVIEWED BY OMER BARTOV	1155
<i>Requiem für Dominic</i> , directed by Robert Dornhelm REVIEWED BY DIANA L. BARKAN	1157
<i>Hard Times and Culture</i> —Part 1, "Vienna, Fin-de-Siècle," directed by Juan Downey REVIEWED BY MIN SOO KANG	1159
<i>Yo, la peor de todas</i> [I, the Worst of All], directed by Maria Luisa Bemberg REVIEWED BY SUSAN E. RAMÍREZ	1161
<i>Quilombo</i> , written and directed by Carlos Diegues REVIEWED BY CLIFF WELCH	1162
<i>Rodrigo D.: No Future</i> , directed by Víctor Gaviria REVIEWED BY E. BRADFORD BURNS	1164
<i>Pictures from a Revolution</i> , produced, directed, and edited by Susan Meiselas, Richard P. Rogers, and Alfred Guzzetti REVIEWED BY JULIE A. CHARLIP and CHARLY BLOOMQUIST	1166
<i>Ikwe</i> , directed by Norma Bailey; <i>Black Robe</i> , directed by Bruce Beresford REVIEWED BY OLIVE PATRICIA DICKASON	1168
<i>American Dream</i> , directed by Barbara Kopple REVIEWED BY ROGER HOROWITZ	1170

Reviews of Books

GENERAL

RICHARD RORTY. <i>Philosophical Papers</i> . Volume 1, <i>Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth</i> . Volume 2, <i>Essays on Heidegger and Others</i> . By Richard T. Vann	1173	CARLO GINZBURG. <i>Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method</i> . By Harry C. Payne	1176
ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE. <i>Feminism without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism</i> . By Louise A. Tilly	1175	SCOTT GORDON. <i>The History and Philosophy of Social Science</i> . By Bruce Mazlish	1176
		BRUCE MAZLISH. <i>The Leader, the Led, and the Psyche: Essays in Psychohistory</i> . By Geoffrey Cocks	1177

YOSEF HAYIM YERUSHALMI. *Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable.*
By Sander L. Gilman 1178

MAX OELSCHLAEGER. *The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology.*
By Gunther Barth 1179

KEITH TESTER. *Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights.*
By Harriet Ritvo 1180

DAVID HENIGE. *In Search of Columbus: The Sources for the First Voyage.*
By Pauline Moffitt Watts 1181

ALAN K. SMITH. *Creating a World Economy: Merchant Capital, Colonialism, and World Trade, 1400–1825.*
By William H. McNeill 1182

JAMES DEFRONZO. *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements.*
By Jonathan Adelman 1182

GLENN ANTHONY MAY. *Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War.*
By David F. Trask 1183

KEITH KYLE. *Suez.*
By Peter L. Hahn 1184

DIANE B. KUNZ. *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis.*
By David S. Painter 1185

JOSEPH SMITH. *Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930.*
By David M. Pletcher 1185

THOMAS M. LEONARD. *Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability.*
By Stephen G. Rabe 1186

SUSANNE JONAS. *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power.*
By Thomas P. Anderson 1187

ANCIENT

ROBERT A. BAUSLAUGH. *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece.*
By Thomas Figueira 1187

AVERIL CAMERON. *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse.*
By T. D. Barnes 1188

THOMAS W. GALLANT. *Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece: Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy.*
By Robert Garland 1189

RICHARD E. MITCHELL. *Patricians and Plebeians: The Origin of the Roman State.*
By William V. Harris 1189

JOHN K. EVANS. *War, Women and Children in Ancient Rome.*
By Susan Treggiari 1190

EDWARD CHAMPLIN. *Final Judgments: Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills, 200 B.C.–A.D. 250.*
By Brent D. Shaw 1190

R. J. A. WILSON. *Sicily under the Roman Empire: The Archaeology of a Roman Province, 36 b.c.–a.d. 535.*
By L. Richardson, Jr. 1191

MICHELE RENEE SALZMAN. *On Roman Time: The Codex-Calendar of 354 and the Rhythms of Urban Life in Late Antiquity.*
By David Potter 1192

MEDIEVAL

GEORGES DUBY and MICHELLE PERROT, editors. *Histoire des femmes en occident. Volume 2, Le Moyen Age.*
By Caroline Walker Bynum 1193

MYRIAM GREILSAMMER. *L'Envers du tableau: Mariage et maternité en Flandre médiévale.*
By Barbara A. Hanawalt 1194

CAROLYN L. CONNOR. *Art and Miracles in Medieval Byzantium: The Crypt at Hosios Loukas and Its Frescoes.*
By Annabel Wharton 1195

SHARON FARMER. *Communities of Saint Martin: Legend and Ritual in Medieval Tours.*
By Thomas F. X. Noble 1195

PIERRE BONNASSIE. *From Slavery to Feudalism in South-Western Europe.*
By Constance B. Bouchard 1196

PAUL FREEDMAN. *The Origins of Peasant Servitude in Medieval Catalonia.*
By James W. Brodman 1197

EMMA MASON. *St. Wulfstan of Worcester, c. 1008–1095.*
By Kristine E. Haney 1198

RICHARD SHARPE. *Medieval Irish Saints' Lives: An Introduction to Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae.*
By Pamela Sheingorn 1198

CONSTANTIN FASOLT. *Council and Hierarchy: The Political Thought of William Durant the Younger.*
By James A. Brundage 1199

PETER W. EDBURY. *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191–1374.*
By James M. Powell 1200

PETER F. AINSWORTH. *Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History: Truth, Myth, and Fiction in the Chroniques.*
By Peter F. Dembowski 1201

GUY LLEWELYN THOMPSON. *Paris and Its People under English Rule: The Anglo-Burgundian Regime 1420–1436.*
By Richard W. Kaeuper 1201

MODERN EUROPE

ULRICH MUHLACK. *Geschichtswissenschaft im Humanismus und in der Aufklärung: Die Vorgeschichte des Historismus.*
By Helen Liebel-Weckowicz 1202

SAMUEL Y. EDGERTON, JR. *The Heritage of Giotto's Geometry: Art and Science on the Eve of the Scientific Revolution.*
By Edward A. Gosselin 1203

KATHRYN M. OLESKO. *Physics as a Calling: Discipline and Practice in the Königsberg Seminar for Physics.*
By Steven Turner 1203

TIM UNWIN. *Wine and the Vine: An Historical Geography of Viticulture and the Wine Trade.*
By Leo A. Loubère 1204

ANNE HOLLANDER. *Moving Pictures.*
By Karsten Harries 1205

STUART WOOLF. *Napoleon's Integration of Europe.*
By James Friguglietti 1206

RICHARD F. HAMILTON. *The Bourgeois Epoch: Marx and Engels on Britain, France, and Germany.*
By J. D. Hunley 1206

- GARY P. STEENSON. *After Marx, Before Lenin: Marxism and Socialist Working-Class Parties in Europe, 1884–1914.*
By K. Steven Vincent 1207
- LEE KENNETT. *The First Air War, 1914–1918.*
By Keith W. Bird 1208
- JOHN N. HORNE. *Labour at War: France and Britain 1914–1918.*
By Susan Pedersen 1209
- TOM BUCHANAN. *The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement.*
By Thomas C. Kennedy 1209
- ANITA PRAŻMOWSKA. *Britain, Poland, and the Eastern Front, 1939.*
By M. B. Biskupski 1210
- CHRISTOPHER DUFFY. *Red Storm on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany, 1945.*
By Earl F. Ziemke 1210
- MICHEL MARGAIRAZ. *L'État, les finances et l'économie: Histoire d'une conversion 1932–1952.*
By Richard F. Kuiseil 1211
- JOHN GILLINGHAM. *Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community.*
By F. Roy Willis 1212
- KENNETH R. ANDREWS. *Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I.*
By Edward M. Furgol 1213
- MARK NICHOLLS. *Investigating Gunpowder Plot.*
By Roger B. Manning 1214
- PAUL LANGFORD. *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689–1798.*
By Henry Horwitz 1214
- CLIVE DEWEY. *The Passing of Barchester.*
By Jeffrey Cox 1215
- MARGARET STROBEL. *European Women and the Second British Empire.*
By Dorothy O. Helly 1216
- JOHN BARRELL. *The Infection of Thomas De Quincey: A Psychopathology of Imperialism.*
By Martin A. Danahay 1216
- PATRICK JOYCE. *Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class 1848–1914.*
By Theodore Koditschek 1217
- ANN POTTINGER SAAB. *Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria, and the Working Classes, 1856–1878.*
By Marvin Swartz 1218
- GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB. *Poverty and Compassion: The Moral Imagination of the Late Victorians.*
By Standish Meacham 1219
- JANE LEWIS. *Women and Social Action in Victorian and Edwardian England.*
By Reba N. Soffer 1220
- OLIVER MACDONAGH. *Jane Austen: Real and Imagined Worlds.*
By R. K. Webb 1221
- WILLIAM S. PETERSON. *The Kelmscott Press: A History of William Morris's Typographical Adventure.*
By D. L. LeMahieu 1221
- ROBERT W. D. BOYCE. *British Capitalism at the Crossroads, 1919–1932: A Study in Politics, Economics, and International Relations.*
By Stephen A. Schuker 1222
- ANDREW THORPE. *The British General Election of 1931.*
By Trevor Lloyd 1223
- JANE McL. CÔTÉ. *Fanny and Anna Parnell: Ireland's Patriot Sisters.*
By Janet A. Nolan 1223
- ELIZABETH A. MUENGER. *The British Military Dilemma in Ireland: Occupation Politics, 1886–1914.*
By Thomas E. Hachey 1224
- FAITH E. BEASLEY. *Revising Memory: Women's Fiction and Memoirs in Seventeenth-Century France.*
By Warren Roberts 1225
- ROGER CHARTIER. *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution.*
By Jack R. Censer 1225
- VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT. *Democratizing France: The Political and Administrative History of Decentralization.*
By Nathanael Greene 1226
- DONALD REID. *Paris Sewers and Sewermen: Realities and Representations.*
By Barrie M. Ratcliffe 1227
- LENARD R. BERLANSTEIN. *Big Business and Industrial Conflict in Nineteenth-Century France: A Social History of the Parisian Gas Company.*
By George J. Sheridan, Jr. 1228
- HENRY ROUSSO. *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944.*
By Bertram M. Gordon 1229
- DAVID SVEN REHER. *Town and Country in Pre-Industrial Spain: Cuenca, 1550–1870.*
By Bartolomé Yun 1230
- MARY ELIZABETH PERRY. *Gender and Disorder in Early Modern Seville.*
By Anne Jacobson Schutte 1230
- THORKILD KJÆRGAARD. *Den danske revolution 1500–1800: En økohistorisk tolkning* [The Danish Revolution, 1500–1800: An Ecohistoric Interpretation].
By H. Arnold Barton 1231
- E. H. M. DORMANS. *Het tekort: Staatsschuld in de Tijd der Republiek* [The Deficit: Public Debt in the Dutch Republic].
By Stephen B. Baxter 1232
- CARL-JOHAN GADD. *Självhushåll eller arbetsdelning? Svenskt lant- och stadshantverk ca. 1400–1860* [Self-Sufficiency or Division of Labor? Rural and Urban Crafts in Sweden, ca. 1400–1860].
By Lars G. Sandberg 1232
- GERHARD SCHORMANN. *Der Krieg gegen die Hexen: Das Ausrottungsprogramm des Kurfürsten von Köln.*
By William Monter 1233
- DAVID WARREN SABEAN. *Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870.*
By William W. Hagen 1233
- JÜRGEN MÜLLER. *Von der alten Stadt zur neuen Munizipalität: Die Auswirkungen der Französischen Revolution in den linksrheinischen Städten Speyer und Koblenz.*
By Mary Lindemann 1234
- ROBERT D. BILLINGER, JR. *Metternich and the German Question: States' Rights and Federal Duties, 1820–1834.*
By Paul W. Schroeder 1235
- WOODRUFF D. SMITH. *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 1840–1920.*
By Harry Liebersohn 1236

- RALPH JESSEN. *Polizei im Industrieviertel: Modernisierung und Herrschaftspraxis im westfälischen Ruhrgebiet 1848–1914.*
By Elaine Glovka Spencer 1237
- WILLIBALD GUTSCHE. *Wilhelm II: Der letzte Kaiser des Deutschen Reiches; Eine Biographie.*
By Lamar Cecil 1237
- THOMAS A. KOHUT. *Wilhelm II and the Germans: A Study in Leadership.*
By Isabel V. Hull 1238
- MARION A. KAPLAN. *The Making of the Jewish Middle Class: Women, Family, and Identity in Imperial Germany.*
By Vicki Caron 1239
- PETER S. FISHER. *Fantasy and Politics: Visions of the Future in the Weimar Republic.*
By David Gross 1240
- ROBERT S. GARNETT, JR. *Lion, Eagle, and Swastika: Bavarian Monarchism in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933.*
By Johnpeter Horst Grill 1241
- BURKHARD JELLONNEK. *Homosexuelle unter dem Hakenkreuz: Die Verfolgung von Homosexuellen im Dritten Reich.*
By George M. Kren 1242
- OMER BARTOV. *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich.*
By George H. Stein 1242
- OLAF GROEHLER. *Bombenkrieg gegen Deutschland.*
By Earl R. Beck 1243
- JEAN-CLAUDE WAQUET. *Le Grand-duché de Toscane sous les derniers Médicis: Essai sur le système des finances et la stabilité des institutions dans les anciens états italiens.*
By R. Burr Litchfield 1244
- ANTHONY H. GALT. *Far From the Church Bells: Settlement and Society in an Apulian Town.*
By Nicholas J. Esposito 1244
- ELDA GENTILI ZAPPI. *If Eight Hours Seem Too Few: Mobilization of Women Workers in the Italian Rice Fields.*
By Richard Camp 1245
- HILLEL LEVINE. *Economic Origins of Antisemitism: Poland and Its Jews in the Early Modern Period.*
By Gershon David Hundert 1246
- VLAD GEORGESCU. *The Romanians: A History.*
By Paul E. Michelson 1246
- CHARLES JELAVICH. *South Slav Nationalisms: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914.*
By Keith Hitchins 1247
- PÉTER GUNST. *Die bäuerliche Gesellschaft Ungarns in der Zeit zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen.*
By John Komlos 1248
- BEN-CION PINCHUK. *Shtetl Jews under Soviet Rule: Eastern Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust.*
By Alexander Orbach 1249
- THOMAS W. SIMONS, JR. *Eastern Europe in the Postwar World.*
By Dov B. Lungu 1250
- THOMAS C. OWEN. *The Corporation under Russian Law, 1800–1917: A Study in Tsarist Economic Policy.*
By Steven G. Marks 1250
- ELISE KIMERLING WIRTSCHAFTER. *From Serf to Russian Soldier.*
By Stephen P. Frank 1251
- GERALD D. SURH. *1905 in St. Petersburg: Labor, Society, and Revolution.*
By Michael Melancon 1252
- ROGER PETHYBRIDGE. *One Step Backwards, Two Steps Forward: Soviet Society and Politics in the New Economic Policy.*
By Peter Kenéz 1253
- GÁBOR TAMÁS RITTERSPORN. *Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications: Social Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR, 1933–1953.*
By Eugene Huskey 1253

NEAR EAST

- R. STEPHEN HUMPHREYS. *Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry.*
By Michael G. Morony 1254
- JACOB M. LANDAU. *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization.*
By Dale F. Eickelman 1255
- MARVIN ZONIS. *Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah.*
By Fakhreddin Azimi 1256

AFRICA

- M. W. DALY. *Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934–1956.*
By Kenneth J. Perkins 1257
- HOWARD TEMPERLEY. *White Dreams, Black Africa: The Antislavery Expedition to the River Niger 1841–1842.*
By Felix K. Ekechi 1258
- KAREN TRANBERG HANSEN. *Distant Companions: Servants and Employers in Zambia, 1900–1985.*
By Dane Kennedy 1258
- LUISE WHITE. *The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi.*
By Elizabeth Schmidt 1259
- JONATHAN NEIL GERSTNER. *The Thousand Generation Covenant: Dutch Reformed Covenant Theology and Group Identity in Colonial South Africa, 1652–1814.*
By Peter Walshe 1260
- BILL NASSON. *Abraham Esau's War: A Black South African War in the Cape, 1899–1902.*
By Melvin E. Page 1261

ASIA

- ANN WALTNER. *Getting an Heir: Adoption and the Construction of Kinship in Late Imperial China.*
By Stevan Harrell 1261
- VIVIEN W. NG. *Madness in Late Imperial China: From Illness to Deviance.*
By N. Sivin 1262
- BEATRICE S. BARTLETT. *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820.*
By John Dardess 1263
- CHANG JUI-TE. *Chung-kuo chün-tai t'ieh-lu shih-yeh kuan-li te yen-chiu: Cheng-chih ts'eng-mien te fen-hsi, 1876–1937 [Railroads in Modern China: Political Aspects of Railroad Administration, 1876–1937].*
By E-tu Zen Sun 1263
- ZHANG YONGJIN. *China in the International System, 1918–20: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery.*
By Nicholas Clifford 1264

CHRISTIAN HENRIOT. <i>Shanghai 1927-1937: Elites locales et modernisation dans la Chine nationaliste.</i> By Mary Backus Rankin	1265	DONALD YACOVONE. <i>Samuel Joseph May and the Dilemmas of the Liberal Persuasion, 1797-1871.</i> By Lawrence B. Goodheart	1279
ARIF DIRLIK. <i>Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution.</i> By Elizabeth J. Perry	1265	IRA V. BROWN. <i>Mary Grew: Abolitionist and Feminist (1813-1896).</i> By Jane H. Pease	1280
SAKAMOTO TARŌ. <i>The Six National Histories of Japan.</i> By G. Cameron Hurst, III	1266	DAVID R. ROEDIGER. <i>The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class.</i> By Steve Fraser	1280
JAMES EDWARD KETELAAR. <i>Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution.</i> By Martin Collcutt	1267	JANET DUTSMA CORNELIUS. "When I Can Read My Title Clear": <i>Literacy, Slavery, and Religion in the Antebellum South.</i> By Robert R. Dykstra	1281
MARK W. MCLEOD. <i>The Vietnamese Response to French Intervention, 1862-1874.</i> By William J. Duiker	1268	HAZEL DICKEN-GARCIA. <i>To Western Woods: The Breckinridge Family Moves to Kentucky in 1793.</i> By Sherry L. Smith	1282
ANAND A. YANG. <i>The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District, 1793-1920.</i> By Sugata Bose	1269	JEANNE BOYDSTON. <i>Home and Work: Housework, Wages, and the Ideology of Labor in the Early Republic.</i> By Mary Beth Norton	1283
GYAN PRAKASH. <i>Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labor Servitude in Colonial India.</i> By Walter Hauser	1269	ROBERT V. REMINI. <i>Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union.</i> By Joel H. Silbey	1283
RICHARD SISSON and LEO E. ROSE. <i>War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh.</i> By Michael H. Fisher	1270	LARRY GARA. <i>The Presidency of Franklin Pierce.</i> By Paul H. Bergeron	1284
ALASTAIR DAVIDSON. <i>The Invisible State: The Formation of the Australian State 1788-1901.</i> By Henry S. Albinski	1271	ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN. <i>Lincoln, the South, and Slavery: The Political Dimension.</i> By George B. Forgie	1284
UNITED STATES		WILLIAM MARVEL. <i>Burnside.</i> By Warren W. Hassler, Jr.	1285
GLEENDA RILEY. <i>Divorce: An American Tradition.</i> By Carol E. Jenson	1272	ANDREW ROLLE. <i>John Charles Frémont: Character as Destiny.</i> By John E. Baur	1286
MARK E. KANN. <i>On the Man Question: Gender and Civic Virtue in America.</i> By Cynthia Russett	1272	ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR. <i>The Civil War in the American West.</i> By Charles Royster	1286
DONALD A. RITCHIE. <i>Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents.</i> By Robert O. Blanchard	1273	MONROE LEE BILLINGTON. <i>New Mexico's Buffalo Soldiers, 1866-1900.</i> By Gerald W. Patton	1287
MORRIS W. FOSTER. <i>Being Comanche: A Social History of an American Indian Community.</i> By Laurence M. Hauptman	1274	JOSEPH M. WHITE. <i>The Diocesan Seminary in the United States: A History from the 1780s to the Present.</i> By John Whitney Evans	1288
CARL E. SWANSON. <i>Predators and Prizes: American Privatizing and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748.</i> By Joseph Goldenberg	1275	SUSANNE KLINGENSTEIN. <i>Jews in the American Academy, 1900-1940: The Dynamics of Intellectual Assimilation.</i> By Deborah Dash Moore	1289
LAMAR RILEY MURPHY. <i>Enter the Physician: The Transformation of Domestic Medicine, 1760-1860.</i> By Joseph F. Kett	1275	HENRY WARNER BOWDEN. <i>Church History in an Age of Uncertainty: Historiographical Patterns in the United States, 1906-1990.</i> By John M. Mulder	1289
JOAN M. JENSEN. <i>Army Surveillance in America, 1775-1980.</i> By Roy Talbert, Jr.	1276	DAVID B. PARKER. <i>Alias Bill Arp: Charles Henry Smith and the South's "Goodly Heritage."</i> By Ted Ownby	1290
ROY TALBERT, JR. <i>Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917-1941.</i> By John Whiteclay Chambers II	1276	STEPHEN CRESSWELL. <i>Mormons and Cowboys, Moonshiners and Klansmen: Federal Law Enforcement in the South and West, 1870-1893.</i> By Wilbur R. Miller	1291
DONALD G. NIEMAN. <i>Promises to Keep: African-Americans and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present.</i> By Herman Belz	1277	JOHN N. INGHAM. <i>Making Iron and Steel: Independent Mills in Pittsburgh, 1820-1920.</i> By Diane Lindstrom	1291
SYLVIA R. FREY. <i>Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age.</i> By Robert McColley	1278	CRANDALL A. SHIFFLETT. <i>Coal Towns: Life, Work, and Culture in Company Towns of Southern Appalachia, 1880-1960.</i> By David A. Corbin	1292
SHANE WHITE. <i>Somewhat More Independent: The End of Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810.</i> By Julie Winch	1278		

- PETER R. KNIGHTS. *Yankee Destinies: The Lives of Ordinary Nineteenth-Century Bostonians*.
By Margo Anderson 1293
- RONALD A. PETRIN. *French Canadians in Massachusetts Politics, 1885–1915: Ethnicity and Political Pragmatism*.
By Thomas J. Archdeacon 1294
- STEVEN FRASER. *Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor*.
By Joyce Shaw Peterson 1294
- ROBERT H. ZIEGER. *John L. Lewis: Labor Leader*.
By Ronald L. Filippelli 1295
- ROGER L. WILLIAMS. *The Origins of Federal Support for Higher Education: George W. Atherton and the Land-Grant College Movement*.
By Paul H. Mattingly 1296
- ANDREW J. POLSKY. *The Rise of the Therapeutic State*.
By Priscilla Ferguson Clement 1296
- GERALD N. GROB. *From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America*.
By John C. Burnham 1297
- CHARLES MUSSER. *High-Class Moving Pictures: Lyman H. Howe and the Forgotten Era of Traveling Exhibition, 1880–1920*.
By John S. Schuchman 1298
- CHARLES MUSSER. *The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1907*; EILEEN BOWSER. *The Transformation of Cinema, 1907–1915*; RICHARD KOSZARSKI. *An Evening's Entertainment: The Age of the Silent Feature Picture, 1915–1928*.
By Steven J. Ross 1298
- MARTHA L. OLNEY. *Buy Now, Pay Later: Advertising, Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s*.
By James H. Soltow 1300
- RICHARD GILLESPIE. *Manufacturing Knowledge: A History of the Hawthorne Experiments*.
By Stephen Waring 1301
- STANLEY COBEN. *Rebellion against Victorianism: The Impetus for Cultural Change in 1920s America*.
By David E. Shi 1301
- BARBARA MELOSH. *Engendering Culture: Manhood and Womanhood in New Deal Public Art and Theater*.
By Joan Shelley Rubin 1302
- PAULA RABINOWITZ. *Labor and Desire: Women's Revolutionary Fiction in Depression America*.
By Eileen Boris 1303
- GEOFFREY PERRET. *There's a War to Be Won: The United States Army in World War II*.
By Phillip S. Meilinger 1304
- CARLO D'ESTE. *Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome*.
By Alan F. Wilt 1304
- KARAL ANN MARLING and JOHN WETENHALL. *Iwo Jima: Monuments, Memories, and the American Hero*.
By John Bodnar 1305
- KENNETH LIPARTITO and JOSEPH PRATT. *Baker and Botts in the Development of Modern Houston*.
By Michal R. Belknap 1306
- ARNOLDO DE LEON. *Ethnicity in the Sunbelt: A History of Mexican Americans in Houston*.
By Mauricio Mazon 1307
- IGNACIO M. GARCIA. *United We Win: The Rise and Fall of La Raza Unida Party*.
By David R. Maciel 1308
- STEPHEN P. WARING. *Taylorism Transformed: Scientific Management Theory since 1945*.
By John W. Sloan 1308
- JOHN W. SLOAN. *Eisenhower and the Management of Prosperity*.
By Patrick D. Reagan 1309
- ANTHONY LEWIS. *Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment*.
By Richard Polenberg 1310
- SUZANNE STAGGENBORG. *The Pro-Choice Movement: Organization and Activism in the Abortion Conflict*.
By Jane S. De Hart 1310
- DONALD A. YERXA. *Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898–1945*.
By David Healy 1311
- SERGE RICARD. *Théodore Roosevelt: Principes et pratique d'une politique étrangère*.
By Robert W. Sellen 1312
- LLOYD E. AMBROSIOUS. *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I*.
By N. Gordon Levin, Jr. 1312
- JAN WILLEM SCHULTE NORDHOLT. *Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace*.
By Gary B. Ostrower 1313
- NEIL V. SALZMAN. *Reform and Revolution: The Life and Times of Raymond Robins*.
By John M. Thompson 1314
- H. W. BRANDS. *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918–1961*.
By Günter Bischof 1314
- JEFFERY M. DORWART. *Eberstadt and Forrester: A National Security Partnership, 1909–1949*.
By Harry Howe Ransom 1315
- BARRY H. STEINER. *Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy*.
By David Alan Rosenberg 1316
- LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC. *The United States and the Genocide Convention*.
By Seymour Maxwell Finger 1317

CANADA

- MICHAEL DOUCET and JOHN WEAVER. *Housing the North American City*.
By Alan F. J. Artibise 1317
- BRIAN S. OSBORNE and DONALD SWAINSON. *Kingston: Building on the Past*.
By Gilbert Stelter 1318
- JACK VERNEY. *The Good Regiment: The Carignan-Salières Regiment in Canada, 1665–1668*.
By Micheline D'Allaire 1319

LATIN AMERICA

- JEAN-YVES MOLLIER. *Le scandale de Panama*.
By William D. Irvine 1319
- D. S. CHANDLER. *Social Assistance and Bureaucratic Politics: The Montepios of Colonial Mexico, 1767–1821*.
By John E. Kicza 1320

THOMAS WHIGHAM. <i>The Politics of River Trade: Tradition and Development in the Upper Plata, 1780–1870.</i>		MARION K. PINSDORF. <i>German-Speaking Entrepreneurs: Builders of Business in Brazil.</i>	
By John Hoyt Williams	1321	By Frederick C. Luebke	1322
RONALD M. SCHNEIDER. <i>“Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil.</i>		THOMAS E. SKIDMORE. <i>The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85.</i>	
By John D. French	1321	By John D. Wirth	1323
Collected Essays	1324	Communications	1350
Documents and Bibliographies	1338	Index of Advertisers	60(a)
Other Books Received	1341		

Contributors

Ivo Banac is professor of history and Master of Pierson College at Yale University. He received his advanced degrees from Stanford University and is the author of *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (1984), which was awarded the Wayne S. Vucinich Prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and *With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (1988), which won the Josip Juraj Strossmayer Award at the Zagreb Book Fair. Banac has written numerous reviews, articles, and edited six collections, including most recently *Dubrovački eseji* (Dubrovnik Essays, 1992). He is a corresponding member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the editor of *East European Politics and Societies*, and a member of several editorial boards.

István Deák was born in Hungary, and before coming to the United States in 1956, he attended the universities of Budapest and Paris. At Columbia University in New York, he studied with, among others, Fritz Stern and Henry L. Roberts. Now professor of history at Columbia, he was the director of the university's Institute on East Central Europe for eleven years. In 1990, he was elected to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest. His major publications are *Weimar Germany's Left-wing Intellectuals: A Political History of the "Weltbühne" and Its Circle* (1968), *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849* (1979), and *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918* (1990). Deák is preparing a work on the problems of resistance and collaboration in East Central Europe during World War II.

Keith Hitchins is professor of history at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. His interests are Eastern Europe, particularly Romania and Hungary, and modern nationalism. Among his books are *The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780–1849* (1969), *Orthodoxy and Nationality* (1977), *Hungarica* (1981), and *The Idea of Nation* (1985). He has written a history of Romania from 1774 to 1947 and is at work on a study about the old regime in southeastern Europe between 1600 and 1800. His interests also lie outside Europe; he is completing a history of the Tajiks and is editor of the new *Journal of Kurdish Studies*.

Ben Kiernan, a native of Melbourne, Australia, earned his doctorate from Monash University in

1983. He is author of *How Pol Pot Came to Power* (1985) and of two other works, as well as thirty articles on contemporary Cambodia. He has co-authored or edited five books on modern Asia, particularly Cambodia and Vietnam. His most recent is *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–77* (1988). Kiernan's work has been translated into eight languages. He is now writing a new social and political history of the Khmer Rouge regime, 1975–1979, and is an associate professor of history at Yale University.

Jiří Kořalka was born in Šternberk, Czechoslovakia, earned his Ph.D. in 1966 and his Dr.Sc. in 1991. From 1975 to 1991, he was the head historian of the Hussite Museum in Tábor. A visiting professor to the universities of Kent (1969), Bielefeld (1987–88), and Vienna (1991), he is now research consultant to the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences, Prague, and editor of the yearbook *Husitský Tábor*. His publications include *Všeněmecký svaz a česká otázka koncem 19. století* (1963), *Co je národ?* (1969), *Přehled dějin Československa* (1982), vol. 1.2, chaps. 8–9, *Die tschechische Bürgertumsforschung* (1989), and *Tschechen im Habsburgerreich und in Europa 1815–1914* (1991). Among his research interests are Czech-German relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, theories of the nation and nationalism, and small nations in international relations before 1914–1918.

Maria Todorova holds a degree in history from the University of Sofia, where she was a professor of Balkan history until 1992. She has also studied at St. Antony's College, the Institutes for Balkan and for Oriental Studies in Moscow and Leningrad, and the Laboratory for Demographic History in Paris. In 1988, she was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, in 1988–90 a Fulbright Visiting Professor at the universities of Maryland and California, Irvine. For the last two years, she has been Mellon Distinguished Visiting Professor at Rice University. She has now joined the history department at the University of Florida. Todorova's specialty is problems of nineteenth-century Balkan social and political history, particularly historical demography. The author of *England, Russia and the Tanzimat* (1980), *British Travellers' Accounts on the Balkans, 16th–19th Century* (1987), *Historians on History* (1988), *Balkan Family History*

and the European Pattern: Demographic Developments in Ottoman Bulgaria (1992), she is at present working on problems of Bulgarian and Balkan nationalism.

Piotr S. Wandycz is the Bradford Durfee Professor of History at Yale University. His latest book is titled *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (1992). A recently elected member of both the Polish Academies of Sciences and an honorary member of the Polish Historical Association, he has long specialized in three fields, Polish, East Central European,

and European diplomatic history. The author of five books in Polish, he has written some ninety articles in English, French, Polish, and Italian. Wandycz began his studies in France and holds a master's from Cambridge University and a doctorate from the University of London. His works in English include *France and Her Eastern Allies 1919–25* (1962), *The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances 1926–36* (1988) (both awarded the George Louis Prize by the AHA), *Soviet-Polish Relations 1917–21* (1969), *The United States and Poland* (1980), and *The Lands of Partitioned Poland 1795–1918* (1974).

Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Poland

PIOTR S. WANDYCZ

THE *ANNUS MIRABILIS* 1989, WHICH SAW THE BEGINNING of the end of Communism in Poland, turned a new page in Polish historiography. True, the process of freeing history from ideological and political constraints had been going on for several years, but partially and selectively. In 1989, the newly won freedom spread to the study of all fields and all epochs, from specialized monographs to basic textbooks. Yet freedom was purchased at a price that entailed the virtual termination of the state's patronage of culture and learning and that grievously affected the economic foundations of universities, institutes, libraries, and publishing houses. As on earlier occasions, the close connection between history and politics (and economics) was more marked in Poland than in the West.

The Polish historian had traditionally been not only a scholar but also a guide, for history as a discipline and history as national consciousness were often inseparable.¹ It has been said that the Poles, more than other nations, experienced historical events twice: when they occurred and when they became the object of debates and disputes. In the process, myths accumulated and frequently established a stronger hold on people's *Weltanschauung* than the history "wie es eigentlich gewesen."

Since the end of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century—that is, at the time of the growth and flowering of history as a scholarly discipline—Poland did not exist on the political map of Europe. This circumstance had an obvious impact on Polish culture and learning, including the study of history. The partitioning powers deliberately cultivated an image of Polish history as indicative of Poland's inability to exist as an independent state. In German and Russian textbooks, the country was presented as a historical failure. No wonder that the defense of the national heritage became an almost obsessive Polish concern. During the brief periods of partial semi-independence or autonomous existence—the Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1815), the Congress Kingdom (1815–1831), the Vilnius educational district in the early nineteenth century, and autonomous Galicia toward the end of the century—Polish historical sciences flourished at Vilnius (Wilno), Warsaw, Cracow, or Lvov universities. At other times, enormous efforts were required to finance archival collections and publications, learned

¹ See Robert W. Seton-Watson, *The Historian as a Political Force in Central Europe* (London, 1922); Emil Niederhauser, "Szkoly historyczne a polityka w Europie wschodniej do 1945 r.," *Kwartalnik historyczny*, 95 (1988): 105–34; Denis Deletant and Harry Hanak, eds., *Historians as Nation-Builders: Central and South Eastern Europe* (London, 1988).

institutes, professional journals and associations, in brief, all that accompanied the contemporaneous development of historical sciences throughout Europe.

Polish historical writings have traditionally stressed their didactic nature and their service to the nation. At times, this emphasis interfered with objectivity, although leading Polish historians have always registered their disapproval of tendentious presentations. Yet a certain national commitment unavoidably stemmed from the close interrelationship of history and politics. While Western historians of the Age of Enlightenment—a Voltaire, Montesquieu, or Gibbon—would search for the causes of the rise and decline of states, their Polish disciples personally experienced the collapse of their state in the late eighteenth-century partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Thus, whether affected in terms of philosophy and methodology of history, by the Enlightenment, Romanticism, Positivism, Idealism, or Marxism, Polish historians could not escape from the fact of the partitions. As a leading Polish scholar remarked in 1923, “the fundamental question for our historiography has been to fathom the understanding of the causes of Poland’s fall.”²

Such an inquiry encompassed the entire span of national history and centered on such antinomies as “monarchy versus republic,” “state versus nation,” “universalism versus national uniqueness.”³ The “monarchic-state-universal” argument ran roughly as follows: the Polish nation did not differ from others, but its lack of discipline and insufficient political sense adversely affected its historical development. The organization of the state was at odds with principles of order and law enforcement; freedom led to license. In the conflicts between the monarch, who sought greater power, and the “noble nation,” the monarch was usually right, and the nobility proved incapable of running the state. In order to regain independence, the Poles had to learn from the examples of the past what to avoid and how to gain discipline and political acumen.

The “republican-national-unique” argumentation emphasized that the Polish “noble nation” had achieved what was exceptional and ahead of the times: a parliamentary democracy, limited and elective monarchy, and a respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual. The republic became a center of attraction for neighboring countries and expanded through voluntary unions, not conquests. True, central authority did suffer in the process, but the spontaneous activity of the noble nation compensated for it. By and large, the nobility and not the monarchy represented the true interests of Poland. When the state fell, the nation survived, and it was not a mere collection of passive subjects. Inspired by the past, it could strive for the recovery of independence. This dispute was indeed fundamental and relevant for the present and the future, which often led to accusations of optimism or pessimism in appraising Poland’s history and future chances.

The author of the first attempted synthesis of Poland’s history, written in the

² Stanisław Zakrzewski, cited in Marian Henryk Serejski, *Historycy o historii*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1963–66), 2: 601.

³ See Jan Adamus, *Monarchizm i republikanizm w syntezie dziejów Polski* (Łódź, 1961); Marian Henryk Serejski, *Naród a państwo w polskiej myśli historycznej* (Warsaw, 1973); *Swojskość a cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej* (Warsaw, 1973); Jerzy Kłoczowski, ed., *Uniwersalizm i swoistość kultury polskiej*, 2 vols. (Lublin, 1989–90).

spirit of the Enlightenment, Bishop Adam Naruszewicz (1733–1796), blamed the Poles themselves for the partitions. No country fell to foreign oppression, he opined, without having first weakened itself. As a close associate of the reforming king, Stanislas Augustus, he spoke from personal experience. In doing so, however, he transferred his views to the past, erecting an essentially static model according to which the rulers always battled against the forces weakening the state. In this “monarchic” interpretation, Naruszewicz criticized the elective monarchy, the privileges of the nobility, and the Polish-Lithuanian union, which had overextended the state and sapped its strength. Naruszewicz realized that history was more than a chronicle of wars and dynasties, and he mentioned the importance of constitutional, cultural, even socioeconomic factors. He also spoke of the historian’s method in almost modern terms, but his was still largely the traditional presentation.

Naruszewicz’s preoccupation with archival sources was typical for his contemporaries, who saw the preservation of the records of the past as a way of salvaging the partitioned Polish nation from oblivion. The reformers who had vainly struggled to preserve independence now turned their efforts to “enliven, maintain, and strengthen devotion to the homeland in our fellow countrymen.”⁴ The Society of the Friends of Learning, which they established in Warsaw in 1800, saw as one of its main tasks to “preserve and bring precision to the history of the nation.”⁵ Foundations were laid for scholarly historical work.

The historiography of the Enlightenment was challenged in the first half of the nineteenth century by Joachim Lelewel (1786–1861), the true father of Polish history as a discipline. He was a “rationalist in his scholarly scrutiny and precision and a Romantic in the creation of great historical syntheses”; Lelewel’s history, like that of Michelet, was “a hymn to freedom.”⁶ A democrat who engaged in politics—he was a member of the Polish government during the Uprising of 1830–1831—Lelewel above all was a scholar, indeed, a pioneer in such fields as bibliography, numismatics, diplomatics, and historical geography. He moved from ancient history into medieval and modern, from general into national, and wrote a comparative study of Poland and Spain. His erudition amazed his contemporaries.

Like his predecessors, Lelewel believed in the didactic function of history, and like them he looked to the Polish past for an answer to the phenomenon of partitions, which he regarded in a truly Romantic fashion as a violation of the laws of nature by tyrants.

In what may have been one of the earliest texts on methodology, Lelewel distinguished between criticism, etiology, and historiography. He preferred the people (*lud*) over rulers as the object of historical study, and he perceived state

⁴ “Prospectus of the History of the Polish Nation,” cited in Bernard Ziffer, *Poland: History and Historians* (New York, 1952), 19.

⁵ Cited in Andrzej Feliks Grabski, *Orientacje polskiej myśli historycznej* (Warsaw, 1972), 104. His more detailed study of the Enlightenment period is *Myśl historyczna polskiego Odrodzenia* (Warsaw, 1976).

⁶ Respectively, Helena Więckowska, *Joachim Lelewel* (Warsaw, 1980), 17; and Marian Henryk Serejski, *Joachim Lelewel et la science historique de son temps* (Wrocław, 1953), 15. Compare his *Joachim Lelewel 1786–1861: Sa vie et son oeuvre* (Warsaw, 1961); William J. Rose, “Lelewel as Historian,” *Slavonic Review*, 15 (1936); and Joan Skurnowicz, *Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism: Joachim Lelewel and the Polish National Idea* (Boulder, Colo., 1981).

history in terms of its constitutional evolution. Lelewel introduced a novel periodization into Polish history, breaking with one based on dynasties. The first period, which grew out of pre-Christian Slav origins (which he idealized as a Golden Age), he called *gminowładztwo*, i.e., popular rule or democracy. The early medieval period that followed represented the corruption of the first by feudalism, the church, and magnate rule. The third, lasting from the fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries, saw a democracy of the nobles, a new form of *gminowładztwo*. The fourth, lasting to the partitions, once again saw corruption (epitomized by the *liberum veto*) of the country by rulers, magnates, and Jesuits. The democratic system in the first and third periods was based essentially on a civic spirit characterized by freedom, equality, and brotherhood. During this time, Poland became a great state thanks to the development of "republican" institutions at home and the principle of voluntary unions (as with Lithuania) abroad. When this uniquely national spirit was abandoned, Poland's decline invariably followed.

Lelewel was convinced that this periodization was verifiable by sources, and indeed it has prevailed in Polish historiography in its essence to the present. More controversial was the republican interpretation based on the belief that the forces of democracy and liberty compensated for a weak central power. It was also questioned whether this form of democracy was a uniquely Polish phenomenon contrasting with the Western traditions.

Unlike most of his Enlightenment predecessors, Lelewel constructed a dynamic and basically optimistic model of the Polish historical process. The partitions he saw as interrupting a movement toward recovery and reform. Thus Poland could derive inspiration from its republican past and "revive when it will direct its forces sensibly."⁷

Lelewel's ideas were attacked by some of his contemporaries and translated by others into terms proclaiming Poland's messianic mission. A basic revision of Lelewel's historiography came, however, a decade or so after his death, the work of a group of historians called the Cracow School. Both it and the rival Warsaw School rose in the wake of the tragedy of the 1863 uprising against Russia and were affected in their ideas and methodology by the rising "scientific" or positivist historiography, by historicism, and the appearance of the German-type seminar.⁸ With sharpened tools of the discipline at their disposal, historians sought a deeper meaning in the historical process. Was history to be modeled on the natural sciences and governed by similar laws or was it a "book of revelations" (Thomas Carlyle) with the spirit realizing itself through the nation or state? These were questions of more than academic interest to Polish historians. Indeed, they were highly relevant in a political and national sense.

The Cracow and Warsaw schools, having rejected Romantic nationalism in the name of realism, undertook a reexamination of the past in accord with Ranke's precept "wie es eigentlich gewesen." Cracow historians were conservatives, and

⁷ Cited in Więckowska, *Lelewel*, 24.

⁸ See Marian Henryk Serejski, "L'Ecole historique de Cracovie et l'historiographie européenne," and Andrzej Feliks Grabski, "The Warsaw School of History," *Acta poloniae historica*, 26 (1972): 127-69.

the founders of the school were deeply religious. The Warsaw historians were mainly liberals imbued with positivist thinking.

The co-founder of the Cracow School, Józef Szujski (1835–1883), was one of the most outstanding Polish historians. Viewing the historical process from the position of philosophical idealism and a Catholic *Weltanschauung*, he stressed that change, not progress, constituted its essence. Not physical laws but “historical providence” explained long-range trends. Each nation lived its inner life (civilization) and external life (politics). In Poland’s case, the distorted political evolution—he largely blamed the Poles for the partitions—stemmed from a delayed civilizational start (*młodość cywilizacyjna*) as compared with the West. This dichotomy lent itself to misinterpretations when Szujski first praised the achievements of the Polish-Lithuanian union from the point of view of civilization and then criticized them on political grounds.⁹

Was Szujski essentially a pessimist? To understand his emphasis on the ills of the past, one has to understand the context of his writings. When he fulminated against “false history as the mistress of false politics” and rejected Lelewel’s view about the originality of native institutions, he did so because he believed that history should teach the Poles to “recover the political sense.”¹⁰ An opportunity for a political apprenticeship then presented itself, as Galicia entered a period of autonomy, and Szujski wanted history to inspire the Poles to exploit this chance. Indeed, the repolonization of education in Galicia, the establishment of the Academy of Arts and Sciences (*Akademia Umiejętności*), the creation of the first chairs of Polish history, the initiation of publication of sources, as well as the appearance in 1887 of the major historical review, *Kwartalnik historyczny*, heralded a tremendous change. Galicia became a Polish Piedmont.

The most influential synthesis of Polish history, however, which eclipsed Szujski’s own writings and came to epitomize the Cracow School, was the work of Michał Bobrzyński (1849–1935). It is still read and discussed today. Masterfully organized, powerfully argued, and filled with thought-provoking statements, this “Outline of Polish History” published in 1879 provided a pessimistic view of the past. Adapting Lelewel’s framework, Bobrzyński substituted the ideal of a well-ruled monarchic state for Polish republicanism and democracy, which he regarded as having failed to support political or social freedoms. The original Slav Golden Age had no basis in sources. Bobrzyński, to whom the development of state institutions was the essence of history, regarded Poland’s evolution as anomalous. The much-needed stage of strong monarchy was bypassed, and “we fell, because we believed ourselves to be above the laws governing mankind.”¹¹ According to Bobrzyński, Poland’s peripheral position explained why it was among the last European nations to be integrated into Western civilization.

Bobrzyński differed from the founders of the Cracow School in his methodology as well as in his rejection of the role of providence in history. He also questioned moral judgments: consequences and results and not conscience and

⁹ See Jerzy Maternicki, “Józef Szujski wobec tzw. idei jagiellońskiej,” *Historia XIX i XX wieku: Prace ofiarowane Henrykowi Jabłońskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin* (Wrocław, 1970), 41–55.

¹⁰ Cited in Serejski, *Historycy*, 1: 146.

¹¹ Michał Bobrzyński, *Dzieje Polski w zarysie* (1880–81; Warsaw, 1974), 34.

intentions were the proper object of historical criticism. A lawyer and politician (viceroy of Galicia after 1908), Bobrzyński was greatly concerned with the impact of historical writings on politics. He blamed Lelewel's Romantic school for the 1863 uprising and asserted that a synthesis based on "naked truth" ought to bring out not "a dreamy spirit of freedom, but the hard spirit of work, duty and sacrifice."¹²

Bobrzyński's book provoked heated controversies among Poles generally, not only professional historians, and stimulated the appearance of a series of major works, though no rival synthesis, by Warsaw scholars.¹³ Using a similar methodological approach, these historians set out to describe the great work of recovery accomplished prior to the partitions. To put all blame on the Poles was contrary to facts. In a major study of Polish historical schools, Władysław Smoleński (1851–1926) assailed the Cracow historians for using the fall of the Polish state "to illuminate earlier events and to color the vision of the farthest past with pessimism." Smoleński demanded that history be divorced from politics and that "the origins and the process of gathering moral strength which had guaranteed the life and the culture of the nation" be made the starting point of historical inquiry.¹⁴

The depressing view of Poland's past projected by the Cracow School called for a new approach transcending the accomplishments of the Warsaw scholars. The turn of the century, with its rising tide of neo-Romanticism, new political departures in the Polish lands, and the changing international situation, brought once again the issue of national independence to the fore. The great historical trilogy of the novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz was written to "lift up" Polish hearts.¹⁵ As for a new scholarly departure opposing the Cracow School and beginning a systematic study of the nineteenth century, this was largely the achievement of Szymon Askenazy (1866–1935) and the scholars grouped around him in Lvov (Lemberg).¹⁶ The "optimism" of this school did not stem from any general assumptions but rather from a comparative approach to Poland and Europe in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Following Albert Sorel's views on the revolutionary and Napoleonic period, Askenazy questioned the exceptional and unique nature of the partitions. Poland fell because it was more vulnerable than other countries, and one could not prove that it was incapable of recovery. Poland was neither the chosen one nor the outcast of Europe. Askenazy's standing should not eclipse the achievements of some of his colleagues, for instance Oswald Balzer (1858–1933), but his erudition and style in the Taine or Macaulay tradition set him apart. He was also the first Polish scholar to contribute to the *Cambridge Modern History*. His students belonged to various political groups but shared a common belief in "service to Poland's cause through the search for historical

¹² Cited in Serejski, *Historycy*, 2: 598–99.

¹³ One of the most important was Tadeusz Korzon, *Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski za czasów Stanisława Augusta*, 2d edn., 6 vols. (Cracow, 1897–98).

¹⁴ Cited in Grabski, *Orientacje*, 19.

¹⁵ The most recent English translations of the trilogy are: *With Fire and Sword*, *The Deluge*, *Fire in the Steppe*, W. S. Kunicki, trans. (New York, 1991–92). For a historical essay uncritically glorifying the Polish past, see Antoni Chołoniewski, *Duch dziejów Polski* (Cracow, 1917).

¹⁶ See Józef Dutkiewicz, *Szymon Askenazy i jego szkoła* (Warsaw, 1958).

truth.” Or, as another disciple of Askenazy put it, the school restored “the continuity between past and present Polish politics.”¹⁷

POLAND’S REBIRTH IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR I changed drastically the perspective from which historians viewed the national past. The partitions ceased to be the “end” of Polish history. In the words of Bobrzyński himself, all Polish historiography required revision, and “the new synthesis of our history must focus not on the question how and why we fell, but how we were emerging from the fall and with what resources of moral and physical strength . . . we turned to the building of the state.”¹⁸ It was the historian’s task, as another scholar affirmed a decade later, to explain this “unprecedented vitality of the nation.”¹⁹

The state-nation antinomy acquired a new political dimension when it corresponded to the division between the camps of Józef Piłsudski and of Roman Dmowski.²⁰ The raging dispute as to which of them played the decisive role in Poland’s rebirth had a clear political connotation. After Piłsudski established his dominance in 1926, the version stressing his role became generally accepted in textbooks.²¹ On the purely academic level, the scholars’ interest was directed at the nineteenth century and the international context of the Polish question. But even here, a certain link with contemporary politics existed, since the earlier armed uprisings could be and were seen from the perspective of the last successful military effort (*czyn zbrojny*) of Piłsudski and his legionaries in World War I.

Independent Poland created new conditions for the development of historical scholarship: five universities, new research institutes, initiation of the basic Polish biographical dictionary, publication of sources, and participation in international conferences. Interwar historiography could claim many achievements in numerous areas: medieval and modern history (Zygmunt Wojciechowski and the versatile Marcei Handelsman with a score of disciples), East European (Oskar Halecki), diplomatic and military (Józef Feldman, Waław Tokarz, Marian Kukiel), pre-partition Polish history (Władysław Konopczyński, Waław Sobieski), economic (Franciszek Bujak, Jan Rutkowski), constitutional (Stanisław Kutrzeba), and cultural (Aleksander Brückner, Stanisław Kot). The list is obviously far from being complete. Yet, for all the individual excellence and collective achievements, there were no startlingly new departures in methodology, and a projected ten-volume synthesis did not appear. A more popular history of Poland was published at home followed by a joint venture with foreign scholars that came out abroad during and after World War II.²²

¹⁷ Respectively, Marian Kukiel, “Przesilenie w historiografii krajowej,” *Teki historyczne*, 7 (1956–57): 21; and Michał Sokolnicki, cited in Grabski, *Orientacje*, 348.

¹⁸ Cited in Serejski, *Historycy*, 2: 597.

¹⁹ Józef Siemiński cited in Serejski, *Historycy*, 2: 30.

²⁰ See Andrzej Wierzbicki, *Naród-państwo w polskiej myśli historycznej dwudziestolecia międzywojennego* (Wrocław, 1978).

²¹ See Tadeusz Jędruszcak, “Spory o genezę II Rzeczypospolitej,” *Droga przez półwiecze: O Polsce 1918–1968* (Warsaw, 1969); and Janusz Żarnowski, “Odbudowa niepodległości w 1918 r. w historiografii polskiej ubiegłych lat sześćdziesięciu,” *Kwartalnik historyczny*, 85 (1978): 817–30.

²² Respectively, Aleksander Brückner, ed., *Polska: Jej dzieje i kultura od czasów najdawniejszych do chwili obecnej*, 3 vols. (Warsaw, 1927–32); and William F. Reddaway, ed., *Cambridge History of Poland*,

The only attempt at revisionism was undertaken in the mid-1930s by Olgierd Górka, who sought to debunk much of history as apologetic if not false. Górka followed the Cracow School in his pessimistic view of the partitions as caused by Poles themselves but took an optimistic view of Poland's rebirth, ascribing it to Polish efforts. However, his forays into areas that lay beyond his expertise helped to discredit his theses among fellow historians.²³

World War II, which started with Poland's military defeat and the occupation of the country by Nazi Germany and the USSR, and ended with the emergence of a Soviet-dominated Communist Polish state that was shifted geographically westward, was a traumatic experience for the Poles. Once again, the issue of the inability to preserve independence and the responsibility for the fall arose. Did these events, comparable to the partitions, the January 1863 uprising, or the reemergence of a Polish state in 1918, justify a new look at Poland's past? Was Marxist dialectical determinism to become the basis of a new revisionist methodology?

While these questions began to be hotly debated and demands were made that "realism," as practiced by the Cracow School, become the guiding light of historical revision, professional historians reacted cautiously.²⁴ Senior historian Władysław Konopczyński represented the views of many when he said that these were not sufficient reasons to break with pre-war Polish historiography. True, Poland's loss of the historic eastern borderlands and the acquisition of the formerly German territories necessitated a geographic-historical reorientation. Emphasis was to be placed on German-Polish relations and the medieval Polish (*Piast*) character of these "western lands." By contrast, the Jagiellonian period of Polish-Lithuanian union and eastward expansion was to be treated more critically and Slav unity stressed.²⁵ It was also recognized that social problems, particularly the history of the peasantry, demanded greater attention. All this was still within the bounds of scholarly discussion, as was the view of the diplomatic historian Henryk Wereszycki, who stressed the importance of what the Germans call "Primat der Aussenpolitik" in 1795, 1918, and 1939. Wereszycki also advanced the thesis that during the last two hundred years "Poland oscillated between freedom and unfreedom," which necessitated an emphasis on the study of the nation rather than of the state.²⁶

This plurality of views, which coincided with the 1945–1947 period of transition in politics, was clearly not going to be tolerated for long by the Communist regime. At the first postwar meeting of the Polish historians in 1948 in Wrocław,

2 vols. (Cambridge, 1941–50). See also Bronisław Dembiński, Oskar Halecki, and Marceł Handelsman, *L'historiographie polonaise du XIX^{ème} et XX^{ème} siècle* (Warsaw, 1937).

²³ See William J. Rose, "Realism in Polish History," and Oskar Halecki, "What Is Realism in Polish History?" in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 2 (October 1942): 235–49; and 3 (October 1943): 322–28. See also M. P. "Rozmowa z Prof. Górka," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, 45 (1978): 171–78.

²⁴ For debates, see Stanisław T. Bębenek, *Myślenie o przeszłości* (Warsaw, 1981); among iconoclastic writers were Adolf Bocheński and Ksawery Pruszyński.

²⁵ Book titles were symptomatic, for instance Zygmunt Wojciechowski, *Polska-Niemcy: Dziesięć wieków zmagania* (Poznań, 1945).

²⁶ The article and commentary are reprinted in Henryk Wereszycki, *Niewygasta przeszłość* (Cracow, 1987), 277–92; and Stefan Kieniewicz, *Historia a świadomość narodowa* (Warsaw, 1982), 23–33.

the Marxists, still a small minority, went on the offensive and denounced national history as full of lies.²⁷ "Recasting and rewriting of Polish history" was "central to the process of imposing and legitimizing Communist rule," according to a specialist on the subject.²⁸ With the Stalinist Soviet model declared as binding, Polish historiography became the object of crude manipulations and dictates.

At an encounter with Soviet colleagues in 1950, a group of Polish historians was lectured on the proper approach to the nation's past. The notorious Soviet text *Istoriia Pol'shi* was to indicate the way. The 1950 congress of Polish sciences condemned interwar historiography as "an ideological endorsement of the mad and criminal policies of Polish fascism."²⁹ The paper of Żanna Kormanowa, a Communist standard-bearer, presented the thesis "that there has been no historical science in Poland and that it was up to us to create one."³⁰ The first methodological conference in Otwock, which followed (December 1951–January 1952), witnessed the introduction of new directives and the denunciation of opponents. A novel periodization of Polish history determined by socioeconomic stages of evolution postulated a division into pre-feudal, feudal, capitalist, and socialist periods. The "second serfdom" became a central issue, and the partitions ceased to be a turning point. Interwar Poland did not deserve to be called independent because of its land-owning, bourgeois character and dependence on foreign capital.

The historian's task was to discover "progressive" trends and tendencies in the past that anticipated or spontaneously paved the way for Marxism. The purpose was to find in the past legitimating antecedents of Communist Poland. Those who "deviated" were denounced as guilty of "personalism," "psychologism," "moralism," "nationalism," or "factographism." Controversies were resolved by invoking the authority of the Marxist-Leninist classics. An example was made of Wereszycki's new book on Polish post-partition history, already earlier denounced by Kormanowa as exemplifying "cosmopolitanism closely linked with nationalism" and now withdrawn from circulation.³¹

The sovietization of Polish history proceeded on a broad front. Professional journals carried ideological admonitions and pointed out politically correct views. University and school textbooks were based on a somewhat crudely conceived dialectical determinism of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist type. History presented in terms of class struggle, oppression by rulers, magnates, and bourgeoisie, and social resistance lost much of its color and became depersonalized. Following the Soviet model, a Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) was established with numerous specialized institutes. It absorbed the old Cracow Academy and lesser independent institutions. Under the auspices of PAN, a multi-volume history of Poland

²⁷ They called for struggle against "feudal reservations in historiography," denounced the Cracow School and the "nationalist tendencies of interwar historiography, its enmity toward the Polish workers' movement [and] its anti-bolshevism." Cited in Grabski, *Orientacje*, 48.

²⁸ Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "The Rise and the Decline of Official Marxist Historiography in Poland, 1945–1983," *Slavic Review*, 44 (Winter 1985): 663. See also her "Soviet Impact on Polish Postwar Historiography," and "Sovietization and Liberalization of Polish Postwar Historiography," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 11 (January 1952): 372–96; and 19 (July 1959): 149–73.

²⁹ Cited in Grabski, *Orientacje*, 51.

³⁰ Witold Kula, "W sprawie naszej polityki naukowej," *Kwartalnik historyczny*, 63 (1956): 153.

³¹ See Kukiel, "Przesilenie," 2.

based on Marxist precepts began to be prepared. It proved a much longer and harder task than anticipated. The draft (*makieta*) of the first volume was not published until 1957, and by then conditions had changed.

The response and behavior of historians during this period varied. There were the ardent sovietizers (often opportunists) who were guilty of falsifications of history as well as demoralization, even corruption, of academic life. There were those who participated in the shaping of Polish historiography seeking to prevent its distortions and to protect endangered colleagues. The head of the Historical Institute at the Academy, Tadeusz Manteuffel, belonged to this category and retained personal integrity. Then there were those, probably in the majority, who paid lip service to the new dogmas and concentrated on research and writing in "safer" areas such as archaeology, ancient and medieval history, or history of art. But even in politically more sensitive fields, a minimal freedom of maneuver often existed. An example may be the work on Lelewel, whom the Communists sought to "marxify" and present as a precursor of their "progressive" trends without too much success.³² The general atmosphere of the big lie, however, was stifling, and the gap between "official" history and "historical consciousness" remained large. Certain historians like Wereszycki were virtually barred from the profession.

During the Stalinist period, the activity of those Polish historians who had remained as émigrés abroad was particularly important. Most of them had ties to three centers: the Sikorski Institute in London, the Piłsudski Institute and the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in New York, and the Rome-based Historical Institute linked to the Lanckoroński Foundation. Their respective periodicals, *Teki historyczne*, *Niepodległość*, and *Antemurale*, often served as correctives of the distorted image propagated by Marxist historiography at home. Some books in recent Polish history were particularly important in that respect.³³ Publications of sources were a major contribution of the Rome center (*Elementa ad Fontium Editiones*). As for monographic studies, mostly in English, they concentrated on diplomatic and comparative history easier to research abroad and on filling in gaps in Polish writing.

The high point of Marxist historiography was reached in 1953, but even two years later the rigid dogma of "objective laws in history" continued to be propagandized.³⁴ The Polish upheaval of October 1956, which brought the "national communist" Władysław Gomułka to power, also affected historical studies. The institutional framework, as Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier put it, "remained intact," but there was a "partial restoration of professional ethics at the university level."³⁵ In publications, the following rules prevailed: history written for historians was far less affected by the reigning dogmas than textbooks or works destined for the average reader; the more recent the period treated, the greater the interference of the censor; matters pertaining to Russia or the antecedents of the Communist movement were reserved for special treatment.

³² See Skurnowicz, "Lelewel in Polish Historiography in People's Poland," *Polish Review*, 36 (1991): 169–82.

³³ For instance, Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski 1864–1945*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1953–60).

³⁴ Adam Schaff, *Obiektywny charakter praw historii* (Warsaw, 1955).

³⁵ Valkenier, "Rise and the Decline of Official Marxist Historiography," 664.

This schizophrenic state of affairs was harming history as a discipline and the status of historians. Many of them continued to adhere to imposed terminology in order to avoid confrontations. Invoking precedents from the period of the partitions, when authors used self-censorship or agreed to cuts in order to have books published, they subscribed to the principle of the lesser evil.

Still, in the post-October atmosphere, the volume of the *makieta* of "History of Poland" in production became the object of scathing criticism by Wereszycki. Restored to the profession though barely tolerated by the establishment, Wereszycki attacked the "pessimism of false theses" as applied to the presentation of nineteenth-century Polish uprisings. Were achievements of historians of so little value that one had constantly to invoke the authority of Marx? Was any European nation able to regain its independence unaided by others? The volume he reviewed seemed to accept both these theses.³⁶ Largely thanks to Wereszycki's efforts, the uprisings were now "rehabilitated," and the false scheme according to which the masses had always to be progressive and patriotic and the gentry reactionary and unpatriotic was at least partially abandoned.

In the late 1950s and through the 1960s, an abundance of valuable studies and monographs contrasted with the slow-moving synthetic "History of Poland." A series titled "historical confrontations" began to appear that presented divergent views on different periods. A highly respectable "History of Poland" appeared in English, publication in the native tongue not being allowed.³⁷ Occasionally, a book succeeded in destroying a Marxist cliché; for instance, the concept of a "bourgeois nation" was challenged successfully by Tadeusz Łepkowski.³⁸

Late nineteenth and twentieth-century Polish history was still subject to constraints and falsifications that undermined the credibility of historians. In textbooks and broader studies, socioeconomic issues reigned supreme, dehumanizing a vision of the past and making history boring to the reader. This state of affairs helps explain the phenomenal success of Paweł Jasienica, an amateur historian who provided a vivid and brilliantly painted panorama of the Polish past.³⁹ The guardians of Marxist orthodoxy upbraided Jasienica for "heroistic personalism and optimism," criticism that only added to the popularity of his volumes.

The 1960s saw two developments exemplifying the close connection between politics and history. One of them was the celebration of a thousand years of Poland's history. But which event was to be celebrated: Christianization of the country or its statehood? The former would stress the Western heritage and Catholicism of which People's Poland was a negation. The latter would show an evolution of statehood with Communist Poland representing the culminating point.

The second development had to do with the initiative of the Polish church hierarchy to begin a German-Polish reconciliation. It took the form of an open

³⁶ See Wereszycki's articles reprinted in *Niewygasta*, 35–54, 249–76.

³⁷ Stefan Kieniewicz, gen. ed., *History of Poland* (Warsaw, 1988). The other contributors representing the cream of Polish historians were Aleksander Gieysztor, Janusz Tazbir, Emanuel M. Rostworowski and Henryk Wereszycki.

³⁸ Tadeusz Łepkowski, *Polska: Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu 1764–1870* (Warsaw, 1967).

³⁹ For English translations, see *Piast Poland* (Miami, 1985); *Jagiellonian Poland* (Miami, 1978); and *Commonwealth of Both Nations: The Silver Age* (New York, 1987).

letter to the German episcopate offering forgiveness and asking for the same. The Communists attacked the church for its lack of patriotism, a theme exploited by the rising “nationalist” trend in the party. It reached its nadir in March 1968 with attacks on students, intellectuals, and Jews. The repercussions in historiography were somewhat paradoxical and led to the “rehabilitation” of yet another period of history, namely the interwar years and non-Communist Polish strivings toward liberation during World War II.

The ground had been partly prepared by the writings of Colonel Zbigniew Żałoski, who tried to vindicate all Polish military efforts and heroes in the name of educational needs. In turn, it was decided that the state need not be studied only as a repressive instrument of class domination but could also be viewed as performing useful social functions. Similarly, the study of the workers’ movement could transcend party history, for the workers were a class of the *nation* and an inquiry into national consciousness on all levels was legitimate. Indeed, books appeared that were written in a more objective way about interwar Poland and social history. This evolution, however, did not reach the level of the synthetic “History of Poland,” whose draft, in Manteuffel’s words, read as if it were written by a foreigner “unsympathetic to Poland and unfamiliar with its problems.”⁴⁰

In the 1970s, challenges to prevailing taboos pursued different themes and approaches. A journalist dared to question, although obliquely, the Soviet role vis-à-vis Poland in 1939. A Marxist historian criticized the apologists of People’s Poland.⁴¹ Both books were withdrawn from circulation: a study of wartime Ukrainian-Polish relations never reached the bookshelves. Several books that did not directly defy the censorship had a profound political impact. A Catholic writer’s volume on the recalcitrant (“unbowed”) Polish intelligentsia of the late nineteenth century suggested analogies with the present. So did Tomasz Łubieński’s book titled *To Fight or Not to Fight?* which pondered the options of Poles under the partitioning powers.⁴² The much-neglected field of history of political thought (free from Marxist clichés) became greatly enriched by the works of Andrzej Walicki.⁴³

All these writings appeared after Gomułka’s fall in 1970 and his replacement as first secretary by Edward Gierek. The program of modernization by Gierek, pursued within the frame of the West-East détente, involved renewed efforts toward legitimization of the regime. Stressing continuity, Gierek underlined the importance of Poland’s reemergence in 1918 and ascribed it to the will of the nation. Party history as well as Soviet-Polish relations continued, however, to be taboo. This discrepancy could only result in growing criticism. A “flying university” was set up within the dissident movement to teach the forbidden subjects. The response of the regime was one of selective harassment. In 1976, demands

⁴⁰ Cited in Valkenier, “Rise and the Decline of Official Marxist Historiography,” 666.

⁴¹ Respectively, Leszek Moczulski, *Wojna polska* (Poznań, 1972); and Maria Turlejska, *Zapis pierwszej dekady 1945–1954* (Warsaw, 1972).

⁴² Bohdan Cywiński, *Rodowody niepokornych* (Warsaw, 1971); Tomasz Łubieński, *Bić się czy nie bić?* (Warsaw, 1978).

⁴³ To mention only two: *Filozofia a mesjanizm: Studia z dziejów filozofii i myśli społeczno-religijnej romantyzmu polskiego* (Warsaw, 1970); and *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought* (Oxford, 1975).

for history textbooks free of falsehoods were openly voiced, and on the eve of the birth of Solidarity, the Polish Historical Association (PTH) changed its bylaws, which had proclaimed Marxism to be the only method of historical scholarship.

The eighteen months of Solidarity represented the breaking down of all dams, historical orthodoxy included. The subsequent martial law only drove the new writings underground. They constituted the "second circulation" and included the first fully objective works on postwar Polish history.⁴⁴ Authors of tainted textbooks asked for their withdrawal, and new syntheses of twentieth-century Polish history were attempted, for instance that by Wojciech Roszkowski writing under the pseudonym of Andrzej Albert.

The collapse of Communism meant the end of interference with history writing, and it offered a challenge to the profession from both purely scholarly and educational viewpoints. The most pressing task was filling the "blank spots" (ignored or distorted events and developments) connected especially with Soviet-Polish relations.⁴⁵ Such burning issues as the Soviet invasion in 1939, mass deportations, the Katyn Forest Massacre and Moscow's policies toward the Warsaw uprising in 1944, the Polish October of 1956, and Solidarity claimed priority, largely on political and emotional grounds. But there were many pages in the long Russo-Polish relationship that needed to be written or rewritten, and the same could be said about some aspects of the German-Polish past.⁴⁶

POLITICAL PLURALISM IN POLAND has its counterpart in a divergence of historical approaches, and Polish historiography could, as in the past, be affected by domestic preoccupations and methodological trends in the profession. Which way will it go? One cannot exclude the possibility that the transitional character of socioeconomic-political reality with all its hardships may engender new "pessimistic" visions of the past on the model of the Cracow School. In other instances, the opposite may be true. The long-lasting Communist efforts to paint much of the twentieth century up to 1945 in black colors have provoked a reaction characterized by almost uncritical glorification of interwar Poland and its leading figures. Voices have already been heard warning against moving from one extreme to the other. Similarly, there is a tendency toward martyrology that could degenerate into national masochism. History should abandon its role as a substitute for politics, wrote Jan Kieniewicz, and "strengthen the intellect rather than fortify the heart."⁴⁷

It seems likely that there will be a continuing proliferation of fields of specialization and a variety of methodological approaches. The *Annales* school has long had its disciples, and the German *Gesellschaftsgeschichte* is influential. Perhaps

⁴⁴ For instance, Krystyna Kersten, *The Establishment of the Communist Rule in Poland 1943–1948* (Boulder, Colo., 1991), originally published in the clandestine "second circulation."

⁴⁵ See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Glasnost and Filling in the 'Blank Spots' in the History of Polish-Soviet Relations 1987–1990," *Polish Review*, 36 (1991): 247–67.

⁴⁶ See Wojciech Wrzesiński, "The Need to Look Anew at the Polish Programme for German Studies," *Polish Western Affairs*, 32 (1991): 183–93.

⁴⁷ For his and some other historians' views, see *Arka*, 29 (1990): 29–49. See also Andrzej Ajnenkiel, Janusz Kuczyński, and Andrzej Wohl, eds., *Sens historii Polski* (Warsaw, 1990).

less likely to attract a following is the Modernization School (which sees global evolution toward one goal) described by an American historian as a “unilineal, involuntarily Marxist American approach.”⁴⁸ Its heyday in America appears to have passed.

The leading, if not the only, Polish specialist in methodology, Jerzy Topolski, has been evolving in his writings from a sophisticated Marxist stance to a position that seeks to reconcile freedom of choice on the part of the individual and society with conditions that affect this choice and the element of chance.⁴⁹

Is a new synthesis of Polish history influenced by the two centuries of historical debates likely to appear in the near future? It is difficult to say, although there is great need for one that could incorporate the Lelewelian and Cracow School achievements. A safer prediction would concern the growth of psychohistory, microhistory, women's history, or studies of *mentalités*, as well as the exploration of other topics characteristic of many recent Western historical writings.

Among the many topics that could be addressed by present-day Polish historiography, one might single out two of particular importance from an educational standpoint that also reflect long-range political, ideological, and social concerns. They are multi-ethnic and regional histories. The first would explore more fully the coexistence of heterogeneous nationalities of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, its partitioned lands throughout the nineteenth century, and the interwar Polish Republic.⁵⁰

Demands for studies that would examine the interrelationship of Poles with other ethnic groups have been made since the mid-1920s but without much tangible result.⁵¹ The recent organization of Jewish studies at Warsaw and Cracow universities is encouraging in that respect, for life in an ethnically near-homogeneous Poland of today may not only promote ethnocentrism and parochialism but also distort the vision of the nature of the old *respublica*.

Polish historians have long recognized—from Szujski to Halecki, Wereszycki and Kieniewicz—the methodological and educational advantages of studying Polish history in conjunction with that of its neighbors, particularly Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians.⁵² Yet much remains to be done to show historical parallels and contrasts. A comparative study of the two multinational great powers in the region, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Polish-Lithuanian *respublica*, would be of great interest.

⁴⁸ Donald Treadgold cited in Peter Sugar, “Continuity and Change in Eastern European Authoritarianism: Autocracy, Fascism, Communism,” *East European Quarterly*, 18 (Spring 1984): 2.

⁴⁹ See his latest, *Wolność i przymus w tworzeniu historii* (Poznań, 1990).

⁵⁰ An attempt in this direction was my book *The Lands of Partitioned Poland 1772–1918* (Seattle, 1974), scheduled to appear in a Polish translation. See also Wojciech Wrzesiński, ed., *Polska myśl polityczna XIX i XX wieku*, vol. 6, *Między Polską etniczną a historyczną* (Wrocław, 1988); and Jerzy Tomaszewski, *Ojczyzna nie tylko Polaków* (Warsaw, 1985).

⁵¹ In 1923, Stanisław Zakrzewski wrote: “Our historiography generally devoted little attention to the history of non-Polish elements in the old Respublica . . . The history of the Jews in Poland is still ‘terra incognita’ and the same can be said about the history of the Germans in Poland . . . We were simply not interested in the story of the attitudes of the non-Polish peoples to the state”; cited in Serejski, *Historycy*, 2: 615.

⁵² For recent studies, see Jerzy Kłoczowski, *Europa słowiańska XIV–XV wieku* (Warsaw, 1984); and Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London, 1992). The latter book is being translated into Polish.

Over the last forty-five years, Polish historiography operated under a long shadow cast by the semi-totalitarian Communist regime. Under these conditions, historians accomplished a great deal, though often at the price of compromises or political-ideological concessions. Polish historians and the historical establishment face great challenges, as does the society at large. The contributions of Polish historiography over the last two hundred years, even if often known only to specialists, permit guarded optimism. One thing is certain, Polish historiography like Poland itself has returned to Europe; in a deeper sense, it had never left it.

Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia

JIŘÍ KOŘALKA

THE THIRTY MONTHS THAT HAVE PASSED since the political change in Czechoslovakia during November–December 1989 have been connected, among other developments, with new discussions about the usefulness and acceptability of the national conception of Czech history. In this article, I try to elucidate some historical roots and social circumstances of the new discussions, primarily among Czech historians. However, problems of this kind are relevant for other countries and nations of East Central and Southeastern Europe as well, because the national conceptions of history of two or three neighboring nations in this area tend to be incompatible.

During the nineteenth century, national conceptions of history were an inseparable part of the nation-building process all over Europe.¹ Small groups of intellectuals in multinational monarchies that had no support from the existing states of that time as well as long-established states of the Western world identified themselves as modern nations and projected this idea onto their past. National structures, interests, and feelings were declared to be more important than those of state and religion. In historical research, the nation appeared almost timeless, existing from hoary antiquity and acting as a collective personality.² The Czech nation was conceived of as an almost eternal category that had developed from its tribal origins to its historical culmination in the Hussite reformation and revolution of the fifteenth century, fallen asleep after the Thirty Years' War, reawakened and was then revived in the nineteenth century. The Czech national conception of history appropriated for the Czechs the glorious past of the medieval Kingdom of Bohemia and explained the ascension of the Habsburg dynasty to the Bohemian throne as ruinous for national interests.³ Furthermore, according to nineteenth-century national conceptions of history, a nation of one's own was supposed to be a bearer of the best human character, in contradiction to the negative qualities of its neighboring rivals. For example, the Czechs of the first half of the nineteenth century were depicted as a small people, progressive,

I wish to thank Cathleen M. Giustino for discussing this essay with me and for helping to correct my English.

¹ In the vast literature on nation-building and nationalism, my work has the greatest affinity with that of John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (New York, 1982). See my *Co je národ?* (Prague, 1969).

² Eugen Lemberg, *Nationalismus*, 2 vols. (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1964), 1: 115–16, 134–42.

³ See Joseph F. Zacek, *Palacký: The Historian as Scholar and Nationalist* (The Hague, 1970), 75–92.

naturally peaceful, but in defense heroic, in contrast to the allegedly belligerent Germans.⁴

From the mid-1880s until the 1930s, the leading group of Czech historians at the newly established Czech University in Prague, including Jaroslav Goll, Josef Pekař, Josef Šusta, and their disciples, were able to separate themselves from most of the national myths and legends. In a parallel direction, due to the rapid development of the Czech economy and of self-administration on the local level, it no longer appeared necessary to direct all Czech cultural activities toward national "awakening." Their scholarly journal, the *Český časopis historický* (Czech Journal of History), seems to have been more consistent in the struggle against the nationalism of their own culture than most of the historical periodicals of contemporary Central European neighbors.⁵ In the Czechoslovak Republic after 1918, Goll and his school were often criticized for having defended the idea of a supra-national Habsburg empire and for not having forcefully supported efforts for the full independence of Czechs and Slovaks even during most of World War I. Although in the first half of the twentieth century, left-wing opinions prevailed in Czech culture, particularly among writers, a considerable part of Czech historiography retained, until 1938–1939, its conservative nature.⁶ In the sphere of contemporary history alone, ideas and evaluations close to the official ideology of the Czechoslovak state were more influential.⁷

Between 1939 and 1945, as well as in the first years following World War II, Czech opposition and resistance to the German occupation of Czech lands was connected with a far-reaching regeneration of older romantic conceptions of Czech history, primarily in the general public. Among professional historians after World War II, for example in *Český časopis historický*, which resumed publication in 1946, the attempt of various Czech scholars to take up the heritage of Goll's school was evident, but the postwar nationalist wave proved to be stronger. The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 took advantage of the popular anti-German and pro-Russian Czech nationalism, but it established a rigid totalitarian regime of the Soviet type in a very short time. Its attitude was extremely hostile to bourgeois values, and the break in the continuities of Czech historical research and writing was more profound than in Poland or in Hungary. *Český časopis historický* ceased in 1949, and the new *Československý časopis historický* (Czechoslovak Journal of History) from 1953 onward denied any lineage with the traditions of its predecessor. Most of the non-Communist university teachers of history, above all in Prague, were forced out of their jobs.

⁴ Jiří Rak, "Das Stereotyp des Deutschen im tschechischen historischen Bewusstsein," *Oesterreichische Osthefte*, 31 (1989): 88–102.

⁵ See Jiří Kořalka, "Contemporary Austrian History in the Early Years of *Český časopis historický* (1894–1914)," Solomon Wank, Heindrun Maschl, Brigitte Mazohl-Wallnig, and Reinhold Wagnleitner, eds., *The Mirror of History: Essays in Honor of Fritz Fellner* (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1988), 91–113.

⁶ Monika Glettler, "Josef Pekař—Verurteilen oder verstehen?—'Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Vergangenheit,'" in Josef Pekař, *Tschechoslowakische Geschichte*, Monika Glettler, ed. (Benediktbeuern, 1988), 13–33.

⁷ Josef Anderle, "Major Contributions of Czechs and Slovaks to Austrian and Hungarian History, 1918–1945," *Austrian History Yearbook*, 6–7 (1970–71): 169–220. Compare Jan Kapras, Bohumil Němec, and František Soukup, eds., *Idea československého státu*, 2 vols. (Prague, 1936).

The official ideology of Czech historiography in the 1950s, as presented by Zdeněk Nejedlý, a musicologist and the first president of the Communist-led Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, was a peculiar mixture of old romantic nationalism and the theory of class struggle. Historical progress, according to this conception, resulted from the activities of the oppressed classes, of serfs and the urban poor in the Middle Ages and early modern times, and of the working class in the capitalist age. Ruling and wealthy classes were assumed to be reactionary. Communists were declared to be the only heirs of the progressive traditions of the Czech nation. The ostensible revival of radical nationalist conceptions of Czech history, which had been characteristic of the second half of the nineteenth century, was connected with a forced propagation of Russophilism, as well as with a drastic cut-off from the West. During the 1950s, the official Marxist historiography of all East Central European countries claimed to be internationalist, but the frontiers to the outside were effectively closed. The radical nationalist conceptions of the histories of the alleged brotherly socialist countries turned out to be incompatible with each other. To the extent that scholarship of lasting value was produced in this period, it was to be found largely in research on economic history and the early labor movements.⁸

The development of a modern Slovak historiography lagged for several decades because, until 1918, the Hungarian government did not tolerate any Slovak schools of higher education. In the Czechoslovak Republic, however, the first generation of Slovak professional historians was established by the late 1930s. Although some supported a Czechoslovak orientation, the most outspoken Slovak historians, such as Daniel Rapant, were successful in contesting the conception of a unified Czechoslovak history.⁹ In contrast to the German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, where all Czech universities were closed in November 1939 and the teaching of Czech history was forbidden even in Czech secondary schools, Slovak historiography was able to expand remarkably during World War II and to assert Slovak national identity against Magyar domination on the one hand and Czech on the other. Even under Communist pressure, which was attempting to force the young historical profession of Slovakia into conformity with the Czechoslovak idea, Slovak scholars were able to establish a firm organizational basis for their work, one that surpassed everything at the disposal of previous generations of Slovak historians. In 1953, a new *Historický časopis* (Historical Journal) in Bratislava, capital of Slovakia, came into existence beside the Czechoslovak (not Czech) periodical; research institutes of the Slovak Academy of Sciences were founded beside those of the Czechoslovak Academy; and surveys of Slovak history were written alongside official outlines of Czechoslovak (not Czech) history.¹⁰

⁸ Josef Kočí and Jiří Kořalka, "The History of the Habsburg Monarchy (1526–1918) in Czechoslovak Historiography since 1945," *Austrian History Yearbook*, 2 (1966): 198–223.

⁹ See Hans Lemberg, "Gibt es eine tschechoslowakische Geschichte? Versuche einer nationalen Geschichtsintegration," Hans Lemberg, Peter Nitsche, and Erwin Oberländer, eds., *Osteuropa in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Festschrift für Günther Stökl zum 60. Geburtstag* (Cologne, 1977), 376–91.

¹⁰ In more detail, Jiří Kořalka, "Probleme einer böhmischen, tschechischen oder tschechoslowakischen Geschichte," Herwig Wolfram and Walter Pohl, *Probleme der Geschichte Oesterreichs und ihrer Darstellung* (Vienna, 1991), 229–44.

From approximately 1963 onward, paralleling a gradual political thaw in Czechoslovakia, the atmosphere in many Czech research institutes and university departments of history began to change. A plurality of opinions and methods was no longer exceptional. Personal contacts between Czech historians and Western colleagues and institutions were resumed, particularly between historians in Prague and those of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany. On board a specially chartered boat on the Danube, about two hundred Czech and Slovak historians went to the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Vienna in August 1965. At various conferences and meetings of scholars abroad, historians from Czechoslovakia were a pleasant surprise, because of their obvious distance from dogmatic Marxism. In April 1966, the participation of Czech historians in a conference at Bloomington, Indiana, on the nationality problem in the Habsburg monarchy made a good impression on American specialists in that field.¹¹ Various reformed Communist groups acted as a driving force in the creative world of Czech historical research of the late 1960s, taking advantage of their privileged position in the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences and of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The most interesting topics of study pursued by these groups included reflections on the interdependence of Czech and Central European history, particularly the Czech-German problem, and investigations of the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia after 1945. Nevertheless, the public influence of older, pre-Communist historians, such as Jaroslav Werstadt and František Kutnar, also increased substantially.¹² Slovak historiography before 1969 was less differentiated and less open to the world than Czech historical research, but Slovak historians also participated in the revival, all the while being more concerned with problems of national identity and national emancipation.¹³

The activities and authority of Czech reformed Communists culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968. Several leading Czech historians took an active part in the political life of the country (a contrast to the situation during and after November 1989). Opinions considered heretical from the standpoint of rigid Marxism were developed by the Czechs in the history of labor and socialist movements, above all in that of the Communist International.¹⁴ In the sphere of methodology, the middle-aged generation of Czech historians, in most cases, did not return to pre-Communist approaches but was inspired more by contemporary social historians in France and West Germany. Headed by the leading Czech medievalist, František Graus, editor-in-chief of the *Československý časopis historický*, these scholars tried to develop a new conception of Czech history that did not deny the importance of ethnic and national factors but was decidedly anti-nationalistic in its outlook, primarily when considering the relation of the Czechs to their neighbors.

¹¹ See the *Austrian History Yearbook*, 3 (1967), 3 parts; esp. 1: 147–53; 2: 223–60.

¹² Ferdinand Seibt, "Bohemia: Probleme und Literatur seit 1945," *Historische Zeitschrift*, Sonderheft 4 (1970): 145, 150–52, 202. See also František Kutnar, *Přehledné dějiny českého a slovenského dějepisectví*, 2 vols. (Prague, 1973, 1977), 2: 282–84, 318, 327.

¹³ For the most stimulating book of this period, see L'ubomír Lipták, *Slovensko v 20. storočí* (Bratislava, 1968).

¹⁴ *Revue dějin socializmu* (Review of the History of Socialism), 8–9 (1968–69), issue 1 of 10 (1970), as a continuation of *Příspěvky k dějinám KSČ* (Contributions to the History of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), 1–7 (1961–67).

A volume of their essays included unusual interpretations of the Hussite period as a "distant past," of the so-called national awakening as activities of "patriots without a nation," and of Czech society before 1914 as a "nation without a state."¹⁵ Miroslav Hroch profoundly influenced international research on modern nation-building in Europe, using comparative methods and new theoretical constructions.¹⁶ Sober in tone and free of emotions, accounts appeared of the political and military activities of Czechs and Slovaks during World War I and those of Eduard Beneš on the eve of and in the first part of World War II.¹⁷

The military intervention by the Soviet Union and its allies in August 1968 brought disillusionment to those who dreamed of reformed Communism in Czechoslovakia and of a liberal Eurocommunism on an international scale. More than a year passed, however, before the suppression of independent research by Czech and Slovak historians in official institutions took place, beginning in the spring of 1970. The ensuing purge at the institutes of the Academy of Sciences and at the universities was, at least in Prague, even more thorough than that after February 1948 or than that in other countries of the Soviet bloc, except for the Soviet Union itself in the late 1930s. More than five hundred Czech historians were dismissed from their posts, most of them finding themselves under a publication ban that lasted ten, fifteen, or more years. Surprisingly few prominent Czech historians emigrated and established themselves at foreign universities, with the exception of František Graus at Giessen and Basel, and Bedřich Loewenstein and Michal Reiman at the Free University of Berlin. A small minority of dismissed historians found jobs in regional museums. Expelled members of the Communist Party were treated more harshly than non-Communists; as is usual in totalitarian organizations and systems, heretics who had previously belonged to the "chosen people" and then abandoned the faith were deemed to be more dangerous than heathens. Many of them had to seek employment as window-washers, stokers, streetcar and cab drivers, or bookkeepers. Once again, the social situation of Slovak reformist historians after 1969–1970 was better than that of their Prague colleagues. The Slovaks were fewer in number, and most of them remained professional historians, though in less lucrative jobs. Even in Brno, capital of Moravia, mutual support among historians of different political fortunes proved to be more effective than in Prague.

THE SO-CALLED COMMUNIST NORMALIZATION in Czechoslovakia during the 1970s and 1980s was successful only on the surface. In fact, it was impossible to reestablish conditions as they had existed in Czech historiography before 1968. Consequently, until the fundamental political changes in the country in Novem-

¹⁵ František Graus, ed., *Naše živá i mrtvá minulost: Osm esejí o českých dějinách* (Prague, 1968).

¹⁶ Miroslav Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas: Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen* (Prague, 1968). See also Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985).

¹⁷ Karel Pichlík, *Zahraniční odboj 1914–1918 bez legend* (Prague, 1968; 2d edn., 1991); Jan Křen, *Do emigrace: Západní zahraniční odboj 1938–1939* (Prague, 1963; 2d edn., 1969); Křen, *V emigraci: Západní zahraniční odboj 1939–1940* (Prague, 1969).

ber–December 1989, Czech historical research was split into three large groups or trends that developed almost separately and communicated with each other only rarely. They included official historiography, the dissident camp, and the middle zone.

Well-staffed research institutes of the Academy of Sciences and good publication facilities were at the disposal of a limited group of Czech historians who were acceptable to and supported by the official regime after 1969–1970. Substantial differences distinguished this group from an analogous group in the Czech historical community of the 1950s. They were definitely less numerous and less productive than their predecessors. The most important publications of the Academy of Sciences in the period of Communist normalization originated in the inspirational atmosphere of the late 1960s. The immense monograph by Jaroslav Purš on the idea and concept of the industrial revolution was finished in 1969.¹⁸ Two volumes of the *Outline of the History of Czechoslovakia*, published in 1980 and 1982, were written before the end of 1974 and reflected, in most chapters, the state of research and open-minded discussions during the preceding decade.¹⁹ For the first time since the classic textbooks of Josef Pekař,²⁰ the period between 1780 and 1848 was not described as the Czech national revival but rather was presented as a constituent part of the history of the Habsburg monarchy with special regard to the role of the Austrian state, Bohemian aristocratic patriotism, and Europe-wide nation-building processes, including the German and Czech national movements.²¹ An isolated attempt by Václav Král to revive Zdeněk Nejedlý's ideas and methods was not successful. Even in official Czech historiography after 1969–1970, there was no return to radical nationalist conceptions of Czech history.

The official leading group, as represented by Václav Král, Jaroslav Purš, and their followers, did not aim at producing new research results or new ideas but at preventing the appearance of anything that the political leadership of the Communist Party could regard as unseemly and detrimental. Václav Král blamed several Czech historians who had published some of their works abroad for having insinuated themselves into the favor of ideological enemies. The official group was afraid of Czech democratic traditions in politics and culture. Their members did not even wish to discuss problems of socialism and Marxism because of the omnipresent shadow of the reformist Prague Spring of 1968. Czechoslovakia was the only country in the Soviet bloc in which a special journal dedicated to the history of the labor movement was closed down in the beginning of 1970 and was not reestablished. The official journal *Československý časopis historický* yielded to political and ideological pressures with great readiness. In no other historical periodical in the country was the share of biased political writings so high in comparison with contributions of substantive scholarship. Bias was

¹⁸ Jaroslav Purš, *Prumyslová revoluce: Vývoj pojmu a koncepce* (Prague, 1973). See also Purš, "Complex Revolution of Modern Age and Industrial Revolution," *Historica*, 19 (1979): 135–70.

¹⁹ Jaroslav Purš and Miroslav Kropilák, eds., *Přehled dějin Československa*, 2 vols. (Prague, 1980–82).

²⁰ See Hans Lemberg, "Ein Geschichtsbuch unter drei Staatssystemen: Josef Pekařs Oberklassenlehrbuch von 1914–1945," Hans Lemberg and Ferdinand Seibt, eds., *Deutsch-tschechische Beziehungen in der Schulliteratur und im populären Geschichtsbild* (Brunswick, 1980), 78–88.

²¹ Purš and Kropilák, eds., *Přehled*, 1.2: 457–66, 500–13, 528–31.

particularly obvious in the book reviews and commentaries, in which the editors deleted any uncommon or stimulating thought. The most important books and discussions in historical scholarship outside Czechoslovakia were neglected, whereas the few Czech books that did slip by the so-called normalization guards after 1970 came in for sharp criticism on political grounds.²²

It would, however, be unfair to ignore a number of solid works of historical scholarship on modern history that were produced at Czech universities and in Czech research institutes between 1970 and 1989. As a rule, they were written by individuals who were merely tolerated in official institutions. Miroslav Hroch and Josef Petrů of Charles University in Prague, working together, entered into an international discussion on early modern Central Europe, while as teachers and tutors, they inspired relatively broad research on problems of modern historical consciousness and culture.²³ In the sphere of historical demography, Pavla Horská published several substantive articles and essays that were favorably received by specialists in West European countries.²⁴ Investigations by Vlastislav Lacina into Czech economic development and policy before and after 1918, similar to Zdeněk Deyl's research on Czechoslovak social legislation between the two world wars, were based on a vast knowledge of published and unpublished sources.²⁵ In Opava, the Silesian Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences became a recognized center of research in the history of industrial regions, including the social consequences of industrialization.²⁶ Czech ethnologists achieved remarkable results in the study of everyday life in the Czech lands during the modern period, especially regarding the way of life and culture of the working population of Prague.²⁷ The University of Brno was successful in promoting research on the history of various Czech political parties, predominantly in Moravia.²⁸ As for Bohemia, Jan Galandauer's two-volume biography of the Czech Social Democratic and Communist leader Bohumír Šmeral greatly surpassed in scholarly quality previous writings of Czech Communist historiography in this field.²⁹ Among legal publishing houses before November 1989, the

²² See *Československý časopis historický*, 27 (1979): 907–15 (against František Kutnar); 28 (1980): 442–46 (against Otto Urban); 33 (1985): 101–05 (against Jan P. Kučera and Jiří Rak).

²³ Miroslav Hroch and Josef Petrů, *Das 17. Jahrhundert—Krise der feudalen Gesellschaft?* (Hamburg, 1981). See also Hroch, ed., *Úloha historického povědomí v evropském národním hnutí v 19. století* (Prague, 1986).

²⁴ Pavla Horská, "Population de fait et population de droit dans les recensements autrichiens de la première moitié du XIX^e siècle," *Annales de démographie historique* (Paris, 1971), 85–89; Horská, "Statistiques autrichiennes de la fin du 19^e siècle: Source pour l'étude réciproque de l'évolution sociale et démographique," *Historická demografie*, 7 (1974): 99–135; Horská, "Urbanizace v českých zemích v letech 1879–1914," *Československý časopis historický*, 27 (1979): 704–29.

²⁵ Vlastislav Lacina, "Hospodářská politika české buržoazie a vznik Československé republiky," *Československý časopis historický*, 32 (1984): 668–92; Lacina, *Velká hospodářská krize v Československu 1929–1934* (Prague, 1984); Zdeněk Deyl, "Von der Sozialversicherung zur Volksversicherung in der Tschechoslowakei," *Historica*, 21 (1982): 63–104; Deyl, *Sociální vývoj Československa 1918–1938* (Prague, 1984).

²⁶ Dan Gawrecki, et al., *Prumyslové oblasti českých zemí za kapitalismu*, Vol. 1: 1780–1918 (Opava, 1987); and many articles in the journal *Slezský sborník*.

²⁷ Antonín Robek, Mirjam Moravcová, and Jarmila Štátná, eds., *Stará dělnická Praha: Život a kultura pražských dělníků 1848–1939* (Prague, 1981).

²⁸ Jiří Malíř, *Vývoj liberálního proudu české politiky na Moravě: Lidová strana na Moravě do roku 1909* (Brno, 1985); and many articles in the journal *Časopis Matice moravské*.

²⁹ Jan Galandauer, *Bohumír Šmeral*, 2 vols. (Prague, 1981–86).

Prague firm Melantrich acquired a prominent place by supporting solid research in modern history and its popularization, publishing several dozen volumes in a large series of historical biographies as well as special illustrated issues with attractive historical themes.³⁰

At the opposite pole, the activities of the dissident group "Charter 77" fostered an admirable rise of Czech independent historiography. Persecuted reformed Communists came together with liberal Protestants, Catholics, and free-thinkers, and a conservative pro-Habsburg group even sprang up around the review *Střední Evropa* (Central Europe). Dissident Czech historians demonstrated a high degree of political and national responsibility. In very straitened circumstances, not infrequently in a laborer's trailer far away from study rooms in archives and libraries, they discussed the key problems of their common past. The old nationalism was absolutely alien and repellent to most of them. Some dissidents were not far from national iconoclasm when attributing negative qualities to their own national background rather than to that of their neighbors. The relations between Czechs and Germans during the last two centuries, which culminated in the expulsion and transfer of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia immediately after World War II, were examined in the writings of Czech unofficial historiography without respect to old taboos and ingrained prejudices.³¹ Their disputes interested a large public in Czechoslovakia and Germany, not just the community of specialists in modern history.

The results of research and reflection in the relatively closed circle of Czech independent historiography are contained in twenty-six typed or mimeographed volumes of the journal *Historické studie* (Historical Studies) from the years 1978–1989 and in special volumes of the *Knižnice Historických studií* (Library of Historical Studies) after 1985. Since the political changes in November–December 1989, parts of both these samizdat publications have been printed in book editions.³² The majority of the articles in these volumes concern modern and contemporary history after 1918 and focus on persons and events that had or could have political significance for people living today. Alongside the Czech-German problem, there appeared, among other things, historical evaluations of the Czechoslovak political system and the foreign policy of the interwar period, and examinations of Czech non-Communist resistance and the cultural development of Czech society under German occupation during World War II. Political history was given clear priority over new methodological approaches like those current in social history in the West. On the occasion of three international congresses of historians—in San Francisco (1975), Bucharest (1980), and Stuttgart (1985)—English translations of a series of articles from samizdat journals were prepared and published in a modest form with the help of foreign friends.³³

³⁰ *Slovo k historii* (A Word to History), 1 (1985), four or five issues a year.

³¹ As a summary of three samizdat volumes, see Bohumil Černý, Jan Křen, Václav Kural, and Milan Otáhal, eds., *Češi, Němci, odsun: Diskuse nezávislých historiků* (Prague, 1990).

³² Essays by Jaroslav Mezník, Josef Hanzal, Milan Otáhal, Jan Křen, and Jiří Doležal reprinted in *Sborník historický*, 37 (1990). See also Bohumil Černý, "Kurzanzeigen," *Bohemia*, 29 (1988): 481–500 (summaries of sixty-nine articles from *Historické studie*).

³³ *Acta Persecutionis* (San Francisco, 1975); *Acta Creationis* (Bucharest, 1980); *Independent Historiography in Czechoslovakia*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1985).

Often, provocative reflections on the place of Czechs and Czechoslovakia in Central Europe and in Europe as a whole, in addition to considerations about the meaning of Czech history, characterize the most valuable contributions of the Czech dissident historiography of the 1980s.³⁴ In this discussion, independent philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, and writers participated alongside historians.

Between the two extreme ends of the Czech historiographic spectrum, a small space opened for historians who, in contrast to the carefully watched scholars of central institutions, were not subject to immediate ideological and political pressure. Not all historians expelled from universities and the research institutes of the Academy of Sciences were deprived of the possibility to pursue scholarly work as a career. Restrictions and prohibitions took a variety of forms and created a variety of hardships. Among these were both temporary and long-term prohibitions on teaching and publishing in central publishing houses and journals. In some cases, however, these restrictions did not apply to regions outside Prague. In fact, after 1970, a remarkable decentralization of Czech historical research occurred. New historical journals and occasional publications were created that remained of peripheral interest to the official sites of historical research located in Prague. Examples include *Husitský Tábor* (Hussite Tabor) published in Tábor, *Studia Comeniana et historica* (Comenius and Historical Studies) in Uherský Brod, *Ústecký sborník historický* (The Ústí Yearbook of History) in Ústí nad Labem in northern Bohemia, *Minulostí Západočeského kraje* (The West Bohemian Past) in Plzeň, *Acta Universitatis Carolinae—Historia Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis* in Prague, and from the mid-1980s the venerable *Časopis Matice moravské* (Journal of the Moravian Foundation) in Brno as well. These periodicals present important contributions by prestigious historians who were not allowed to publish in the official *Československý časopis historický* or in the publishing house of the Academy of Sciences.

Thus a middle zone, the “gray zone” of Czech historical research, appeared between the official and the dissident currents, particularly following the proclamation of “Charter 77” in January 1977. This zone allowed relatively propitious conditions for historical research, even when the fruits of the work had to sit a long time before being published or were dispersed as specialized articles outside Prague or in foreign countries. Before 1989, historians from the middle zone could not completely avoid cooperation with the political authorities, especially outside Prague, where few career historians worked, although this cooperation did not have a decisive influence on their scholarly work. None of them had the least intention of resurrecting the radical nationalist conception of Czech history, and the attempts by Václav Král to promote such a revival encountered general criticism.

Otto Urban, one of the best-known representatives of the middle zone of Czech historians before 1989, remained at the history department of Charles University in Prague, even though he was not allowed to advance to the position of docent

³⁴ See Jan Křen, “Historische Wandlungen des Tschechentums,” in Hans-Peter Burmeister, Frank Boldt, and György Mészáros, eds., *Mitteleuropa, Traum oder Trauma? Ueberlegungen zum Selbstbild einer Region* (Bremen, 1988), 191–232.

or professor or, at first, even to lecture. As a result of the rivalry between various groups within the official circle of Czech historiography, Urban managed from 1978 on to publish in Prague several well-balanced books concentrating on macrostructures and political history.³⁵ In the relatively peripheralized archives of Charles University, Jan Havránek continued his previous studies in historical demography and the history of education but, above all, remained an important resource for foreign students and researchers in Czech history. In contrast to official historians, Havránek readily provided foreigners with help and advice in their work.³⁶ František Kutnar culminated his lifework with a profound two-volume history of Czech and Slovak historiography.³⁷ Under Kutnar's presidency, the *Historický klub* (Historians' Club) in Prague continued to act as a meeting place of scholars outside the official institutions, although it was temporarily interrupted in the mid-1980s.

Three well-attended conferences dealing with problems of the Hussite reformation and revolution of the fifteenth century were organized by the Hussite Museum at Tábor in 1978, 1980, and 1983. They did not concentrate merely on medieval history but also provided a good opportunity for the free exchange of opinions about historical traditions and about the conscious use and misuse of history in public life.³⁸ From 1981 onward, an interdisciplinary symposium on Czech history and culture of the nineteenth century took place in Plzeň every year in March, on the anniversary of the birth of the composer Bedřich Smetana. Stimulating reports and discussions from the Plzeň meetings were alternately published by the National Gallery and by the Institute for Theory and History of Art in Prague.³⁹ The animated and efficient scholarly atmosphere that prevailed at the symposia in Tábor and Plzeň would have been unimaginable at the official institutions in Prague at that time, and historians under official supervision were not allowed to participate. In the 1980s, the ideological pressure against the gray zone in Czech historical research ceased to be as effective as it had been immediately after 1969–1970.

In the unique conditions of the middle zone, a vigorous group of young Czech historians asserted themselves, initially at conferences and in periodicals outside Prague. Jiří Rak, Petr Čornej, Zdeněk Hojda, Jiří Pešek, and some other historians in their thirties rejected any intellectual association with not only the sterile official circle that had assumed the dominant position after 1969–1970 but

³⁵ Otto Urban, *Kapitalismus a česká společnost: K otázkám formování české společnosti v 19. století* (Prague, 1978); Urban, *Česká společnost 1848–1918* (Prague, 1982); Urban, *Vzpomínka na Hradec Králové: Drama roku 1866* (Prague, 1986).

³⁶ See Hans Lemberg, Karel Litsch, Richard Georg Plaschka, and György Ránki, eds., *Bildungsgeschichte, Bevölkerungsgeschichte, Gesellschaftsgeschichte in den böhmischen Ländern und in Europa: Festschrift für Jan Havránek zum 60. Geburtstag* (Vienna, 1988), xi–xviii.

³⁷ František Kutnar, *Přehledné dějiny českého a slovenského dějepiscetví*, 2 vols. (Prague, 1973–77).

³⁸ "Husitský Tábor v českých dějinách," *Husitský Tábor*, 2 (1979): 5–148; "Idea míru a internacionální spolupráce v husitství," *Husitský Tábor*, 4 (1981): 7–275; "III. husitologické sympozium," *Husitský Tábor*, 8 (1985): 7–301; 10 (1988–1991): 17–120.

³⁹ *Historické vědomí v českém umění 19. století* (Prague, 1981); *Město v české kultuře 19. století* (Prague, 1983); *Divadlo v české kultuře 19. století* (Prague, 1985); *Povědomí tradice v novodobé české kultuře: Doba Bedřicha Smetany* (Prague, 1988); *Průmysl a technika v novodobé české kultuře* (Prague, 1988); *Člověk a příroda v novodobé české kultuře* (Prague, 1989); *Proudý české umělecké tvorby 19. století: Sen a ideál* (Prague, 1990); *Proudý české umělecké tvorby 19. století: Smích v umění* (Prague, 1991).

also the Marxist generation of the 1950s. They tried to follow up on and develop the best results of Czech pre-Marxist research before 1948 while maintaining a critical distance from it. At the same time, they were strongly influenced by methodological innovations in Polish historiography. It must be recognized that the young generation of Czech historians participated prominently in the animated exchange of opinions before 1989, particularly in the *Husitský Tábor*. Their unusual approach to the study of the Czech linguistic and literary revival in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, to the Bohemian medieval chronicles and their reception in modern times, or to the stereotyped picture of Germans in Czech historical thought of the nineteenth century was warmly received by many readers, not only historians.⁴⁰ From the University of Prague, where for almost fifteen years Václav Král guided the education of students, some young historians of questionable quality continued to graduate, but scarcely any would admit to having been Král's disciple. Radical nationalist conceptions of Czech history were by no means attractive to the new generation of Czech historians.

In contrast to the turbulent situation in Czech historical research, the development of Slovak historiography in the 1970s and 1980s enjoyed greater continuity. Political intervention in Bratislava was less destructive than in Prague. Research institutes of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, the history departments of universities, the *Historický časopis*, and the Slovak Historical Society continued to function without disturbing interference. Furthermore, the few dissidents among Slovak historians did not establish a specific group, although some of them participated in the Prague dissent. In general, Slovak historians before 1989 were able to produce more impressive collective works than were Czech historians in official institutions of that time. Czech official historiography contributed nothing analogous to the multi-volume *Dejiny Slovenska* (A History of Slovakia) or the *Slovenský biografický slovník* (Slovak Biographical Dictionary). In Slovak historical journals, critical reviews of works by Václav Král appeared, and discussions about crucial problems of modern Slovak history were not exceptional. In Slovakia more than in the Czech lands, self-assertion of national identity appeared as an urgent task.

FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CHANGES in Czechoslovakia in November–December 1989 did not cause any distinguishable break in research and reflections on modern Czech history. Nevertheless, the obstacles blocking publication of historical research by former dissidents and by scholars in the middle zone were removed. The fate of five syntheses on Czech history in the nineteenth century prepared during the last two decades and published between 1982 and 1992 demonstrate this point. The authors of these works dissociated themselves from traditional Czech nationalism and with their approaches caused a great stir among Czech intellectuals.

⁴⁰ Vladimír Macura, *Znamení zrodu: České obrození jako kulturní typ* (Prague, 1983); Petr Čornej, *Tajemství českých kronik: Cesty ke kořenům husitské tradice* (Prague, 1987); Rak, "Das Stereotyp des Deutschen."

Otto Urban's substantive work on Czech society from 1848 to 1918 is a very readable and comprehensive history of Czech political development during the last seventy years of the Habsburg monarchy.⁴¹ It is the only one of the five books that was issued by a Prague publishing house before 1989. Urban's study was unfavorably received in the official circles of the Academy of Sciences, but its qualities were duly appreciated outside official institutions. In 1990, it was awarded the Anton Gindely Prize in Vienna, and it is now being translated into German. Urban also published a useful textbook that attempts to present in parallel the historical development of Czechs and Slovaks until 1918.⁴²

Jan Křen entered the discussion with a stimulating book on the "conflictual community" of Czechs and Germans in the Czech lands from the late eighteenth century to the end of World War I. This work, written between 1974 and 1986, was published first in 1986 in a samizdat edition in Prague, in 1989 in book form by Sixty-Eight Publishers of Toronto, and in 1990 by the publishing house Academia in Prague. The modern political developments in Bohemia and Moravia are reflected by Křen in the broader circumstances of Central Europe as a historical community of non-German populations with the Germans. Opposed to the widespread exaggeration of the conflicts involved, he prefers to accentuate elements of compromise, tolerance, and mutual accommodation in the common history of Czechs and Germans.⁴³ A German translation of Křen's book has been announced by the Collegium Carolinum in Munich.

Three authors with a single pen-name, "Podiven" (One Who Wonders)—Petr Příhoda, a psychiatrist, Petr Pithart, a jurist and political scientist, and Milan Otáhal, a modern historian—worked together on a critical survey of the Czech past from the Baroque period until the eve of World War II. Their manuscript incorporated several "iconoclastic" articles, previously published in the exile quarterly *Svědectví* (Testimony) on the faults and mistakes made by Czech cultural and political leaders of the nineteenth century. Written during the fifteen years before November 1989, and originally intended for a samizdat edition, it was published in Prague without any changes in December 1991.⁴⁴

In the same month, the Austrian Institute of Eastern and Southeastern Europe brought to the international book market in a joint publishing project by two presses, one in Vienna and the other in Munich, my book in German on the social circumstances of Czech nation-building and the nationality problem in the Czech lands within the broader context of the Austrian empire and of Europe between 1815 and 1914.⁴⁵ This study systematizes the results of my research and widely dispersed articles published since 1980.

In June 1992, an assertive group of middle-aged Czech historians published a two-volume *History of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown*, which looks to be the most

⁴¹ Urban, *Česká společnost 1848–1918*.

⁴² Otto Urban, *České a slovenské dějiny do roku 1918* (Prague, 1991).

⁴³ Jan Křen, *Konfliktní společenství: Češi a Němci 1780–1918* (Prague, 1990). See also Křen, *Bílá místa v našich dějinách?* (Prague, 1990).

⁴⁴ Podiven [pseud.], *Češi v dějinách nové doby: Pokus o zrcadlo* (Prague, 1991).

⁴⁵ Jiří Kořálka, *Tschechen im Habsburgerreich und in Europa 1815–1914: Sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge der neuzeitlichen Nationsbildung und der Nationalitätenfrage in den böhmischen Ländern* (Vienna, 1991).

engaging and well-informed survey of Czech history to date. The chapters on the long nineteenth century written by Pavel Bělina, Jiří Rak, and Jiří Pokorný are distinguished by a fair treatment of the Austrian state as well as of the German and Jewish communities in the Czech lands.⁴⁶

Opinions in the contemporary discussions of Czech historians about problems of nation and nationalism in the nineteenth century vary sharply from the traditional national conception of history. First of all, ethnic and national structures are considered strictly as historical phenomena, which have their own origin, changeable developments, and transformations. The Czech national society of the twentieth century did not arise simply from the ethnic background of unprivileged rural and urban populations or from the conscious activities of a small group of patriotic intellectuals. There were, during the entire nineteenth century, other important structures and relations present in the Czech lands. An Austrian consciousness characterized by loyalty to the emperor and to the supra-ethnic Habsburg monarchy influenced a significant part of the Czech-speaking population by means of schooling, religious services, and the army. National structures and the Czech-German ethnic conflict did not monopolize the spectrum of political and cultural life in Bohemia and Moravia. Daily life on the Czech-German linguistic frontier was for the most part not conflictual, and there were many interethnic marriages and changes of identity. Ethnic and cultural assimilation progressed from both sides and must not be evaluated in terms of national fidelity or treason. For a long time, local and regional ties appeared to be very influential. In contemporary Czech historical research, much more attention is paid to the social role of the Bohemian and Moravian aristocracy and to the Jews, who were, in most cases, not directly engaged in interethnic rivalries. Partly, they remained between the front lines; partly, they accommodated modern Czech society. Still, only a few of them identified themselves as Czechs.

A second difference is the conviction of contemporary Czech historians that the limited outlook of a national conception of history can be surmounted merely by the inclusion of the history of the Czech lands into the general political, economic, social, and cultural history of Central Europe. It is, for example, impossible to understand Czech political developments in 1848–1849 without referring to the German revolution. The readiness of the German National Assembly in Frankfurt to make concessions to non-Germans in Austria (within the German Confederation) went no further than granting some cultural autonomy to the non-German ethnic groups in regions where they lived. Politically, however, the German revolution considered the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovenes in the Alpine regions, and the Italians in Trentino and Trieste as German citizens with equal civil rights, that is, as Germans in the political sense. The awareness of the broader Central European context in which Czech history is situated has brought about an enriched understanding of majority and minority relations, an understanding based on geopolitical considerations. The Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia appeared to be an ethnic minority in a Greater Germany or in a German-dominated Austrian state (without

⁴⁶ Petr Čornej, Pavel Bělina, and Jiří Pokorný, eds., *Dějiny země Koruny české*, 2 vols. (Prague, 1992).

Hungary, Galicia, and Dalmatia). Any independent or autonomous status of the Kingdom of Bohemia or of the three provinces of the Bohemian crown (that is, Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia) would on the other hand place the Czechs in a majority position, and the Germans of the Czech lands would become a minority. Again, in an autonomous, separate area of German Bohemia (*Deutschböhmen*), the Germans would be able to preserve an undisputed majority position against growing Czech ethnic minorities there. Such a differentiated geopolitical approach to the problem of majorities and minorities is less biased than the previous one-sided conceptions.

A third difference is that modern Czech historians in the last twenty-five years resolutely abandoned one of the key affirmations of the traditional national conception of Czech history, which declared the multi-ethnic Habsburg monarchy to be a "prison of nations." The new view contends that, after the failure to build a homogeneous society under German domination in the Austrian empire (an idea lost on the battlefields of 1859 and 1866), the Austrian state afforded much better conditions for a multiple rise of non-dominant ethnic groups than elsewhere in Europe. Czech society could take advantage, to a large extent, of the economic, socio-political, and cultural facilities of the multi-ethnic state, without having to assume responsibility for this state. An efficient communal and regional self-administration was capable of defending the particular interests of Czech society and its elites. Moreover, the Czechs achieved a near-complete capitalist social structure and a modern system of political parties that survived, without great changes, until the suppression of the parliamentary regime of the Czechoslovak Republic in the autumn of 1938. Although the fundamental antagonism between a dynamic national society and the anti-federalist powers in Austria-Hungary hampered a durable solution, the way to reform remained open until the international crisis of 1914.

IN CONCLUSION, two and a half years after the great political changes in Czechoslovakia, research in modern history has seen the free publication of opinions that before 1989 circulated only among dissidents and their friends or were printed abroad. However, political history and macrostructural approaches are still given preference over new research methods. Most active Czech historians, be they from the previous middle zone, from the dissidents, or from the former young generation, suffer from the many demands on their time and expertise. Public interest in modern history is high, and historians are expected to write for newspapers and cultural reviews, and they often speak on the radio and television. Even though no Czech historians have taken top government positions like their Hungarian colleagues, they participate in governmental commissions and advisory bodies. Much time is spent in negotiations concerning the reorganization of universities and the Academy of Sciences. The number of new students in history is multiplying faster than before 1989, and the teaching load of the better university historians is often burdensome. In comparison with the privileged institutes of the Communist era, financial means for research in the

social sciences are more limited, and the newly introduced system of short-term grants from the government does not favor basic research projects.

Nevertheless, the recent political changes have exerted a positive influence on historians of Czechoslovakia. No one who had not experienced the totalitarian restrictions on travel can imagine the value of free contacts with foreign countries for a scholar. For the first time in more than fifty years since 1938–1939, all Czech historians can feel themselves unrestrained in their international engagement, limited only by their insufficient knowledge of foreign languages and lack of finances. Political pressure, which had precluded the exploration of many historical topics or, at the very least, prompted extensive self-censorship, was terminated. Regarding the future development of Czech historical research, a continuation of the widespread decentralization begun after 1969–1970 looks hopeful. The Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Prague, headed by František Šmahel, has dropped previous unrealistic claims to dictate or even to coordinate historical research in the country. It has found a new role, besides editing the *Český časopis historický*, in serving the community of historians through the publication of bibliographies, biographical dictionaries, and other manuals. Along with the venerable universities at Prague, Brno, and Olomouc, new teaching and research facilities in history have been established at Ústí nad Labem, Plzeň, České Budějovice, Ostrava, and Opava. Most promising seems to be a number of young Czech historians who were trained at universities outside Czechoslovakia. For them, as well as for some other scholars, a return to a purely national conception of history seems to be out of the question.

Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Hungary

ISTVÁN DEÁK

IN HUNGARY, HISTORIANS HAVE OFTEN MADE HISTORY, and it is no accident that, at the moment these lines are being written, the prime minister, the foreign minister, the minister of defense, three deputy ministers, the president of the parliament, and a good many deputies of newly democratic Hungary are all professional historians.

The public's preoccupation with the past and its acceptance of the historian as politician have often led to the relative neglect of other more pragmatic fields of research. In the age of Enlightenment, when British and French economists and political philosophers stirred up society with their discourses on power, government, and the production and distribution of goods, Hungary's lone political economist, Gergely Berzeviczy (1763–1822), had scant influence. True, during the subsequent age of reform, roughly between 1825 and 1848, economics became a major public concern. The most influential book of the period was called "Credit" and was written by Count István Széchenyi (1791–1860), the greatest reformer of the reform age. But, by the second half of the nineteenth century, preoccupation with Hungary's past, its historic rights and its historical mission again preempted other more important problems in parliamentary politics. Then, after 1918, the writings of historian Gyula Szekfű may have done more than official political propaganda to discredit the pre-World War I liberal regime and legitimize the counterrevolution. In other words, it was books on history and historically inspired belles-lettres that molded public consciousness, not the success of businesspeople and enterprising professionals. A national intelligentsia profoundly—or, better still, overly—aware of the country's distress (no matter what the period happened to be, the distress was either real or at least generally perceived to be) readily turned to the past to warn, to exult, and to prophesy.

In 1996, the Hungarian state will celebrate its 1,100th anniversary, but documents noting the existence of Hungarians are considerably older than that.¹ The earliest known Hungarian historical chronicle dates from the eleventh century, and, because an extraordinary number of historians have been at work

¹ Of the many brief histories of Hungary in a Western language, here are some of the more recent and more successful: C. A. Macartney, *Hungary: A Short History* (Chicago, 1962); Thomas von Bogay, *Grundzüge der Geschichte Ungarns* (Darmstadt, 1967); Péter Hanák, ed., *One Thousand Years: A Concise History of Hungary* (Budapest, 1988); and Peter F. Sugar, ed., *A History of Hungary* (Bloomington, Ind., 1990). The latter, intended as a college textbook, is a collaborative work in which experts expand on the historical periods discussed in this essay.

since that time, Hungarian historical literature is very rich indeed. It seems best, therefore, to discuss first the history of history writing and then to analyze some of the problems that have confronted twentieth-century historians.²

Note that public fascination with national history, especially with a faraway, often mythical, past as a guide to future action, is hardly a Hungarian monopoly! Rather, such fascination is common to East Central Europe as a whole. Romanians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, and South Slavs have had little choice but to find inspiration and consolation in visions of past greatness when faced with the miseries and powerlessness of the present. While such concerns have undoubtedly been good for the historical profession, it is not difficult to see why less reliance on historians, and on literati in general, and a greater trust in bankers, stock market analysts, and technicians would probably benefit the next generation of East Central Europeans. For even if inspired historians have used history not to inflame nationalistic passions but to illuminate errors and crimes of the past, a good part of the public has preferred to identify with those historians whose main goal has been to incite hostility toward outsiders, minorities, and aliens.

THE PAGAN HUNGARIANS, a nomadic people of Finno-Ugric linguistic origin and a heavily Turkicized culture, came to the Carpathian Basin from the east late in the ninth century. Their obscure ancestry and origin, the pagan legends they brought with them, and the fact that their language was unrelated to those of the neighboring peoples fascinated the earliest historians. The first fully surviving history, titled *Gesta Hungarorum* (The Deeds of Hungarians), which dates from the late twelfth century, contains largely mythical accounts of the origin of Hungarians and their conquest of the Carpathian Basin. It also relates old pagan legends and recounts the miraculous deeds of Saint Stephen (r. 1000–1038), founder of the Christian Hungarian kingdom, and Saint Ladislav, a conquering ruler of the late eleventh century. The author, whose name is unknown but who was most probably a clerical notary of King Béla III (r. 1172–1196), waxes pragmatic and political when arguing the exalted ancestry of the ruling Árpád dynasty or presenting a spirited defense of the privileges of the great native families against the Western aristocrats systematically introduced by the monarch. A few words in

² Even though there are hundreds of specialized studies on this or that Hungarian historian or historical school, I have not been able to find a single general survey, in Hungarian, of Hungarian historiography. Luckily, there exist a few surveys in Western languages, the foremost being Steven Béla Várdy, *Modern Hungarian Historiography* (Boulder, Colo., 1976). Contrary to its title, the book takes the reader from the early chroniclers to the historians of the 1940s. Stephen Borsody, "Modern Hungarian Historiography," *Journal of Modern History*, 26 (1952): 398–405, is a brief summary of the period between 1867 and 1950. Holger Fischer's *Politik und Geschichtswissenschaft in Ungarn: Die ungarische Geschichte von 1918 bis zur Gegenwart in der Historiographie seit 1956* (Munich, 1982) discusses, as the title says, the history of Hungary after 1918 as seen by the post-1956 generation of historians. I have found these works most helpful in writing this essay.

Unlike histories of historiography, there exist a great many handbooks on Hungarian historical sources, for instance, Henrik Marczali, ed., *A magyar történet külföldinek kézikönyve* (Budapest, 1901), which lists the most important documentary sources from pre-conquest times to the third quarter of the nineteenth century; and Domokos G. Kosáry, *Bevezetés a magyar történelem forrásaiba és irodalmába*, 4 vols. (Budapest, 1951–59), which is a critical analysis of sources and their literature up to 1825.

his chronicle referring to some “Blasii” or “blaci” in Transylvania at the time of the Hungarian conquest have, typically, occasioned furious controversy between Romanian and Hungarian historians, the question being whether or not those words prove that the Romanians (Vlachs) predated the Magyars in this politically disputed province.³

The *Gesta Hungarorum* was followed by several other chronicles, each more descriptive, and each almost invariably emphasizing either the rights and privileges of the native nobility or—as Hungary’s vast body of free men or nobles became increasingly divided into a few powerful oligarchs and all the others—exhorting the king to join forces with the lesser nobility.

In 1301, with the extinction of the Árpád dynasty, the throne became a bone of contention between the Italian Angevins, the Polish-Lithuanian Jagiellos, the Franco-German Luxemburghs, and, by the fifteenth century, the Austrian Habsburgs. Inevitably, the chronicles of the period reflected the views of a given writer’s princely master and the monastic order to which he belonged. Thus the famous Vienna “Illustrated Chronicle” (ca. 1360) echoed, in Latin of course, the chivalric ideology and expansionist foreign policy of Louis the Great (r. 1342–1382), an Angevin king. The chronicles outlined nearly all the historical problems that would be debated for centuries to come: the origin of the Hungarians; the circumstances that brought them into the Danube Basin; the extent of the lands they initially occupied; the success of the conquerors in integrating the many peoples they found in the region, who were often superior in agricultural and other skills; the trauma of a free nation of tribal warriors undergoing forced baptism and “Westernization” at the orders of their king; the problem of state-building and constitutionalism (because of the presence of a large noble estate—the real or putative descendants of the original free warriors—the king’s power was never accepted as absolute); and the question of what actually was the nation’s mission in Europe. Regarding the nation’s mission, all the chronicles agree: Hungary was a bastion of Western Christianity against the pagans, against such Balkan heretics as the Bogomils, against Byzantium, and (beginning in the fifteenth century) against the Muslim Turks.

After the Habsburgs liberated Hungary from Ottoman domination at the end of the seventeenth century, matters became more complicated because of the need to deal not only with threats from the East but also with Habsburg/German imperialism. As a result, there arose, in modern times, a small but vocal “Eastern” historical school, which tended to see Hungary as the westernmost bastion of an imaginary community of uncorrupted Asiatic (Turanian) peoples. For most Hungarians, however, the nation has always been an integral though particularly endangered part of Western Christianity, and its politically enfranchised strata—

³ On medieval historians, see C. A. Macartney, *Studies on the Earliest Hungarian Historical Sources*, 3 vols. (Budapest, 1938–40); and Macartney, *The Medieval Hungarian Historians: A Critical and Analytical Guide* (Cambridge, 1953). On the *Gesta Hungarorum*, see György Györffy, “Formation d’états au IX^e siècle suivant les ‘Gesta Hungarorum’ du Notaire Anonyme,” *Nouvelles études historiques* (Budapest, 1965), 1: 27–54.

So as not to make each footnote intolerably long, I will try to limit each of my references to a few sources only and then mainly to those in a Western language. I assume that Hungarian speakers know where to find their information.

the juridical descendants of the ancient conquerors—have been seen as possessing inalienable feudal rights against both oligarchic and royal tyranny.

THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION came to Hungary not markedly later than to Western Europe; and while the greatest historians in the brilliant court of King Mathias Corvinus (r. 1458–1490) were Italian humanists such as Antonio Bonfini (1427–1503), scores of writers of Hungarian or at least East Central European origin also served at the royal court. Following the demise of Mathias's great empire, György Szerémi (*ca.* 1490–1548) and other historians described the decline of Hungarian politics and society, lamenting the fateful Battle of Mohács in 1526, which had been won by the Turkish armies of Süleyman the Magnificent. In that battle, King Louis II of Hungary and Bohemia was killed, and Hungarian independence was lost. As it turned out, the loss was to endure for more than three hundred years.

The kingdom came to be divided into a Habsburg-dominated west, a Turkish-occupied center, and an autonomous east.⁴ The eastern territory, the principality of Transylvania, was ruled for the next 150 years by members of a handful of Hungarian aristocratic families. As vassals of the sultan, these princes paid tribute to the Sublime Porte, but the best among them were able to exploit the conflict between Vienna and the Turks to make Transylvania virtually independent and quite powerful. The "Transylvania phenomenon," that is, the ability of such princes as the Calvinist Gábor Bethlen (r. 1613–1629) to turn the principality into a significant actor on the international scene and to elevate his court into a great cultural center, has been a major topic in Hungarian politics and historiography. The question was, and still is, whether or not to approve of a cautiously collaborationist policy with a neighboring (especially a heathen) great power, and whether or not to applaud a culture developed in conscious defiance of Habsburg, Catholic, and German culture.⁵

Although Latin remained the language of administration, education, law, and the Catholic church well into the nineteenth century, the sixteenth-century

⁴ On Hungarian history in the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, see János M. Bak, *Königtum und Stände in Ungarn im 14.–16. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1973); S. B. Vardy, Géza Grosschmid, and Leslie S. Domonkos, eds., *Louis the Great: King of Hungary and Poland* (Boulder, Colo., 1986); Joseph Held, *Hunyadi: Legend and Reality* (Boulder, 1985); György Székely and Erik Fügedi, eds., *La Renaissance et la Réformation en Pologne et en Hongrie* (Budapest, 1963); Péter Kulcsár, "Der Humanismus in Ungarn," and Katalin Péter, "Die Reformation in Ungarn," both articles in Ferenc Glatz, ed., *Etudes historiques hongroises 1990*, 7 vols. (Budapest, 1990), 2: 27–37 and 39–51. Regarding the last publication, it should be noted that Hungarian historians have been contributing a special collection of historical essays to each one of the quinquennial International Congresses of Historians. Unfortunately, the quality of these multi-volume publications was formerly quite uneven; some appeared without any conceptualization and editorial policy, with the articles printed in alphabetical order, by author. The collection was often used as a dumping ground for unwanted manuscripts. It is all the more satisfying, therefore, to note that in the above-mentioned 1990 group, each volume has a theme (Settlement and Society in Hungary; Ethnicity and Society; Environment and Society; Intellectual Trends; Reformists and Radicals; The Stalinist Model, and Selected Bibliography). Although these volumes still contain no exchange of opinions, they offer an excellent overview of recent trends in Hungarian historical literature.

⁵ A comprehensive work on Transylvania is Béla Köpeczi, ed., *Erdély története*, 3 vols. (Budapest, 1986), about which more later. See also László Makkai, *Histoire de Transylvanie* (Budapest, 1946).

bard-historians used the vernacular to describe the exploits of Hungarian soldiers against Turkish soldiers, and so, not surprisingly, did the dynamic Protestant preacher-historians. The Catholic Reformation of the seventeenth century brought Baroque culture into Hungary and with it a remarkable memoir literature, one of whose great masters was Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II (1676–1735), the exiled leader of an early eighteenth-century revolt against Habsburg rule.⁶

The Habsburg liberation of Hungary and the defeat of the Rákóczi Rebellion in 1711 was followed by a long period of domestic peace. Although Hungarian soldiers participated in all the wars of their Habsburg overlords, Hungary itself saw no enemy armies until a brief incursion by Napoleonic soldiery in 1809. There was time to rebuild an almost totally devastated country, to found libraries and schools, and to revive learning. Under the guidance of the Jesuits and in the spirit of Habsburg Baroque piety, learning took place, again, mostly in Latin. Many Catholic—and Protestant—clerics spent a lifetime collecting and publishing historical documents. It was left to Jesuits György Pray (1723–1801) and István Katona (1732–1811) to produce the first two multi-volume histories of Hungary, Katona's opus actually extending to forty-two volumes. Several similar attempts followed these, some in Hungarian, others—a sign of times—in German; some remain valuable today, while others are notable for their wildly romantic nationalism.⁷

THE AGE OF REFORM, said to have begun with Count Széchenyi's founding of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1825, changed everything. Before that year, Hungary had been but an underdeveloped province of the Austrian empire. It was governed directly from Vienna, not always to the benefit of the country. Its enormously wealthy titled nobility preferred Vienna to the somnolent Hungarian cities, inhabited mainly by German burghers and other foreigners. The landed and landlocked lower nobility who controlled Hungary's fifty-odd "noble" counties, was steeped in classical culture and still conducted its affairs in Latin. The gentry class also controlled the peasants, who were now legally neither serf nor free yet were generally tied to the land by custom, ignorance, and the money and labor dues they owed the landowners. By 1848, the Vienna authorities were in steady retreat; Hungary was governed increasingly from the emerging new

⁶ There is a critical bilingual edition of Rákóczi's memoirs: *Mémoires du Prince François II Rákóczi* (Budapest, 1978). See also Béla Köpeczi and Ágnes R. Várkonyi, *II. [i.e. Második] Rákóczi Ferenc* (in Hungarian) (Budapest, 1976); and Béla Köpeczi, "The Hungarian Wars of Independence in the 17th and 18th Centuries in the European Context," in György Ránki, ed., *Hungarian History—World History* (Budapest, 1984), 31–40.

⁷ On eighteenth-century Hungary, see Éva H. Balázs, "Aus dem Leben Gergely von Berzeviczys," in *Études historiques hongroises* 1990, 5: 9–20; George Barany, "Hoping against Hope: The Enlightened Age in Hungary," *AHR*, 79 (April 1971): 319–57; Horst Haselsteiner, "Enlightened Absolutism and Estates Politics in Hungary at the Time of Joseph II," in Ránki, *Hungarian History—World History*, 51–58; Béla K. Király, *Hungary in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Decline of Enlightened Despotism* (New York, 1969); Domokos Kosáry, *Művelődés a XVIII. századi Magyarországon* (Budapest, 1983); Henrik Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1910); Julius [Gyula] Miskolczy, *Ungarn in der Habsburger-Monarchie* (Vienna, 1959); and Peter F. Sugar, "The Influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution in Eighteenth Century Hungary," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 17 (1958): 331–55.

capital in Buda and Pest (a unified city of Budapest was created only in 1873); some high aristocrats had joined the reform movement; and individual members of the untitled nobility, supported by intellectuals of lower class origin, had formed political parties and were introducing many reform bills in the now vigorous National Diet. The aim of reform was to turn Hungary into a sovereign, centralized, Magyar-dominated, and thoroughly modern, liberal, and capitalist state.⁸

A bloodless revolution triumphed in the spring of 1848, but the Hungarians soon confronted a vast enemy alliance made up of Habsburg loyalists and Slavic as well as Romanian nationalists. The Hungarian army fought a long war, which it inevitably lost. These events have led to a massive historical literary outpouring, focusing on such questions as: Could the conflict have been avoided? If not, could it have been won? Did the reformer-revolutionaries go too far or not far enough? Was the revolution a noble Fronde, that is, basically counterrevolutionary, or a bourgeois revolution led by the progressive nobility? Was it a struggle for national freedom or a revolt of the oppressed against foreign and domestic oppressors? Did the revolution liberate the peasants or was liberation a gradual process, virtually unconnected with the 1848 laws? Furthermore, was 1848–1849 a crucial stage in the progressive self-emancipation of the East Central European peoples or was it the region's first ethnic and race war? Finally, was Louis Kossuth a champion of freedom or a proto-fascist?⁹ The debate over 1848–1849 actually somewhat overshadowed another no less important development in Hungarian history, the Compromise Agreement of 1867, which led to the creation of the Dual Monarchy of Austria and Hungary.

Some of Kossuth's most active companions later became historians. Bishop Mihály Horváth (1809–1878) and others of the group were firm believers in equality before the law; they praised the emancipation of the peasants and favored the emancipation of the Jews as well as some kind of compromise with Hungary's ethnic minorities, who together constituted an absolute majority of the population. Horváth's highly popular works on the history of Hungary and the history of the War of Independence reflected a superb mastery of historical methodology and a naïve belief in the nation's collective longing for freedom.¹⁰

⁸ On the (first) Hungarian age of reform, see Endre Arató, *A nemzetiségi kérdés története Magyarországon, 1790–1840*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1960); George Barany, *Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian Nationalism, 1791–1841* (Princeton, N.J., 1968); Moritz Csáky, *Von der Aufklärung zum Liberalismus: Studien zum Frühliberalismus in Ungarn* (Vienna, 1981); Domokos G. Kosáry, *Napoléon et la Hongrie* (Budapest, 1979); and the special Széchenyi issue of the *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 20 (October 1960): 251–313, with articles by George Barany, B. G. Ivanyi, Francis W. Wagner, and others.

⁹ The Revolution of 1848–1849 boasts a rich literature even in Western languages. Here is a sampling: István Deák, *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849* (New York, 1979); László Deme, *The Radical Left in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848* (Boulder, Colo., 1976); György Spira, *A Hungarian Count in the Revolution of 1848*, trans. Richard E. Allen (Budapest, 1974), which is about Széchenyi. The two most important recent histories of modern Hungary in English are Jörg K. Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary, 1867–1986*, trans. Kim Traynor (London, 1988); and Andrew C. Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825–1945* (Princeton, N.J., 1982). The lives of some of modern Hungary's political leaders are discussed in Pál [Paul] Bódy, ed., *Hungarian Statesmen of Destiny, 1860–1960* (New York, 1989). On the economic history of modern Hungary, see T. Iván Berend and György Ránki, *Hungary: A Century of Economic Development* (New York, 1974).

¹⁰ Mihály Horváth, *Huszonöt év Magyarország történelméből*, 3 vols. (Geneva, 1865; Pest, 1868); and

The national liberal historians and the subsequent generation of Rankean scientific positivists endeavored to turn history into an exact science. This aim was reflected in the creation of the Historical Society and the Historical Commission of the Academy of Sciences. Thereafter, the two institutions competed, often bitterly, for money and prestige; together, they produced an amazing number of documentary collections. The most remarkable was the *Monumenta Hungariae Historica*, a series of sources for the medieval and early modern periods. By World War I, it numbered some 120 volumes.¹¹ Funds were made readily available by a government eager to show that the newly prosperous Hungary was able to match Vienna in every respect, even in producing a counterpart to the Austrian *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum*. Whether or not the historians of the scientific school achieved true greatness is open to debate. Certainly, their most spectacular achievement, a richly illustrated, ten-volume "History of the Hungarian Nation," published for Hungary's millennial celebrations in 1896, deserves praise if for no other reason than because each of the massive volumes was written by a single historian, and because it reflects the liberal optimism of the Hungarian intelligentsia in a period when liberalism was on the decline in most other places.¹²

In any case, the positivist school was soon pushed into the background, at least as far as the public was concerned, by a new national romantic school, characterized by a maniacal insistence on Hungarian greatness and an unrelenting hostility to Austria and the Habsburgs. Kálmán Thaly (1839–1909), to cite but one of these historians, engaged in a cult of the Protestant Transylvanian tradition and of the *kuruc* soldiers of Prince Rákóczi as opposed to the treasonous *labanc* Hungarian soldiers on the Habsburg side. Because original *kuruc* camp songs were in short supply, Thaly composed other, actually quite delightful, "original" songs of his own. Another historian soon unmasked the forgery, but this did little harm to Thaly's reputation, as his ideology was in harmony with Hungary's post-1900 politics, which aimed at complete independence from Austria and the creation of a Great Hungarian Empire.¹³

Yet first-class history was also written all through this so-called Dualistic Age.¹⁴

Horváth, *Magyarország függetlenségi harcának története* (Geneva, 1865; Pest, 1871). On Horváth, see Ervin Pamlényi, *Horváth Mihály* (in Hungarian) (Budapest, 1954). Other important works by national liberal intellectuals are László Szalay, *Magyarország története*, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1852–54; Pest, 1865); and Baron Joseph [József] Eötvös, *Der Einfluss der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1854). On Eötvös, see Paul Body, *Joseph Eötvös and the Modernization of Hungary, 1840–1870*, 2d rev. edn. (Boulder, Colo., 1985).

¹¹ Vardy, *Modern Hungarian Historiography*, 299–303, lists the titles of the *Monumenta* series.

¹² Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *A magyar nemzet története*, 10 vols. (Budapest, 1895–98); Ágnes R. Várkonyi, *Pozitívista történetelmélet a magyar történetírásban*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1973).

¹³ See Ágnes R. Várkonyi, *Thaly Kálmán és történetírása* (Budapest, 1961).

¹⁴ Here are some titles on the history of Hungary between the 1850s and 1918: Moritz Csáky, *Der Kulturkampf in Ungarn: Die kirchenpolitische Gesetzgebung der Jahre 1894/95* (Graz, 1967); Friedrich Gottas, *Ungarn im Zeitalter des Hochliberalismus: Studien zur Tisza-Ära (1875–1890)* (Vienna, 1976); István Diószegi, *Hungarians in the Ballhausplatz* (Budapest, 1983); József Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War* (Budapest, 1989); Péter Hanák, *Ungarn in der Donaumonarchie: Probleme der bürgerlichen Umgestaltung eines Vielvölkerstaates* (Vienna, 1984); and Hanák, *Der Garten und die Werkstatt: Ein kulturgeschichtlicher Vergleich Wien und Budapest um 1900* (Vienna, 1992); John Lukacs, *Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture* (New York, 1988); György Szabad, *Hungarian Political Trends between the Revolution and the Compromise (1849–1867)* (Budapest, 1977); and Gábor Vermes, *István Tisza: The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist* (New York, 1985).

In fact, many of Hungary's greatest historians, such as Sándor Szilágyi (1827–1899), who was editor of the aforementioned ten-volume history, Bishop Vilmos Fraknói (1843–1924), Ignác Acsády (1845–1906), Árpád Károlyi (1853–1940), Sándor Márki (1853–1925), Dávid Angyal (1857–1943), Henrik Marczali (1856–1940), and Károly Tagányi (1858–1924), to name but a few, worked in this period.

Adept at research and source criticism, Tagányi specialized in social and economic problems of medieval Hungary. He established that Hungary had not experienced feudalism; it had only adapted some feudal social forms. Like several of his contemporaries, Tagányi, too, was interested in Hungary's neighbors and found analogous developments among the Slavic and Germanic peoples. Ignác Acsády, another economic historian, wrote a remarkable study of Hungarian serfdom, wherein he ventured beyond classical liberalism to concerns about social inequality.

The most prolific of all, however, was Henrik Marczali, the editor of and contributor to a fine twelve-volume world history as well as the author of several monographs on Hungarian history. His *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century*, which appeared in English in 1910, has lost little of its validity with the passage of time. It is worth noting that several of these historians, including the Catholic Bishop Fraknói, were of Jewish origin, testifying to the dazzling success of Jews in the liberal age. Unlike in Vienna, the pre-World War I Hungarian political establishment never weakened in its determination to accept the Jews as motors of economic progress and as dedicated assimilationists in the multinational Hungarian state. Their entry into the professions and the civil service was welcomed, too, at least until after World War I; and, if some Jewish historians did not get the foremost academic appointments they deserved, it was only because of their refusal to embrace the national, populist, romantic view of history. In fact, one of the foremost representatives of the national romantic school and a professor at Budapest university, Aladár Ballagi (1853–1928), was of Jewish origin.¹⁵

INNOVATION CAME EARLY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY in two forms: radical history and *Geistesgeschichte*, or the history of ideas. Cultural life in Hungary before World War I was becoming one of extremes. Although certain liberal tenets, such as the freedom of religion and of the press or the belief in material progress, were upheld by most, an emerging New Left was agitating for social and ethnic equality, while on the right the rejection of liberalism and socialism and the cultivation of "Christian values" were added to old-fashioned sentimental chauvinism.

Those on the left, primarily young intellectuals from assimilated and successful Jewish families, coalesced around the journal *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Centu-

¹⁵ Károly Tagányi, *A földközösség története Magyarországon* (1894; rpt. edn., Budapest, 1949); and Tagányi, *Lebende Rechtsgewohnheiten und ihre Sammlungen in Ungarn* (Berlin, 1922); Ignác Acsády, *A magyar jobbágyország története* (1906; 3d edn., Budapest, 1948); Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century*; Henrik Marczali, *Ungarische Verfassungsgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1910); and Marczali, ed., *A nagy képes világtörténet*, 12 vols. (Budapest, 1899–1904). On the cultural and social achievements of Jews in pre-World War I Hungary, see William O. McCagg, Jr., *Jewish Nobles and Geniuses in Modern Hungary* (1972; rpt. edn., New York, 1986).

ry). Trained in Western sociology, these radicals focused on much-neglected social and ethnic problems. Like the first reform generation, this second generation, too, was exasperated by Hungary's backwardness relative to Western Europe and warned against the government's chauvinistic and imperialistic policy. Ervin Szabó (1877–1918), a syndicalist socialist, dared to attack the hallowed memory of the Revolution of 1848–1849, arguing that it was more of a noble Fronde than a bourgeois revolution. Oszkár Jászi (1875–1957), who was to spend the last thirty-odd years of his life teaching at Oberlin College in Ohio, dedicated his younger years to the nationality question. Not only his radical critique of traditional society but also his rejection of Bolshevism caused him to become an exile, first from the Hungarian Republic of Soviets in 1919, then from the counterrevolutionary Horthy regime, and finally from the post–World War II Communist system. His *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (1929) has become a classic on the tragic problems of Europe's last anational and multinational state. The rehabilitation, in the 1980s, of Szabó and Jászi by such reformist Budapest historians as Péter Hanák and György Litván was a gauntlet thrown down before Hungary's older Communist leaders.¹⁶

The biggest challenge to the reign of national romantic historians came, however, not from the radicals on the left but from a young, rather conservative historian. In "The Exiled Rákóczi" (1913), Gyula Szekfű (1883–1955) dismissed the cultish writings of Kálmán Thaly and his followers and presented the defeated prince as a powerless and embittered political exile. There was a great public outcry: politicians and the press branded Szekfű a traitor. Worse yet, he was called pro-Habsburg, an unforgivable sin in a country whose Magyars saw themselves as oppressed by Austria but whose Slavic and Romanian minorities saw the Magyars as the foremost representatives of Austrian oppression. The incident again testified both to the chauvinism of the political establishment and to the extraordinary importance of historians and historical literature. After all, the Great Prince had been dead for nearly 180 years.¹⁷

Despite the attacks, or perhaps because of them, Gyula Szekfű became Hungary's most famous historian. His long career led him from the positivist writings of his youth to the great synthesizing efforts of his *Geistesgeschichte* period and finally to the rather leftist views of his old age. Politically, he moved from conservative liberalism to cautious endorsement of the Hungarian Republic of Soviets in 1919, then to a much more enthusiastic endorsement of the White counterrevolution and its conservative Catholic Neo-Baroque culture, then to a stand against fascism, and finally to agreeing to serve as post–World War II

¹⁶ Ervin Szabó, *Társadalmi és pártharcok a 48–49-es magyar forradalomban* (1921; 3d edn., Budapest, 1949); György Litván, ed., *Szabó Ervin történeti írásai* (Budapest, 1979). Oscar [Oszkár] Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (1929; rpt. edn., Chicago, 1961); and Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (1924; rpt. edn., New York, 1969); Attila Pók, "Oszkár Jászi as the Organizational Leader of the Reform Movement," in Glatz, *Etudes historiques hongroises 1990*, 5: 105–12. On the second reform generation, see Zoltán Horváth, *Die Jahrhundertwende in Ungarn: Geschichte der 2. Reformgeneration (1896–1914)* (Neuwied, 1966); and Attila Pók, *A Huszadik Század körének történetfelfogása* (Budapest, 1982).

¹⁷ Gyula Szekfű, *A száműzött Rákóczi* (Budapest, 1913). Two major works of Szekfű also appeared in a Western language: *Der Staat Ungarn* (Stuttgart, 1918); and *État et nation* (Paris, 1945).

Hungary's ambassador to Moscow, from where he reported on the Soviet experiment in the glowing terms of a fellow traveler.¹⁸

Foremost among Szekfű's attempts to apply *Geistesgeschichte* philosophy and method in Hungary was his "Three Generations: The History of a Declining Age," published in 1920. In it, he traced what he saw as the early flourishing and subsequent deterioration of Hungarian political and spiritual life between the beginning of the reform age in 1825 and the collapse of the Hungarian state in 1918. His culprits were Hungarian liberalism and its practitioners: the gentry and the Jews. It is not clear, at least to me, whether Szekfű only attacked Hungarian pseudo-liberalism, as his defenders claim, or whether he rejected the liberal heritage in its entirety. There can be no doubt, however, that the public interpreted the book as a refutation of the market-oriented, freethinking, and confessionally tolerant nineteenth century. Nor can it be doubted that, at least in 1920, Szekfű himself blamed the Jews for a large part of Hungary's, and especially the Hungarian middle class's, tragedy. Although not a politician, Szekfű, with his great prestige as a historian, did influence political developments.¹⁹

THE SITUATION IN 1920 WAS TRULY TERRIBLE. There had been the lost war and the disillusioning experience with Bolshevism, then the Peace Treaty of Trianon, which confirmed Hungary's loss of two-thirds of its pre-war territory and nearly 60 percent of its pre-war population, more than 3 million of whom were ethnic Hungarians. Indeed, the nation has yet to recover from these traumas.²⁰ Refugees from the detached territories, including tens of thousands of civil servants, officers, and professionals flocked into Rump Hungary, aggravating the already catastrophic economic situation there. It was in this atmosphere of moral and social crisis that Szekfű formulated the ideology of a new state and society. Since Hungary was no longer an important power, he contended, it had to shine through its unique spiritual values. Immigrants, whether Germans, Slavs, or Jews, fit poorly into the new society formed by the tragic Hungarian experience, one that only those with a Hungarian soul could genuinely perceive. If some of this strikes us today as nonsense, we must remember that such views were widespread in Central and Eastern Europe, and that in a sequel to this book, published in 1934, Szekfű himself recognized the dangers of spiritualizing a nation's historical experience. In his added discussion of the fate of the post-Trianon "fourth

¹⁸ Ferenc Glatz, *Történetíró és politika* (Budapest, 1980), discusses Szekfű's Catholic upbringing, his training as an archivist in Vienna, and some of his most important works, among them "The Exiled Rákóczi." Vardy, *Modern Hungarian Historiography*, also deals extensively with Szekfű.

¹⁹ Gyula Szekfű, *Három nemzedék: Egy hanyatló kor története* (Budapest, 1920, 1922).

²⁰ On the Treaty of Trianon in June 1920, see especially Francis Deak, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1942); Béla K. Király, Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders, eds., *Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, a Case Study on Trianon* (New York, 1982); and Mária Ormos, *From Padua to the Trianon, 1918–1920* (New York, 1990). On the revolutions of 1918–1919, see Bennett Kovrig, *Communism in Hungary: From Kun to Kádár* (Stanford, Calif., 1979); Tibor Hajdu, *The Hungarian Soviet Republic* (Budapest, 1979); Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary*; Peter Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918–1919 and the Big Three* (Boulder, Colo., 1976); and Pastor, ed., *Revolutions and Interventions in Hungary and Its Neighbor States, 1918–1919* (Boulder, 1988); Rudolf L. Tökés, *Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic* (New York, 1967); and Iván Völgyes, ed., *Hungary in Revolution, 1918–19: Nine Essays* (Lincoln, Neb., 1971).

generation," he endorsed humane values and rejected the racist ideologies.²¹

Szekfű's call to redress the catastrophe of World War I and the Trianon Peace Treaty through the assertion of Magyar cultural superiority was taken up by scores of historians and, most important, by an outstanding minister of education, Count Kunó Klebelsberg (1873–1932), who set out, in the 1920s, to make Hungary into a cultural power in Central and Eastern Europe. The results were spectacular for an impoverished little country: scores of Hungarian institutes and libraries were set up abroad, and respectable foreign language journals such as the *Ungarische Jahrbücher* and the *Revue des études hongroises*, as well as many new documentary collections were published, among them the magnificent *Fontes* series on the history of Hungary and its neighboring peoples.²²

One of the greatest achievements of this cultural effort was a five-volume Hungarian history, the first volume of which was written by medievalist Bálint Hóman (1885–1951) and the other four by Szekfű. Emphasizing the nation's "spiritual culture" but not neglecting "material culture," the work earned some enmity, mainly because of its warm endorsement of Hungary's intellectual debt to Catholic Austria and to German culture. Still, this brilliantly written "Hóman-Szekfű," as Hungarians have come to call it, became a popular success. It sold 9,000 copies, a respectable achievement in a country of 9 million. Note, however, that the new "Ten-Volume History of Hungary," which was begun in 1978 and is still unfinished at thirteen gigantic volumes, and which often makes heavier reading than the Hóman-Szekfű, easily recruited over 100,000 subscribers. This would be the equivalent of an American sale of some 2.5 million copies of a multi-volume national history.²³

BESIDES SZEKFŰ, THE INTERWAR PERIOD brought forth a remarkable crop of historians, such as Turcologist Gyula Németh (1890–1976), who discussed, among many other things, the nature of the Hungarian conquest, and Bálint Hóman, who published copiously on medieval towns and coinage but also produced a biography of Saint Stephen. Hóman, incidentally, was minister of education in several governments, including a pro-Nazi one in 1944; for this, he was sent to prison after the war, where he died. Another great medievalist, Elemér Mályusz (1898–1989), who had begun as a *Geistesgeschichte* historian, later developed his own ethno-historical school. Rejecting Szekfű's emphasis on Western influences, he insisted on the contributions of a special and original Magyar spirit to historical developments. This was a dangerous intellectual game indeed, the only virtue being that Mályusz's concern with Hungarian versions of *Volk* and *Volkstum* also marked a break with the hitherto-fashionable, elite-centered social history.

²¹ Gyula Szekfű, *Három nemzedék és ami utána következik* (1934; rpt. edn., Budapest, 1989).

²² Vardy, *Modern Hungarian Historiography*, 305–07, lists the titles of the *Fontes Historiae Hungaricae Aevi Recentioris*.

²³ Bálint Hóman and Gyula Szekfű, *Magyar történet*, 5 vols. (1935–36; 7th edn., Budapest, 1941–43); Zsigmond Pál Pach, ed., *Magyarország története tíz kötetben*, 13 vols. (Budapest, 1976–). Although the latter publication is still unfinished, some of its individual volumes have already seen multiple editions.

Then there was the prolific Sándor Domanovszky (1877–1955), who edited a five-volume history of Hungarian culture, wrote on agrarian and urban history, and served for several decades as editor of *Századok* (Centuries), the journal of the Historical Society. Ferenc Eckhart (1885–1957) analyzed and demythologized Hungarian legal and constitutional history in light of current socioeconomic developments. But Eckhart also renewed, even if in a more scientific vein, the Protestant *kuruc* historiographical tradition of Kálmán Thaly and company, arguing in his “Economic Policy of the Vienna Court in Hungary during the Reign of Maria Theresa” (1922) that the Habsburgs had always aimed at the colonization and exploitation of the rebellious Hungarians. This thesis opposed Gyula Szekfű’s *labanc* interpretation of Habsburg-Hungarian relations. Eckhart was, incidentally, already of that generation whose active life continued under the post–World War II Communist system. Luckily for him, the regime welcomed him as a transmitter of the *kuruc* tradition in historiography, which came to be favored by the Stalinist historians. It is worth noting, however, that, with the exception of Eckhart, no serious historian subscribed for long to the theory of unrelenting Habsburg Catholic colonization and exploitation.²⁴

István Hajnal (1892–1956) was one of the relatively few historians of the period whose interest was decidedly international. Educated in the spirit of German anti-capitalist sociology, he concerned himself as much with the history of machines and industrialization as with the history of writing and written records. Rather typically for a generation of historians that knew nothing as yet about professional compartmentalization, Hajnal also published on, among other things, the foreign policy of revolutionary Hungary in 1848, the Kossuth emigration in Turkey, the chancellery of King Béla IV in the thirteenth century, and the life and times of Palatine Miklós Esterházy in the seventeenth century.²⁵ Hajnal is said to have inspired a host of populist writers, the darlings of Hungarian intellectual life in the 1930s. The populists advocated a “Third Road,” neither capitalist nor socialist, neither liberal nor Marxist, but one based on the relatively uncorrupted life and aspirations of the peasantry.²⁶ Another great historian of the period was the Roman specialist András Alföldi (1895–1981), whose genuinely cosmopolitan career and interests had little influence on specifically Hungarian historiography.

Among the many interwar historians must still be mentioned those whose main professional activity was in the post–World War II period. Having started out in a historical research institute set up during the war by the historian and

²⁴ See, for instance, Bálint Hóman, *König Stephan I der Heilige: Die Gründung des ungarischen Staates* (Breslau, 1941). One of Elemér Mályusz’s major accomplishments was a critical edition of documentary sources from the reign of Sigismund I (king of Hungary, 1387–1437, Holy Roman Emperor, 1410–1437): *Zsigmondkori oklevéltár*, 3 vols. (Budapest, 1951–58). Also, Mályusz, *Kaiser Sigismund in Ungarn, 1387–1437* (Budapest, 1990); Sándor Domanovszky, ed., *Magyar művelődéstörténet*, 5 vols. (Budapest, 1939–42); and Ferenc Eckhart, *A bécsi udvar gazdasági politikája Magyarországon Mária Terézia korában* (Budapest, 1922). Eckhart, *A Short History of the Hungarian People* (London, 1931), is still of some interest today, as is, incidentally, Domanovszky, *Die Geschichte Ungarns* (Munich, 1923).

²⁵ See, for instance, István Hajnal, *Vergleichende Schriftproben zur Entwicklung und Verbreitung der Schrift im 12.–13. Jahrhundert* (Budapest, 1943); *L’enseignement de l’écriture aux universités médiévales* (Budapest, 1954); and *A Batthyány-kormány külpolitikája* (1957; rpt. edn., Budapest, 1987).

²⁶ On the populists, see Gyula Borbándi, *Der ungarische Populismus* (Mainz, 1976).

geographer Prime Minister Count Pál Teleki (1879–1941), historians Domokos Kosáry, Kálmán Benda, and László Makkai (1911–1989) attempted to continue after 1945 the tradition of conservative-liberal historiography. Instead, they were periodically excluded from the profession, and Kosáry himself spent nearly three years in jail after the 1956 Revolution. In a characteristic Hungarian career, he is today the president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

UNDER ADMIRAL MIKLÓS HORTHY'S COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY REGIME, his supporters were united only in their territorial revisionism, anti-Bolshevism, and "Christian national" sloganeering. For the rest, they were divided into what might be called an "Old Right"—aristocrats, senior civil servants, and mostly Jewish industrialists and bankers, who wished to restore the pre-World War I conservative-liberal system—and a larger but less influential "New Right" that was authoritarian, strongly anti-Semitic, social reformist, and sympathetic to German National Socialism. Horthy vacillated between the two camps. His counterrevolutionary terrorist past inclined him toward the New Right; his earlier service under Francis Joseph and his contempt for the "Brown Bolshevik" mob led him to side with the Old Right.²⁷ In the end, territorial revisionism led Hungary to compete with its neighbors for the favor of Germany and thus also to participate in the anti-Soviet war. But, when it became clear that Hitler would lose the war, the Old Right reasserted itself, and in 1943 Hungary became, for all practical purposes, a neutral country. This in turn led to a German military occupation in March 1944, renewed mobilization for war, and the deportation to Auschwitz of over half a million (out of nearly 900,000) of the hitherto-protected Jews. In October 1944, the Germans installed an outright fascist regime in Hungary, and in December 1944, the advancing Red Army installed an anti-fascist regime.²⁸ The fighting in Hungary caused terrible destruction, devastating, among other things, several libraries and archives. In 1947, the Communists put an end to the democratic coalition government and, within a year, instituted a Stalinist dictatorship.

Note that, with one or two exceptions, no well-known historian had sided with the fascists; most had sympathized either with the Old Right or, like Szekfű and

²⁷ Here is a sampling of the very rich literature, in a Western language, on Hungary in the interwar period: István Deák, "The Historical Foundations: The Development of Hungary from 1918 until 1945," in Klaus-Detlev Grothusen, ed., *Ungarn* (Göttingen, 1987), 36–66; Nandor F. Dreisziger, *Hungary's Way to World War II* (Astor Park, Fla., 1968); Mario D. Fenyo, *Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941–1944* (New Haven, Conn., 1972); Gyula Juhász, *Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1919–1945* (Budapest, 1979); Stephen Denis Kertész, *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1953); Kovrig, *Communism in Hungary*; C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1919–1937* (New York, 1937); and Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929–1945*, 2 vols. (New York, 1956–57); Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *The Liberal Opposition in Hungary, 1919–1945* (Budapest, 1983); and Thomas L. Sakmyster, *Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Danubian Crisis, 1936–1939* (Athens, Ga., 1980).

²⁸ On the fascist movements in Hungary, see Miklós Lackó, *Arrow-Cross Men, National Socialists, 1935–1944* (Budapest, 1969); and Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania* (Stanford, Calif., 1970). On the Holocaust in Hungary, see Randolph L. Braham, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary*, 2 vols. (New York, 1981).

Kosáry, engaged in anti-Nazi activity. All this made little difference after the war, for, by 1949, the profession had passed into the hands of Marxist-Leninists.

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM had entered into Hungarian intellectual life in the early twentieth century with the writings of Ervin Szabó and some contributors to the "Twentieth Century" or with the members of the so-called Sociological Society. Marxist theoreticians actually assumed political power for a few months in 1919, an exhilarating-enough experience for them to spend the next decade or two in Austrian or Soviet exile debating the causes of the collapse of the Republic of Soviets. The main theoretical question was whether or not Hungarian society had been "ripe" for a socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. If so, then this required historical proof of a previous bourgeois revolution, not an easy thing to come by, given that the nineteenth-century middle class had been both small and made up chiefly of German and Jewish immigrants.

An astute young ideologue who followed this line of inquiry was József Révai (1898–1959), asserting in his "Marx and the Hungarian Revolution" (1932) and his numerous writings on Louis Kossuth that, even without a native bourgeoisie, 1848 was a bourgeois revolution, the role of the Third Estate having been assumed by the reformist untitled nobility. While it flew in the face of Ervin Szabó's earlier analysis, this approach legitimized the proletarian dictatorship of 1919 and paved the way to a rapprochement with progressive non-Marxists, which was especially important to Communists in the post-1935 Popular Front era. By making Kossuth, who "had been able to rise above his class barriers," a hero of both Communists and nationalists, Révai appealed particularly to the populist writers, with whom he created an uneasy but lasting alliance. This alliance survived even the later Stalinist terror in Hungary, over which Révai presided as cultural tsar. In fact, Révai and another writer, Aladár Mód (1908–1973), may be regarded as founders of the "National Marxist" historical school.²⁹

There was, however, another more classic, internationalist Marxist interpretation of history, represented primarily by Erik Molnár (1894–1966), a jurist and self-trained historian. Not in exile during the Horthy era, Molnár had had to publish his works on medieval social history under a pseudonym. After World War II, he became the founder and first director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences (1949–1966). But whereas Molnár was able to preserve some intellectual excellence at this elite institution, students and the public at large were subjected to Aladár Mód's "Four Centuries of Struggle for an Independent Hungary" and the even worse textbooks it inspired.³⁰ These works presented an unholy mixture of superpatriotic *kuruc* and proletarian internationalist historical analyses. One of the most ruthless cultural bosses of the period was Erzsébet Andics, another former "Muscovite" exile, whose historical writings were crammed with heroes and antiheroes. Thus the sixteenth-century peasant rebel

²⁹ József Révai, *Kossuth Lajos* (Budapest, 1944); *Marx és az 1848-as magyar forradalom* (Budapest, 1953); *Marxizmus és magyarság* (Budapest, 1946); *Marxizmus, népiesség, magyarság* (Budapest, 1955).

³⁰ Aladár Mód, *400 [i.e. Négy száz] év küzdelem az önálló Magyarorszáért* (1943; 7th edn., Budapest, 1954).

György Dózsa, the super-rich Prince Rákóczi, some late eighteenth-century Jacobin conspirators, the petty noble Louis Kossuth and his bitter critic, the plebian poet Sándor Petőfi together formed the haloed ancestry from whom the line of succession led directly to Mátyás Rákosi, Hungary's Stalin. Other historical figures became weaklings or traitors, although the largest group were undoubtedly the nonpersons. The latter included Béla Kun and other people's commissars of the 1919 Republic of Soviets, who had been shot in the late 1930s at the orders of Stalin. History was compartmentalized into tribal, pre-feudal, feudal, late feudal, and the other prescribed Marxist periods.

Whether out of ideological conviction, opportunism, or fear, nearly all the historians who were permitted to do so participated in this charade. There were some real achievements, especially in the hitherto much-neglected fields of economic and industrial history, but most of the books and articles of the period make painful reading today.

Jointly with the total rewriting of the past came the total reorganization of academic and cultural life. Universities were reduced to training high-school teachers, while the Academy of Sciences, with its innumerable scientific institutes and its Soviet-style scientific degrees (Aspirant, Kandidat, Doktor), assumed strict control of all scholarly activity. The Institute of History had its own Five-Year Plan; it also fought resolutely against the "Front of Bourgeois Reactionary Historians." This struggle was carried out mostly at international historical conferences, and the humiliation of the enemy was duly noted in the pages of *Századok*, the official historical journal.

A particularly rapid "thaw" under Prime Minister Imre Nagy followed the death of Stalin in 1953. This, in turn, was followed by an orthodox Communist reaction in 1955 and then a most exciting agitation among young, disillusioned Communist intellectuals. The agitation led directly to the revolution of 1956. A handful of historians played an active part here, but the study of history being the alpha and omega of "scientific socialism," historians were especially privileged, intimidated, and indoctrinated, which meant that they followed the party line somewhat longer than many others.

THE FIRST WINDS OF CHANGE could be felt in the early 1960s when—with the permission of the party leadership, of course—historians at the Institute used the writings of Erik Molnár to refute the excessive nationalism of the low-brow party historians. They pointed out, for instance, that the Rákóczi Rebellion was less in the interest of the oppressed peasantry than in that of the noble landowners, who felt threatened by the Habsburg bureaucracy and the policy of centralization. This debate was much more than a scholarly discussion on the conflict between the particularism of the Hungarian nobility and the centralizing policy of the Habsburgs. Molnár was, after all, not only a historian and the head of the Institute, he had also held senior positions in the party leadership, and whatever he said or wrote reflected specific trends in the political organization. The questioning of Aladár Mód's romantic *cum* orthodox interpretation of the last

four hundred years in Hungarian history represented an important step in the gradual liberalization of Hungarian intellectual life. For the first time in many years, conflicting views on basic issues were presented. It was also Molnár who initiated two major debates on periodization in Hungarian history, held in 1966 and 1969.

At that time, too, there began another debate, which was to assume great importance in the subsequent reform movement, namely, whether or not it had been correct to characterize Hungary's status in the Dual Monarchy between 1867 and 1918 as that of "semi-colonial subjection." Such historians as György Ránki, T. Iván Berend, Péter Hanák, and László Katus discovered, often in contrast to what they had advocated a few years earlier, that Hungary had actually profited economically from its close association with Vienna and, through it, with Western capitalism.³¹ This discovery opened the way to an economic and political rapprochement with Western Europe.

EXILES AND ÉMIGRÉS FROM POST-WORLD WAR II COMMUNISM were, for the most part, well educated; inevitably, thousands among them took up teaching in their host country, and many became historians. The American Association for the Study of Hungarian History lists well over a hundred U.S. and Canadian members. Not all are immigrants, for there had been quite a few Western experts on Hungarian history before the arrival of the refugees from Communism; and, in recent times, a number of young, native-born Americans have chosen Hungary as their specialty.

Of the older generation, we have already mentioned Oszkár (Oscar) Jászi. Even better known was the British historian C. A. Macartney (1895–1978), who may well have plunged into Hungarian history in order to challenge the markedly pro-Slav and pro-Romanian orientation of R. W. Seton-Watson and other British historians. Macartney's important early works on Hungarian medieval history and medieval historiography have been overshadowed by his monumental *History of Hungary, 1929–1945* (1956–57). The pre-1945 generation also includes István (Stephen) Borsody, who wrote on the Nazi and Soviet conquest and the ethnic question in the successor states, and the U.S. diplomat Francis Deak (1899–1972), who published a major study on Hungary at the Paris peace conference.³²

It was, however, after the Communist takeover that émigré historians and others interested in Hungary came into their own. Although at first without easy

³¹ On the Erik Molnár debates, see *Vita a feudális kori magyar történelem periodizációjáról* (Budapest, 1968); and *Vita Magyarország kapitalizmuskori fejlődéséről* (Budapest, 1971). An early manifestation of such a more positive evaluation of the liberal capitalistic period in Hungarian history was Péter Hanák, "Hungary in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: Preponderancy or Dependency?" *Austrian History Yearbook*, 3 (1967): 260–302. This and all other articles in Volume 3 of the *Yearbook* originated from an international conference on ethnicity held at Indiana University in April 1966. Another early example of bias-free historical writing is Magda Ádám, *Magyarország és a kisantant a harmincas években* (Budapest, 1968).

³² Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution*; Jászi, *Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*; Macartney, *Studies of the Earliest Sources*; *Medieval Historians*; and *History of Hungary*; Stephen Borsody, *The Tragedy of Central Europe: Nazi and Soviet Conquest and Aftermath*, 3d edn. (New Haven, Conn., 1980); Borsody, ed., *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation* (New Haven, 1988); and F. Deak, *Hungary at the Paris Conference*.

access to Hungarian archives or no access at all, they tackled almost every major problem of Hungarian historiography. With the relaxation of Communist vigilance in the late 1960s, the Hungarian archives were opened even to émigrés.

Because it is impossible to do justice to all, the names and contributions of the many fine historians working in the West are relegated to the footnotes or are omitted altogether. Instead, I shall mention only some of their favorite subjects: church history and the constitutional and religious significance of the Holy Crown of Stephen; the great reformers of the nineteenth century; the Revolution of 1848; Hungary's place within the Habsburg possessions; political and economic developments in the Dual Monarchy; Budapest in 1900; the life of Count István Tisza, the Hungarian prime minister who was in a position to prevent the outbreak of World War I; the Jewish contribution to Hungarian economy, society, and culture; the revolutions of 1918–1919; the crucial influence of Hungarian left-wing exiles on Western culture; Hungarian-German relations in the interwar period and during World War II; Hungary's military role in World War II; and the Holocaust in Hungary.³³

Of a more general nature are Jörg S. Hoensch's and Andrew C. Janos's histories of modern Hungary. Janos's approach is particularly interesting, for he argues that Hungarian developments were decisively influenced by the country's geographically peripheral position and that the nobility had been dethroned in Hungary as early as the second half of the nineteenth century by a bureaucracy recruited from among the lower middle class and the assimilationist minorities.³⁴

Many of these works simply complement research done in Hungary—without the Marxist-Leninist bias. Unique, however, were the writings of émigrés on the Communist era, particularly on 1956. Because the Communist period was the preserve, in Hungary, of historians in the Institute on Party History, nothing valuable on that era came out of Hungary itself until the late 1980s. As for the 1956 Revolution, its only permissible treatment in Hungary was laughable.

POLITICAL POWER BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1956 AND THE SPRING OF 1988 rested in the hands of János Kádár, who had betrayed the revolution and sent his former revolutionary colleagues, including Prime Minister Nagy, to the gallows. True,

³³ Asztrik Gabriel, *The Medieval Universities of Pécs and Pozsony* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1969); Bak, *Königtum und Stände*; Bogay, *Grundzüge der Geschichte*; Thomas von Bogay, *A Szentkorona, mint a magyar történelem forrása és szereplője* (Munich, 1983); Egyed Hermann, *A katolikus egyház története Magyarországon 1914-ig* (Munich, 1973); Csáky, *Kulturkampf*; Góttas, *Ungarn im Zeitalter des Hochliberalismus*; Barany, *Stephen Széchenyi*; I. Deák, *Lawful Revolution*; István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918* (New York, 1990); John Komlos, *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union: Economic Development in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, N.J., 1983); Deme, *Radical Left*; Body, *Joseph Eötvös*; Lukacs, *Budapest 1900*; Vermes, *István Tisza*; Pastor, *Hungary between Wilson and Lenin*; Tökés, *Béla Kun*; Mary Gluck, *Georg Lukács and His Generation, 1900–1918* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); Lee Congdon, *The Young Lukács* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1983); Congdon, *Exile and Social Thought: Hungarian Intellectuals in Germany and Austria, 1919–1933* (Princeton, 1991); Fenyo, *Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary*; Peter Gosztony, *Endkampf an der Donau 1944/45* (Vienna, 1969); Kertesz, *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool*; Stephen Denis Kertesz, *Between Russia and the West: Hungary and the Illusions of Peacemaking, 1945–1947* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1984); and Braham, *Politics of Genocide*.

³⁴ Hoensch, *History of Modern Hungary*; and Janos, *Politics of Backwardness*.

Kádár much improved economic conditions in Hungary, and he tolerated a degree of cultural freedom that made Hungary “the merriest barrack in the camp.” But with regard to the Revolution of 1956, he and his comrades were categorical. It was to be treated as a right-wing counterrevolution instigated by U.S. imperialists. Hungary was an imperialist target because it happened to be the weakest link in the otherwise expanding world socialist system. This temporary weakness was due to the survival in the country of unhealthy, leftist, dogmatic (Stalinist) practices. Because of treason in the Communist ranks, so the official thesis continued, the workers were unable to resist the imperialists; literally at the last minute, the nation was rescued from bourgeois democracy by the fraternal assistance of the Great Soviet Union. The Kádár government having done away both with the counterrevolution and left deviationism, the official thesis concluded, the road now lay open toward unlimited progress.³⁵

Because most Hungarian historians no longer could bring themselves to mouth such propaganda, they chose to say nothing about 1956, or when forced, dismissed it in a few words. It was a major breakthrough when, in the early 1980s, historians began to refer to 1956 not as a counterrevolution but as “the regrettable October events,” and it marked the beginning of the end of Communism when, in 1989, a historical commission appointed by the party pronounced the revolution to have been “a popular uprising.”³⁶

With regard to the Communist period as a whole, an interesting Western study is *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* by Charles Gati (1986). The story of the Hungarian Gulag has also been convincingly told by several former victims.³⁷ Western literature on 1956 is so enormous that I can only refer to certain types of historical treatment. There are, for instance, the documentary collections published by the Department of State, the U.S. Senate, the UN, and Radio Free Europe. There are also the several collections of fascinating refugee interviews and eyewitness accounts. Some of the best histories on 1956 are by reformist or revolutionary intellectuals; understandably, these authors emphasize the crucial role former party literati played in the revolution. There also exist a number of secondary histories of the revolution. In the category of special studies belong the Briton Bill Lomax’s history of 1956, which emphasizes the decisive role of the workers’ councils during and after the revolution, and Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller’s

³⁵ Ironically, one of the most characteristic examples of this type of writing, János Berecz, *1956 Counter-Revolution in Hungary: Words and Weapons*, appeared in 1986 in Budapest, when the term counterrevolution was no longer fashionable, not even in high party circles. The reason was the slowness of the translator and the publisher: the original Hungarian version was published in 1981. For an American variant of the official Hungarian approach, see Herbert Aptheker, *The Truth about Hungary* (New York, 1957). At least that book appeared a year after the revolution.

³⁶ Writing in 1986, party historians Sándor Balogh and Sándor Jakab still strongly condemn the Imre Nagy government in their *History of Hungary after the Second World War, 1944–1980* (Budapest, 1986), 143–52; but rather than using the term counterrevolution, they consistently refer to “the October events.” Going one step further, Hanák, *One Thousand Years* (1988), 237, tells the story of the revolution in a single dramatic sentence: “Hungarian society and its socialist system went through a profound and tragic crisis and only emerged from it at the cost of considerable sacrifice and losses.”

³⁷ Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham, N.C., 1986); George H. Hodos, *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948–1954* (New York, 1987); Endre Marton, *The Forbidden Sky* (Boston, 1971); Béla Szász, *Volunteers for the Gallows: Anatomy of a Show Trial*, trans. Kathleen Szász (London, 1971); and István Fehérváry, *The Long Road to Revolution: The Hungarian Gulag, 1945–1956* (Santa Fe, N.M., 1984).

Hungary 1956 Revisited (1983), which blames not only the USSR but also the Western powers for the Soviet intervention in Hungary and finds the original seeds of the 1956 tragedy in the conference at Yalta. Another favorite approach in dealing with 1956 has been retrospective essay collections, such as those edited by Béla K. Király, himself an important figure in the revolution.³⁸

As Communism mellowed in Hungary (despite occasional setbacks), cooperation between Western and “native” Hungarian historians became intense, and a number of émigré authors saw their work appear in Hungarian translation. The crowning achievement of this collaboration is *A History of Hungary* (1990), edited by American-Hungarian Peter Sugar and written by Hungarian, U.S., Canadian, and Austrian authors.

The step-by-step dismantling of the Marxist-Leninist edifice in historiography was the work primarily of a loose team of Hungarian historians operating under the informal guidance of György Ránki (1930–1988), deputy director of the Institute of History, who was in turn shielded by Zsigmond Pál Pach, the institute’s director. Ránki actually commuted in the 1980s between Budapest and Indiana University in Bloomington, where he held the Chair in Hungarian Studies. This, too, would have been inconceivable just a few years earlier, and it was still inconceivable at that time in most other Communist countries.

After Ránki’s untimely death, the mantle of reform was taken up by Ferenc Glatz, the new director of the Institute of History and also minister of education between 1988 and 1989. Another major innovation was the founding, in 1979, of the illustrated monthly journal *História*, which not only systematically questioned all the party taboos but brazenly presented its untraditional views to a nonprofessional audience of 60,000 subscribers. Due in part to György Ránki’s feverish activity, young historians began to spend a year or two studying in Paris, Mainz, Oxford, or the United States.

By the early 1980s, Marxism-Leninism no longer figured in books on history, not even as a “Red Tail,” that brief invocation of Marx, Engels, and Lenin long added as a kind of afterthought at the end of an otherwise non-Marxist book. Instead, historians embraced the *Annales* school or plunged into psychohistory, social, Foucaultian, and even gender history.³⁹

³⁸ United Nations, *General Assembly, Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, Report* (New York, 1957); Free Europe Committee, *The Revolt in Hungary: A Documentary Chronology of Events Based Exclusively on Internal Broadcasts by Central and Provincial Radios, October 23, 1956–November 4, 1956* (New York, [1957]); Tamás Aczél and Tibor Méray, *The Revolt of the Mind: A Case History of Intellectual Resistance behind the Iron Curtain* (New York, 1960); Tibor Méray, *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*, trans. Howard L. Katzander (New York, 1959); Miklós Molnár, *Budapest 1956* (London, 1971); Paul Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution* (Stanford, Calif., 1961); Ferenc A. Váli, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961); Paul E. Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary* (London, 1962); Bill Lomax, *Hungary 1956* (London, 1976); Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller, *Hungary 1956 Revisited: The Message of the Revolution—A Quarter of a Century After* (London, 1983); Tamás Aczél, ed., *Ten Years After: The Hungarian Revolution in the Perspective of History* (New York, 1967); and Béla K. Király and Paul Jónás, eds., *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect* (Boulder, Colo., 1978). I. L. Halász de Beky, comp., *A Bibliography of the Hungarian Revolution, 1956* (Toronto, 1963), lists 2,136 items that appeared within the first seven years after the revolution.

³⁹ See, for example, “Studies in Hungarian Social History,” published by the Institute on East Central Europe at Columbia University, with contributions by Mária M. Kovács, *The Politics of the Legal Profession in Interwar Hungary* (New York, 1987); György Lengyel, *The Hungarian Business Elite*

Indeed, there was no dogma that this most recent reform generation of historians found itself unwilling to question. The tone of the “Ten-Volume History of Hungary” changed with each new volume. Another unheard-of innovation was the publication, in 1986, of a three-volume “History of Transylvania,” which would have been inconceivable earlier, when the history of any region was the exclusive right of its Communist owner. Even though the editor of the “History of Transylvania” was Communist Hungary’s then-minister of culture, the book caused a storm of indignation in Ceaușescu’s Romania.⁴⁰ The Bucharest government placed a full-page advertisement in major Western dailies, including the April 7, 1987, issue of *The New York Times*, protesting this “Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,” a publicity coup for a scholarly book that, because of the editor’s fear of aggravating the lot of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, does not even treat the post-1918 period.

Among the many old-new subjects taken up by the reformist historians were an objective presentation of the life and times of Saint Stephen; church history, much neglected in the earlier Communist period; the rehabilitation—as opposed to the traditional Kossuth cult—of Count István Széchenyi; the continued reevaluation, in an increasingly favorable light, of the liberal Dualistic period; a more detached approach to the revolutions of 1918–1919, and, rather ironically, the rehabilitation of the Communist Béla Kun; the total re-thinking of the interwar years, with due respect paid to conservative-liberal political practices that survived the counterrevolution; and the reintroduction of the Jews as a subject worthy of study after several decades of hypocritical silence. In the last case, the main themes have been the role of Jews in business and culture, assimilation, past and present anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust.⁴¹

No sooner did these and other writers begin engaging in the Hungarian version of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, the attempt to overcome the past, than protests arose against the historians’ “dirtying their own nest.” Nevertheless, the impetus for an honest evaluation is strong, not only among radical intellectuals but also among the public at large. Many see the spiritual father of this process in sociologist István Bibó (1911–1979), who stood up to both fascism and Communism and, in

in *Historical Perspective* (New York, 1987); and Gábor Gyáni, *Women as Domestic Servants: The Case of Budapest, 1890–1940* (New York, 1989).

⁴⁰ Köpeczi, *Erdély története*.

⁴¹ György Györffy, *István király és műve* (Budapest, 1977); Spira, *Hungarian Count*; Péter Hanák in Péter Hanák, ed., *Magyarország története, 1890–1918*, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1988), chaps. 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7. (Note that this is Vol. 7 of the “History of Hungary in Ten Volumes.”) Also in the same book, Miklós Szabó on the political thought and culture of the period (chap. 12); Litván, *Szabó Ervin*; Hajdu, *Hungarian Soviet Republic*; Juhász, *Hungarian Foreign Policy*; Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *Liberális pártmozgalmak, 1931–1945* (Budapest, 1986); Péter Hanák, ed., *Zsidókérdés, asszimiláció, antiszemitizmus* (Budapest, 1984); Viktor Karády, “A magyar zsidóság helyzete az antiszemita törvények idején,” and articles by László Váradi, Mária Schmidt, Ferenc Erős, and others on the Holocaust, Jewish identity, etc., in *Medvetánc*, nos. 2–3 (1985). Also, Mária M. Kovács’ paper, “Jews and Hungarians: A View after the Transition” (Washington, D.C., 1992). Two fine Budapest journals, the *New Hungarian Quarterly* and the *Budapest Review of Books*, provide information, in English, on the intellectual currents and new publications in Hungary.

his writings, attempted to come to terms with Hungary's many social and ethical problems, including anti-Semitism.⁴²

Even before the collapse of Communism in 1989, there appeared a few fairly candid works on the post-World War II Communist takeovers and the systematic destruction of the democratic parties.⁴³ Today, with the old academic institutions and universities undergoing rapid transformation and many new international scientific institutions being set up in Budapest (the European Institute, Central European University), the historical profession increasingly resembles its Western counterparts. Historians pursue manifold goals without any central planning; research grants are now offered mainly by private institutions. There is a shortage of teaching positions, and salaries are impossibly low. The press is free, but fewer and fewer publishers are able and willing to publish good books. Many of the old state and quite a few of the new private publishers are bankrupt, while the prices of books are skyrocketing. The popularity of history is weakening but has not disappeared, and public debate continues on, for instance, the historic place of Hungary in Europe. In this respect, the major inspiration may have come from the Renaissance historian Jenő Szűcs (1928–1988), who argued that the East Central European states, including Hungary, constituted a separate entity between the West and the East, the latter having been formed under Russian and Byzantine influence. At a November 1990 meeting of Hungarian historians, Ferenc Szakály, a specialist in the Turkish period in Hungary, went so far as to say that, unlike Hungary, the independent Transylvanian principality had the distinct characteristics of Oriental despotism.⁴⁴

A long, drawn-out discussion on Hungarian nationhood is also taking place, the questions being what makes a nation and who are the Hungarians. Many are reluctant to accept the fact that a Hungarian, or a German, or a Russian, or a Jew is a person who considers himself or herself a member of that nation. What seems to motivate this debate is the still-lingering enmity between the "populist" and "urbanist" writers, which, according to some pessimists, has never amounted to more than the enmity of country-bred intellectuals toward their more sophisticated Jewish counterparts. This conflict is further aggravated by the populist, and popular, resentment of the vastly disproportional Jewish presence in the pre-1956 Stalinist leadership; conversely, the radical democratic dissidents, who had been instrumental in ending Communist rule in Hungary but who themselves were often children of former Stalinist leaders, resent the populists', and the people's, easy toleration of the Kádár regime.

SOME HISTORICAL ISSUES are becoming heavy with present-day political meaning. Marxist-Leninist historiography had rejected the traditional nationalist interpretation of the Trianon Treaty. Although it emphasized the imperialist nature of

⁴² See István Bibó, *Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination: Selected Writings*, Károly Nagy, ed. (Boulder, Colo., 1991).

⁴³ For instance, István Vida, *Koalíció és pártarcok, 1944–1948* (Budapest, 1986).

⁴⁴ See Jenő Szűcs, *Les trois Europes*, trans. Véronique Charaire, Gábor Klaniczay, and Philippe Thureau-Dangin (Paris, 1985). The debate took place in the "Central Europe Club—European Institute," Budapest, November 15, 1990.

the Paris peace treaties, it carefully abstained from even mentioning the territorial and minority problems the treaties had created. This servility toward the neighboring "fraternal socialist nations" was, in turn, rejected, in the 1980s, by such historians as Mária Ormos, L. Zsuzsa Nagy, and all those who were at a conference in 1990 on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Trianon Treaty. Going further, some historical publications now echo the nationalist interpretation of the interwar period.⁴⁵

For several decades, Marxist-Leninist historians had talked of "Horthy fascism." Such a vicious oversimplification was questioned by some historians, like Ignác Romsics, well before the collapse of the Communist system. This open criticism again was characteristic of Hungary's relatively smooth transition from Communism to democracy.⁴⁶ Today's problem is the tendency, especially of the popular press, to rehabilitate *en bloc* the Horthy regime, whose crimes were, after all, as numerous as its redeeming features.

Similarly, the evaluation of Hungary's role in World War II moved from wholesale condemnation to a much more nuanced evaluation by György Ránki, among other writers. The more recent right-wing view, not at all generally accepted, is that Hungary fought a war of self-defense and hence a just war between 1941 and 1945. Those who argue in such a way tend to forget, however, that it was Hungary that attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941.⁴⁷ Even István Bibó's post-World War II call for a national self-examination is only half-heartedly accepted by those who most often invoke the name of this great populist thinker. After all, some neo-nationalists maintain, Hungarians suffered so greatly under Communism and the moral basis of society was so gravely weakened that what the nation needs today is not more soul searching but a restoration of self-confidence.

It is, in truth, difficult to judge Hungary's wartime collaboration with Nazi Germany. Would more or would less collaboration have helped the country save more of its citizens and national wealth from destruction? Specifically, would more assiduous collaboration have spared the lives of half a million Jews? The Hungarian Holocaust occurred literally at the last minute, it must be remembered, and only after the Germans had gathered clear evidence of the Horthy government's desire to surrender to the Allies.⁴⁸ The debate on collaboration can and will be extended to the Communist era and promises to become part of a great East European *Historikerstreit*.

Now that even the Soviet Foreign Ministry archives are opening up in Moscow,

⁴⁵ See Ormos, *From Padua to the Trianon*; and Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *A Párizsi békekonferencia és Magyarország, 1918–1919* (Budapest, 1965). For a more radical condemnation of Trianon, see Ernő Raffay, *Trianon titkai: Avagy, Hogyan bántak el országunkkal* (Budapest, 1990).

⁴⁶ Ignác Romsics, *Bethlen István: Politikai életrajz* (Budapest, 1991). Bethlen, an "Old Right" conservative, was Hungary's prime minister between 1921 and 1931. Later, he became Regent Horthy's chief anti-Nazi adviser. Bethlen died in a Moscow prison either in 1946 or in 1947. Romsics wrote several essays on Bethlen before the appearance of this book.

⁴⁷ See, for instance, György Ránki, *A második világháború története* (Budapest, 1973). For a spirited defense of Hungary's role in World War II, see *Kommentár* (Budapest), May 1, 1990.

⁴⁸ On the possible connection between Hungary's attempt to leave the war in 1944, the German occupation of the country, and the Holocaust of Hungarian Jews, see Braham, *Politics of Genocide*; and István Deák, "Could the Hungarian Jews Have Survived," *New York Review of Books*, February 4, 1982. Also the exchange in the May 27, 1982, issue.

it will become increasingly possible to uncover what really happened in 1956. It has become clear, for instance, that János Kádár, much admired in the West for his "goulash Communism," was deeply involved in the judicial murder of fellow Communists and non-Communists in the late 1940s, then again in the wake of the 1956 Revolution. But such research, while important and necessary, is also controversial, for it skirts the boundaries of a criminal investigation. Today's debate centers on the role of the former Communist intellectuals around Imre Nagy, as opposed to the role of the young freedom fighters. What in 1956 amounted to a concerted struggle against the Stalinist leadership is seen by many today as a rivalry between those who, in the October days, wanted no more than to improve the socialist system and those who wished to achieve complete national independence.⁴⁹

What haunts Hungarians, finally, is the problem of the 3 million ethnic Hungarians in Romania, in the Czech and Slovak Federation, Ukraine, and what used to be Yugoslavia. Their fate in some of these countries, today especially in the Serbian-dominated Vojvodina, is a cause for serious concern. Yet the subject is also fraught with danger. Silence could be interpreted as indifference and the opposite as irredentism and unwanted intervention.

Hungary's present leadership is ideologically "national liberal," which makes it somewhat similar to the moderate Republicans in the United States. The right wing of the governing coalition is, however, vocally nationalistic, anti-Semitic, and increasingly critical of the West, specifically of the United States. There exists a small possibility that the past may be rewritten again, in an ultra-conservative and xenophobic vein. This is, however, only speculation. Today, freedom is unfettered in Hungary.

⁴⁹ A new high school textbook on the 1956 Revolution: György Litván, ed., *Az 1956-os magyar forradalom: Reform, felkelés, szabadságharc, megtorlás* (Budapest, 1991), has been criticized for overemphasizing the role of reformist Communist intellectuals.

Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Romania

KEITH HITCHINS

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTIES since the overthrow of the Ceaușescu dictatorship in December 1989 have raised urgent questions about the path of development Romania will take in the coming decade. The critical issue is whether the country will follow the Western example of a market economy and parliamentary democracy or choose another model closer to its agrarian socio-economic and Eastern cultural heritage. The controversy has rekindled a national debate of long standing about the nature of modern Romania and its place in Europe: whether, in effect, Romania belongs to the West or to the East. It has revolved especially around fundamental processes of nation-building that originated in the first half of the nineteenth century—the creation of new political and economic structures and integration into Europe. A review of these processes and the reaction of Romanians to them may serve to put the issues facing contemporary Romanian intellectuals and politicians in perspective.

From the early decades of the nineteenth century until World War II, the formation of a modern nation-state absorbed the energies of one generation after another of Romanians.¹ The achievement of national political goals had priority: from the preservation of autonomy for the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in the 1830s and 1840s down to the emergence of Greater Romania in 1918. At each stage, the initiative belonged to the Romanians. But crucial to their success was their ability to position themselves advantageously among the great powers, a strategy they themselves recognized was necessary in order to harmonize national aspirations and international realities. Although they sought support mainly from the West, they received no special treatment from that quarter, except when it suited Western purposes. At first, from the later decades of the eighteenth century to the 1830s, Romanian leaders relied on a single patron, Russia, whose policies had been the most effective in loosening the bonds of Ottoman Turkish domination, but they were not prepared to accept a Russian protectorate in its place.² During the 1830s and 1840s, Russia dissipated the good

¹ The most recent general history of the Romanians in English that emphasizes the period covered in this essay is Vlad Georgescu, *The Romanians: A History*, Alexandra Bley-Vroman, trans. (Columbus, Ohio, 1991).

² A thorough, even-handed survey of Russo-Romanian relations is Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821–1878* (Cambridge, 1984). There is much on Russian policy toward Moldavia and Wallachia and the Romanian reaction to it in Anastasie Iordache and Apostol Stan, *Apărarea autonomiei Principatelor române, 1821–1859* (Bucharest, 1987).

will it had accumulated as the liberator of Orthodox Christians from Muslim rule by its heavy-handed interference in Romanian internal affairs. The Russophobia that afterward became a constant in Romanian foreign relations dates from this period. It was soon reinforced in 1848 when a Russian army destroyed a fledgling experiment in liberalism and independence in Wallachia.

Largely as a consequence of the Russian experience, Romanian politicians and intellectuals sought to replace dependence on a single power by a collective guarantee from all the powers. Their action represented a definitive shift in foreign policy away from the East toward the West, especially toward France. They also looked to the West to support their efforts to bring about the union of Moldavia and Wallachia, which they judged an essential step toward full independence. The crisis in international relations caused by the Crimean War gave the Romanians the opportunity they sought. In the Treaty of Paris of 1856, the victors in effect abolished the Russian protectorate and established the mechanism by which the Romanians themselves might have a voice in deciding their future form of government. When the great powers rejected the union of Moldavia and Wallachia, Romanian leaders, backed by a surge of public enthusiasm, brought about *de facto* union in 1859 by electing the same man, Alexandru Cuza, prince of each principality. Cuza himself completed the administrative union of the principalities in 1861, and the powers acquiesced in what seemed an inevitable sequence of events. It was through a similar combination of great-power bickering and Romanian initiative that independence was secured in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin and the Kingdom of Romania proclaimed and recognized in 1881.³ The settlement of these matters left a residue of bitterness on the Romanian side, for independence had been won at a high price. The Romanians had had to cede southern Bessarabia to Russia, despite their claims that the tsar's ministers had promised to respect the territorial integrity of their country. They had also been forced by the Western powers to change the country's constitution in order to allow Jews the opportunity to acquire full rights of citizenship.⁴

For the next three decades, until World War I, Romanian leaders abandoned the policy of reliance on collective action by the great powers to promote national interests. Their belief that their country had been ill-used by Russia and the other powers during the Eastern crisis of 1875–1878 and their perception of the international situation as uncertain and hostile to newly independent states

³ The literature on the crucial period between the union of the principalities and independence is abundant. Thad W. Riker, *The Making of Roumania: A Study of an International Problem, 1856–1866* (London, 1931), remains a fundamental account of the policies of the great powers. A recent critical investigation of relations between the powers and Romania from a Romanian perspective is Gheorghe Cliveti, *România și puterile garante 1856–1878* (Jassy, 1988). Indispensable for many aspects of nation-building is Lothar Maier, *Rumänien auf dem Weg zur Unabhängigkeitserklärung, 1866–1877* (Munich, 1989). As for Russo-Romanian relations between 1875 and 1878 and, in particular, the dispute over southern Bessarabia, an able presentation of Russian objectives is Mikhail Zalyshkin, *Vneshniaia politika Rumynii i rumyno-russkie otnosheniia, 1875–1878* (Moscow, 1974). Gheorghe I. Brătianu, *Le problème des frontières russo-roumaines pendant la guerre de 1877–1878 et au Congrès de Berlin* (Bucharest, 1928), analyzes Romanian policy.

⁴ The literature on the Jews of Romania during the period is lacking in impartiality. Hostility to Jews is manifested in such works as Verax [Radu D. Rosetti], *La Roumanie et les Juifs* (Bucharest, 1903). Anti-Semitism is denounced in Carol Iancu, *Les Juifs en Roumanie, 1866–1919: De l'exclusion à l'émancipation* (Aix-en-Provence, 1978).

persuaded them to bind their country to powerful allies. King Charles I and his prime minister therefore agreed to join the Triple Alliance in 1883, which they judged to be the most powerful bloc of states on the Continent. This commitment served as the foundation of Romania's foreign policy until 1914, despite a manifest sympathy for France among both politicians and the general public.⁵

With the achievement of independence, Romanian leaders could pursue more aggressively another significant task of nation-building—the joining to the kingdom of the some 2,800,000 Romanians in Hungary (the historical principality of Transylvania and the adjoining Banat, Crișana, and Maramureș regions), the 230,000 in Austria (Bukovina), and the 1,000,000 in Russia (Bessarabia). Although Romanian governments between the 1890s and World War I were circumspect in handling the nationality problem in their two powerful neighbors, the rising level of irredentist sentiments at home was a constant reminder of how fragile the partnership with Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance had become and how slight the sympathy for Russia remained.

Of the three communities, the Romanians of Bukovina and Bessarabia were perhaps the least fortunate. Cut off abruptly from their Moldavian homeland (the former when Austria occupied northern Moldavia in 1774 and the latter when Russia annexed that part of Moldavia between the Prut and Dniester rivers in 1812), they were subject almost at once to centralization. They could not participate in politics as distinct ethnic communities, and their cultural life was under constant pressure from unsympathetic bureaucracies. Yet a national consciousness, at least among the educated, remained alive and manifested itself vigorously in 1917 and 1918.⁶

The Romanians of Transylvania made the strongest defense of nationality.⁷ Their political leaders formed the Romanian National Party in 1881 to coordinate the preservation of political and cultural autonomy in the face of efforts by successive Hungarian governments to assimilate the non-Magyar nationalities.

⁵ On Romania's relations with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Ernst Ebel, *Rumänien und die Mittelmächte* (Berlin, 1939), retains its value as a survey based on published diplomatic sources. It may be supplemented by Gheorghe Nicolae Căzan and Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *Rumänien und der Dreibund, 1878–1914* (Bucharest, 1983). Uta Bindreiter, *Die diplomatischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Rumänien in den Jahren 1875–88* (Vienna, 1976), traces the links between trade, politics, and nationalism in Austro-Hungarian–Romanian relations. Relatively little has been published on Romania's relations with France during the period. Vasile Vesa, *Les relations politiques roumano-françaises au début du XX^e siècle (1900–1916)* (Bucharest, 1986), is a useful introduction devoted mainly to the period of the war.

⁶ The writing of up-to-date, impartial, and comprehensive histories of the Romanians of each province is a pressing task for scholars. On Bukovina, one may consult Erich Prokopowitsch, *Die rumänische Nationalbewegung in der Bukowina und der Dako-romanismus* (Graz, 1965). On Bessarabia, there is *Istoria Moldavskoi SSR*, vol. 1 (Kishinev, 1965), which ignores Moldavian (that is, Romanian) political and intellectual movements and treats the Moldavians as part of the broader Russian society. The standard Romanian work remains Ion Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei: Scriere de popularizare* (Cernăuți, 1923).

⁷ The most recent of numerous surveys of the controversial nationality problem in Transylvania before World War I are Ștefan Pascu, *Făurirea statului național unitar român 1918*, vol. 1 (Bucharest, 1983), which sets forth a Romanian viewpoint, and Béla Köpeczi, ed., *Erdély története*, vol. 3 (1830–tól napjainkig) (Budapest, 1986), which presents the Romanian national movement within the context of Transylvania as a part of Hungary. Of particular value is Cornelia Bodea and Hugh Seton-Watson, eds., *R. W. Seton-Watson and the Romanians, 1906–1920*, 2 vols. (Bucharest, 1988), which contains the correspondence and other writings of the famous journalist and historian.

Largely as a consequence of these actions, the idea that Romanians and Magyars were natural allies destined to stand together “in a sea of Slavs and Germans” gave way to bitterness and intransigence. The Romanians were sustained by a new idea of nation that justified self-determination. Formulated in the 1890s by Aurel C. Popovici, a leading advocate of the federalization of the Habsburg Monarchy and much influenced by Social Darwinism, it likened the ethnic nation to a living organism endowed by nature with a right to develop in accordance with its unique attributes.⁸ Iuliu Maniu, on behalf of the Romanian National Party, took the idea of nation further by insisting that it knew no political boundaries and had united Romanians everywhere in a struggle to achieve national fulfillment.⁹ It was a view shared by many intellectuals and politicians in the Romanian kingdom. Inevitably, Romanian aspirations to self-determination could not be reconciled with the determination of Hungarian political leaders to transform multinational Hungary into a Magyar national state. Negotiations between 1910 and 1914 to effect a compromise failed, for by then both sides were certain that national survival itself was at stake.¹⁰

Greater Romania came into being primarily in response to specific conditions prevailing in each of the territories inhabited by Romanians, rather than by successes on the battlefield. (Romania had entered World War I in 1916 on the Allied side in order to gain Transylvania and Bukovina, but German and Austro-Hungarian armies had prevailed.) First in Bessarabia in 1917 and 1918 as a result of the chaos created by the Russian Revolution and then in Transylvania and Bukovina as Austria-Hungary disintegrated, Romanian political leaders rallied public opinion to demand union with Romania and called for the Romanian army to support them. The resulting territorial acquisitions more than doubled the size of the country to 296,000 square kilometers and increased the population from 8,500,000 to over 16,000,000. The acquisitions were sanctioned, though not without rancor, by the major Allied powers in the peace treaties of 1919 and 1920.¹¹ The great majority of Romanians were now included within the new borders (only some 600,000 remained outside). Territorially, the nation-state had thus become a reality.

An essential aspect of nation-building was the creation of new political institutions. The general tendency between the early decades of the nineteenth century and the 1930s was toward rationalization in administration and an alignment of government as a whole with Western models.¹² In the 1830s, the Organic Statutes,

⁸ Aurel C. Popovici, *Principiul de naționalitate* (Bucharest, 1894), 21.

⁹ Iuliu Maniu, *Discursuri parlamentare* (Blaj, 1906), 76–77.

¹⁰ Keith Hitchins, “The Nationality Problem in Hungary: István Tisza and the Rumanian National Party, 1910–1914,” *Journal of Modern History*, 53 (December 1981): 619–51.

¹¹ The often bitter relations between Romania and the Big Four at Versailles are discussed by Sherman D. Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I. C. Brătianu* (New York, 1962).

¹² The most extensive survey of Romanian parliamentary institutions and activity between the 1830s and 1918 is Paraschiua Căncea, Mircea Iosa, and Apostol Stan, eds., *Istoria parlamentului și a vieții parlamentare din România pînă la 1918* (Bucharest, 1983). Indispensable for Romanian thought on constitutional theory and practice is the collection of essays written by leading public figures during the drafting of the Constitution of 1923 and published by Institutul Social Român, *Noua Constituție a României și nouile constituții europene* (Bucharest, 1923). Solid studies of political parties before World War I are Apostol Stan, *Grupări și curente politice în România între unire și independență*

in effect constitutions, one each for Moldavia and Wallachia, laid solid foundations for systematic government and confirmed the principle of representation in a legislative assembly, at least for the upper classes. During the springtime of peoples in 1848, Moldavian and Wallachian revolutionaries drafted constitutions guaranteeing citizens fundamental political and civil rights and expanding their participation in public affairs. Although the liberal government established to bring these principles to fruition in Wallachia was short-lived, just two decades later they were embodied in a new fundamental law, the Constitution of 1866, which provided a stable framework for the development of political life until the eve of World War II. The accession of the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen dynasty, also in 1866, enhanced political stability by providing firm direction for both internal and foreign policy. Then, in the following decade, disparate political groupings coalesced into the two main parties—the National Liberal and the Conservative—which infused life into the parliamentary institutions outlined in the constitution. After World War I, political structures were adapted to the needs of the expanded nation-state in the Constitution of 1923. But the expectations of political continuity proved illusory as a drift toward authoritarian government gained momentum in the 1930s. The inabilities of parliamentary government and of traditional political parties to deal with the world economic depression and other crises have often been cited as causes of the weakening of democracy. But many critics also detected a fatal flaw in the political structure itself—the middle-class character of the constitutions of 1866 and 1923, which had been drawn up for a country in which the middle class constituted only a narrow stratum of the population. As a consequence, critics pointed out, the operation of sophisticated political machinery lay not with an enlightened and experienced citizenry but was left to a small circle of professional politicians and a peasant majority lacking in education and experience whom the politicians could manipulate at will.

POLITICIANS AND INTELLECTUALS beginning in the later decades of the nineteenth century undertook another essential task of nation-building—the transformation of an overwhelmingly agricultural economy into one based on industry and the city.¹³ The results were mixed. Agriculture remained the foundation of the

(1859–1877) (Bucharest, 1979); and Ion Bulei, *Sistemul politic al României moderne: Partidul Conservator* (Bucharest, 1987). Of great value in assessing political programs and ideologies in the interwar period are the essays in Institutul Social Român, *Doctrinile partidelor politice* (Bucharest, 1923). The drift toward authoritarianism in the 1930s is amply covered in Armin Heinen, *Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien: Soziale Bewegung und politische Organisation* (Munich, 1986), now the standard work on the Iron Guard. Also valuable on the nature of the Iron Guard is Eugen Weber, "Romania," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., *The European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley, Calif., 1965), 501–74.

¹³ An indispensable guide to Romania's economic development in the interwar period is Henry L. Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven, Conn., 1951). David Turnock, *The Romanian Economy in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1986), provides up-to-date details. Essential reading is Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial* (Bucharest, 1940), an exhaustive survey of all the major branches of the Romanian interwar economy by a master economic thinker and a leading figure in the Peasantist movement. On agriculture and agrarian reform and its

economy until World War II. It provided the bulk of the national income and the primary means of livelihood for almost 80 percent of the population. Striking, too, was the persistence of tradition. The organization of agriculture changed but little after the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Its characteristic feature remained "peasant agriculture," a system of production carried on by individual peasant families on small holdings. On the whole, it was primitive in technology and methods and burdened by overpopulation and debt, conditions perpetuated in large measure by a concentration on the production of grain for export. Not even the extensive land reforms of the 1920s significantly altered the traditional patterns of production, despite clear evidence that they impeded progress. The reforms that governments did introduce in the interwar period, such as support for cooperatives, an expansion of rural credit, and the promotion of industrial crops, benefited almost exclusively the relatively small number of prosperous peasants.

Industry from the 1890s on experienced steady growth. Output in some branches, such as oil, metallurgy, and chemicals, was impressive. The driving force behind industrialization was a small industrial and banking elite with close links to major political parties, especially the National Liberals, who had made the creation of a modern industry their primary economic goal in nation-building. Characteristic of the interwar period was the increasing intervention of the state to accelerate economic growth in general and promote industry in particular. Although it respected private ownership and allowed private capital numerous advantages, the government arrogated to itself the role of planning and supervising what came to be called the "national economy." The state, in effect, assumed the economic functions that the middle class had exercised in Western Europe during the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the development of industry was uneven. Significant gaps remained: for example, industry could not produce all the machines it needed for its own continued growth, and in technology the majority of its plants remained behind those of the West. Another persistent obstacle to the development of industry was the inability of the domestic market to absorb its products because of the low standard of living and the consequent diminished purchasing power of the majority of the population. Thus industrial growth in many sectors depended more on state support than on consumer demand.

Romanian nation-building not only touched political and economic structures but also involved the integration of minorities and the dispossessed majority, the peasantry, into the general social fabric. Little progress was made in the interwar period. Problems of social integration had been aggravated by the acquisition of new territories at the end of World War I because with them came substantial minorities. In 1920, approximately 30 percent of the population was ethnically

consequences, the fullest account in English remains David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania: The War and Agrarian Reform (1917-21)* (London, 1930). It may be supplemented by D. Șandru, *Reforma agrară din 1921 în România* (Bucharest, 1975); and Vasile Bozga, *Criza agrară în România dintre cele două războaie mondiale* (Bucharest, 1975). Marcela Felicia Iovanelli, *Industria românească, 1934-1938* (Bucharest, 1975), describes the successes and shortcomings of industrialization and the limits of state intervention.

non-Romanian compared to 8 percent before the war. The Hungarians of Transylvania, who composed 29 percent of the population of the historical principality, strove to maintain a separate political and cultural identity in Greater Romania and resisted integration into the broader Romanian society. For their part, the Romanian government and Romanian nationalist organizations, ever wary of irredentism, rejected Hungarian claims to autonomy.¹⁴ The Jews of Greater Romania, some 730,000, or 4 percent of the total population in 1930, had traditionally been treated as foreigners and in the 1930s had to confront virulent forms of anti-Semitism and government-sponsored discrimination.¹⁵ The majority of peasants also fell into the category of outsiders. Dependent on the yields of inadequate holdings, they led a substandard existence characterized by inadequate diet, rudimentary housing, and poor or nonexistent health care. Government programs brought only slight improvements in their condition.¹⁶

A fundamental component of nation-building was the Romanians' growing relationship with Western Europe.¹⁷ Economic contacts were of paramount importance initially in drawing Romania out of the relative isolation imposed by Ottoman suzerainty. Relations grew steadily after the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829 between Russia and the Ottoman empire, in which the Ottomans renounced their centuries-old commercial monopoly over Moldavia and Wallachia and thereby opened the principalities' markets and raw materials to international trade. Exchanges between Romania and Western Europe (including Austria-Hungary and Germany) expanded dramatically between the 1870s and World War I, when Romanian exports tripled and imports quadrupled, clear evidence of Romania's integration into the international economic system. The same dynamic rhythm of trade with Western Europe continued in the interwar period. Romania's exports on the whole were those of a predominantly agricultural country—grain, animals, and lumber, which along with oil constituted over 85 percent of total exports in 1937. Manufactured goods and machinery made up the bulk of imports, but in the 1930s significant changes occurred in the general pattern. The share of semi-processed goods and raw materials increased, because of progress

¹⁴ Works on the Hungarians of Transylvania in the interwar period are abundant but are almost all polemical. Imre Mikó, *Huszonkét év: Az Erdélyi Magyarok politikai története 1918. December 1-től 1940. Augusztus 30-ig*. (Budapest, 1941), is a detailed and sympathetic survey of their political organization and objectives. The Romanian point of view is sustained by Silviu Dragomir, *La Transylvanie roumaine et ses minorités ethniques* (Bucharest, 1934).

¹⁵ An impartial monograph on the Jews of Romania in the interwar period has yet to be written. Representative of much anti-Jewish writing is Anastase N. Hâciu, *Evreii în Țările Românești* (Bucharest, 1943). An indictment of anti-Semitism by a leader of the Jewish community is W. Filderman, *Adevărul asupra problemei evreiești din România* (Bucharest, 1925).

¹⁶ An indispensable introduction to almost every aspect of the peasant condition, except religion, is D. Șandru, *Populația rurală a României între cele două războaie mondiale* (Jassy, 1980).

¹⁷ On economic relations with Western Europe, I. Puia, *Relațiile economice externe ale României în perioada interbelică* (Bucharest, 1982), provides the necessary data within the general context of economic development. Maurice Pearton, *Oil and the Romanian State* (Oxford, 1971), describes the Western presence in the oil industry; and Constanța Bogdan and Adrian Platon, *Capitalul străin în societățile anonime din România în perioada interbelică* (Bucharest, 1981), make a minute investigation of the size and effects of foreign investments in Romanian industry, especially 1934–1938. On Western European influence on Romanian political institutions, see Alexandre Tilman-Timon, *Les influences étrangères sur le droit constitutionnel roumain* (Paris, 1946).

in industrialization and the growing capacity of domestic industry to satisfy consumer demand.

The role of the West in the growth of Romanian industry was mixed. By exporting massive quantities of processed goods to Romania, it hastened the demise of traditional artisan crafts in the nineteenth century and retarded the development of a modern industry. But, at the same time, the transfer of technology and substantial investments of capital spurred industrialization. Large-scale investments began after Romania achieved independence in 1878, and by World War I foreign capital had become predominant in numerous industries, especially oil, gas and electricity, metallurgy, and chemicals. Foreign capital retained a significant share of industry in the interwar period, but by 1938 the Romanian industrial and financial elite had increased its own capital holdings in industry overall to about 60 percent.

Romania's economic relationship with Western Europe was clearly one of dependence. Essential to the country's well-being was the sale of large quantities of agricultural products and other raw materials. Thus the loss of international markets during the depression of the early 1930s, for instance, brought severe economic hardship at home. Dependence on exports discouraged reforms in agriculture because it tended to reinforce the traditional structures of inefficient, peasant agriculture. As for industry, although Romanian industrialists and bankers, aided by the National Liberal Party, tried to extend their control over the national economy by limiting the participation of foreign capital, Romania continued to be a large importer of capital and thus remained dependent on Western investments to propel the economy forward.

Western Europe also exerted a decisive influence on Romanian political institutions. Beginning in the 1830s, the Romanian intellectual and political elite traveled regularly to the West, mainly to France and Germany, for higher education. For a century, they drew inspiration and ideas directly or indirectly from all the ideologies current in Europe, from Romanticism and liberalism to the various strains of nationalism and conservatism. In institution-building, too, the West stood as the example: the Constitution of 1866 was modeled on the Belgian constitution of 1831, the main codes of law were inspired by French codes, and parliamentary structures drew heavily on Western experience.

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COURSE ON WHICH ROMANIA EMBARKED in the 1830s almost immediately provoked controversy among Romanian intellectuals. Their concern centered on the massive intrusion of Western Europe into Romanian society, a process that compelled them to confront fundamental questions of who they were as Romanians and what path of development was best suited to the national genius. As the debate intensified, two general currents of ideas became discernible, one that held Romania to be a part of Europe and thus destined to develop economically and socially in ways similar to the urbanized and industrialized West and the other that emphasized the country's inherent agrarian character and the consequent need to cleave to tradition.

In the course of a century, until World War II, both the “traditionalists” and the “Europeanists,” as adherents of the two currents came to be called, displayed a remarkable continuity of thought.¹⁸ The traditionalists insisted that Romania had always been and would remain a predominantly agricultural country. They focused their attention on the small peasant producer as the pillar of a vital economic and social order, and they extolled the village as the preserver of “healthy” tradition and “authentic” national values. Thus certain that Western Europe, urbanized and industrialized, could never serve Romania as a model of development, they decried the turn their country had taken in the nineteenth century when it adopted “wholesale” Western political and economic institutions. The Europeanists came to strikingly different conclusions. They had no doubt whatever that Romania was a part of Europe and would inevitably follow the same course of development as the West. They insisted that Romania had taken the right path in the nineteenth century by opening the doors wide to European ideas and institutions, and they predicted that their country would become more urban and more industrial and that the middle class would grow and rightfully assume leadership in a modern nation-state.

The first systematic criticism of the direction that modern Romania had taken came from a group of young intellectuals who in the 1860s and later argued that their country had entered the European economic and cultural world too precipitously, borrowing and imitating without regard for indigenous customs and experience. Known as Junimists (from *junime*, youth), they argued that such contact with Europe had been harmful precisely because it had touched only the surface of Romanian society.¹⁹ Much indebted to European historicist and evolutionist thought, they perceived in recent Romanian history a fateful deviation from the principles of organic social development that had led to a “paralyzing antinomy” between the form and substance of Romania’s institutions. Titu Maiorescu (1840–1917), the leading theorist of Junimism, put the matter in stark terms: in appearance, the Romanians had acquired almost the whole of Western civilization, but in reality their politics, science, and literature had been stillborn, “phantoms without bodies” and “forms without substance.”²⁰ He discovered a fundamental incongruity between the institutions and the social structure of contemporary Romania. In his view, there were only two classes in Romanian society—landlords and peasants—but the political and economic forms borrowed from the West were the products of profound changes that had brought the bourgeoisie to power. Yet, he claimed, Romania had no bourgeoisie, and hence its political and economic structures lacked substance. Although Maiorescu and other Junimists were eager to move their country toward a modern civilization patterned on the Western model, they were certain that they

¹⁸ Discussions of the main issues dividing traditionalists and Europeanists are to be found in Kenneth Jowitt, ed., *Social Change in Romania, 1860–1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation* (Berkeley, Calif., 1978); and Z. Ornea, *Tradiționalism și modernitate în deceniul al treilea* (Bucharest, 1980).

¹⁹ The most complete account of Junimism from a sociological perspective is Z. Ornea, *Junimea și junimismul* (Bucharest, 1975).

²⁰ Titu Maiorescu, “În contra direcțiunii de astăzi a culturii române,” *Convorbiri Literare*, 2 (December 1, 1868): 305–06.

could accomplish their goal without changing traditional social and economic structures, since they foresaw the continued predominance of agriculture in the economy and society and dismissed industry as merely the artificial creation of foreigners and foreign capital.

Arguments similar to those of the Junimists in their analysis of nineteenth-century Romania formed the core of all subsequent traditionalist theories of nationhood and development. At the turn of the century, burgeoning agrarianist writers were the most fervent promoters of traditionalism. The Sămănătorists (from *sămănător*, sower) insisted that Romania had been diverted onto a "false path" in the early nineteenth century by politicians and intellectuals who had abruptly broken with the country's agrarian past.²¹ They discovered in such a thoughtless act the underlying cause of all the contradictions in contemporary Romanian society. Their principal spokesman, historian Nicolae Iorga (1871–1940), vehemently denounced capitalism as an "unnatural implantation" into an agrarian society that lived by economic and social laws of its own. For him, the great city was the symbol of everything that had gone awry in the evolution of nineteenth-century Romania. It was the place where capitalist industry and commerce flourished and where the new social and economic order that was undermining traditional society drew its nourishment. He found the whole process by which modern Romania had come into being artificial, an "exercise in ideology" imposed on a people who until then had followed a "natural, organic evolution."

Sharing a similar vision of an agrarian Romania and dismay at the course of development it had taken were the Poporanists (or Populists, from *popor*, people).²² Their leading theorist, the lawyer and journalist Constantin Stere (1865–1936), praised rural civilization as organic and authentic and rejected urban civilization as an import and hence inorganic. A rural life, he insisted, was the only social and political form for Romania; the peasant was the "whole man" and the village the only place where he could flourish. Aware of the peril that Western capitalism and industry posed for an agrarian society, Stere was nonetheless certain that an economic and social system based on small-scale peasant agriculture and operating in accordance with categories and values of its own could withstand the onslaught.²³

In the two decades after World War I, the traditionalists drew sustenance from general European currents of thought opposed to rationalism and scientific positivism. They turned for guidance to, among others, Nietzsche, whose anti-rationalism fascinated them, and Spengler, whose theories about the inevitable decline of civilizations, notably the West, provided them with welcome analytical tools. Strikingly new in their own thought was an emphasis on Eastern Orthodox spirituality as the essential component of Romanian ethnic consciousness. They discerned in Orthodoxy the primary support of the organic way of life preserved in the Romanian village. This fusion of Eastern Christianity and the folk tradition

²¹ Z. Ornea, *Sămănătorismul*, 2d edn. (Bucharest, 1971), is comprehensive and critical.

²² The most extensive study is Z. Ornea, *Poporanismul* (Bucharest, 1972).

²³ Constantin Stere, "Social-democratism sau poporanism?" *Viața Românească*, 2 (September 1, 1907): 327–34; (October 1, 1907): 17–18; 3 (April 1, 1908): 59–60.

laid the foundations of Orthodoxy, a characteristic expression of Romanian identity in the interwar period.²⁴

The founder of Orthodoxy was theologian and journalist Nichifor Crainic (1889–1972). He insisted that the sources of Romanian spirituality, and hence the element that defined the Romanian national character and had determined the evolution of Romanian society until the nineteenth century, had originated in Byzantium. Thus he showed no hesitation in placing the Romanians squarely in the East. But his reverence for the East was balanced by a total rejection of the West; he found every aspect of modern Western society and thought incompatible with the national character. Proclaiming the differences between the Orthodox East and the Roman Catholic and Protestant West “insurmountable” and “eternal,” like traditionalists before him, he blamed the liberals of 1848 and the authors of the Constitution of 1866 for having forced Western ideas and institutions on a society structurally incapable of assimilating them.

Crainic found a theoretical justification for his hostility to the West in the antinomy “civilization” and “culture.” Borrowing extensively from Spengler, he adopted the thesis that the West (civilization), because of its embrace of science and materialism, had entered the period of old age and decline. He identified the distinctive sign of its crisis as the “world city,” Berlin or New York, “centers of death,” an environment of “unrelieved materialism” and “colorless internationalism” that deprived people of a creative sense, leaving them sterile, “without metaphysics.”²⁵ Crainic complained that Romanian liberals had introduced the spirit of the modern city into the world of the patriarchal Romanian village and had imposed a polished civilization dominated by scientific positivism on a culture of “primitive youth,” delicate and almost childlike in its feelings, whose means of expression was religion. The results, he lamented, were everywhere to be seen in the “chaos” of contemporary Romanian society, and he could foresee no other salvation for the Romanians except a return to the “native genius” and the “autochthonous spirit,” that is, a revitalization of spiritual life based on the Eastern tradition.

Allied spiritually to Crainic was Nae Ionescu (1888–1940), a professor of philosophy at the University of Bucharest and the chief theorist of *trăirism* (from *trăire*, living), the Romanian variant of existentialism. He stood in the forefront of the anti-rationalist current in Romanian thought in the interwar period and exerted a stunning influence on the generation of intellectuals who began their careers in the 1920s, including Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran.²⁶ Ionescu proclaimed the bankruptcy of positivism and insisted that the world was guided by forces intractable to man’s cognitive powers. Life was a spontaneous gushing forth of the human spirit that reason was powerless to contain. This certainty of

²⁴ An extensive, though one-sided, account of Orthodoxy may be found in Dumitru Micu, *“Gîndirea” și gîndirismul* (Bucharest, 1975). See Mac Linscott Ricketts, *Mircea Eliade: The Romanian Roots, 1907–1945*, 2 vols. (Boulder, Colo., 1988), for a comprehensive introduction to the anti-rationalist currents in Romanian intellectual life in the interwar period.

²⁵ Nichifor Crainic, “Parsifal,” *Gîndirea*, 3 (January 20, 1924): 181–82.

²⁶ For Ionescu’s influence on the young generation of Romanian intellectuals, see Mircea Eliade’s comments in Nae Ionescu, *Roza vînturilor, 1926–1933* (Bucharest, 1937), 421–44; and Ricketts, *Mircea Eliade*, 1: 91–126.

the primacy of exuberant life over the intellect led Ionescu to religious faith. Only the existence of God and his intervention in phenomena, he taught, relieved the world of its character as an "absurd anarchy."

Ionescu found a refuge from the absurdities of contemporary society in the Romanian village, for it was here that the soul prevailed over the mind and the Romanian peasant stood in direct communion with the essential nature of things. Orthodoxy, he thought, had been primarily responsible for shaping the attitude of the peasant toward life and thus for creating a specifically Romanian view of the world. Like Crainic, Ionescu traced the intimate relationship between Orthodoxy and the village back to the coming of Christianity to ancient Dacia in the first century, and he judged the influence of Eastern Christianity to have been so profound that it became a part of the Romanians' very being; or, as he put it, "we are Orthodox because we are Romanian, and we are Romanian because we are Orthodox."²⁷

This blending of ethnicity and Eastern spirituality led Ionescu to conclude that fundamental, unbridgeable structural differences separated the Romanians from Western society. He found in Roman Catholic and Protestant Europe the stark antithesis to Romanian peasant society; the West was individualist in social relations, rationalist in intellectual preoccupations, and bourgeois-capitalist in economic structures. He stridently denounced the institutions of bourgeois Europe as artificial creations based on purely "juridical" relationships between groups and individuals. The institutions of the Romanian village, on the other hand, he pronounced "organic" structures, which had preserved Romanians' easy integration into nature and their community and had enhanced their receptivity to the mystery of existence. Such qualities, Ionescu insisted, explained why Romania could never become industrial: Romanians lacked the spirit of calculation and the discipline of work that were the foundations of modern, urban, capitalist society.

Traditionalists of a different sort were the Peasantists (Țărăniști, from *țăran*, peasant). They were concerned primarily with the material well-being of rural society and stood for a Romania economically and politically in harmony with its predominantly agrarian structures.²⁸ Like the Poporanists, they held peasant agriculture to be by its very nature noncapitalist, and they struggled to keep capitalism from penetrating the organization of agriculture, out of fear that it would destroy everything distinctive and genuine in the Romanian way of life. But they also made original contributions to the debate about Romania's development, notably the elaboration by economist Virgil Madgearu (1887–1940) of the doctrine of agrarian Romania as a third world situated between the capitalist West and the collectivist East (the Soviet Union).²⁹

Madgearu's theory was based on the assumption that the peasant family holding was a unique, noncapitalist mode of production and constituted the

²⁷ Ionescu, *Roza vînturilor*, 205.

²⁸ The best source for Peasantist economic and social doctrine is Virgil Madgearu, *Agrarianism, Capitalism, Imperialism* (Bucharest, 1936). Z. Ornea, *Țărănismul: Studiu sociologic* (Bucharest, 1969), is an ample survey intended to reveal the contradictions between Peasantist theory and the lamentable reality of peasant agriculture.

²⁹ Virgil Madgearu, "Teoria economiei țărănești," *Independența Economică*, 8 (1925): 1–20.

foundation of Romania's national economy. In formulating it, he was indebted to the Poporanists for fundamental ideas about the nature of peasant agriculture. But he also drew extensively on the writings of Russian agricultural economist Aleksandr Chaianov, especially *Die Lehre von der bäuerlichen Wirtschaft*,³⁰ which provided the theoretical foundation for Madgearu's analysis of the Romanian family holding. He was attracted particularly to Chaianov's arguments about the qualitative differences existing between peasant agriculture on the one hand and the large-scale, capitalist agricultural enterprise on the other. Madgearu insisted that peasant holdings, despite their technological inferiority to the large capitalist farm, had not only not disappeared but had, in fact, become stronger. He discerned the key to that strength in the special quality of the peasant holding—production by the family. That economic activity, he maintained, was governed by laws of its own, especially a different conception of gain and a different economic psychology from those of the capitalist enterprise. He had to admit that capitalism dominated the contemporary world economy; but beside it and separate from it, he claimed, existed an agriculture with its own distinctive mode of production and social organization.

In his last major work, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial* (The Evolution of the Romanian Economy after the World War),³¹ Madgearu could discern no fundamental change in the structure of the Romanian economy in the interwar period: the capitalist sector in general was still small; in his view, capitalism as a mode of production had touched only a few branches of industry in a significant way and agriculture maintained its predominance. He concluded that there was still no possibility that the Romanian economy could be integrated into the world capitalist system, for its structure continued to be determined by several million peasant holdings, which formed an economic network governed by values qualitatively different from those of a capitalist economy. Nonetheless, he could not ignore the fact that Western capitalism exerted a powerful influence over Romanian agriculture. Although he continued to deny that it had transformed the mode of production of peasant holdings, he admitted that it had penetrated the mechanism of distribution and, as a consequence, had subordinated the "whole essence" of the peasant holding to the capitalist market.³²

Madgearu displayed considerable reserve toward Western European political institutions. As in economic development, he made a sharp distinction between the Eastern and Western experience. This comparative approach persuaded him that his brand of peasant democracy would in the long run prove superior to the "bourgeois" form that had evolved in Western Europe. The economic crisis of the early 1930s had crystallized his thought on the subject. Certain that the "bourgeois-liberal social order" was in decline, he perceived as the main cause a striking contradiction in Western society, exacerbated by the recent depression. He saw an infrastructure based on economic and social inequality on the one hand and, on the other, a democratic superstructure based on equality before the law and

³⁰ A. V. Chaianov, *Die Lehre von der bäuerlichen Wirtschaft: Versuch einer Theorie der Familienwirtschaft im Landbau* (Berlin, 1923).

³¹ (Bucharest, 1940).

³² Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, 358.

universal suffrage. This contradiction, in his view, was inherent in bourgeois, individualist democracy and therefore could never be resolved. Although he remained committed to democracy, he was determined to avoid the "pitfalls" of its Western form, which, he thought, came down to an exaggerated emphasis on individual rights and an almost complete disregard of individual responsibilities toward society. This style of democracy, which proclaimed liberty as an inalienable right but ignored the principles of equal opportunity and social justice, was based, he concluded, on legal abstractions and had failed to keep pace with the general evolution of society.³³

THE EUROPEANISTS WERE AS DIVERSE in their assessments of Romania's evolution as the traditionalists, but they shared a common conviction that its destiny lay with Western Europe. In the later decades of the nineteenth century, the doctrine was expressed by a number of economists who saw in industrialization the only means of achieving economic and social progress and of overcoming the handicaps of underdevelopment.

Not all Europeanists were capitalists. Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea (1855–1920), the principal theorist of Romanian socialism, set forth similar views about a Western path of development in such influential works as *Neoiobăgia* (Neo-serfdom) published in 1910.³⁴ He argued that underdeveloped countries inevitably came to be influenced by advanced nations, and, as a result, the social and economic conditions prevailing in the advanced nations at any given time determined the development of "backward countries." Pointing out that bourgeois capitalism was the primary determinant of development in the modern age, he showed how Romania's exchange relations with the West since the early nineteenth century had "revolutionized" all its social, economic, and moral relations and were relentlessly bringing the country into alignment with Western Europe.³⁵ The main task for socialists, he admonished, was to accelerate the process by all possible means.

Two figures in Europeanism stand out: literary critic Eugen Lovinescu (1881–1943) and economist and sociologist Ștefan Zeletin (1882–1934). For the first time in scholarly literature, they undertook a comprehensive investigation of the causes that lay behind the development of modern Romania. They both linked the process to the introduction of Western-style capitalism in the Romanian principalities in the first half of the nineteenth century. But Lovinescu found the motive force of change in ideas, whereas Zeletin emphasized economic and social causes. Nonetheless, they agreed that "Westernization" was a necessary historical stage through which every country was destined to pass, and they had no doubt that outside European influences rather than internal forces had been the main catalyst for the development of modern Romania.

³³ Virgil Madgearu, "Tendențele de renovare ale democrației," *Viața Românească*, 27 (May–June 1935): 10–13.

³⁴ A valuable introduction to Dobrogeanu-Gherea's career and thought is Damian Hurezeanu, *Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea: Studiu social-istoric* (Bucharest, 1973).

³⁵ Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Opere complete*, Ion Popescu-Puțuri, ed., 8 vols. (Bucharest, 1976–83), 38 (*Neoiobăgia*).

In his influential investigation of the origins and development of modern Romania, *Istoria civilizației române moderne* (The History of Modern Romanian Civilization),³⁶ Eugen Lovinescu traced the origins of modern Romania back to the early nineteenth century, to the beginnings of intense cultural contacts with Western Europe. He thus treated the encounter as a contest between Western and native systems of ideas. The West triumphed, Lovinescu argued, because the Romanian elites judged Europe to be superior to the East. Consequently, these elites undertook to close the enormous gap they perceived between themselves and the West by adopting Western institutions, ethics, and practices, in accordance with what Lovinescu called “synchronism.” For him, this “law” was the key to understanding the relationship between agricultural, patriarchal Romania on the one hand and the industrial, urban West on the other. Accordingly, the inferior imitated the superior—the underdeveloped nations copied the more advanced, and the village the city. But, Lovinescu insisted, synchronism was not simply imitation; it was also integration. He was certain that all Europe was drawing closer together as a result of the expansion of modern means of communication, and he pointed out that the most diverse societies were becoming “homogenized” more rapidly than ever before. As an example, he cited the speed with which a new art form became internationalized, how rapidly cubism or expressionism spread across Europe. It was obvious, he thought, that Romania could not help becoming a part of this integral, cosmopolitan civilization.³⁷ He assigned to the middle class the responsibility for accomplishing this task, since it alone was capable of introducing all the elements of world civilization to the Romanians and of overcoming the resistance of the “passive” and “inert” peasant masses.

Ștefan Zeletin offered an economic interpretation of Romania’s Europeanization complementing Lovinescu’s analysis of the cultural phases of the process.³⁸ In his controversial investigation of the Romanian middle class, *Burghezia română: Origina și rolul ei istoric* (The Romanian Bourgeoisie: Its Origins and Historical Role),³⁹ he showed how modern Romania was the product of fundamental economic changes caused by the introduction of Western capital in the first half of the nineteenth century. Europeanization, in his view, had been rapid, and he dated Romania’s definitive entrance into the Western economic sphere from the period immediately after the Crimean War. The inevitable consequence was an economic revolution in which the old agrarian state slowly dissolved, the country adapted itself to the demands of capitalism, and a bourgeoisie emerged to guide it through all the successive stages of modernization. He could foresee no other course for Romania; to remain a predominantly agricultural country struck him as absurd and contrary to the laws of social evolution.

³⁶ Eugen Lovinescu, *Istoria civilizației române moderne*, 3 vols. (Bucharest, 1924–26). Eugen Simion, *E. Lovinescu: Scepticul mîntuit* (Bucharest, 1971), treats Lovinescu’s Europeanism as an expression of his aesthetic values.

³⁷ Lovinescu, *Istoria civilizației române moderne*, 3: 43–51, 63–103, 187–91.

³⁸ In the absence of a monograph on Zeletin’s career, one may consult Cezar Papacostea, “Ștefan Zeletin: Însemnări privitoare la viața și opera lui,” *Revista de filosofie*, 20 (July–September 1935): 201–62.

³⁹ Ștefan Zeletin, *Burghezia română: Origina și rolul ei istoric* (Bucharest, 1925).

A short list of Europeanists would also include economist and politician Mihail Manoilescu (1891–1950). Despite his repudiation of “old-style” liberalism and his embrace of corporatism in the 1930s, he had no doubt that Romania would follow the Western path of industrialization, which he saw as the only means of surmounting economic backwardness and ending Romania’s dependence on Western Europe. He dismissed as fanciful the goal of the Poporanists and other agrarianists to build a prosperous, modern economy based on agriculture. In his major work on international economic relations, *Théorie du protectionisme et de l’échange international*,⁴⁰ he argued that industry enjoyed an intrinsic superiority over agriculture. From his own analysis, he concluded that the productivity of labor in industry was greater than in agriculture. He showed how the disparity in value thus created accounted for the immense advantage in trade and the economic and political dominance that Western Europe had gained over agricultural Eastern Europe.⁴¹

Like Zeletin, Manoilescu accorded a key role to the bourgeoisie in the development of capitalism in Romania in the nineteenth century. But he discerned a growing crisis in the Romanian bourgeoisie and urged fundamental changes in its structure if it was to fulfill its tasks in the twentieth century. He pronounced the creative period of the old bourgeoisie, which had assumed leadership of Romania’s capitalist development after 1829 (his account of its origins was essentially the same as Zeletin’s), to be at an end and prophesied that it faced a revolt of major proportions on the part of the mass of the population, whom it had exploited mercilessly. In *Rostul și destinul burgheziei românești* (The Role and Destiny of the Romanian Bourgeoisie),⁴² he argued that the bourgeoisie must be “purified” through a complete reconstruction of its political, economic, and social organization, a process he perceived already underway in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In Romania, too, he foresaw that the bourgeoisie would continue to organize and direct the economy, but it would no longer be burdened by the “dead weight” of capitalism and liberalism. Instead of remaining dominant, it would be integrated into the state through a single, all-encompassing political party, and its economic motivation would be “de-materialized” through corporatism. As a result, the Romanian bourgeoisie would be composed of persons eager to produce and to serve society as a whole, but it would remain a bourgeoisie because the individual ownership of the means of production would be maintained.⁴³

THE EXPECTATIONS OF BOTH the Europeanists and the traditionalists were undone by World War II and what followed, as Communism became the overwhelming fact of life for Romanians in the second half of the twentieth century. For over forty years, from the late 1940s until 1989, it served as the ideological cover for

⁴⁰ Mihail Manoilescu, *Théorie du protectionnisme et de l’échange international* (Paris, 1929).

⁴¹ Mihail Manoilescu, “Le triangle économique et social des pays agricoles: La ville, le village, l’étranger,” *Internationale Agrar Rundschau*, 6 (June 1940): 16–26; Mihail Manoilescu, *Forțele naționale productive și comerțul exterior* (Bucharest, 1986), introduction, 26–28.

⁴² Mihail Manoilescu, *Rostul și destinul burgheziei românești* (Bucharest, 1942).

⁴³ Manoilescu, *Rostul și destinul burgheziei românești*, 322–48, 380–98.

a political and economic system that turned Romania away from Western Europe toward the East. But Communism was not a robust indigenous growth. In the interwar period, it had struck but shallow roots in Romanian society and remained on the periphery of political life. Communism's lack of success had been partly owing to relentless pursuit by the authorities, including its outlawing in 1924, which drove it underground and kept membership small (the high point was about 5,000 members in 1936). Yet the economic and social structure of interwar Romania also set formidable obstacles in the way of a collectivist, internationalist movement represented by the Romanian Communist Party. The aspirations of the peasants for land of their own, their devotion to religion, even if only formal in many cases, and their respect for tradition made recruitment in the countryside difficult for the Communist Party. Moreover, the mental climate of the village persuaded many party leaders that the peasant was conservative by nature and unlikely to be moved by their vision of the new proletarian order. Thus Communists neglected the village, even the agricultural proletariat, which represented a potentially strong constituency. The relatively modest level of industrialization and urbanization kept the factory working class, the party's preferred constituency, small in number. Here, too, the influence of the village persisted, for the main source of urban labor was the countryside, where class consciousness was little developed. The Communist Party also had to combat a deep sense of patriotism in both the city and the village. Patriotism had been strengthened by the creation of Greater Romania in 1918, and it cut across class lines, causing Communist appeals to international proletarian solidarity and friendship with the Soviet Union to fall on deaf ears. Reduced to perhaps a few hundred members during World War II, the Communist Party became a significant and then dominant force only after the war through the support of Soviet occupation authorities and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This is not the place to describe Communist rule.⁴⁴ Nor can its effects on the long-term development of Romania be fully measured without greater historical perspective. In time, the period may be judged an aberration that diverted Romania from the Europeanizing course it had taken in the early nineteenth century. But historians will undoubtedly point to those aspects of development in the Communist period that suggest continuity with the interwar years. They may note, for example, similar strivings to industrialize and to attain economic independence from Western Europe (and after 1960 from the Soviet Union) and may cite the role of the state as economic coordinator. There will be those, too, who will see Communist rule as having contributed to the century-long process of modernization through forced industrialization, the reordering of agriculture and rural society, and the introduction of extensive collective social benefits. Yet,

⁴⁴ Of the numerous works in English on the Communist period, a short list would include Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944–1965* (Berkeley, Calif., 1971), a penetrating analysis of the policies carried out by the Communist Party to transform Romanian society; Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania* (Berkeley, 1991), an important contribution to the study of the idea of nation and of mentalities in contemporary Romania; John Michael Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), a comprehensive investigation and critical evaluation of Communist Party economic policies; and the useful survey by Michael Shafir, *Romania: Politics, Economics and Society; Political Stagnation and Simulated Change* (Boulder, Colo., 1985).

whatever the judgment of historians may be in the future, it is evident now that the overall experience of Communism for Romanians was traumatic. In the economy, it substituted central control for the entrepreneurial spirit; in political and social life, it submerged civil society in institutions lacking integrity; in intellectual life, it stifled the free expression of the human spirit; and, gravest of all, it did incalculable injury to the collective moral sense by proliferating laws and disdaining Law.

To interpret the past and to analyze nation-building under such circumstances offered intellectuals a challenge far more formidable than that faced by their predecessors. History as a pure science that was disengaged from patriotism and ideology had rarely been practiced before World War II, but then, at least, historians and social thinkers had been free to pursue truth as they thought best and to confront ideas in open forums. By contrast, during the Communist period, the humanities and social sciences were subordinated to party interests, and intellectuals were mobilized to add their skills to the building of the new, collectivist order.

Nonetheless, the controls that historians and others had to endure were far from uniform during the Communist period.⁴⁵ Nor, after the early 1960s, can one speak of a "united front" of historians and social scientists engaged in fulfilling a single research agenda imposed from above. Rather, history and social thought between 1947 and 1989 evolved in three broad stages. The first was the period of mobilization, lasting until about 1960, and was characterized by a more or less strict adherence to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, as interpreted by the party, and a general uniformity of views about Romania's past. The second period, between the early 1960s and 1971, was one of relaxation corresponding to the modest trend of liberalization in cultural life and a slight softening of political and economic rigidity. It allowed historical inquiry and discussion to diversify and flourish in ways unknown during the previous twenty years. Then, in 1971, the situation changed dramatically when Nicolae Ceaușescu demanded a return to strict ideological conformity in the humanities and social sciences. At the same time, his so-called July theses signaled the beginning of party-sponsored nationalism in historiography, which soon became interwoven with an oppressive cult of personality unique in modern Romanian history.

These political and ideological shifts were reflected in changing conceptions of nation-building, which continued to be the primary object of historical investigation and analysis. In general, the treatment historians and others accorded nation-building moved from an internationalist or proletarian interpretation in the 1950s to a nationalist or patriotic stance in the 1980s. This evolution is particularly evident in evaluations of internal and external influences on the process. At first, Russia was praised as the chief contributor to the formation of modern Romania, and matters of discord such as Bessarabia were passed over in silence. Much was made also of the role Russian revolutionaries played in creating the Romanian socialist movement,⁴⁶ and the Bolshevik Revolution was pro-

⁴⁵ Vlad Georgescu, *Politică și istorie: Cazul comuniștilor români, 1944–1977* (Munich, 1981), 11–75.

⁴⁶ Gheorghe Haupt, *Din istoricul legăturilor revoluționare româno-ruse, 1849–1881* (Bucharest, 1955).

claimed a turning point in Romanian history.⁴⁷ Soviet-Romanian friendship and cooperation were hailed as eternal. By contrast, Romania's relations with Western Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were described in somber terms and judged to have had solely negative consequences. Yet the inevitability of Romania's entrance into the world capitalist system was grudgingly acknowledged. In the 1960s, the attitude toward Russia and the Soviet Union changed: the existence of a Bessarabian problem was recognized, and Marx's own writings were used to prove Russia's persistent hostility to the modern Romanian state.⁴⁸ This trend in historiography continued in the 1970s and 1980s, as anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiments mounted. At the same time, historians and social thinkers reasserted Romania's traditional pre-war links to Europe. However, they refrained from a wholehearted embrace of Europe, evincing instead the Romanians' century-old ambivalence toward the West. On the one hand, they achieved a certain balance in evaluating the respective contributions of East and West to the creation of modern Romania, but, on the other, they emphasized "internal forces" rather than "foreign influences" as the primary determinants of nation-building.

Many advocates of the new nativism joined together under the banner of "protocronism," which came to the fore in the 1970s.⁴⁹ The concept, which had affinities to earlier traditionalist interpretations of national development and, later, to Ceaușescu's increasingly nationalist utterances, emphasized the unique and pioneering character of Romanian culture.⁵⁰ Its proponents, like the interwar traditionalists, warned of the dire consequences of subordination to the West and by implication denounced such cosmopolitan theories of development as Lovinescu's synchronism.⁵¹ These critical issues of Romania's place in Europe and the viability of the Western model continued to absorb intellectuals in the 1980s and were by no means resolved by the fall of the Ceaușescu dictatorship.

Nation-building itself remains unfinished, as the post-1989 generation of intellectuals grapples with fundamental aspects of the process. The boundaries of Greater Romania must be reconstituted through the reintegration of Bessarabia (now the Republic of Moldova) and northern Bukovina, which were lost to the Soviet Union after World War II. The drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of new political and economic institutions are again urgent tasks. Serious problems of social integration have yet to be resolved. A peasantry and an urban working class, for forty years taught only to follow, have finally to be accorded full citizenship in a democratic state.

The most acute minority question concerns the status of the Hungarians of Transylvania. Old animosities, a heritage of both the interwar period and the Ceaușescu dictatorship, have come to the surface. The issue at hand is whether the Hungarians will have civil and human rights as members of a distinct ethnic community with political and cultural autonomy or as individual citizens in an

⁴⁷ *Contribuții la studiul influenței Marii Revoluții Socialiste din Octombrie în România* (Bucharest, 1957).

⁴⁸ Karl Marx, *Însemnări despre Români* (Bucharest, 1964).

⁴⁹ Adrian Dinu Rachieru, *Vocația sintezei: Eseuri asupra spiritualității românești* (Timișoara, 1985), 36–59.

⁵⁰ Edgar Papu, "Protocronism românesc," *Secolul 20*, 5–6 (1974): 8–11; and "Protocronism și sinteză," *Secolul 20*, 6 (1976): 7–9.

⁵¹ See, for example, Dan Zamfirescu, *Istorie și cultură* (Bucharest, 1975), 64–65.

integral Romanian state. By contrast, another minority problem has become less acute, as the Jewish community (about 20,000 members) slowly disappears, mainly through emigration.

Yet a fundamental question, not unlike the one posed by the Junimists in the nineteenth century, remains: Which path of development will the Romanians choose? Formidable obstacles confront those who would resume the Western path. The protocronists and their allies stand for tradition. Then there is the residue of Communism. The National Salvation Front, the majority party in the present government and dominated by former Communists, has been reluctant to adopt Western economic institutions and on numerous occasions has violated the letter and spirit of political democracy. Nonetheless, it has drawn support from many who fear a free market and capitalism as well as other changes that might jeopardize the collective benefits in employment, health care, and education, which they had gained during the Communist period. The idea of a third way, expounded so eloquently by the Peasantists in the interwar period and at present nourished by a resurgent nationalism, remains an attractive alternative to the Western (capitalist and cosmopolitan) and the Eastern (collectivist) models. The national debate over paths of development thus shows no signs of diminishing, and the Romanians stand as before at the crossroads of East and West.

Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia

IVO BANAC

IN MAY 1979, ONE YEAR BEFORE TITO'S DEATH, the specialists on the history of Yugoslav unification gathered at one of those ritualistic congresses that Communist neo-traditionalism churned up with typical mastodonic grace. They gathered at Ilok, a sleepy Croatian town on the Danube, downstream from Vukovar, within sight of the Franciscan church in which St. John of Capistrano was laid to rest in 1456. But, unlike the swallows that mark the return of spring to the California mission named after the same warrior-saint, the historians at Ilok marked the points of appui for the lines of historiographic combat. To be sure, the four days at Ilok gave ample space to the usual drones of *faktografska istoriografija*, the tiresome and unimaginative unfoldings on the agreeable minutiae of Yugoslav unity. Still, this congress was unlike all previous gatherings of its kind. For behind the façade of stock phrases about "bourgeois historiography," "liberal integralist ideology," and "strategic imperialist aims and interests of big financial capital," one could hear entirely new tones and interpretations that went contrary to the celebratory intentions of the meeting. Instead of the solemn rite on the sixtieth anniversary of Yugoslavia, the proceedings were marred by several speakers, notably Momčilo Zečević, a Belgrade historian and specialist in Slovenian history, who took on several sacred cows.

In a report that one participant characterized as "shock therapy," Zečević asserted first that there existed a one-sided ideology and policy of treating the Yugoslav unification and the ideas that charted its course as if the "Yugoslav idea [was] an ancient and unilinear aspiration, created before the formation of nations, as a process that was coordinated in its motives and interests, and constantly on the rise"; second, that the official historiography overstated the importance of the supposed unitary trends, such as the nineteenth-century Illyrianist movement in Croatia; third, that there have been few systematic analyses of the "Serb national question, as a historical, state-juridical, and national interest of the Serb people"; fourth, that there existed (and presumably still exist) real national interests of each specific national community in Yugoslavia that may not always be reconcilable, precluding the possibility of reducing the Serb interests to that of the "national interests of the Serb bourgeoisie"; fifth, that historiography ignored the religious question—"a factor of first order in our area, including in the struggle for the establishment of Yugoslavia," which was inflamed by the three "leading churches [*sic*], Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic," notably by the anti-Yugoslav

Vatican; sixth, that, due to "political and pedagogical motives," historiography "remained obstinately silent about the fratricidal attacks among the Yugoslav peoples in the course of the First World War"; and last, in general, that the "reasons for mutual distrust and conflict among the participants in the unification of Yugoslavia . . . were complex and deep and could not be solved in an offhand manner, with various declarations, resolutions, and similar political and juridical acts."¹

In 1979, Yugoslav historiography, or, more exactly, its dominant institutional part, was still bound by the ideology of the Titoist party-state. Hence, seen retrospectively, Zečević's paper was the beginning of an erosion of the Titoist interpretation of South Slavic history. It is a curiosity of the Yugoslav Communist regime that it failed to codify its thinking on a series of historical questions that had been controversial since the beginning of the Yugoslav state (1918). Nevertheless, the pragmatic consensus of Communist historical interpretation was summed up in Tito's report to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) in 1948. Tito assumed that the unification was innately good: "The unification of the South Slavs was needed and had to be accomplished. This was the idea of the most progressive people in the lands that were called South Slavic." But he also recognized that the new state was burdened with inevitable conflicts from the very beginning, because of Great Serbian hegemony under the monarchy of the Karadjordjevićs and "bourgeois power." He singled out Montenegro and Croatia as the two South Slavic lands in which the unification was resisted by the populace and thereafter imposed by the Serbian and Entente (mainly French) troops. He also implicated the non-Serbian bourgeoisie in the success of the Great Serbian project, because it feared the "revolutionary movement of the masses" more than Serbian hegemony.²

As for the nature of the interwar regime, Tito described it as the "dictatorship of the ruling Yugoslav bourgeoisie, headed by the king," which put on a democratic mask until 1929, when "King Aleksandar was obliged to throw off that mask, trample the constitution and . . . openly proclaim a monarcho-fascist dictatorship."³ After the assassination of Aleksandar in 1934, the successive regimes, notably those of prime ministers Milan Stojadinović and Dragiša Cvetković (1935–1941), did not mitigate the severity of the dictatorship ("this was not the democratization of the country, but its fascisization under the influence of Italian and German fascism"). The Cvetković-Maček agreement of 1939, which sought to "solve" the Croatian question, was "in one sense, a division of power between the Serbian and Croatian bourgeoisie."⁴ Tito was particularly harsh with Vladko Maček, the leader of the Croat Peasant Party (HSS), for his anticommunism and leniency with the Croat pro-fascist Ustašas. As for the April war of 1941, when Yugoslavia was attacked and quickly occupied by the Axis powers, Tito held that "as is well known, the Yugoslav army capitulated, owing to the treachery and

¹ Momčilo Zečević, "Nekoliko pitanja istoriografiji o jugoslovenskom ujedinjenju," *Stvaranje jugoslovenske države 1918*, Nikola B. Popović, ed. (Belgrade, 1983), 439–41, 446–48.

² Josip Broz Tito, "Politički izvještaj," *Peti kongres Komunističke partije Jugoslavije: Izveštaji i referati* (Belgrade, 1948), 24–26.

³ Tito, "Politički izvještaj," 29.

⁴ Tito, "Politički izvještaj," 50, 53.

cowardice of the generals, after twelve days of weak resistance.”⁵ It goes without saying that his version of wartime history was devoid of any sympathy for Draža Mihailović, the leader of the predominantly Serbian Chetniks, who, according to Tito, represented “the last remnant of armed power of the old, rotten, bourgeois order, [which] in no case wanted to struggle against the occupiers but, at all costs, wanted to safeguard the old bourgeois social order under the occupation.”⁶ As for the Communists, “without the leading role of the KPJ [Communist Party of Yugoslavia], we would today have no new Yugoslavia . . . nor can one imagine the realization of brotherhood and unity of our peoples.”⁷

SINCE 1948, THIS VERSION OF YUGOSLAVIA’S TWENTIETH-CENTURY HISTORY was maintained in institutional historiography without regard to Communist party membership. The Yugoslav historical establishment, represented by a generation of historians born before 1918, such as Vaso Čubrilović, Dragoslav Janković, and Jorjo Tadić in Serbia; Vaso Bogdanov, Ferdo Čulinović, and Jaroslav Šidak in Croatia; Bogo Grafenauer and Fran Zwitter in Slovenia; and Anto Babić and Branislav Djurdjev in Bosnia-Hercegovina, was preoccupied, with exceptions, with the pre-1918 period. Although they occasionally disagreed, their disagreements were not subversive of the Titoist historical interpretation, which was further serviced by a somewhat younger establishment of historians specializing in the history of the KPJ (Pero Damjanović, Jovan Marjanović, Pero Morača, and Vlado Strugar). Both establishments, after accounting for disparities in age and interest, generally cohered in a series of joint projects, beginning with bibliographic guides on historical publications (published for the world congresses of historians in 1955, 1965, and 1975), two volumes of the “History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia” (1953, 1959), and in various encyclopedia projects, notably the two editions of the “Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia” (1955–1971, 1980–1991).

From the end of the 1960s, however, it became increasingly clear that the unity of Yugoslav historiography was dependent on regime unity. The demise of Yugoslavia in the 1990s cannot be traced to a single factor, nor was it only an aspect of regime fragmentation. Nevertheless, the internal troubles inside the Titoist establishment—the emergence, in the 1960s, of a reformist bloc with a strong base in the northwestern republics and the associated correlation between systemic reform and administrative decentralization (genuine federalism)—had immediate repercussions in historiography. The publication of the third volume of the “History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia,” which was to deal with the critical period of nineteenth and twentieth-century national integration and state-building, kept being postponed and never came to pass. There were growing polemics over controversial aspects of twentieth-century history. In 1963, General Velimir Terzić brought out his monograph *Jugoslavija u aprilskom ratu 1941* (Yugoslavia in the April War of 1941) in which he attributed Yugoslavia’s swift fall to the treason of Croat leaders, notably Maček, who supposedly “after 1930 . . .

⁵ Tito, “Politički izvještaj,” 63–65.

⁶ Tito, “Politički izvještaj,” 94.

⁷ Tito, “Politički izvještaj,” 128–29.

sought the help of the Axis powers and worked on—and planned beforehand—the destruction of Yugoslavia. In fact, [this leadership] for the most part chose treason, which was clearly manifested in the April war.”⁸ At the Eighth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), held in Belgrade in December 1964, Tito himself expressed an oblique criticism of “nationalist manifestations in historiography,” by denouncing “instances of indirect claims that aver some kind of primacy of one national history over the others.”⁹

Tito’s authority concealed the cleavages in what was still the single center of power. Ever the master of political balance, Tito expected historians to bestow, without favor, the proper measure of praise and censure on each national community. But he himself started providing increasingly different measures in historical scorekeeping. In 1966, Tito forced the leading Serbian Communist, Aleksandar Ranković, out of the SKJ leadership, signaling, among other things, greater leeway for the critics of Serbia’s role in Yugoslav history—but only up to a point. In short, he wanted to take centralism, with its political locus in Serbia, a few notches lower in general regard without stirring up a great deal of fuss.¹⁰ By January 1970, the Croat Communists took the struggle against centralism one step further. In repudiating Yugoslavist unitarism, a tendency favoring the amalgamation of the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and other South Slavs into a supranational Yugoslav nation, they stated that no form of nationalism was attractive or without danger for Yugoslavia and its individual peoples, warning that “unitarism is in fact only a form of nationalism of the stronger nation in the variant of great state chauvinism.”¹¹ The pace of confrontation with centralism and unitarism, especially in its Serbian version, was at issue. Hence the nervous and inconclusive nature of historical polemics in the early 1970s.

Opposition to centralism and unitarism came largely as an unexpected gift to Croatian historiography, which did not really take full advantage of the opportunity.¹² Indeed, establishment historians in Croatia were exposed to harsh

⁸ Velimir Terzić, *Jugoslavija u aprilskom ratu 1941* (Titograd, 1963), 664, n. 1. This book provoked a storm of criticism in Croatia, prompting political condemnations in the party press. According to one critic, “One gets the impression that [Terzić] proceeded from an a priori assumption that the collapse of royal Yugoslavia and its army was not caused, first of all, by its regime, untenable relations among its nationalities, corruption and lack of preparedness on the part of state and military leadership, and the aggression of fascist powers within a specific international situation, but that the causes of collapse must be sought among the consequences of this order of things, mainly in one consequence—the behavior of individual peoples in the April war, above all in the Croatian developments and in the behavior of the Croat people as a whole.” Stjepan Šćetarić, “O političkim i vojnim uzrocima sloma Jugoslavije,” *Putovi revolucije*, 2, nos. 3–4 (1964): 498–99.

⁹ Josip Broz Tito, “Uloga Saveza komunista u daljnjoj izgradnji socijalističkih društvenih odnosa i aktualni problemi u međunarodnom radničkom pokretu i borbi za mir i socijalizam u svijetu,” in *Osmi kongres SKJ* (Belgrade, 1964), 35.

¹⁰ In his concluding remarks at the plenum that censured Ranković (July 1966), Tito clearly had Serbia in mind as the “center of nationalist deviations that have manifested themselves even in the ranks of Communists,” but then he quickly added, “Let’s not now have only Belgrade in mind. Belgrade is the city of all South Slavs. There are a great number of Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Bosnians, and Montenegrins in Belgrade. That is a Yugoslav city, and all of us are responsible for what happens in it.” Cited in *Četvrti plenum Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije* (Belgrade, 1966), 97.

¹¹ Savka Dabčević-Kučar, “Bratstvo i jedinstvo na elementima onoga što nas spaja u samoupravnom socijalizmu,” *X sjednica Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske* (Zagreb, 1970), 6–7.

¹² Notable exceptions were the works of Franjo Tudjman, currently the president of Croatia, and Trpimir Macan, a historian of broad synthetic interests and a uniquely poignant reviewer of historical

censure by nonacademic practitioners such as Zvonimir Kulundžić, who berated their timidity and lack of patriotism.¹³ But where the historians were still reluctant, other intellectuals ventured forth. The reading public was elated by the poet Vlado Gotovac's stinging attacks on Belgrade scholars Miroslav Pantić and Jorjo Tadić, who invested considerable energy in denying or ignoring the Croat character of Dubrovnik's prestigious literary and historical heritage. Playing on Tadić's textual scholarship, Gotovac charged that a "merchant's invoice is more important to [Tadić] in determining the national character of [Dubrovnik] than the city's whole spiritual tradition."¹⁴ Tadić's posthumously published defense of the unitarist character of Dubrovnik went beyond the scope of his theme to affirm the traditional unitarist view that religion was the facile—and erroneous—dividing line between the Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats. In an allusion to the newly proclaimed policy of viewing Bosnian Muslims as a nation, he offered his opinion that "we are endeavoring to proclaim one of our religious communities as a nation, which is a unique case in present-day Europe."¹⁵

The tense early 1970s can only be understood as a conflict over the future of Yugoslavia. The centralist and unitarist bloc held that the distinctions between the nationalities were being blurred and that Yugoslavia could be homogenized on the traditions—real or invented—of forceful Yugoslavism. In practice, this meant the extirpation of non-Serb nationalisms, always interpreted as separatist and potentially fascistic, and the quiet absolution of Serbian history and political practice from the sin of supremacy. The remission of the supremacist offense was permitted precisely because "Great Serbian hegemony," willingly or unwillingly, regardless of its historical record, became an auxiliary to Yugoslav national amalgamation. Hence, when Tadić questioned his critics' unfavorable view of "insatiable centralist circles of Great Serbian monarchy," he credited the latter with the adoption of Yugoslavism and linked his critics with the anti-Yugoslav and fascistic Ustašas.¹⁶

literature, but neither belonged to the academic establishment. For an insight into the concerns and criticisms of leading Croat historians in the early 1970s, see Mirjana Gross, "Hrvatska historiografija na prekretnici?" *Kritika*, no. 14 (September–October 1970): 642–54. The article is mainly concerned with the lack of institutional support for and adequate funding of Croatian historians.

¹³ Kulundžić went for the jugular in stating that the misfortune of Croatian historiography lay in its domination "by men who served the previous regimes quite subserviently and who, for their own personal reasons, out of their guilt complex, transported their own sins onto the whole nation, thereby developing what we usually refer to as the *guilt complex* of this whole people." Zvonimir Kulundžić, *Tragedija hrvatske historiografije: O falsifikatorima, birokratima, negatorima, itd . . . itd . . . hrvatske povijesti*, 2d edn. (Zagreb, 1970), 7–8. Arguing that the Ustaša complex—a sense of guilt for the anti-Serb crimes of the Ustašas—was self-imposed, Kulundžić stated that the source of the problem rested with "us intellectuals who did not, sufficiently persistently and systematically, always and at every opportunity, place the Ustaša symbol of *U with a bomb* alongside the Chetnik symbol of *skull and bones*, Ustaša daggers and clubs alongside Chetnik curved knives and saws, [Ante] Pavelić alongside [Milan] Nedić and [Kosta] Pećanac . . . Just as only a small, insignificantly small portion of Serbs can be called by the extremely odious name of *Chetnik*, so, too, among the Croats, there was only a handful of bloodthirsty madmen in whom the beast was awakened and whom we can christen with the terrible name *Ustaša*"; Kulundžić, *Tragedija hrvatske historiografije*, 6.

¹⁴ Vlado Gotovac, "Autsajderski fragmenti: Svitak treći," *Kritika*, no. 8 (September–October 1969): 557.

¹⁵ Jorjo Tadić, "Sablasti kruže Jugoslavijom," *Istorijski časopis*, 18 (1971): 49.

¹⁶ Tadić, "Sablasti kruže Jugoslavijom," 50.

The decentralist bloc proceeded from the demonstrable fact that amalgamation did not take place and concluded that this was not a setback but a benefit of Yugoslav unity. The decentralists stood by the historically evolving and separate national identities of each of the South Slavic nations, starting with the clearly distinct Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes but including the Macedonians and Montenegrins, whom the Yugoslav Communists recognized as distinct Yugoslav nations in the 1930s and thereafter treated accordingly. This roster of "nations" was completed in 1967 with Bosnian Muslims. In addition, a number of non-Slavic "nationalities," notably the Albanians of Kosovo and the Hungarians of Vojvodina, were recognized as unassimilable components of the multinational Yugoslav state and therefore entitled to every protection of identity, language, and culture, including contacts with their conationals in neighboring states (Albania, Hungary). The decentralist logic was that Yugoslavia would better cohere, or would at least be a less repressive place, if the threat of assimilation to any constituent nation, or for that matter to the supranational Yugoslav community, could be permanently removed. Hence when Gotovac attacked various unitarists, he did not fail to point out that "those who see only a superfluous problem in the real equality of our nations and nationalities, those who see only socially destructive nationalism in every national program, those who see only an insignificant remnant of history in every sign of national identity, no matter what sort of revolutionary ideas they have in their heads, are really aiding dogmatists and conservatives, are really giving a chance to their programs, to their terrorist voluntarism."¹⁷ Obviously, the ideology of Yugoslav socialism itself became an instrument in the contention between the centralist/unitarist and decentralist/distinctivist camps.

The contention was soon tested in historiography but at an unseasonable hour. In December 1971, at the Twenty-First Session of the SKJ Central Committee, Tito disturbed the political equilibrium by striking at the League of Communists of Croatia. He accused its leaders, Savka Dabčević-Kučar and Miko Tripalo, previously his closest collaborators in the struggle against centralism, as being soft on Croat nationalism—of stressing the sovereignty of Croatia at the expense of Yugoslavia's collective sovereignty and state unity, moreover, to the detriment of socialist statehood, defined as a "community of working people," not as a national state.¹⁸ This seemingly abrupt change in course inaugurated a nasty campaign against Croat nationalism, attended by arrests, mass firings and expulsions from the party, denunciations, and censorship. The brief synthesis *Povijest hrvatskog naroda* (History of the Croat People), by Trpimir Macan, whose outside reviewer was Franjo Tudjman, was withdrawn from the market and destroyed.¹⁹ In a

¹⁷ Gotovac, "Autsajderski fragmenti," 559.

¹⁸ Josip Broz Tito, *Govori druga Tita* (Zagreb, 1971), 8.

¹⁹ The contents of this handy book were hardly controversial. In fact, the author's balanced position was evident in all sensitive questions that mattered to the authorities. The book's offense had more to do with the known political liabilities of author and reviewer than with its biases. To be sure, there was also the sin of omission. The whole postwar section consists of the following three sentences: "In a state community with the other nations and nationalities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Croat people live and prosper in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. [This republic] is a result of the joint struggle of Croats and Serbs, and of all South Slavic nations, in the

separate development, Tadjman was arrested and sentenced to two years in prison on charges of belonging to a "counterrevolutionary nationalist group."²⁰ It was in this context that Vladimir Dedijer (1914–1990), Tito's biographer, sometime dissident, and gadfly, announced the publication of *Istorija Jugoslavije* (History of Yugoslavia), stating that "there were some objections to the fact that [the book] will not be called the 'History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia.' It is good that the Twenty-First Session of the SKJ [Central Committee] took place. Had it been otherwise, the 'History of Yugoslavia' would have appeared, perhaps, only in an English edition."²¹

Dedijer clearly meant to challenge the decentralist/distinctivist camp in its hour of trial. Excepting the authors of the book's premodern sections, notable and highly respected Belgrade historians Ivan Božić and Sima Ćirković, the volume had a decidedly centralist bent. Writing on the twentieth century, Dedijer himself contributed one of his typically journalistic and quaint pieces that had much colorful detail but little analysis.²² It was Milorad Ekmečić (b. 1928), Serb historian at the University of Sarajevo, who stepped forward with a series of interpretations on nineteenth-century developments that challenged the decentralists' basic premises. In particular, he advanced the thesis that nationhood based on language was the only concept of nation-building that can be traced to progressive rationalist and romanticist premises. This permitted his defense of the Serbian language reformer and national ideologist Vuk Karadžić (1787–1864), who rejected the traditional identification between Serbdom and Orthodoxy in favor of an assimilationist notion that Serbs were defined by their language, meaning the štokavian dialect common to almost all Serbs, most Croats, and all Bosnian Muslims. Since Karadžić and his followers failed to assimilate Croats and Muslims through the construction of Serb "linguistic" nationhood, Ekmečić concluded that religion was to blame: "The basic democratic conception of a nation depended on the premise that [nations] should not be tied directly to religion but to a secular factor. Having attempted to realize this idea, the South Slavic awakeners succeeded only partially in their literary and cultural tasks, whereas the backward agrarian reality of the Balkans of the time prevented the success of their political tasks."²³

Ekmečić went on to claim that the "failure of this agrarian society to build a secular idea like language [*sic*] (the only possible democratic conception of society)

National Liberation War [World War II]. It is the realization of the Croat people's right to liberty, statehood, and independence." Trpimir Macan, *Povijest hrvatskog naroda* (Zagreb, 1971), 228.

²⁰ Tadjman was charged with, among other things, calling for a reexamination of the historical circumstances that contributed to the never-ending Croat struggle for survival. On Tadjman's role in historical controversies, see Željko Krušelj, "Franjo Tadjman—biografija," in Tomislav Pušek, ed., *Franjo Tadjman* (Zagreb, 1991), 41–116.

²¹ "Istorija," *Politika* (March 30, 1972): 13.

²² Dedijer did not fail to promote many questionable views, notably on the supposedly vast anti-Serbianism of the Slovene Catholic press in 1914, "genocide" against the Serbs of "Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of Croatia" in World War I, exploitation of economically backward regions of interwar Yugoslavia by Slovenian and Croatian financial capital, "peasant spontaneity" in the activities of the HSS, and his own favorite themes of "spheres of influence" and "uniqueness of the Yugoslav revolution." Ivan Božić, Sima Ćirković, Milorad Ekmečić, and Vladimir Dedijer, *Istorija Jugoslavije* (Belgrade, 1972), 383–84, 394–96, 424–26, 432–33, 529.

²³ Božić, et al., *Istorija Jugoslavije*, 236.

into the foundation of nationhood meant that the subsequent South Slavic history would be marked by this failure, thereby determining its whole purport.”²⁴ As a result, Ekmečić could not fail to see traces of religious—specifically, Catholic—obstructionism in all anti-unitarist movements, even when they were perfectly secular, as in the case of Ante Starčević’s Party of (Croat State) Right. By implication, the anti-unitarist policy of the SKJ also was seen as somehow connected to the Catholic church, the leap of faith that was made by Ekmečić and a significant portion of Serb opinion some twenty years later.

As it happened, the work of Dedijer and Ekmečić appeared in print in the fall of 1972, at approximately the same time as Tito’s attempt to reimpose discipline on the reluctant leadership of Serbian Communists, thereby reestablishing balance in Yugoslavia’s political system. Serbian Communist “liberals,” led by Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović, were not the proponents of centralism. In fact, they were the first Serbian leaders in the history of Yugoslavia who retreated from centralist ambitions. Nevertheless, they also understood the struggle against centralism as the emancipation of Serbia from the tutelage of the federal center. This position won them some reprieve from Serbian nationalists but only heightened Tito’s suspicions. In the words of Latinka Perović, “whereas the other republics could always, with more or less reason, point to Serbia by attacking centralism in Tito’s presence, criticism of centralism from Serbia itself was understood as a direct challenge to Tito.”²⁵ After Tito removed the Croat leadership, the Serbians’ reluctance to jump on the bandwagon of the antinationalist campaign was seen as covert nationalism.²⁶ Nikezić and Perović resigned on October 21, 1972. Attacks on Serbian nationalism could then focus on Dedijer and Ekmečić.

THE “TURN” OF 1971–1972 REPRESENTED A RETREAT from democratization but not from Titoist federalism, which was defended and promoted by the increasingly repressive SKJ. The polemics against Dedijer and Ekmečić were therefore marked by repressive federalism, which was predicated on “sweeping up before one’s own threshold,” that is, on repudiating the “nationalism of one’s own nation.” For example, Serbian historian Branslav Gligorijević questioned Dedijer’s economic analysis, which he saw as devoid of “an accurate picture about the foundations of the Serbian bourgeoisie’s hegemony.” Djuro Stanisavljević, a Serb social historian from Croatia, questioned Dedijer’s figures on Serb war losses in Yugoslavia and Ustaša Croatia. (“Should the figures refer to the total number of Serbs killed during the war, then the figure of 200,000 is only insignificantly exaggerated. Should we believe the number of 600,000 Serbs killed in Croatia alone, and then take a look at the censuses of the last forty years, we would have

²⁴ Božić, *et al.*, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, 244.

²⁵ Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga: Ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971/1972* (Sarajevo, 1991), 195.

²⁶ The issue of Dubrovnik, more precisely, its depiction as a city of “štokavian-speaking Catholics” but not Croats, in the book *Srpski narod i njegov jezik* (The Serb People and Their Language, [Belgrade, 1971]) by the Serbian philologist Pavle Ivić, was used by the new leadership of Croatia to attack Serbian nationalism and, by implication, the Serbian leadership that took no repressive actions against it; Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga*, 398.

to question the motives of those who make such claims.”) And Momčilo Zečević criticized Dedijer for “leaving an impression that animalistic Serbophobic attitudes existed in Slovenian bourgeois political circles.”²⁷ But there was also a type of Marxist anti-hegemonism among the critics of the “History of Yugoslavia,” for example, when the Bosnian Muslim historian Avdo Sućeska complained about the “insufficiently accented issues of class” in the book and then proceeded to note that this tendency was particularly damaging to the history of Bosnian Muslims, “who are barely noticeable in this book.”²⁸

Although swipes at Serbian biases were permitted if couched in Marxist rhetoric, this accommodation was less likely in “postnationalist” Croatia. To be sure, the establishment Croat historians strongly criticized Ekmečić and Dedijer. Mirjana Gross, in particular, made short work of Ekmečić’s double standard. (“[Ekmečić] believes that the ideology of the Party of Right had many elements similar to the great nationalist movements of the [twentieth] century; first of all because of [its belief in] the ‘geopolitical basis of nations.’ I wonder why this bias should be ascribed only to the ideology that sought to gather the South Slavic population, which it considered Croat, into a Croatian state, and not to the ideology that sought to gather the South Slavic population, which it considered Serb, into a Serbian state?”)²⁹ For all that, the freedom of debate was increasingly restricted as Croatia slipped into the period of “Croat Silence,” which lasted until 1989. This was the age of unbridled sectarianism without genuine belief, administered by an alliance of dogmatists and opportunists. Stipe Šuvar, Croatia’s doctrinal watchdog, initiated periodic attacks on the humanistic intelligentsia. A typical example of these one-sided ideological combats was the assault in 1978 on Zvonimir Kulundžić’s uneven biography of the peasantist author Slavko Kolar. Mounted by Goran Babić, a talented poet in Šuvar’s service, it included an ominous warning that exposés of unitarism in scholarship were subversive of the Yugoslav socialist system: “This is all about a struggle for or against socialism; and everything else is nothing but a smoke screen and noise whose aim is to conceal the basic course of this counterrevolutionary activity garbed in a literary, scholarly, and artistic robe, like a monk’s habit. In order to disguise this, accusations of unitarism are being showered down upon us.”³⁰

In fact, the debate about the “History of Yugoslavia” was the last major historical debate in the oppressive atmosphere of late Titoism. The pursuit of politics through historiography wound down by the middle of the 1970s, at the time of Tito’s last legislative effort. The constitution of 1974 was meant to establish repressive federalism as a political *perpetuum mobile*. Its basic feature was a system of unceasing rotation of and representation by the republican leaders, redefined to include, to the chagrin of Serbia’s opinion makers, the leaders of Serbia’s two autonomous provinces—Vojvodina and Kosovo. Analogous sub-systems operated in every area of public interest, including historiography; the

²⁷ “Istorija Jugoslavije,” *Gledišta*, 14 (March 1973): 275, 290, 297.

²⁸ “Istorija Jugoslavije,” 264.

²⁹ Mirjana Gross, “Ideja jugoslavenstva u XIX stoljeću u ‘Istoriji Jugoslavije,’” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 5 (1973), no. 2: 15.

³⁰ Goran Babić, *Možda uzaludno: Polemike* (Zagreb, 1983), 167.

congresses of historians kept rotating from republic to republic.³¹ However, while the architects of revolving machines always attempt to free the motion of their constructions from the influence of every physical force, Tito's *perpetuum mobile* was meant to highlight the visible hand of the party. That was the system's structural weakness, as became evident with Tito's death in 1980.

The Serbian leadership, however reliably Titoist after 1972, grumbled against the constitution as early as July 1977. It seized on the passing of Tito as a signal to begin the unraveling of the federalist era. The opportunity for launching the debate on the constitutional order, primarily over the liabilities of Serbia's "parcelization" into three federal units, presented itself in the spring of 1981 with the commencement of demonstrations by Albanian students in Kosovo. Henceforth, the Serbian intelligentsia and political elite were on a campaign against Tito's constitution. Their calls for the diminution of Kosovo's autonomy could only be accomplished by exaggerating the Albanian menace and by reopening every historical underpinning of Tito's federalism. The sparring at the historians' congress in Ilok was the parent of this effort.

History's utility to Yugoslav politics was not a debatable premise in 1981. It is more difficult, however, to account for the speed with which the new political vacuum prompted an outpouring of revisionist works, almost exclusively in Serbia. Most of these works, at least initially, dissected the history of the system and its demiurge. Ironically, it was Dedijer, the "Partisan Michelet," as he was called in a poignant obituary, who first lifted the hand that had written Tito's official biography against his erstwhile master.³² Dedijer's *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* (New Contributions to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito; 1981) demythologized the late dictator and portrayed him as a lecher and schemer, dissembler and master of craftiness, bon vivant and tyrant, charismatic leader and pacesetter in "excessive retortion" (Dedijer's euphemism for the execution of "enemies").³³ Though maintaining the appearance of amity for his subject, Dedijer clearly delighted in breaking every taboo, from Tito's participation in the Austro-Hungarian units on the Serbian front in 1914 to the negotiations between his Partisan forces and the Germans in 1943, from the Comintern's policy toward Yugoslavia to the responsibility for the reckless endangerment of imprisoned Communist leaders in Croatia (the abortive Kerestinec escape of 1941). This ungraceful book, a cabbage head on a makeshift body, full of unrelated provocations, including Dedijer's obsession with "revolutionary suicides" and vituperative epithets directed against Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, archbishop of Zagreb and metropolitan of Croatia, provoked a storm of protest. It was also widely read and set the course for an entire line of iconoclastic volumes by Serbian authors.³⁴

³¹ The penultimate meeting was at the spa of Arandjelovac, in Serbia, in 1983. The last ever, ominously, at Kosovo's capital of Priština in 1987.

³² Branislav Milošević, "Partizanski Miše," *Vreme*, 1 (December 10, 1991): 27.

³³ Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita*, vol. 2 (Rijeka, 1981), *passim*.

³⁴ The "federal" daily *Borba* (Struggle), the durable bastion of orthodox Titoists, organized a round table on Dedijer's book for January 6, 1982. Participants characterized the volume as "contributions to Dedijer's squaring of accounts with the revolution that he has deserted" (Julijana Vršćinac), "a common but profoundly calculated political pamphlet, imbued with profound antisocialism, anti-communism, and anti-Marxism, devised to glorify [Milovan] Djilas and his blackest liberalistic orientation" (Djuradj Stanisavljević), and "contributions against Josip Broz Tito, his deeds, and our

An admirer of Dedijer has claimed that *Novi prilozi* “definitively mark[ed] the end of illusions that our history can be written according to traditional foreign models, in which everything is subordinated to dry documents and conclusions of political forums . . . Our true history . . . for better or worse, is still exclusively oral.”³⁵ Small wonder that Dedijer’s overstated revisionism legitimated sensationalist debunking and diminished genuine scholarship.³⁶ Nevertheless, the book that Gojko Nikoliš, veteran Communist and dissident, had touted as the “most sensational of all that have appeared in our epoch and on our soil” opened the door for the pretensions of more serious Serbian scholars, who were frequently also more politically sophisticated than Dedijer.³⁷ Whether they were party loyalists, like Branko Petranović or Momčilo Zečević, or dissidents bent on challenging the political monopoly of the SKJ, like Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški, their parallel activities weakened the established interpretations of wartime and postwar developments and contributed to the growing sense of resentment among the Serbian public, frustrated with the party’s inability to “pacify” Kosovo, undo the constitution of 1974, and reconstruct a strong centralized administration favorable to Serb national interests.

Branko Petranović’s *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji (1941–1945)* (Revolution and Counterrevolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945; 1983) was an early and relatively moderate contribution to the reinterpretation of the Yugoslav war along the lines of Serbian national communism. Petranović clearly had his blind spots (the Catholic church, Croat and other non-Serb nationalisms, liberal institutions), but he usually succeeded in keeping his feelings under control and certainly committed no major offenses against professional standards. His principal innovation was the ideological redefinition of the Chetnik movement. Even though Petranović made no effort to obscure the growing collaborationism of the

revolution” (Joco Marjanović). In his discussion, Jovan Pavičević clearly recognized the complicated array of xenophobic and paranoid attitudes that were typical of “old cadres”: “I often asked myself after [reading] this book, perhaps even earlier, is the Western public, American and Western public generally, really interested in our National Liberation Struggle, since already in 1953 Dedijer started writing books for the West? What is this now? Does America really want to know how to make revolution, does it want an example? Or is something else at work here—the destabilization of socialist Yugoslavia? Is this not Dulles’s policy: do not attack communism from the outside, but from the inside?” Milovan Dželebdžić ended his discussion on an ominous note: “All of this should be borne in mind, lest we experience some new trauma, some new civil war, some new massacre.” Branko Jovanović, ed., *Razgovor o knjizi Vladimira Dedijera “Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita”* (Belgrade, 1982), 14, 39, 43, 78, 84.

³⁵ Milomir Marić, “Komesar za ishranu radoznalih,” *Duga* (July 10, 1984): 43.

³⁶ Among the sensationalist works published in the wake of Dedijer’s *Novi prilozi*, the following were notable: Vjenceslav Cenčić, *Enigma Kopinič*, 2 vols. (Belgrade, 1983); and Dragan Kljakić, *Dosije Hebrang* (Belgrade, 1983). Both stressed the dependence of Yugoslav Communists on the Comintern and raised suspicions about the continuity of nationalist “deviations” in the Communist Party of Croatia. Both also touched on the persecution of those Yugoslav Communists, the so-called Cominformists, who sided with Stalin and the Cominform resolution in the Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948. Simultaneously, there appeared a series of novels and plays on the Goli Otok concentration camp, which the Yugoslav security police prepared for the incarceration of Cominformists. The most important of these works were Antonije Isaković, *Tren 2: Kazivanja Čeperku* (Belgrade, 1982); Slobodan Selenić, *Pismo/glava* (Belgrade, 1982); and Dušan Jovanović, *Karamazovi* (Belgrade, 1984). The publication of these highly charged fictional works put pressure on historians to “solve” the questions that the *littérateurs* posed.

³⁷ “‘Novi prilozi’ . . . od prigovora do osporavanja,” *Vjesnik* (March 10, 1982): 5.

Chetniks, he broke with the canons of Communist historiography by stating that the “most significant antifascist manifestation among the Serbian bourgeoisie was connected with the Chetnik organization of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović.”³⁸ As antifascists, that is, a complex set of collaborators, the Chetniks thereby were associated with an anticommunist “counterrevolution” of a Western type.

This position, which was infinitely more favorable than that of mere “fascist hirelings,” could be further elaborated. Andrej Mitrović, a Serbian historian of more pronounced liberal orientation, seized on Petranović’s dualistic distinction between “revolution” (communism) and “counterrevolution” (everything else) to introduce a somewhat more nuanced triad of “liberalism, communism, and fascism.” In his words, “I want to stress this triad precisely because we have really only two phenomena—revolution and counterrevolution—in the title that Petranović offered us, whereas, at the time [of the war], the history of Europe developed under the aegis of three possibilities. Moreover, it must be understood that a war front did not exist between the world of socialism and capitalism but between the coalition of a socialist state [USSR] and liberal states, on one side, and the fascist states, on the other. This confrontation, as a general European model, is interesting in relation to [Petranović’s] thesis that the revolutionary front collided with the counterrevolutionary front on our soil. On international soil, we had three fronts, of which two had made a coalition against the third, that is, after all changes were accounted for, since the socialist state was in coalition with a fascist state at the beginning of the war.”³⁹

Where was the “third front” of liberalism? To Mitrović, this was the continuity of the interwar Yugoslav state, ever in conflict with “Central European imperialism,” in which Serbia represented the most dependable ally of liberal Western Europe, meaning Britain and France. Petranović did not take this reinterpretation to its logical conclusion, although he insisted throughout the book that the “international-legal life of a temporarily defeated [Yugoslav] state was not extinguished” during the war.⁴⁰ Even though he penned extremely straightforward passages that left no doubt about the KPJ’s dependence on the Comintern’s “alien state policy garbed . . . in proletarian internationalism,”⁴¹ he was not prepared to see the exiled royal government as a credible liberal force or to endow its Chetnik agency with the mantle of pluralism. To be sure, the collection of sources *Jugoslavija 1918/1984: Zbirka dokumenata* (Yugoslavia 1918–1984: Collection of Documents; 1985), which he edited together with Momčilo Zečević, was accused of downplaying Chetnik massacres,⁴² but the expanded edition of his *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988* (History of Yugoslavia, 1918–1988; 1988), whose printing was in part financed by the research and publications fund of the SKJ Central

³⁸ Branko Petranović, *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji (1941–1945)*, 2 vols. (Belgrade, 1983), 1: 129.

³⁹ Andrej Mitrović, “Nedovršena slika,” *Politika* (October 15, 1983): 10.

⁴⁰ Petranović, *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija*, 1: 99.

⁴¹ Petranović, *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija*, 2: 82.

⁴² Anto Milušić, “U povodu najnovije zbirke dokumenata o Jugoslaviji (Branko Petranović i Momčilo Zečević, *Jugoslavija 1918–1984, IRO ‘Rad’, Beograd 1985*),” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 18 (1986), no. 1: 111. For the authors’ responses, see Branko Petranović and Momčilo Zečević, “Odgovor na napis Anta Milušića ‘U povodu najnovije zbirke dokumenata o Jugoslaviji,’” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 18 (1986), no. 3: 116–21.

Committee, contained a new and impassioned denunciation of Great Britain and America's "deception of the democratic world" by supporting the Chetniks until the summer and fall of 1942.⁴³ Petranović's preference was for a Serbian-led federal (and Communist) Yugoslavia, not for Serb dominance at any price.

If the number of books sold is any indicator, Petranović's audience was vast, but his social impact, sanitized as it was by official prizes and SKJ graces, was nevertheless limited. It was otherwise with the innocently titled monograph *Stranački pluralizam ili monizam: Društveni pokreti i politički sistem u Jugoslaviji 1944–1949* (Party Pluralism or Monism: Social Movements and the Political System in Yugoslavia, 1944–1949; 1983), which bore the cachet of the Belgrade Praxis group.⁴⁴ The book's authors, social scientists Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški, turned the cheaply printed edition of a thousand copies into a political fire bomb. Their theme was the source of "tactical craftiness" applied by the KPJ to create an impression during the war that it was in favor of a multiparty political system, only to establish Communist political hegemony after the seizure of power. Individual chapters discussed the various methods that the Communists used to marginalize, silence, and eliminate alternative political organizations, as well as the issues at stake in the conflict between the Communists and the adherents of political pluralism. Not surprisingly, Koštunica and Čavoški found the sources of Yugoslav Communist practice in Bolshevik monism and insistence on the monopoly of power. The party polemicists quickly denounced the book as a "plaidoyer for a multiparty system" and an "extremely controversial and tendentious book without precedent in our postwar history."⁴⁵ Although the authors made no special reference to the nationality question, their favorable view of the predominantly Serbian Democratic Party of Milan Grol suggested a noncommunist Serbian model of pluralism.

THE OPPOSITIONAL THEMES IN SERBIAN SCHOLARSHIP roused the SKJ watchdogs in the other republics. But it was the Croat conservatives, still on guard against heterodox thinking in their own back yard, who were particularly alarmed by the new trends in Serbian publishing. Stipe Šuvar, Croatia's chief SKJ ideologist, summoned 165 historians and party activists to Zagreb in October 1983 for a

⁴³ Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988*, 3 vols. (Belgrade, 1988), 2: 186.

⁴⁴ In January 1975, the parliament of Serbia passed a special act designed to exclude from active teaching eight professors and instructors at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Belgrade. These dissident Marxist philosophers and sociologists, associated through their publications and in the public mind with the Zagreb journal *Praxis*, were put "at disposal," which is to say that the authorities ultimately gave them research positions at a special university institution, the Center for Philosophy and Social Theory, publisher of the Koštunica-Čavoški book in 1983. Four of the eight (Zagorka Golubović, Dragoljub Mićunović, Nebojša Popov, and Svetozar Stojanović) were cited in the front matter of this book in the capacity of reviewers or editors.

⁴⁵ Pero Pletikosa, "Pledoaje za višestranački sistem," *Vjesnik* (September 20, 1983): 3; Mirko Arsić, "Tendenciozna 'rekonstrukcija,'" *Politika* (August 6, 1983): 12. In his attack on Koštunica and Čavoški, Arsić was especially insistent on the special role of the KPJ as a party "in the great historical sense." Since the authors were incapable of such obeisance, they were "incapable of comprehending the logos of Yugoslav socialist revolution." Under a barrage of partisan attacks, the authors were themselves obliged to plead that "it is malicious to claim that we are in favor of a multiparty system." Nataša Marković, "Kiselo grozdje," *Danas* (September 27, 1983): 19.

two-day conference awkwardly titled "Historiography, Memoir-Publicistic, and Feuilleton Production in Light of Ideational Controversies." Serbian historians clearly did not wish to confer legitimacy to a meeting that was expected to lash out at Belgrade's ideological latitudinarianism. Of the 70 invitees who did *not* attend, 34 were from Belgrade and Novi Sad, including such notable historians as Sima Ćirković, Dragoslav Janković, Andrej Mitrović, Pero Morača, Čedo Popov, Branko Petranović, and Momčilo Zečević.⁴⁶ Šuvar set the tone for the conference by stating that the time had come for "us" to stop being defensive: "The League of Communists today, more than ever before, must show its ability and strength as the collective intellectual leadership of the working class, must organize the struggle of ideas over real issues and in the right way."⁴⁷ Following Šuvar's lead, alarms were sounded by most participants. Retrospectively, the warnings of Vojan Rus, who predicted "three or four Lebanons" in Yugoslavia should the proponents of a multiparty system have their way, seem exaggerated only in their chain of causality.⁴⁸ The preventive measures were accordingly misplaced.

Šuvar cautioned against the "harmful consequences of all suspicious intrigues in historiography . . . in the sphere of multinational relations." He noted the thesis that the "KPJ was a tool of the Comintern in weakening and wrecking [interwar] Yugoslavia, and that it even carried out an assigned mission of cutting up . . . the new Yugoslavia, especially by setting back and breaking up some of our nations."⁴⁹ He clearly aimed at national protectionism in Serbian historiography. As an object lesson in how to deal with nonconforming historians, his assistants soon whipped up two controlled witch hunts in Zagreb. In January 1984, Zagreb's Yugoslav Lexicographical Institution published the first volume of *Hrvatski biografski leksikon* (Croatian Biographical Lexicon). The biographies of 1,751 notables written by 270 authors aided by 40 editorial assistants, covering the surnames from A to Bi, contained, according to Ines Šaskor, examples of "insufficient Marxist critical evaluation of the contributions of individual personalities to national history."⁵⁰ In April 1984, Goran Babić wrote a convulsive article in which he cited several hundred clerics in the lexicon's published and projected list of subjects, charging that this "reactionary publication" revived an "enormous number of totally marginal people whose sole historical 'merit' was a monk's habit or some black garb, not to mention that there are criminals among them."⁵¹ And, in June 1984, the ideological commission of Zagreb's League of Communists of Croatia (SKH) City Committee organized a discussion on the suspect publication.⁵² Then, in December 1984, Croat hard-liners mounted a campaign against a newly published survey of Croatian film history, *Između publike i države: Povijest*

⁴⁶ Also missing were Mirjana Gross, Dragovan Šepić, and Jaroslav Šidak, three of the most prominent Croat historians, who were also invited to the conference.

⁴⁷ Stipe Šuvar, "Historija revolucije tiče se nas svih," in *Historija i suvremenost: Idejne kontroverze*, Ivan Perić, ed. (Zagreb, 1984), 9.

⁴⁸ Vojan Rus, "Između liberalističkih i dogmatskih revizija," in Perić, *Historija i suvremenost*, 131.

⁴⁹ Šuvar, "Historija revolucije tiče se nas svih," 14.

⁵⁰ Ines Šaskor, "I zločinci—'znameniti Hrvati,'" *Nedjeljna Dalmacija* (August 25, 1985): 22.

⁵¹ Goran Babić, "Voćna salata ili pomirenje svih Hrvata," *Oko* (April 26, 1984): 5, 8–9.

⁵² Sanja Vrhovec, ed., *Aporije Hrvatskog biografskog leksikona* (Zagreb, 1984). Although most participants did not share Babić's view that the edition was an "expression of spiritual counterrevolution," critical and even denunciatory tones prevailed in the discussion.

hrvatske kinematografije 1896–1980 (Between Public and State: A History of Croatian Cinematography, 1896–1980; 1984), by Ivo Škrabalo. The book was denounced as an anticommunist “pamphlet” in which “no sentence is accidental and almost all are tendentious.”⁵³

The lessons in repression were not assimilated in Serbia. Unlike the Croat intellectuals, whose spirits were cowed, Serbian intellectuals, historians especially, whether Communists or noncommunists, became increasingly more daring in their publications. They were not intimidated by the drones of the historical establishment and their ideological warnings at the Eighth Congress of Historians of Yugoslavia (Arandjelovac, October 1983)⁵⁴ or by the antics of Šuvar and Babić. Unfortunately, they were also increasingly more nationalistic. In 1983, Velimir Terzić brought out a new and expanded version of his book on the collapse of Yugoslavia in the April war of 1941 in which he repeated his old theses about Croat betrayal and thereby provoked bitter recriminations from Zagreb.⁵⁵ Desanka Pešić’s book on the Communist nationality policy from 1919 to 1935 was essentially a rehabilitation of Sima Marković (1888–1938), secretary of the KPJ’s Central Party Council in 1919, a leading Serbian Communist, and leader of the Right faction in the party disputes of the 1920s, whose position on the nationality question—notable for its opposition to alliances with the mass movements of non-Serb nationalities—was favorably reevaluated as a classic Leninist position. Pešić’s principal theme was the danger of using “national struggle as a tool of class struggle,” thereby permitting the dominance of national ideology” in Communist politics. This view implied that Serbian disinterest in Croat or Albanian national movements was good communism. Pešić made this even more explicit by denouncing the Communist “treatment of the Serb people [in the interwar period] as strictly *exploitative*” and by arguing that the Communists generally overlooked the relevance of the “Serb question,” that is, the integration of the Serbs within a single state.⁵⁶

Rehabilitation of dethroned Serbian leaders of the interwar period was a further step in the revival of Serb national claims. Some journalists started promoting King Aleksandar, assassinated in Marseilles in October 1934 by Italian-backed Croat and Macedonian terrorists, as the “first victim of fascism in Europe.”⁵⁷ But it was historian Djordje Dj. Stanković’s biography of Nikola Pašić (1845–1926) that initiated the trend in scholarship. Pašić was the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, prime minister of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and chief architect of Serbian predominance in the unified Yugoslav state.⁵⁸ In his work, Stanković avoided the uncritical attitudes of pre-war Serbian historians who viewed Pašić’s efforts in the unification of Yugoslavia as selfless determination to

⁵³ Mira Boglić, “Povijest ili pamfleti,” *Vjesnik: Sedam dana* (December 12, 1984): 12–13; R. Arsenić, “To nije istorija,” *Politika* (March 8, 1985): 10.

⁵⁴ Ratko Peković, “Kako oživeti vreme,” *Duga* (November 5, 1983): 30–32.

⁵⁵ Velimir Terzić, *Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941*, 2 vols. (Belgrade, 1982–83). For a response from a leading Croat historian, see Ljubo Boban, “Izvod iz strogo povjerljive kombinatorike Velimira Terzića. A ponešto i o drugim kombinatorikama,” in Perić, *Historija i suvremenost*, 263–75.

⁵⁶ Desanka Pešić, *Jugoslovenski komunisti i nacionalno pitanje (1919–1935)* (Belgrade, 1983), 143–44, 283.

⁵⁷ Milomir Marić, “Lov na jednog kralja,” *Duga* (November 4, 1984): 30–32.

⁵⁸ Djordje Dj. Stanković, *Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje*, 2 vols. (Belgrade, 1985).

liberate all the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from foreign rule. And he took aim at postwar Marxist historians who blamed Pašić not only for opposing the democratic aspirations of the masses but (after having opted for Serbian hegemony instead of Yugoslav cooperation) also for wrecking all offers of agreement with the South Slavic bourgeoisie of the former Austro-Hungarian territories. Instead, he insisted that Pašić was solving the “Serb national question,” that is, the unification of all Serbs within a single state, which, according to Stanković, necessarily promoted the interests of the other South Slavs. This sort of “Yugoslavism,” defined essentially as a Serb interest, was at the heart of the nationality disputes of the 1980s and hence an accompanying factor in the political disputes.

The wave of Serbian historical revisionism, attended as it was by the appearance of revealing memoirs by various Communist leaders⁵⁹ and publications on Masons and other creators of “secret histories,”⁶⁰ could not by itself be a decisive threat to the stability of nationality relations as long as it was not an immediate instrument of political contention. All of that changed with the rise of Slobodan Milošević (b. 1941) to party leadership in Serbia, when the conclusions of political historiography became fully operational in Serbia’s confrontation with the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina and indeed with the “constitution defenders” in the other republics and in the federal center. Among the curiosities of these intricate struggles was the fact that Milošević rose to power as an orthodox Titoist ready to use “administrative measures” against dissidents. This did not prevent the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), increasingly a nationalist and anticommunist bastion, from lending its authority to Slobodan Milošević.

In May 1985, at the annual meeting of SANU, members decided to organize a commission that would be charged with coordinating a draft memorandum on the current situation in Yugoslavia. The commission included two historians—Radovan Samardžić and Vasilije Krestić. A draft of the document came into the possession of a Belgrade daily in September 1986. According to one version, orthodox Titoists in the federal center, perhaps connected with the conservative federalists outside Serbia, wanted an affair that would embarrass the Serbian leadership and demonstrate its laxity toward nationalism. “The Memorandum of SANU” was the perfect foil for the diminishing luster of Titoist communism. Its authors argued that the confederalist tendencies in the constitution of 1974—not any other systemic weaknesses—were the source of Yugoslavia’s growing difficulties. The root of the problem was the primacy of national over class interest that the KPJ inherited from Stalin’s Comintern:

⁵⁹ On September 18, 1987, at a session of the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) Central Committee, General Nikola Ljubičić, Tito’s longtime minister of defense, denounced the flood of Serbian memoirs: “Here, you see, we have memoirs of Koča Popović, Milovan Djilas, Vojan Lukić, Mirko Marković, Mirko Perović, Milija Kovačević, Gustav Vlahov, Patriarch Dožić, Radivoje Jovanović, Ljubodrag Djurić, and I don’t know who else. What will it mean for Serbia when all of these memoirs are published, and what will the world think of us?” Cited in Slavoljub Djukić, *Kako se dogodio vodja: Borbe za vlast u Srbiji posle Josipa Broza* (Belgrade, 1992), 160.

⁶⁰ See especially Zoran D. Nenezić, *Masoni u Jugoslaviji (1764–1980): Pregled istorije slobodnog zidarstva u Jugoslaviji; Prilozi i gradja* (Belgrade, 1984). Nenezić insinuated that Tito and Kardelj were Masons and that they belonged to the pro-federalist Masonic lodge with Juraj Krnjević and Juraj Šutej, leaders of the Croat Peasant Party; 417, 634, 646, 649, 665. For a polemic on this issue, see Letters to the Editor, *NIN* (October 7, 1984): 4–6, 8. Fascination with Masons was not exclusive to Serbia. For a Croat equivalent, see Ivan Mužić, *Masonstvo u Hrvata: Masoni i Jugoslavija* (Zagreb, 1983).

The strategy of the Comintern [in the interwar period] derived from an estimate that after the absence of proletarian revolution in Western Europe, the Communist parties of Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe must rely on national movements, even if they were explicitly antisocialist and founded on the idea of national as opposed to class unity. Stalin was active in demolishing all resistance to this strategy (for example, in the case of Sima Marković, one of the KPJ's founders). In this spirit, Sperans (Edvard Kardelj) formulated and developed his theory on the national question in his book *Development of the Slovene National Question* [1939], which mainly served as an ideational formula for the development of Yugoslavia toward a confederation of sovereign republics and provinces, a formula finally realized in the constitution of 1974. The two most developed republics [Slovenia and Croatia], which realized their national programs with the promulgation of this constitution, today stand as stubborn defenders of the existing system.⁶¹

The memorandum contained a series of charges about the economic and political discrimination that Serbia allegedly suffered under the Tito regime. Once again, the cause was found in the supposed "revanchist" policy that the Communists imposed on the Serbs, whom they treated as a nation of oppressors, centralists, and gendarmes. Moreover, the "economic subjugation of Serbia" was carried out by an alliance of Croat and Slovene Communists. Croatia and Slovenia "shared similar a historical fate, the same religion, and an aspiration toward the greatest possible independence. As the most developed republics, they also shared common economic interests, which were sufficient reasons for a lasting coalition in attempts to realize political domination. This coalition was deepened by the longstanding collaboration between Tito and Kardelj, the two most important political figures of postwar Yugoslavia, who enjoyed unquestioned authority in the centers of power." The "anti-Serb coalition" promoted the virtual separation of Kosovo and Vojvodina from Serbia proper, the "genocide" against the Serbs of Kosovo, the disintegration of Serb culture along republic lines, and "Serbophobia." The Serbs of Croatia were deprived of their institutions and exposed to assimilation: "Excepting the [wartime] period, never have the Serbs of Croatia been so imperiled as today. A solution to their national status is becoming a political question of the first order." The memorandum concluded with a call for the revision of the constitution by making Kosovo and Vojvodina "real constituent parts of the Republic of Serbia," by abolishing the confederalist elements of the constitution, and, failing that, by defining Serbia's economic and national interests, presumably outside Yugoslavia.⁶²

The novelty of the memorandum was its questioning of Yugoslavia as the optimal solution for the Serbs. Usually, the non-Serb national movements hurled accusations at Yugoslavia on account of various Serbian advantages in the common state. Now, the leading Serbian intellectual institution cast its own aspersions on Yugoslavia. The memorandum shocked and compromised the Communist leadership of Serbia. Although Slobodan Milošević left an impression that he "purposely did not wish to be clear" on the question of the memorandum, he gained considerably from its publication. According to one view, he was privately already in favor of the memorandum's theses. He openly adopted them

⁶¹ "Memorandum SANU," *Duga* (June 1989): 26.

⁶² "Memorandum SANU," 36, 38–40, 42–43, 44, 46, 47.

“two years later as his programmatic orientation. As a result, this document later gained far greater significance than when it originally appeared.”⁶³ The historiography that rose in its shadow represented more than a move toward historical revisionism. It became an agency of aggressive national aggrandizement, clearly in service of Milošević’s political program—the establishment of a strong and unified Serbia that would, once again, be capable of dominating Yugoslavia and, failing that, go its own way together with all the territories in which the Serbs lived, including portions of Croatia and most of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Several Serbian historians—members of or associated with SANU—played a major role in this transformation. Academician Vasilije Dj. Krestić had a history of controversial publications before the memorandum. His collection *Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i jugoslovenska ideja* (Serbo-Croat Relations and the Yugoslav Idea; 1983) portrayed the ideology of South Slavic reciprocity (Yugoslavism) among the Croats as essentially a case of self-interest that promoted Croat supremacy over the Serbs and Slovenes. The Croat Yugoslavists, according to Krestić, “accepted cooperation with Serbia and together with it and under its leadership sought to solve the South Slavic and Eastern Question only when they found themselves in a hopeless position and when all of their plans for primacy among the South Slavs, which [the Croats] would have had in a federally organized [Habsburg] Monarchy, ended in failure.”⁶⁴ Far more damaging was Krestić’s 1986 article “On the Origin of the Genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia,” in which he used ten quotes (spanning the period from 1700 to 1902), accounts of four incidents, and unpublished observations by a Croat politician to claim that the “genocide against the Serbs in [Ustaša] Croatia is a specific phenomenon in our [Serb] centuries-old common life with the Croats. The protracted development of the genocidal idea in certain centers of Croat society . . . did not necessarily have some narrow—but rather a broad—base, took deep roots in the consciousness of many generations.”⁶⁵ Krestić’s article became the sole academic inspiration for the increasingly less specific assertions about the “genocidal nature” of the Croats, a theory that justified the Serb insurgency in Croatia in 1990–1991.

The Serbian Academy’s most serious misstep before the memorandum was the publication of Veselin Djuretić’s *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama* (The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama; 1985), which was condemned as a “defense of the Chetnik movement.”⁶⁶ This poorly researched and written work aroused undeserved attention on account of its intentionally provocative message, which found sponsorship in SANU’s Balkanological Institute. Djuretić set out to prove that the “myth of Serbian hegemony” contributed to the Allies’ misreading of interwar Yugoslav developments, prevented proper appreciation of the dimensions of genocide inflicted on the Serbs by Croat Ustašas, and created a need to impose symmetrical culpability for wartime carnage on both Croats and Serbs, thereby prejudging the choice of local clients in favor of antinationalist Communists instead of equally antifascist but nationalist Chetniks. In Djuretić’s conclusion,

⁶³ Djukić, *Kako se dogodio vodja*, 111, 121.

⁶⁴ Vasilije Dj. Krestić, *Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i jugoslovenska ideja* (Belgrade, 1983), 150.

⁶⁵ Vasilije Krestić, “O genezi genocida nad Srbima u NDH,” *Književne novine* (September 15, 1986): 5.

⁶⁶ “Dr Djuretić isključen iz Saveza komunista,” *Politika* (November 6, 1985): 6. The author and the book’s two reviewers (Zoran Lakić and Savo Skoko) were expelled from the SKJ.

unlike the other nationalities that were on one or another embattled side, the Serbs were uniquely divided between the Communists and Chetniks. Serbian nationalists (Chetniks) were unable to counter the myths of Serbian hegemony and pro-Partisan sentiment among the Croats. Indeed, the "Croat and Muslim extremism (Ustašism)" succeeded in transforming itself into Communist "official policy," thereby hoodwinking the undisciplined and nationally "unconstituted" Serbs. The result was that the Serbs could choose only between the "acceptance of the [Partisans] or death."⁶⁷ Although Djuretić's book was temporarily banned, Serbian polemicists defended his views against the criticisms of the "Zagreb circle,"⁶⁸ as did, more moderately, professional historians like Petranović.⁶⁹

The final product of the SANU line was the monograph by Academician Milorad Ekmečić *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–1918* (The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1790–1918), which appeared in 1989, the year of Milošević's reintegration of Kosovo and Vojvodina, of his militant speech at Gazi Mestan at the 600th anniversary of Serbian defeat at the Field of Kosovo, when he said that the Serbs are "once again in battles and before battles. They are not armed battles, though that is not to be excluded."⁷⁰ In his sophisticated narrative, which stands head and shoulders above the primitive efforts of Djuretić, Ekmečić returned to his old themes about the Catholic hand in the failure of Yugoslav integration. He was far more explicit in his speech at the public forum of Budva, Montenegro, on October 25, 1990, when he charged that "it is not the tragedy of Yugoslav communism that it historically failed to lift culture out of the vault of inferiority before religion, thereby preventing [culture] from becoming the foundation of a new association. The tragedy is that communism acquired this role."⁷¹

Insisting on the culpability of the Catholic church, Ekmečić claimed that the "whole past of Yugoslav unification depended on the ability of churches to rationalize the division of a single linguistic cake. That is, during the [nineteenth and twentieth] centuries, the Yugoslavs were united only to the extent that the

⁶⁷ Veselin Djuretić, *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama*, 2 vols. (Belgrade, 1985), 2: 251, 253.

⁶⁸ The phrase belongs to journalist Milorad Vučelić, who charged that criticisms against various Serbian publications stem from "aggressive and orthodox monopolists in the public, journalistic, cultural, and ideational-political life of Croatia's capital." See Milorad Vučelić, "Protiv nove militantnosti," *Književne novine* (October 1, 1985): 2. Slovenian historian Dušan Biber was actually the most devastating critic of Djuretić's book. See Dušan Biber, "Naučna kuliserija jednog političkog pamfleta: U povodu knjige V. Djuretića, *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama*," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, 17 (1985), no. 3: 95–119.

⁶⁹ Vidojko Veličković, ed., *Stručna rasprava o knjizi dr Veselina Djuretića "Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama"* (Belgrade, 1985), 12–33. Djuretić had the last word on the controversy at the height of Milošević's power in 1991: "We [Serbs] gave up our second chance for the formation of our state after the end of World War II. In the course of that war, we fought under different banners, but we experienced the most ironical position, that is, that the international dimension of our struggle became the means for the total destruction of Serb lands; that our blood, shed in the name of nebulous socialist or Communist ideas, in the name of the ideology of Mother Russia, that is, in league with Russia, which was in the hands of Satan, was used for the destruction of Yugoslavia and Serb lands." Since Communist federalism succeeded in destroying the Serb lands, relief will come from the decommunized homeland of communism that Djuretić just visited: "into the center of Russia—New Russia which is in its slow but inevitable birth pangs, we have thrown a people that had disappeared from Russia's vision, only to emerge as a cosmic people. I am referring to the Serbs." Veselin Djuretić, "Nova Rusija i Srbija," *Pogledi* (September 6, 1991): 40–41.

⁷⁰ Slobodan Milošević, "Ravnopravni i složni odnosi uslov za opstanak Jugoslavije," *Politika* (June 29, 1989): 4.

⁷¹ Milorad Ekmečić, "Budućnost Jugoslavije," *NIN* (November 16, 1990): 55.

Catholic church failed in maintaining Croat and Slovene separatism." The South Slavs did not rise to full unitarism because the "churches divided us." Hence the future of Yugoslavia could go either against the influence of religion (especially Catholicism) and into "spiritual unitarism such as never existed in history" or, alternatively, into "clericalism" and dissolution.⁷² By 1991, in wake of the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe, the dissolution was at hand. Following the legalization of opposition parties in 1989–1990—and the victory of the opposition in the 1990 elections in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina—Serbia and the Yugoslav People's Army became increasingly isolated and determined to accept no further confederalization, much less independence, of the constituent republics. The declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991 and the war that followed prompted an obituary for Yugoslavia in a leading Serbian cultural weekly: "Croatia and Slovenia are exiting from Yugoslavia with the Communist dowry, leaving behind them, in a garbage can, all the symbols, rituals, and party cards with which they acquired the dowry. Moreover, they are exiting from that notorious party and ideological state with spoils that they never would have won on the field of battle."⁷³

The non-Serb reaction to the rise of nationalist historiography in Serbia was inadequate and late. Moreover, as we have already seen in Croatia, much of this effort was mounted by orthodox Titoist polemicists, not genuine historians. Only in the late 1980s did real scholars like Ljubo Boban,⁷⁴ Bogdan Krizman, and Dušan Biber start responding to the avalanche of double standards and distortions. They were joined by demographers who took up the exaggerated claims about the war losses of 1941–1945, the stock subject of nationalist historiography.⁷⁵ Most non-Serb historians were silent or equivocating. Given the tight control of party censorship in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, almost everywhere outside Serbia proper except in Slovenia, popular historical works were rare and usually written by amateurs. Professional historians went about their business, avoiding political history in favor of noncontroversial social studies. The few Serb historians who raised their voices against the deluge were isolated in intellectual ghettos.⁷⁶

"Today it is impossible to say," Milošević argued at Gazi Mestan, "what is historical truth and what is legend in the battle of Kosovo. This is no longer even important."⁷⁷ Yugoslav historiography could not survive the notion that the

⁷² Ekmečić, "Budućnost," 56. Ekmečić did not indulge in the crude anti-Catholic propaganda that arose in Serbia in the late 1980s. He simply legitimated the anti-Catholic literature of Dragoljub R. Živojinović, Vladimir Dedijer, and Milan Bulajić. On this subject, see Ivo Banac, "The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia's Demise," *Daedalus*, 121 (1992): 161–63, 173.

⁷³ Miodrag Perišić, "Kraj Jugoslavije," *Književne novine* (July 1, 1991): 1.

⁷⁴ For Boban's diligent efforts, see *Kontroverze iz povijesti Jugoslavije*, 3 vols. (Zagreb, 1987, 1989, 1990).

⁷⁵ The skillful and moderate work by an émigré Serbian statistician, Bogoljub Kočović, was supplemented by a Croat demographer, Vladimir Žerjavić. See Bogoljub Kočović, *Žrtve Drugog svjetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London, 1985); Vladimir Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb, 1989); Žerjavić, *Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga* (Zagreb, 1992).

⁷⁶ The following works of three quite different scholars are notable: Ivan Djurić, *Istorija—pribežište ili putokaz* (Sarajevo, 1990); Andrej Mitrović, *Raspravljanja sa Klio* (Sarajevo, 1991); Drago Roksandić, *Srbi u Hrvatskoj* (Zagreb, 1991); Roksandić, *Srpska i hrvatska povijest i 'nova historija'* (Zagreb, 1991).

⁷⁷ Milošević, "Ravnopravni i složni odnosi," 3.

distinction between historical truth and popular legends was not a matter of importance. It could not survive the notion that there were different truths, negotiated by professional historians. The one-sided war of historians is notable because legends and ideological distortions were often promulgated by the best historians, not by amateurs. Yugoslav historiography was never harmoniously arranged. Now, it no longer exists. This means that the historiographies of the successor states will be unequal in harmony, quality, and orientation, according to the level of ideologization in each. The historical guild will have a difficult task in removing not only the heritage of the Communist *dirigisme* but also the consequences of the postcommunist chasm. This article has suggested that the dissolution of Yugoslav historiography occurred because of the continuity of partisan loyalties to changing ideological banners. It cannot answer why so many changed their Marxist allegiances (if such they were) so quickly (if they did so) to introduce (or reflect) the new political requirements. The consequences for historiography, but also for ordinary human lives, are vast.

IN 1984, AMID VARIOUS HISTORICAL POLEMICS, Mexican writer Roberto Salinas Price tickled the fancy of the Yugoslav public with his novel theory about the location of Homeric sites. Troy, he claimed, was really at Gabela, a Hercegovinian village on the right bank of the Neretva River, downstream from Čapljina. Frustrated classicists, whose inability to anticipate Salinas's theories became a source of considerable disparagement in the press, responded with a sardonic quiz, whereby the most gullible respondents were proclaimed Trojans: "You have a stomach of steel, a real Trojan stomach, despite the Bronze Age. You can devour everything, nothing can make you ill, nothing can surprise you. You are blessed because you have believed but cannot see. Yours is the kingdom of Troy."⁷⁸

At the time of this writing, the Neretva valley is a great cauldron of war. Čapljina and Gabela are among the many towns and villages that the Yugoslav People's Army has bombed in April and May 1992 in its war against Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Trojan fancy has turned into Hecuba's veiling. But it is Ilok, more so than the bombed slopes of the Hercegovinian Ida, that has produced the most graphic images of the Yugoslav war. In October 1991, slightly more than twelve years after the memorable congress that initiated the war of historians, the army obliged 10,000 Croats to leave Ilok. Instead of performing a solemn rite on the seventy-third anniversary of Yugoslavia, the people of Ilok packed their cars and carts with everything they could carry and took off toward the west. A photograph of a kerchiefed grandmother being searched by two stern army women is particularly memorable.⁷⁹ "No terms can be made with Fate. I have just now seen Cassandra dragged away by force."⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Roberto Salinas Price, *Homer's Blind Audience: An Essay on the Illiad's Geographical Prerequisites for the Site of Ilios* (1980; San Antonio, Tex., 1983); Bruna Kuntić-Makvić, "Veliki prigodni kviz: Jeste li Trojanac?" *Troja i kako je steći*, Zlatko Šešelj, ed. (Zagreb, 1985), 82.

⁷⁹ Dejan Oršić, "Ilok: Egzodus Hrvata," *Arena* (October 26, 1991): 2–5.

⁸⁰ Euripedes, *Trojan Women*, 616–17.

Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Bulgaria

MARIA TODOROVA

THREE YEARS AFTER THE EUPHORIA over the East European revolution, which in Bulgaria is called more modestly and soberly “the changes of November 10, 1989,” a tentative attempt to look back and assess the repercussions of the transformations on different spheres of economic, political, and intellectual life seems justified. On the thorny road to pluralism, the greatest achievement is the degree of “openness.” This is most noticeable in the mass media, particularly in the proliferation of a free press. True, there are already unmistakable signs that this period may be remembered as the short honeymoon of the (almost absolutely) free press, but the fact that Bulgarians are enjoying an unprecedented degree of freedom of expression for the first time in over a century is beyond doubt. Some of the highest expectations in this new atmosphere of openness have been placed on historiography, given the centrality of history in the national consciousness, its unrivaled role as justifier and legitimizer, and the degree of its former subordination to the political demands of the state and the ideological hegemony of communism.

To outline the main aspects of this transformation as it affects the historical profession—the questions of methodology and historiography *per se*, the institutional organization of historical scholarship, and the problem of personnel—this analysis will focus on the following questions: In what sense can one speak of radical or revolutionary changes in historical scholarship? To what extent can continuity be discerned? Where is the balance between the optimistic prognosis of a long-awaited intellectual outburst and the gloomy prospects of prolonged stagnation?

The character of Bulgarian historical scholarship at present is shaped more by the traditions within the discipline and by the problems of human potential than by the legacy of the political and ideological conjuncture of the past forty years. Bulgarian historiography began to professionalize itself after the creation of an independent Bulgarian state (*de facto* in 1878, *de jure* in 1908) and the foundation of its scholarly institutions. Until then, historical writing had been dominated by enthusiasts (clergymen, teachers, local dilettanti) who passionately served the ideas of cultural revival and political independence through historical knowledge. Thus Bulgarian historiography was shaped both by its romantic predecessors, whose noble (and only) aim was to stir national consciousness and

legitimize national aspirations, and by the influence of the positivist and romantic historiographies then prevalent in Europe.¹

The periodization of Bulgarian historiography mirrors the main stages of political life in the country.² Between 1878 and the end of World War I, the historical profession functioned within the framework of the newly born and developing nation-state, with a strong and optimistic irredenta. Historical scholarship of this period became, for the first time, organized in scholarly institutions, and its prime efforts were directed toward the discovery, recovery, and systematic study of the historical heritage. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (known under this name since 1911) was, in fact, an outgrowth of the Bulgarian Literary Society, founded in 1869 along the lines of the existing European academies. It focused its initial efforts on the humanities: ethnography and folklore, archaeology, history, language, and literature. By the turn of the century, it also supported significant activities in the sciences. Despite limited funds, the Society/Academy financed the research of individual scholars, gave awards, sponsored publications, and directed some truly impressive undertakings (for example, the recording of over 200,000 folk songs by the Academy's Musicology Institute).³

The principal focus of historical research was medieval Bulgarian history, a choice influenced partly by the high level of European (especially German) medieval studies of the period but mostly by the desire to reveal the glorious history of the two medieval Bulgarian empires. The basic task of historiography was the shaping of national consciousness and self-esteem on the basis of historical knowledge. From its beginnings, Bulgarian historiography developed according to the idea that history is an active educational, cultural, ideological, and political factor in social life. In this respect, the Bulgarian case was in line with the dominant views on the functions of historical scholarship in the contemporary Balkan and other European countries. Any differences would be found in the degree of politicization and ideologization and in the attempts to look for alternative historical approaches and methods of presentation.

The interwar period was shaped by the severe blow dealt the national irredenta and was a time of acute social and political conflict. The historical profession became more specialized, while the focus of scholarly research broadened to include greater attention to the ancient and modern periods, especially the period of national revival in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, primarily Bulgarian cultural history and the struggle for emancipation by both the church and the

¹ On Bulgarian historiography before the creation of an independent nation-state, see Bonyu Angelov, *Svremennitsi na Paisii* (Sofia, 1964); Dimitir Tsanev, "Osnovni napravleniya v bilgarskata istoriografiya prez pivrata polovina na XIX v.," *Izvestiya na bilgarskoto istoricheskoto druzhestvo*, 29 (1974).

² For general works on Bulgarian historiography, see *Problemi na bilgarskata istoriografiya sled Vtorata svetovna voyna* (Sofia, 1973); Veselin Hadzhinikolov, "Istoricheskata nauka v Bilgariya pri sotsializma: Etapi i nasoki na razvitiye," *Istoricheski pregled*, 45 (1989): 3–19. There are numerous studies on different periods of Bulgarian historiography and on individual historians in the historiographical sections of the major annuals and journals dealing with Bulgarian history: *Izvestiya na bilgarskoto istoricheskoto druzhestvo*, *Istoricheski pregled*, *Izvestiya na instituta po istoriya*, *Etudes historiques*, *Vekove*. For a detailed historiographical review of a central aspect of Bulgarian historical scholarship that is representative of the profession as a whole—the Ottoman period and its legacy—see Maria Todorova, "Die Osmanenzeit in der bulgarischen Geschichtsschreibung seit der Unabhängigkeit," *Die Staaten Südosteuropas und die Osmanen*, H. G. Majer, ed. (Munich, 1989).

³ *Istoriya na Bilgarskata akademiya na naukite* (Sofia, 1971).

nation. The center of historical research became Sofia University, founded in 1888. Research and the teaching of history (which was nominally under the Historical-Philological Faculty) was one of the chief tasks of the university as a whole. After the turn of the century, there emerged an entire generation of professional historians (trained both at home and abroad) who taught at Sofia University and whose research emphasis was mostly on ancient and medieval history. Despite the university's formal academic autonomy, its dependence on state support was made clear several times by political pressures exerted on it during the interwar period. A short-lived experiment with a private Free University revealed the serious constraints that such institutions incur in small countries with limited resources.⁴ Alongside the dominant positivist and romantic trends in Bulgarian historiography, some attempts were made (though, on the whole, marginal to the mainstream) at a reassessment of the historical process from other viewpoints (Marxist, psychological, racist). There was no reevaluation of the basic goals and tasks of history as they had been formulated in the previous period. The degree of politicization of historical scholarship, a charge usually reserved for the Communist period, was extremely high.⁵

Finally, the period after World War II saw the imposition of Marxist methodology. This shift was principally reflected in more intensive research on problems and periods heretofore comparatively underdeveloped: social and economic history (which has produced, probably, the best work from this period), as well as the history of different types of revolutionary movements and class struggle. At the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, a number of dogmatic "truths" were introduced (about the inherently reactionary role of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie, for example, the artificial juxtaposition of the revolutionary and educational trends in the national struggle to the detriment of the latter, etc.), while traditional, well-developed and well-documented research topics were neglected (especially cultural history and the history of ideas other than revolutionary).

However, this period coincided, more or less, with the brief caesura of the domination of the Marxist discourse in what I have called elsewhere the national(ist) continuum of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁶ From the end of the 1950s, there was a steady return to the themes traditionally developed by Bulgarian historiography. The allegiance to doctrine was usually provided by lip-service introductions, after which the remainder of the works consisted, most often, of solid studies uncontaminated with ideological clichés. By the 1980s, even

⁴ *Istoriya na Sofiiskiya universitet "Kliment Ohridski"* (Sofia, 1988).

⁵ William A. Walsh, "Politics and Scholarship in Bulgaria," *Balkan Studies*, 8 (1967): 138–49, presents the results of a sociological study of the members of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and their relationship with the government in the interwar period. Among other things, he mentions the fact that the first president of the Academy (Ivan Geshov) and its last pre-war president (Bogdan Filov, a major archaeologist and ancient historian) were prime ministers while serving as heads of the Academy.

⁶ Maria Todorova, "Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe" (paper presented at the conference "The Social Legacy of Communism" in Washington D.C., February 1992). The papers of this conference are being published in a separate volume by the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies. See also Todorova, "The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism," *East European Nationalism*, Peter Sugar, ed., American University Press (forthcoming).

the lip service had been discarded. At the same time, Bulgarian historiography was completely untouched by the developments in Western Marxism after the war.⁷

For at least two decades, in the 1960s and especially in the 1970s, a continuous escalation took place in the national feelings of all groups within the intelligentsia, but primarily among the liberal arts and particularly acutely among historians and writers. This intensification of national feeling reached its culmination in the 1980s. Given the significant degree of symbiosis between intelligentsia and party in Bulgaria (compared to some of the other East European countries, where the "divorce" had occurred earlier),⁸ it would be an understatement to say that these feelings were only well monitored and manipulated by the party authorities; they were, in fact, sometimes cautiously, more often overtly, supported and directly inspired by the political elites.

Historians, in particular, took upon themselves the voluntary task of protecting and promoting the "national interests" and the "national cause," which enabled them to espouse the false but self-satisfying illusion that they were taking a dissident position. The rehabilitation and glorification of the great figures of the medieval past—the scores of khans and tsars who had created a strong Bulgarian state—were seen as means for countering the pernicious effects of what was defined as "national nihilism" and overcoming what seemed to these scholars the anonymous, anti-individual, deterministic, and overly schematic methodological approach of socioeconomic Marxist history. This project was perfectly acceptable to the Communist leadership because it saw in such historiography the ideal legitimation of its authoritarian and, often, totalitarian ambitions. The centralized state of the past with its strong individual leadership appealed to them as a model to emulate. The only ambiguity in this respect affected the strong man of Bulgaria's politics at the end of the nineteenth century, Stefan Stambolov. It was his overt nationalism shaped in defiant opposition to Russian encroachments, not his political intolerance and heavy-handed dictatorship, that made him an unlikely hero in the existing circumstances.⁹

The lifting of ideological taboos after 1989 and the general atmosphere of openness are expected to produce a reversal in long-held or imposed views in historiography, as well as to boost the free spirit of inquiry and original thought, imprisoned heretofore in the shackles of official doctrine.

⁷ The easiest way to get an accurate idea of the state of Bulgarian historical scholarship in the past decades is to read the most ambitious collective undertaking of the historical profession: the multi-volume *History of Bulgaria*. It engaged the efforts of practically all historians of Bulgaria. Of the planned fourteen volumes, seven have appeared thus far: *Istoriya na Bilgariya*, vol. 1 (Sofia, 1979), on antiquity; vol. 2 (Sofia, 1981), first Bulgarian kingdom; vol. 3 (Sofia, 1982), second Bulgarian kingdom; vol. 4 (Sofia, 1983), fifteenth to eighteenth centuries; vol. 5 (Sofia, 1985), eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century; vol. 6 (Sofia, 1987), 1856–1878; vol. 7 (Sofia, 1991), 1878–1903.

⁸ On the peculiar position of the Bulgarian intelligentsia within the political context, see Maria Todorova, "Improbable Maverick or Typical Conformist? Seven Thoughts on the New Bulgaria," *Eastern Europe in Revolution*, Ivo Banac, ed. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992), 160–63.

⁹ Even before 1989, Stambolov was the object of passionate discussions, but there was no serious monograph on him despite the fact that no formal taboo was in place. A book has now been completed by Encho Mateev, *Dirzhavnikit Stefan Stambolov* (Sofia, 1991).

IN A PROGRAMMATIC ESSAY PUBLISHED IN 1991 on the future tasks of historical scholarship in Bulgaria, the director of the Institute for History at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Mito Isusov, summarized the legacy of the past: "The absence of pluralism in scientific thinking . . . was caused and fed by the existence of a sole methodology . . . the Marxist one. On this basis attempts were made at the permanent politicization of historical science. The political elite considered history as politics turned to the past."¹⁰ He went on to outline six major areas in which the totalitarian system had influenced historiography unfavorably:¹¹

1. The notion of "social commissions" to scholarship, in which historians were engaged in ad hoc tasks of providing material and activities for anniversaries, political campaigns, and such.

2. The unavailability of an adequate archival basis for the development of historical scholarship due either to closed local archives (like the Central Party Archives, the archives of the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs) or the inability to visit foreign archives.

3. The application of class and party-based notions to events of national history, as well as the exaggerated role of the Communist Party in modern and contemporary history.

4. The introduction of "zones of silence," which "comprised Bulgarian-Russian and Bulgarian-Soviet relations, the positive tendencies and phenomena in the policies of the bourgeoisie and its political parties, the characterization of popular, independent and contradictory historical figures, [and] the dramatic and tragic periods in Bulgaria's relations with its neighbors."

5. The implementation of censorship, which "restricted the creative disobedience of historical thought" and induced moods of "autocensorship."

6. The special security bodies, which created an atmosphere of suspicion and fear, meddled in personnel decisions, and, worst of all, managed to seduce a number of scholars into collaborating with them.

Of these six impediments to the normal functioning of the historical profession, three (four, if the constraints on the accessibility of archives is added) are of a structural character and affect the organization of the profession (censorship, security bodies, and "social commissions"); the other three are directly linked to the character of the historical output (the inadequate archives, ideological constraints, and political taboos). What follows from this exposition is the logical expectation that, once the organizational barriers are lifted, historical scholarship will overcome its internal drawbacks. One can safely assert that, at this point, these particular barriers have been lifted: institutes enjoy autonomy, there is freedom of research, and the methodological and ideological monopoly of Marxism has been abolished.¹²

However, let us examine more closely the other issues that bear on the quality of history, as they have been outlined in this programmatic document. First, it is perfectly true that archives were not open to scholars working on the contemporary period, that those working on the interwar period encountered difficulties,

¹⁰ Mito Isusov, "Historical Science and Our Times," *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 1 (1991): 4.

¹¹ Isusov, "Historical Science," 5.

¹² Isusov, "Historical Science," 6.

and that, therefore, the factual history of these periods needs rewriting. But this is certainly not true for the periods before the turn of the century, in which intensive archival work has produced a massive number of published sources.¹³ Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, a well-funded, though not sufficiently efficient, campaign brought into the country microfilm of archival material concerning Bulgaria from practically all major world archives.¹⁴ In fact, from the point of view of the development of its auxiliary disciplines—bibliography, paleography, diplomatics, numismatics—Bulgarian historiography can boast a fairly sound base.¹⁵ Without in any way disclaiming the importance of further archival work, it seems that the concentration on an adequate archival base displays not only a preoccupation with contemporary issues but, much more interestingly, a central characteristic of any empirical scholarship: the fetishism toward the archive, toward the newly found fact, toward the event.

This pattern is corroborated by an analysis of the other concern: the “zones of silence.” To a great extent, the zones named are simply an elaboration on the theme of national(ist) and ideological taboos: the assessment of the role of the bourgeoisie in the interwar period; the “truth” about the relations of Bulgaria with Russia/the USSR; most important, “the dramatic and tragic periods in Bulgaria’s relations with its neighbors,” which is the euphemistic rendering of the resentment felt toward Bulgaria’s isolation and frustrated irredenta (primarily the Macedonian question) following the Balkan wars and the two world wars, and which after 1944 was a theme to be controlled and sometimes silenced in order to prevent accusations of revisionism or to promote a new, class-based, non-national discourse. All these areas were partially or completely censored for ideological or political expediency. Still, the number of published works on the Macedonian question, which was “forbidden” until the mid-1960s and then “released,” is truly amazing and far surpasses the number of supposedly legitimate topics.¹⁶

In fact, the so-called zones of silence were of passionate concern to historians. A great deal of material was accumulated; there were numerous and intense private discussions among colleagues; the interested researchers were in place, actually working on the subjects, and only waiting for the opportunity to expand

¹³ See first and foremost the series *Chuzhdi izvori za bilgarskata istoriya*, which began to be published in the 1950s as a continuation and refinement of the pre-war efforts and continues to issue today from the press of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in a number of multi-volume subseries: *Greek, Latin, Byzantine, Arabic, Turkish, Jewish, Romanian, Hungarian, Serbian, Austrian, German, and Russian Sources for Bulgarian History*. Additionally, there are two series of travelers’ accounts on Bulgaria and the Balkans published by two presses: *Nauka i izkustvo* and *Otechestven Front*. Several dozens of volumes have been published during recent decades presenting collections of authors (French, English, Austrian and German, Hungarian, Armenian, Romanian, Czech, Russian) as well as individual travelers.

¹⁴ These microfilm collections are kept in the Institute of History and in the Central State Archives.

¹⁵ See *Bilgarskata istoricheska nauka: Bibliografiya* (Sofia, 1965-), of which six volumes have been published today covering the period 1960–1989; the ongoing *Bibliographie des études balkaniques* (Sofia, 1966-); *Répertoire d’études balkaniques*, 1966–1975, vols. 1–2 (Sofia, 1983–84); M. Stoyanov, *Bilgarska vîzrozhdenska knizhnina*, vols. 1–2 (Sofia, 1957–59); and numerous excellent bibliographies on separate historical figures, mass movements, important events, and historical problems. I should also mention here the excellent annotated catalogues of archival materials from different collections.

¹⁶ For an excellent overview of Bulgarian historiography on the Macedonian question in the postwar period, see Stefan Troebst, *Die bulgarisch-jugoslawische Kontroverse um Makedonien, 1967–1982* (Munich, 1986), 221–37.

their research further and publish without restraint. Only the ability to publish openly was lacking, the final act, legitimate publication, the sharing of the final product with an interested public, and this was rightly resented.

The same is true for topics such as the assessment of the bourgeoisie, the glorification and overestimation of the role of the party, and Bulgarian-Russian relations. These themes were discussed, some of them even in the open (like the historical discussion about the designation of the bourgeoisie of the interwar period and the political regimes as fascist, authoritarian, military or monarchic dictatorships, or parliamentary democracies). The explosion of articles and monographs on problems and individuals of the period between 1878 and 1944, which is beginning and will likely continue in the near future, is not a new intellectual trend. It simply is the coming into the open of these long-cherished themes. Likewise, it is not new in the sense that it had not been totally repressed. In the 1970s and 1980s, a considerable number of serious works were published dealing with sensitive questions. However, the authors always ran the risk that their work might provoke someone's disapproval, and self-censorship was in place, especially when some works were arbitrarily deemed "unsuitable" for publication.

What is truly remarkable about the proliferation of works on the pre-war period today is the continuity of discourse and ideas. Even works that attempt to present a revisionist view and appraisal are, to a great extent, a direct continuation of work accomplished in the preceding decades. The only thing that has really changed is the openness, the lack of tension, the dropping of the "periphrastic" so typical of the previous prose.¹⁷ This, of course, should not be underestimated: it is undoubtedly a step in the right direction.

Although the lifting of the ban on "forbidden themes" will result primarily in the filling in some gaps in factual knowledge (important in itself), the chief purpose of these new writings will be their cathartic effects on the repressed national psyche. In some cases, the present period already assumes a mirror-image to the pre-war period as a little golden age of its own. Any theme that has been considered forbidden or neglected in the last decades holds a strong attraction. On the other hand, the new openness does not affect the practice of the profession *per se*: the questions of historical theory and methodology and the modes of discourse. It is not surprising, in fact, that these problems have not been enumerated under the rubric "zones of silence." The "zones of silence" contained fields that were alive and vigorous but that were supposed to be under control; to paraphrase, they were "zones to be silenced." They did not contain fields that have been the embodiment of genuine intellectual silence and that are the real "zones of silence."

The only methodological question raised in the programmatic article on Bulgarian historiography is the deleterious influence of the monopoly of Marxism with its class and party bias and the only proposal that "we should be offered

¹⁷ For a good example of this continuity, see Plamen Tsvetkov and Nikolai Poppetrov, "Kîm tipologiyata na politicheskoto razvitie na Bîlgariya prez 30-te godini," *Istoricheski pregled*, 46 (1990). A solid piece of research, this article displays all the characteristics mentioned above.

alternatives in the present theoretical vacuum.”¹⁸ As a concrete step, Isusov suggests seminars, public discussions, and round-table talks on the fate of historical scholarship under totalitarian regimes, “the values of historical science,” the methods, principles, and models of historical research. But, when it comes to the formulation of themes for these seminars and research, his specifics revolve faithfully around the “zones of silence”: “Nation and National Policy,” “The Bourgeois Political System in Bulgaria,” “Typology of Bulgarian Society after the Second World War,” “Historical Science and the Totalitarian System.”

Naturally, this document, for all its programmatic and representative character, reflects the limitations of its author, his generation, and his immediate professional surroundings. A close survey of the main Bulgarian historical journals for the post-1989 period, however, reveals practically no interest on the part of younger historians in the “ways of the profession.”¹⁹ Not surprisingly, a basic continuity of themes and styles persists. The exclusion of the previously obligatory ideological materials, commemorations of anniversaries or public figures, is merely a mechanical change; even before, such pieces looked like unnatural accretions on the main body of the publications. As for occasional essays by historians published in the daily press, they usually either bemoan the past or settle personal accounts.

Yet it would be unfair to overlook some attempts, especially on the part of younger historians, to tackle important problems. In the mid-1980s, a systematic attempt was made to introduce the main trends of Western historical thought by way of translations. An anthology was published that presented theoretical essays from major European and American historians of the twentieth century.²⁰ A series was planned in 1986 to be published by Sofia University Press, and work was in progress on translations of Max Weber, Marc Bloch, and Jacques Le Goff, as well as several general historiographical works on Western historical scholarship. Unfortunately, market considerations and the present shortage of paper have indefinitely postponed the publication of these translations.²¹

Praiseworthy as they were, these initiatives were far behind what had been done by Bulgarian philosophers throughout the 1970s and 1980s in offering the reading public a systematic view of the diversity of philosophical thought. Still,

¹⁸ Isusov, “Historical Science,” 7.

¹⁹ Three journals have been examined for 1989, 1990, and 1991: *Istoricheski pregled*, *Etudes balkaniques*, and *Bulgarian Historical Review*. I have not had the opportunity to see the first issues for 1992. *Istoricheski pregled* is written entirely in Bulgarian. It has published the only article dealing with a methodological problem, though in a narrative and rather unhelpful way: Georgi Boyadzhiev, “Istoricheskata nauka i konkretnite proyavi na obshtestvenite zakonomernosti,” *Istoricheski pregled*, 46 (1990): 5. *Etudes balkaniques* is published in the major European languages (English, French, German, and Russian) but has a more specialized profile of Balkan studies. *Bulgarian Historical Review* gives a good idea in English of the present state of Bulgarian historiography. See also a newly published journal in English: *Bulgarian Quarterly* (1991-) whose aim is to reflect the continuing transformation. It publishes materials in a broad variety of fields—politics, economy, law, and ecology—but a substantial number of the contributors are historians, and a good half of the articles are on historical topics.

²⁰ *Istoritsi za istoriyata* (Sofia, 1988). (Three years earlier, a volume was published only for the use of history students).

²¹ Instead, the preference is for interwar materials, especially memoirs dealing with the monarch and his entourage, and with national issues, that is, readings that in these difficult days can still find an avid public ready to buy them.

other efforts, truly heroic at a time when questions of everyday life and often survival predominate, are being made to keep intellectual curiosity aflame. For example, the Department of History at Sofia has organized two conferences, "The Crisis of History" and "The Individual in the Historical Process," and intends to continue this type of activity on an annual basis.²² Similar efforts have been initiated by the young historians in the institutes of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and in the archives.²³

THE IDEOLOGICAL SCREEN HAS BEEN LIFTED, but the expected revolution in the profession is not taking place. It is not only tradition that is to blame. There are serious obstacles arising from the structure of historical scholarship and the character and quality of the individuals making up the historical profession. Following 1945, important structural changes took place in the organization of historical scholarship. These postwar modifications followed the Soviet practice of dividing research and education, shifting the center of research from the university to the academy. Historical research within the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences was organized in several institutes: the Institute of History (1948), Institute of Archaeology (1949), Institute for Ethnography (1949), Institute for Balkan Studies (1964), and Institute of Thracian Studies (1974), totaling a few hundred scholars and staff altogether. Two semi-scholarly institutions affiliated with the Academy, the Center for *Bilgaristika* (1974) (whose primary goal was the promotion of Bulgarian scholarship abroad by extending administrative and scholarly help to foreign scholars) and the Center for Demography (whose activities, under that misleading title, were directed toward the study of and contacts with Bulgarian émigrés).

The Department of History at Sofia University functioned as the main education and research center (between 1951 and 1972 as part of the Historical Philosophy Department) with a staff of several dozen scholars. In 1963, history also became part of the curriculum of the newly founded University of Tŭrnovo. The short-lived attempt in the 1970s at integrating the university departments with the respective institutes of the academy proved to be a superficial bureaucratic move, but ties were nonetheless in place, and, at least as far as Sofia was concerned, an exchange of ideas and scholars between the two institutions continued. Organizationally apart were several other institutions with a historical profile: the Institute for Military History; the network of central, local, and institutional archives; and museums and libraries, many of which produced separate publications of their own.

Finally, a system of ideological institutes was created on the basis of the former School for High Party Education: the Academy of Social Sciences and Government under the direct auspices of the Central Committee of the Communist

²² Ivan Pirvev, "Lichnostta v istoricheskoto razvitiie," *Istoricheski pregled*, 46 (1990): 7.

²³ Rumyana Koneva, "Continuity in Science and Between Generations," *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 2 (1991); Miriyana Piskova, "Chetvirta mladezhka nauchna sesiya na dirzhavnite arkhivi," *Istoricheski pregled*, 46 (1990): 6; Darina Vasileva, "Erste nationale Jugendschule für Balkanistik," *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 18 (1990): 1.

Party. It consisted of a number of research and educational entities (among them, the Institute for the History of the Bulgarian Communist Party) employing several hundred people, a good many historians among them.

At present, nowhere in Eastern Europe (except for the former East Germany, where the system is being rapidly dismantled in order to be adjusted to the West German model) have the institutes of the Academies of Science been dissolved, despite numerous discussions of their structure, efficiency, and future form and size. The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, an enormous research institution that depends entirely on the state budget, is going through a grave financial crisis. Cuts in personnel and research budgets put into question the very existence of some institutes. Thus far, however, the position of the historical institutes has not been questioned. Even in today's polarized atmosphere, when ideological confrontations most often conceal generational clashes and career struggles, an overriding reflex for survival has generated a consensus among the historians in the Academy about the necessity of preserving their institutes. Should they close down, it is clear that educational institutions, even if they were to expand, would not be able to absorb all the displaced specialists.

Sofia University, by contrast, has received the autonomy it has long sought and hopes to resume the uncontested central place it enjoyed during the interwar period. The serious financial difficulties in the educational institutions have been somewhat relieved by the introduction of tuition fees. Although state institutions are challenged by the mushrooming private and foreign institutions, history is usually marginal to the curricula of these new institutions. Still, it seems very unlikely that in a country with practically no large private fortunes and virtually no established emigration or lobbyists abroad, institutions without state backing would surpass state-sponsored establishments.²⁴ At the moment, the Academy and, to a lesser extent, the university are at an organizational standstill. It would be premature to forecast future developments, which are entirely dependent on the overall economic situation and also on the ability of the rival academy and university lobbies to secure state support in the short run.

The radical change in funding has affected the ideological disciplines: the impending or already accomplished closings of or drastic cuts in the ideological institutes has sent the numbers of unemployed historians soaring. There is also the virtual closing down of university programs such as the "History of the Bulgarian Communist Party" and the "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."²⁵ However, in the latter case, the professors have not been terminated but "absorbed" by closely related disciplines: the "History of Modern Bulgaria," "History of Russia and Soviet Union," and others, with the result that the transformation has affected only the university curriculum, not the "bearers and transmitters" of knowledge. In the long run, the disappearance of these historical courses of study will, in itself, have an impact on the new generations of university graduates. In the short run, however, the shift is more symbolic, hiding behind the façade of titles of courses and chairs—the continuity of personnel.

²⁴ As of August 1992, the fate of one of these newly emerged institutions (in Varna) is still at stake.

²⁵ The other ideological disciplines, such as scientific communism, dialectical materialism, political economy, were served by philosophers and economists.

This short outline of the problems facing the reorganization of historical scholarship in Bulgaria is not meant simply to provide a background to the central issue of new themes and new modes of writing in historiography. It is just that these problems (and the problem of funding) preoccupy historians at the present moment and, in the near future, are likely to overshadow other concerns about the craft.

The other aspect with an immediate bearing on the character and quality of Bulgarian historiography is the question of individuals and their influence. Who created the "history" of the period? How were the scholars and teachers selected and appointed? How did the political transformations following 1989 affect them?

Because history was considered an ideological discipline, it suffered from the various filters the regime applied to sensitive aspects of a person's background such as family history, political affiliation, and loyalty. The university was subject to strict requirements, since it was considered an institution disseminating immediate knowledge and thus more responsible for the indoctrination of the next generation. Despite this responsibility, in the atmosphere of widespread nepotism and lack of anonymity typical for a small country, real victims of ideological taboos in the sphere of historical scholarship were rare. At most, one can speak of the psychological damage incurred by people who were subjected to lengthy and demeaning scrutiny or, more seriously, who were not allowed to teach but were absorbed by the research institutes. Without minimizing the debilitating effects of personnel control and of censorship on the moral climate in the discipline as a whole, one could argue that, with a few exceptions, the historians practicing their craft were representative of the pool available for selection.

THEREFORE, THE USUAL EXPLANATION for the state of Bulgarian historiography—ideological and social pressures—is plausible but not necessarily correct. It is true that the hard sciences were disproportionately favored in the quotas for international exchanges of scholars, especially with the West. The same applies to access to information, particularly the allocation of library funds. Part of this favoritism was legitimized by the contention that ideological disciplines should not be subjected to ideological contagion from abroad. In the 1970s and 1980s, this explanation had become an ideological euphemism for the widely held belief that the humanities were a dispensable intellectual occupation, whereas the sciences were at the center of the industrial and technological revolution, and the country's limited resources should therefore be allocated to them. This argument has served, however, as an easy way for Bulgarian historians to excuse their one-dimensionality. After all, philosophy and especially linguistics proved to be much more susceptible to "contamination" by foreign and unorthodox ideas, although they had been subjected to the same ideological and financial limitations. After 1989, a surprisingly sophisticated postmodernist discourse broke out in the press, represented chiefly by scholars in philosophy, literary criticism, and linguistics. It

is true that there was practically no dialogue between the different social sciences, but it is not only the atomization of society (intellectual life included), so typical of Eastern Europe in general, that is to blame. Bulgarian historiography remained outside the main trends of the historical profession and did not even try to confront the great debates, or even to get informed about them, a situation attributable more to the quality of people who entered the discipline and to the traditions that it has followed closely from its inception than exclusively to external circumstances.

The same reasons that explain the preferential treatment of the sciences likewise account for the greater part of the top high school students in the 1960s and 1970s entering the disciplines of physics, biology, or chemistry. And the top graduates of the foreign language high schools chose courses in diplomacy and foreign trade, preparing for posts in the managerial and the government elite. There was a reversal of this trend in the 1980s, when humanities again became fashionable among high school graduates, but history did not seem to be the most favored among them. It is true that a considerable number of students enrolling in history courses had the intention, upon graduation, of entering the party and the administrative bureaucracy, but this group reduced even further the number of those who approached history as a vocation. In large countries like the United States or the Soviet Union, trends like this would not have had such a decisive effect on the character of the respective disciplines, but in a small country like Bulgaria, in which the university curricula presented practically the entire spectrum of scholarly disciplines, the ebb and flow of student interest was of paramount consequence.

Also significant was the small number of linguistically prepared students, especially the graduates of the foreign language high schools. A small country cannot afford to supply its scholars with a proper sample of world-wide scholarly achievements in translation or, indeed, even in the original languages. The only "world" language that was easily accessible to Bulgarians was Russian, and although it offered an adequate window on global output in the sciences, its role and use in the humanities, particularly history, was more restricted because of its accompanying ideological element. All this is not to say that the historical profession lacked erudite scholars who were cultivated linguists and intellectuals of integrity. But it lacked the critical mass of such individuals necessary to influence the entire discipline.

Today, there is a basic continuity of personnel in the somewhat shaky organizational structure of the historical discipline. This is only natural when the focus of public attention is on changes in the political and economic sphere. The tradition in historical scholarship is not one of drastic transformations. The much more profound changes after World War II, which in a score of other academic disciplines produced a major reshuffling, left the historical profession with comparatively small or superficial shifts, as the "old guard" clumsily and embarrassingly accommodated itself to the new hegemonic doctrine. The recent personnel changes that have taken place in the leadership of institutes and university departments, although presented as radical, have not produced, and do not seem to have the potential to produce, significant innovations. Further-

more, financial constraints and a current freeze in promotions and awarding of academic degrees will additionally hamper the chances for mobility and competition within the historical profession, limited as they have been heretofore.

To summarize, all usual obstacles to change, except for the lifting of the ideological screen, are in place: limited resources, favoring of the sciences and other critical technical skills, condescension to history as the “servant” of politics, and the competition of new and fashionable disciplines in the humanities, such as political science and business and management. If there is to be a revolution in historiography, it will have to take place within the framework of the existing structure and among existing historians. Most important is the tradition within which Bulgarian historiography has evolved.

Born in the age of nationalism, developing in the context of the nation-state and as one of its most important pillars, Bulgarian historiography has evolved almost exclusively according to the precepts of what was considered to be its duty to shape the national consciousness and thus fulfill an important social function. This overwhelmingly didactic character of Bulgarian historiography, alongside its obsession with national history,²⁶ makes it a self-contained and parochial discipline, with clearly defined and limited functions. Other functions of history, such as its cognitive value, its satisfaction of human curiosity or the need for self-knowledge, even its other political functions, have been far less realized. Bulgarian historiography does produce works of high quality within its own self-defined and confining sphere, but it is fair to say that, as a whole, it operates within the framework and traditions of the Rankean “*wie es eigentlich gewesen*.” Questions like “*was es eigentlich bedeutet*” seem as yet to be marginal, if raised at all.

²⁶ An exception, in this respect, is the serious development of Balkan studies, which puts the scholarly analysis in a broader and comparative context. As for general European or world history, the few attempts are of a predominantly popularizing nature.

Review Article
The Vietnam War: Alternative Endings

BEN KIERNAN

Eric M. Bergerud, **The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province** (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

Marilyn B. Young, **The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990** (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).

David L. Di Leo, **George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment** (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

MARILYN YOUNG SIGNED HER PREFACE to *The Vietnam Wars* in August 1990, as the Gulf War broke out. Victorious six months later, President Bush proclaimed, “We’ve kicked the Vietnam Syndrome” and “slain the ghost of Vietnam at last.” Within a year, however, it was haunting Democratic primaries. Faint war records made new apparitions: Bill Clinton, 1960s anti-draft activist; Bob Kerrey, decorated veteran; Tom Harkin, “tiger cages” whistleblower. Oliver Stone’s movie *JFK* called up a kindred spirit while attempting to explain how America (and Stone) had ended up in Vietnam.¹ But, by then, seventeen years after the guns fell silent in Saigon, governments in Washington and Hanoi were edging toward normalization of relations. These new books allow a fresh look at the frenzy that killed 1 to 2 million Vietnamese and 57,000 U.S. troops, dividing America and much of the rest of the world. What were the key issues involved? And was the war winnable? Was it morally justified?

Ever since the war provoked conflict in the United States, historians and others have tried to resolve the question of whether North Vietnam committed aggression against South Vietnam. There has been little consensus on this issue. Douglas Pike, who spent six years in South Vietnam as an official of the U.S. Information Agency, has rejected descriptions of the National Liberation Front (NLF) as either

¹ The case that President Kennedy was “determined not to let Vietnam become an American war” and “would never have placed American combat troops in Vietnam” is outlined by his former assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, Roger Hilsman, in a letter to the *New York Times*, “How Kennedy Viewed the Vietnam Conflict,” January 20, 1992; and by John M. Newman, *JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power* (New York, 1992). They may be right about JFK’s planned U.S. force reduction, but Kennedy had few reservations about U.S. involvement in Vietnamese political affairs and authorized the coup against Ngo Dinh Diem (not Diem’s killing) just prior to his own assassination. See Marilyn B. Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990* (New York, 1991), 93–94, 97–102.

“simply an indigenous organization in which Communists played a part” or “simply a robot-like instrument” of North Vietnam. He has portrayed it as “an organizational steamroller, nationally conceived and nationally organized, endowed with ample cadres and funds, crashing out of the jungle to flatten the GVN [Government of Vietnam].” Pike adds that “of necessity it must have been created in Hanoi and imported.” The NLF, he continues, “sprang full-blown into existence and then was fleshed out. The grievances were developed or manufactured almost as an afterthought.” At first staffed by indigenous South Vietnamese, from 1965 the NLF was “taken over” and “managed” by northern cadres, “even down to the village level,” according to Pike.²

Leading antiwar critic Noam Chomsky offers an entirely different perspective: “The evidence is overwhelming that when the United States expanded its aggression to a full-scale invasion in early 1965 it had no evidence of a North Vietnamese troop presence . . . [A] May 1968 State Department study . . . claimed that elements of the North Vietnamese 325th Division arrived in the South in December 1964–March 1965 . . . [T]his document states that ‘at least until 1959, [the 325th Division was] reportedly composed entirely of South Vietnamese’ (its later composition was not mentioned). Thus a historian would conclude that quite possibly South Vietnam was invaded by South Vietnamese in early 1965 (three years after U.S. air attacks against South Vietnam began).”³

Historians have disagreed less spectacularly, but the differences are clear. According to William J. Duiker, “the insurgency was a genuine revolt based in the South, but it was organized and directed from the North.”⁴ Gabriel Kolko views it differently: “The Party Central Committee’s southern branch, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), was in command of the entire struggle in the south . . . [T]he southern movement was by its very flexibility, autonomy and community basis often quite ready to take care of its own problems in its own ways, the punishment of enemies being just one example. Another, and more important, was the southern Party’s substantially greater emphasis on land reform . . . than Party leaders in Hanoi deemed wise.”⁵

As we shall see, this debate has been resolved. The NLF was inextricably linked to Hanoi, but it comprised the southern branch of a nationwide Vietnamese movement. It was neither a northern-dominated nor a secessionist southern movement. Pike is right that the NLF was “nationally conceived and nationally organized,” but this hardly justifies his description of it as “imported.” The official U.S. assertion of a northern invasion was a distraction. A more relevant question

² Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 82, 76, 116.

³ Noam Chomsky, “On the Aggression of South Vietnamese Peasants against the United States,” chap. 5 of Chomsky, *Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There* (New York, 1982), 161.

⁴ William J. Duiker, *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam* (Boulder, Colo., 1981), 198.

⁵ Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience* (New York, 1985), 126, 129. Other general histories of the war worth consulting are George C. Herring, *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (New York, 1979); William S. Turley, *The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954–1975* (Boulder, Colo., 1986); and James William Gibson, *The Perfect War: The War We Couldn’t Lose and How We Did* (New York, 1986).

would have been: Could Hanoi have successfully called off the southern revolt against Saigon, had it chosen to do so? The central issue of the war concerns the wishes of the South Vietnamese people. As we shall also see, it is now possible to resolve that issue as well.

Eric M. Bergerud, in *The Dynamics of Defeat*, identifies the problem facing the U.S.-backed Government of Vietnam, from its establishment in Saigon upon France's defeat in 1954. The problem was "not to regain legitimacy lost, but rather to establish legitimacy in the first place." The GVN especially "lacked legitimacy with the rural peasantry"⁶—a serious weakness in an agricultural country.

Some explanation is warranted. Democracy did not offer what Saigon sought. President Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that if elections had been held in 1954, "possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader."⁷ The secret U.S. Department of Defense historical compilation on the war, known as the "Pentagon Papers" when leaked in 1971, revealed that American analysts had predicted the Communists would "easily" win elections: "[N]ationalist appeal in Vietnam is so closely identified with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet-Minh movement that, even in areas outside communist control, candidates and issues connected with 'nationalism' and supported by the Viet-Minh would probably be supported by the majority of the people."⁸ The Pentagon Papers concluded that the 1954 Geneva Agreement, specifying nationwide free elections in July 1956, was "a major disaster for U.S. interests."⁹ The Department of State's Division of Research reported on February 1, 1955: "Almost any type of election that could conceivably be held in Vietnam in 1956 would, on the basis of present trends, give the Communists a very significant if not decisive advantage" and that, in South Vietnam, "maximum conditions of freedom and the maximum degree of international supervision might well operate to Communist advantage."¹⁰ The GVN's first leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, prevented this, and he also abolished local elections for Vietnamese village and municipal leaders.

Diem was described as "the only Vietnamese politician" whose anticommunism

⁶ Eric M. Bergerud, *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province* (Boulder, Colo., 1991), 3–4.

⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, Vol. 1, *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (New York, 1963), 372. In December 1954, American journalist Joseph Alsop toured Viet-Minh areas of the south, a "palm-hut state" with "a loyal population of nearly two million." He wrote: "At first, it was difficult for me, as it is for any Westerner, to conceive of a Communist government's genuinely 'serving the people.' I could hardly imagine a Communist government that was also a popular government and almost a democratic government. But this is just the sort of government the palm-hut state actually was"; Alsop, "A Man in a Mirror," *New Yorker*, June 25, 1955, quoted in Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 55.

⁸ Letter to the Department of State from the International Security Agency, April 22, 1955, excerpted in *Credibility Gap: A Digest of the Pentagon Papers*, Len Ackland, comp. (Philadelphia, 1972), 35.

⁹ *U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices—The Pentagon Papers*, 9 pts. in 3 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1971–72), vol. 1, part 1, division 1, sub-division D, p. 2, quoted in Nigel B. Cullen, "Document: America's Vietnam Crimes," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 13 (1983): 504–28, at p. 508, and references cited.

¹⁰ Quoted in George McT. Kahin, *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (New York, 1986), 89. For the CIA's similar assessment, see Kolko, *Anatomy of a War*, 84.

was total and his military successors as “all we’ve got.”¹¹ Consciousness of such a cramped constituency did not yet provoke much U.S. reflection on the enterprise. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wrote to President Johnson: “Only the U.S. presence after 1954 . . . enabled Diem to refuse to go through with the 1954 provision calling for nationwide free elections in 1956.”¹² In the words of the Pentagon Papers, “South Vietnam (unlike any of the other countries in Southeast Asia) was essentially the creation of the United States.”¹³ Specialist U.S. observers agreed that, by 1962, the National Liberation Front had the support of about half the population of South Vietnam, and the government, far less.¹⁴ There is more to this than the GVN’s lack of legitimacy.

In *The Dynamics of Defeat*, one of the best military histories of the war,¹⁵ Bergerud demonstrates that, despite U.S. battlefield victories, “the difficulties we faced were virtually beyond solution.”¹⁶ The enemy could not be eliminated. Force was ineffective. Bergerud does not imply that the war was antidemocratic or immoral. He explains early on that, for the purposes of this book, “I have accepted the moral validity . . . of the Vietnam War.” In concluding, he asserts that, “as charged by the Americans,” the National Liberation Front “was ruthless in its tactics, unquestionably more so than the GVN.”¹⁷

Bergerud accepts other official claims. General Westmoreland pinpointed the objective of U.S. policy as the development of a “free, independent, non-communist nation.” Bergerud agrees with this, even after ruling out South Vietnamese neutralism as “unacceptable to Washington”¹⁸—although “a large portion of the rural population . . . was, in fact, neutral.” He also cites “comprehensive security for the population of Hau Nghia” as a U.S. goal.¹⁹ The U.S.

¹¹ French General Paul Ely, quoted in Kahin, *Intervention*, 82; and *The Pentagon Papers*, Senator Gravel Edition, 5 vols. (Boston, 1971), 2: 304.

¹² Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to President Johnson, March 13, 1964, quoted in Kahin, *Intervention*, 91.

¹³ *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel Edition, 2: 22.

¹⁴ Douglas Pike, *War, Peace, and the Viet Cong* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 6, and Robert G. Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation under Stress* (Boston, 1963), 145, cited in Chomsky, *Towards a New Cold War*, 412 n. 9. Young in *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 73, cites figures for a South Vietnamese village in this period: “75% support for the Front, 20% trying to remain neutral, and 5% firmly pro-government.” Her source is James Walker Trullinger, Jr., *Village at War: An Account of Revolution in Vietnam* (New York, 1980), 91.

¹⁵ Other military histories include Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941–1960* (Washington, D.C., 1983); Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md., 1986); and Greg Lockhart, *Nation in Arms: The Origins of the People’s Army of Vietnam* (Boston, 1989).

¹⁶ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 3.

¹⁷ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 6, 326. Speaking of Nixon’s 1970 Cambodian “incursion,” Bergerud refers to “the near madness that it spawned in the United States.” It is unclear whether he means the National Guard shootings of six student protestors at Kent State University and Jackson State College or the antiwar upsurge itself (p. 287). For a judicious introduction to the American controversy over the Vietnam War, see David W. Levy, *The Debate over Vietnam* (Baltimore, Md., 1991).

¹⁸ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 112, 107–08, 39. See also Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 106–07, 125–26. David Di Leo notes that in mid-1965, Robert Kennedy began to favor “a negotiated withdrawal based on power sharing” between the NLF “and a neutralist Saigon government.” David L. Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1991), 141.

¹⁹ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 105. In fact, the United States sought comprehensive security first for the GVN, not its subjects. Bergerud reveals that “Americans both expected and hoped that defoliation would force villagers to leave Front areas” (p. 71) and that, if enough of the enemy were

intervention in 1965, he adds, “coincided with a massive intervention” by North Vietnam “at a rate initially faster than the U.S. buildup.”²⁰

Strikingly, Bergerud refers to “the sacrosanct status” of North Vietnam, which “made the physical elimination of enemy manpower impossible.”²¹ His language suggests that a U.S. invasion could have eliminated that country’s army, which is unlikely. The fact is that North Vietnam was in no way treated as “sacrosanct.” U.S. planes dropped over 750,000 tons of bombs on it, to bring the North Vietnamese “to their knees.”²² The North’s existence, not its status in U.S. policy, was the obstacle. Few policy options could ignore that.

Bergerud’s final explanation for the war’s outcome exemplifies the approach. He concludes that “because of the accident of geography, the GVN was faced with an insurgency that could lay claim to a great victory over colonialism, that was extremely strong politically, and that was guided by a determined and powerful ally controlling every inch of land bordering the country. In such circumstances, despite intense effort and great dedication (not to mention the blood and treasure expended), any American hope of ‘harnessing the revolution’ and making a weak society strong was doomed. All that remained was force, coercion and violence, and, however successfully used, it was not enough.”²³

The assumptions here are worth probing. Was the Communist-led victory over France in 1954 an accident, especially of *geography*? Was the political strength of the Communists its effect or cause? Did North Vietnamese access to South Vietnam’s land borders, if total, really trump U.S. access to its longer sea borders?²⁴ Did the United States aim to strengthen “a weak society” or a weak government? Did the fierce resistance not reveal a strong society in South Vietnam? Bergerud avoids these questions.

DESPITE ITS ASSUMPTIONS, AND ITS PROVINCIAL FOCUS, *The Dynamics of Defeat* offers an instructive view of the war. As Bergerud explains, “Hau Nghia had certain characteristics that make possible some important generalizations concerning the wider war in Vietnam. It was quite typical of the entire upper Mekong Delta, the heartland of the insurgency, . . . exactly the type of province within which the Americans and the GVN had to prevail.” It was strategically situated, near both Saigon and Communist bases along the Cambodian border. “Americans played a large and critical role,” and “the furious 1970 pacification campaign in Hau Nghia . . . was one of the strongest allied efforts directed anywhere against the

killed, “Americans hoped that fear would deter others from taking their place” (p. 307). The targets of the defoliation and fear were local civilians—potential Communist recruits.

²⁰ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 332.

²¹ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 307.

²² Michael Maclear, *Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War* (London, 1981), 241, 310; Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 122, quoting James Thomson, a former staff member of the National Security Council, and 140.

²³ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 335.

²⁴ U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge is quoted by Young in *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 159, as reminding President Johnson in 1965, “We have great seaports in Vietnam. We don’t need to fight on roads. We have the sea.”

[National Liberation] Front during the entire war.”²⁵

Chapter 4, “Search and Destroy: The Big-Unit War, 1966–67,” gives a superb account of the experiences of the troops of the American 25th Division. The rest of the book, too, is well written and straightforward.²⁶ Its findings make a real contribution to four key historical issues: the nature of the GVN regime, South Vietnamese support for the NLF, the U.S. impact on the war and on Vietnamese sovereignty, and the role of the North Vietnamese.

The Diem regime, which invented the term “re-education camp,” stated that it had arrested over 48,000 people between 1954 and 1960.²⁷ Many were incarcerated in tiny “tiger cages.” The CIA official in Saigon, Edward Lansdale, described the GVN in the late 1950s as an emerging “fascist state.”²⁸ According to its official figures, between January 1957 and June 1962, Communist civilian and military losses in the South totaled 79,000, compared to 35,000 on the government side.²⁹

Ignoring all this, Bergerud still demonstrates that “the aim of the GVN was to crush the Front without fundamentally changing the power relationships existing in South Vietnamese society.” The reader may conclude that elections thus posed a twofold threat. “For years, the GVN itself was the largest landlord in South Vietnam,” while small numbers of private landlords owned as much as 80 percent of the countryside.³⁰ The “not very illustrious” Saigon army, known as ARVN, whose leaders, “almost to a man,” had served the French, “was one of the most thoroughly disliked institutions in rural South Vietnam.” South Vietnamese also had “a lowly opinion” of the government’s National Police as “inefficient and corrupt” and found its Special Branch “repugnant.” Peasants, for their part, saw the GVN as “aloof, corrupt, and inefficient.” NLF sympathizers neutralized the local government militias from inside. Despite U.S. economic support, Bergerud says, even the middle class “had contempt for the GVN” and “frequently regarded the NLF with respect or even admiration.”³¹ NLF agents proliferated in the GVN administration and were “very strong” in Hau Nghia. The American Province Senior Adviser warned, “If there should be a ceasefire, these legal VCI [Viet Cong Infrastructure] will be a dangerous problem.” Peace posed another threat. “Almost all ‘progress’ from the allied point of view was coercive.” GVN

²⁵ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 1–2, 314.

²⁶ Scornful of “intellectual timidity” and jargon, Bergerud dismisses as “rubbish” hopes that U.S. advisers and their Vietnamese counterparts would form a “bicultural brotherhood of warriors.” As for the other end of the historical production process, he warns usefully that historians have no interest “in making the war they are studying less destructive or less dramatic than is commonly thought”; *Dynamics of Defeat*, 77, 249, 256, 156, 167.

²⁷ The true figure is probably higher. Kahin, *Intervention*, 96; and Georges Chaffard, *Indochine: Dix ans d’indépendance* (Paris, 1964), 168–69, using Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Information figures, cited in Carlyle A. Thayer, *War by Other Means: National Liberation and Revolution in Viet-Nam, 1954–60* (Boston, 1989), 215. Thayer reports that 15,000 to 30,000 people were held at any one time in the late 1950s. During 1959 in Long An province alone, on average twenty-six people were arrested each month for Communist activities. Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley, Calif., 1972), 101, citing “police records.”

²⁸ Lansdale quoted in Kahin, *Intervention*, 96.

²⁹ Bernard B. Fall, *Viet-Nam Witness, 1953–66* (London, 1966), 311. Alexander Kendrick asserts that “according to some accounts,” killings by the Diem regime in the late 1950s numbered “as many as 75,000.” Kendrick, *The Wound Within: America in the Vietnam Years, 1945–1974* (Boston, 1974), 112.

³⁰ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 242, 268, 17, 56. See also Robert L. Sansom, *The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), chap. 3.

³¹ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 73, 24–25, 226, 102, 312, 178, 3, 295, 316, 110.

strategy gave “the central position” to “force and coercion,” even “for the political struggle.”³²

The “perceived virtue” of the NLF among South Vietnamese “gave the Front a moral ascendancy in Vietnam that the GVN was never able to counter.” “Although it had few qualms about employing ruthless tactics, such as the ever-present assassination campaign, the Front nevertheless enjoyed widespread support among the peasantry.” The NLF had “pure nationalist credentials,” and “the revolutionaries were personally intimate with the population.”³³ The evidence for Hau Nghia comes from a range of sources. American veterans interviewed by Bergerud often commented that the villages “were full of ‘VC sympathizers.’” In the early 1960s, an NLF defector from Loc Giang village reported that 50 to 60 percent of the peasants there “willingly” followed the Front. Elsewhere, another defector said that “the people were very glad to join the VC . . . The population liked them very much.” A U.S. adviser reported in 1969 that most of the population in Duc Hue district was “anti-American to say the least.” In Tan My village in late 1970, a U.S. official reported that the NLF “have a popular image of being poor, sincere, and honest. People sympathize with them.” “Scores of reports and interrogations” confirmed this as a general picture. The American Province Senior Adviser wrote tautologically in 1969, “The major problem in this province is that it has too many VC.”³⁴

The GVN had no strongholds in Hau Nghia: in 1965, according to Bergerud, “the only support it could find came from a few Catholic hamlets and ARVN artillery.”³⁵ And the situation deteriorated. In 1964, Duc Lap village was chosen for a two-month study by the RAND Corporation. Near the province capital, it was “one of the very few villages in Hau Nghia secure enough to be examined over any extended period.” At that time, the GVN village chief of Duc Lap estimated that 70 percent of his villagers were pro-NLF, 30 percent were neutral, and “only 1 percent openly supported the government.” In early 1966, the villagers’ attitude to the GVN seemed “worse than it was before pacification began.”³⁶ In late 1970, after six years of “very heavy allied pressure,” separate assessments by an NLF official and the American Province Senior Adviser concurred: in Duc Lap, the Front now had “100 percent support.”³⁷

The main reason was the U.S. impact on Vietnam since 1965: “the level of violence increased to a remarkable degree after American intervention.” As we know from other sources, in order to match new U.S. and ARVN forces and firepower, the NLF quadrupled its recruitment and conscription. The tally of

³² Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 312, 5, 224. By contrast, “Before American intervention, the Front usually refrained from forcing young men to join revolutionary military forces”; 61.

³³ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 306, 4, 24, 55.

³⁴ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 171, 49, 63–64, 264, 303, 327, 248.

³⁵ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 327. Five years later, the American Province Senior Adviser suspected “some sort of understanding between the Front and the Catholics”; Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 296. For a study of how fellow Catholics in Australia viewed the Vietnam issue, see Valentine Noone, *Melbourne Catholics and the Vietnam War* (Ph.D. dissertation, Latrobe University, Melbourne, Victoria, 1991).

³⁶ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 73, 273, 76. Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 146–48.

³⁷ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 273, 303.

45,000 new Front recruits in 1964 shot up to 160,000 for 1965.³⁸ According to Bergerud, “Foreign intervention . . . made Front claims on the dangers facing the fatherland very compelling for many. Hatred of Americans was a powerful political and psychological weapon in the hands of the Front, and it used it well”: the “most widely heralded and supported goal” of the NLF was “expulsion of the United States from Vietnam.” There were “frequent reports of mistreatment of villagers detained by American units” and “nearly daily incidents” in which American vehicles caused injuries and damaged crops, while “cruelty on the part of American soldiers toward civilians” was “common enough.” In a 1970 study of displaced refugees, a U.S. Rural Technical Team reported that “American tanks pushed down their houses, they often shot into their hamlets—people were killed and crops were damaged. They lived in anxiety night and day, they knew nothing of their future.” Most had been “effectively propagandized by the Communists” and “show[ed] hatred toward the American troops because of the many casualties and damage they have caused.” Despite the absence of “willful murder” as at My Lai or much indiscriminate violence, seriously strained relations, even “mutual hatred and loathing,” divided the American forces from the people of Hau Nghia.³⁹

In October 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara reported to President Johnson: “Pacification has, if anything, gone backward. As compared with two, or four, years ago, enemy full-time regional forces and part-time guerrilla forces are larger . . . [F]ull security exists nowhere (not even behind the U.S. Marines’ lines and in Saigon).”⁴⁰ In Hau Nghia, Bergerud adds, “no hamlet” was “genuinely safe from the American point of view.” The American Province Senior Adviser, observing a link between greater American activity and increased enemy terrorism, concluded that “the civilians are often caught in the middle; therefore their security has been reduced,” adding, “It is believed that this present situation is unavoidable” if the war is to be won. Bergerud finds that it was “impossible for the U.S. Army to fight the necessary military campaign without causing great destruction and much loss of innocent life.”⁴¹

Bergerud links “the innate destructiveness of U.S. combat operations” to “the very structure of American ground forces.” The practice of preferring any other casualties to one’s own produced “the vast majority of civilian casualties caused by American fire.” Commanders shielding their men was indeed half the story.⁴² The other half was the American war itself, opposed by so many South Vietnamese civilians. Historian Guenter Lewy later put the case for such a war: “If guerrillas live and operate among the people like fish in the water, then, legally, the entire school of fish may become a legitimate military target.” The moral

³⁸ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 43; Noam Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins* (London, 1969), 221 n. 11, citing “official Pentagon figures.” Maclear, *Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War*, 130, gives another U.S. estimate, that guerrilla strength in 1965 had shown “an increase of thirty-three percent over 1964.” Similarly, the number of desertions from ARVN forces rose from 73,000 in 1964 to 113,000 in 1965. Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 142.

³⁹ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 99, 326, 274, 166, 172–73, 276, 114. See also Kevin Sim and Michael Bilton, *Four Hours in My Lai: A War Crime and Its Aftermath* (New York, 1991).

⁴⁰ Quoted in Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 163.

⁴¹ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 176, 277, 5.

⁴² Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 89, 174, 277.

implications of targeting populations are immense. Bergerud at least is more persuasive: "The attitude of the American soldiers on the spot was that if the villagers did not warn them of enemy infiltration, the villagers were responsible for their own safety."⁴³

It was the political price that was miscalculated. Thus "three years of bloody operations by a splendid fighting division, the U.S. 25th Infantry . . . made a shambles of much of the province, and Hau Nghia apparently lost a large number of its people," mainly to refugee flight, while "in many respects, the Front had done very well during the three years beginning with 1966, in both Hau Nghia and all of Vietnam." In 1968, "the sheer violence of the Tet Offensive created a dangerous and very ugly chemistry between U.S. soldiers and the local inhabitants," and "many villagers fled to hamlets controlled by the Front." The American Province Senior Adviser saw "the population . . . slipping through our fingers." "In one way, American intervention made the situation worse: After 1966, followers of the Front could claim very plausibly that they were defending national sovereignty."⁴⁴

Washington claimed *it* was doing that. But falsely. "[T]o a large degree, the war in Hau Nghia province was an American war from the beginning." As early as 1954, on Diem's first day in Saigon, the CIA's Lansdale recalled presenting Diem with "notes on how to be a Prime Minister of Vietnam."⁴⁵ In 1961, President Kennedy cabled his Saigon ambassador, "We would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political, economic and military fields as they affect the security situation." Bergerud asks wryly "whether the concept of sovereignty allows for division between two nations." He adds, "From very early on, the CIA and Army Special Forces were operating with nominal supervision from Saigon," and "the tendency to seek means of fighting the war free from Saigon's control increased as direct American involvement grew." A U.S. Army report in 1966 "was blunt in advising that Americans cease worrying about South Vietnamese and world opinion on the issue of Vietnamese sovereignty," arguing instead for direct American control of much of what it called the "nation-building process." In 1972, three years after "Vietnamization" began, "the American military advisors . . . in fact, commanded ARVN."⁴⁶

All this proved difficult to manage. The Pentagon Papers document the recommendation of General Westmoreland's Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) that "the U.S. will must be asserted" without the GVN leaders being "identified as US puppets."⁴⁷ In my view, the United States could not always treat the GVN as a simple puppet regime, precisely because it was too dangerously close

⁴³ Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York, 1978), 306; Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 176.

⁴⁴ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 236–37, 213, 304, 306.

⁴⁵ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 12; Lansdale quoted in Kahin, *Intervention*, 81.

⁴⁶ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 31–33, 256, 320. The Phoenix Program, too, was successful in Hau Nghia only when "U.S. advisors were running these programs completely"; 312.

⁴⁷ Quoted in Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 112. Another U.S. official document proclaimed that "US influence over key decisions must be attained as quickly as possible." *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel Edition, 2: 580, 503, quoted in Cullen, "Document," 514. R. B. Smith describes the U.S. goal as "to ensure the survival of South Vietnam as an independent state: independent, that is, of North Vietnam—and also, in the long run, of the United States itself"; Smith, *An International History of the Vietnam War*, Vol. 3, *The Making of a Limited War, 1965–66* (New York, 1991), 4.

to being one, depending almost totally on massive U.S. support without any significant Vietnamese legitimacy of its own. Vietnam's anticommunists were in such short supply that they possessed leverage with Washington, which lacked options within its self-imposed policy limits—including rejection of Vietnamese neutralism. The U.S. goal was to build a pro-American South Vietnam, neither Communist nor neutral, free and independent to choose such a political system for itself, if necessary without democracy. The problems for propaganda here are obvious.

What of Hanoi's intervention in South Vietnam, the official reason for the U.S. war? Bergerud finds that, "by the end of 1965, the NLF had won the war in Hau Nghia province," while "the CIA representative in Hau Nghia concluded that 98 percent of the insurgents in the province were local and that they neither got nor needed substantial aid from Hanoi." The Front, "although controlled from the outside, was locally recruited and self-sustaining." During 1966, "the Front was expanding in Hau Nghia and . . . very likely sending out much more in terms of taxes, food, and recruits than it was receiving in the way of weapons." Despite heavy losses after that, it "was able to keep its forces up to strength through local recruitment."⁴⁸ Units of the North Vietnamese PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam) "did not appear in Hau Nghia until 1968."⁴⁹ The Central Office South Vietnam or "Viet Cong Pentagon," was "dominated by southerners," and in 1968 it was still responsible for most military operations, those south of Hue, while "[North Vietnamese Military Commander General] Giap and PAVN controlled the northern battles."⁵⁰

Only by the end of 1969 was the NLF in Hau Nghia "weaker than at any previous time since American intervention."⁵¹ (That is, after four years, it was weaker only than when it "had won the war"! This bravely upbeat formulation quietly acknowledges the counterproductive nature of U.S. intervention.) By 1969, the NLF was indeed finally "growing dependent on all types of aid from the North. Nevertheless, the GVN was never able to convert Front weakness into government strength. As before, the GVN in Hau Nghia was totally dependent upon forces from outside."⁵² Even by 1971, "the attrition process that weakened the Front was not accompanied by any important change in allegiance on the part of the rural population in favor of the GVN." The year 1972 saw "a marked revival of the Front in Hau Nghia."⁵³

⁴⁸ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 82, 326, 236–37, 161.

⁴⁹ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 93. In neighboring (and originally overlapping) Long An province, the date was December 1967; Race, *War Comes to Long An*, 64 n. According to Maclear, PAVN units used tanks "for the first time in the Vietnam war," in the north of South Vietnam in February 1968; *Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War*, 195. For further provincial studies, see David Hunt, "Villagers at War: The National Liberation Front in My Tho, 1965–1967," *Radical America*, 8, nos. 1–2 (1974): 3–181; and Frank Frost, *Australia's War in Vietnam* (Boston, 1987), on Phuoc Tuy.

⁵⁰ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 197. For a clear explanation of COSVN, see Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 72, 186. One of the best explanations of the relationship between southern and northern Vietnamese Communists is Carlyle A. Thayer, "The PRG and the Reunification of Vietnam," *Dyason House Papers*, 11 vols. (Melbourne, 1974–85), vol. 1, no. 5 (June 1975): 1–5. See also Thayer's *War by Other Means*.

⁵¹ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 254.

⁵² Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 237.

⁵³ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 314, 317–18.

Of these four key issues, one is central. What were the aspirations of the South Vietnamese people? Though contested by some of Bergerud's assumptions, overwhelming evidence in his book and elsewhere reveals widespread South Vietnamese opposition to the U.S. definition of their aspirations without allowing them to be voiced in democratic elections.

Bergerud also takes a fresh look at the U.S.-GVN Phoenix Program, which he describes in detail as a failure, and at the Communists' Tet Offensives of 1968 and 1969, which took great losses but "paved the way for ultimate victory."⁵⁴ He similarly views their Easter 1972 offensive as "a great and decisive victory," in which the Communists "seized a third of the country." Bergerud also examines the later fighting and 1973 ceasefire, which the Communists at first respected but the GVN violated, to its eventual cost.⁵⁵

In a final chapter, "Reflections on the War," he explains and addresses three schools of thought claiming that the war could have been won. By Chapter 12, the congressional stab-in-the-back theory (of Nixon, Kissinger, and Westmoreland) packs little punch, and Bergerud administers the final blow: "Fighting in Hau Nghia showed that at every level and despite numerous tactical blunders, PAVN and Front military forces were superior to their GVN counterparts in morale and determination . . . and able to defeat a sizable army without any friendly air support whatsoever, an impressive military achievement . . . [M]ore U.S. aid and even the introduction of American air power could have, at most, delayed the collapse."⁵⁶

Second, Bergerud assesses the "more plausible" view of Colonel Harry Summers: a quicker, wider, decisive application of massive military force in the region would have won the war.⁵⁷ He counters that even South Vietnam was "until the

⁵⁴ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 257–94, 247. For the view that the Tet Offensive was a military defeat that the American media inaccurately portrayed as a Communist victory, see Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington* (Boulder, Colo., 1977). For different views, see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York, 1988), sect. 5.5.2 and appendix 3; Daniel C. Hallin, *The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam* (Berkeley, Calif., 1986); and William M. Hammond, *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968* (Washington, D.C., 1988), which concludes, "What alienated the American public in both the Korean and Vietnam wars was not news coverage, but casualties . . . Public support for each war dropped inexorably by 15 percentage points whenever total U.S. casualties increased by a factor of 10." See "US Study Faults Govt Policy for VN Pullout," Reuter News Service, (Bangkok) *Nation*, August 31, 1989.

As for the early 1960s, Neil Sheehan reports, "Had any reporter been sufficiently knowledgeable and open-minded to have questioned the justice and good sense of U.S. intervention in those years, he would have been fired as a 'subversive.'" Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York, 1988), 315. The *New York Times* senior military correspondent informed readers in 1965 that "it is far better to fight in Vietnam—on China's doorstep—than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers." Hanson Baldwin, *New York Times*, February 21, 1965, quoted in Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 142.

⁵⁵ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 320, 328. For a concurring analysis, see Ngo Vinh Long, "Saigon's Peace Violations and Collapse," in Long and Douglas Allen, eds., *Coming to Terms: Indochina, the United States, and the War* (Boulder, Colo., 1991), 44–50.

⁵⁶ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 329.

⁵⁷ Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York, 1982). For an assessment of the Vietnam War's effect on one of South Vietnam's closer neighbors, see Ben Kiernan, "The Impact on Cambodia of the U.S. Intervention in Vietnam," in Jayne Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., *The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives* (Armonk, N.Y., forthcoming 1992).

very end, a dreadfully dangerous place to be for American soldiers"; that "GVN officials throughout rural Vietnam were forced to retreat each night to the hamlet fort"; and that "elements of an American division, an ARVN division, and a greatly expanded militia . . . were unable to provide genuine security for the government administration anywhere in Hau Nghia at night." And so, "no increase of military effort against the North in 1965–66 would have altered the weakness of the GVN in the countryside . . . [T]hese prospects were not bright and may well have entailed a debacle far greater than the one suffered."⁵⁸ Bergerud again takes no moral position on the Summers theory, and his critique refers to a U.S. military debacle, not a civilian one. In my view, a disaster exceeding the suffering that Vietnamese peasants did endure could have accompanied Summers' more aggressive approach. If it is true that commanders always re-fight their last war, then the Summers strategy vanquished Vietnam in the Kuwait Theater. But its impact on Indochina may not have been as euphoric.

Bergerud finds even less plausible the view of John Paul Vann, among others, that unnecessary reliance on firepower caused neglect of the "other war," "pacification," the "village war" for "hearts and minds," reforming the GVN and "harnessing the revolution." In 1961, Diem's brother Nhu had been one of the first to confront this critique: "People say that our cadres should go out, work with the peasants and establish a relationship of affection and confidence with them to learn their needs. But if the cadres do this, they are overwhelmed by the people's claims and demands. The only thing for the government to do is issue orders and back them up with force."⁵⁹ Bergerud is unable to show that MACV ever gave full attention to "the village war," either.⁶⁰ But he rejects the claim that "MACV did not realize the importance of pacification or failed to give it considerable support." The reason it failed was simple: "The Party's analysis of the situation in rural Vietnam was correct and ours was wrong." The Communists believed that a social revolution was necessary, that they were supported by large numbers of peasants, many of whom were "the best and brightest" and prepared to die for the cause and that many more were in doubt or neutral. The GVN had supporters "but never enough of them."⁶¹ It was not reformable. Vann himself recommended that, if necessary, the "GVN must be *forced* to accept US judgment and direction,"⁶² which is not likely to have helped. Bergerud's view is that the actual

⁵⁸ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 289, 75, 330–31.

⁵⁹ Ngo Dinh Nhu, interview with Gerald C. Hickey, in John C. Donnell and Gerald C. Hickey, *The Vietnamese "Strategic Hamlets": A Preliminary Report* (Santa Monica, Calif., 1962), quoted in Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 51.

⁶⁰ Bergerud first notes "MACV's reluctance to station American troops more or less permanently to a specific, heavily populated district or province on pacification duties"; *Dynamics of Defeat*, 115. Nevertheless, he writes, "even Westmoreland . . . authorized a large number of pacification operations by American units from the very beginning of the war. There was probably not a single month during their entire stay in Hau Nghia that some 25th Division units were not engaged directly in support of the pacification campaign. During the rainy seasons of both 1966 and 1967, such operations were the major effort of the entire division"; 332 and following.

⁶¹ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 332–33, 326–28.

⁶² John Paul Vann, "Harnessing the Revolution in Vietnam" (emphasis in original), Vietnam Research and Evaluation Information Center, Agency for International Development, September 10, 1965, reproduced April 1967, 7 pp., at p. 5. The late Alex Carey kindly provided me a copy of this document, which Vann had given him in 1970. The John P. Vann Archives are at the U.S. Army

experience of the war showed this theory to lead to an impasse, but here he is not as convincing as in his critique of Summers.

Bergerud ends in this vein: "American leaders, both civilian and military, committed a strategic blunder that has brought many a general to grief: They chose the wrong battlefield. Tragically, this error brought violent consequences that Americans must contemplate for a very long time, indeed."⁶³

IF ERIC BERGERUD'S IS ONE OF THE BEST military histories of the war, Marilyn B. Young's *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990* is a ranking civilian one. Even better written, it surveys broader reaches. This scholarly and searching history of the U.S. role in Vietnam masterfully intertwines the two nations, weaving the war's impact on their populations into a common thread. Young contributes the perspective of an opponent of U.S. involvement. Just as Bergerud defers the moral issues, Young barely addresses the military one of whether the war was "winnable." Her concern is whether it was defensible. A finely tuned antenna picks up the sexual, *macho* language of power used by men making war,⁶⁴ as well as the violence itself. Of 1966, she writes, "There were now only two options: American troops could be withdrawn, or they could stay on and kill." She describes Nixon as a "murderous President." This statement is defensible, especially in relation to Cambodia.⁶⁵ But Young occasionally uses inadequate terms like "real errors" for killings by Vietnamese Communists, finds it "obscene" to investigate their actual numbers, and naïvely asserts that the Communist Party "disbanded" in 1945, when it simply went underground.⁶⁶ On the whole, though, like Bergerud's, her book is judicious and balanced.

Most interesting, the two authors seem to agree on a good deal. Young would likely dispute few of Bergerud's findings, and she adds much valuable information on each of the key issues reviewed above. For instance, she quotes the secretary of the GVN's Military Directorate, General Pham Xuan Chieu, in 1966: "We are very weak politically and without the strong political support of the population which the NLF have." Therefore, a second Saigon official claimed, "We cannot leave the Vietcong in existence." Young's analysis is that the NLF, for its part, waged war through "a blend of violence [and] redistributive justice."⁶⁷

On the U.S. role, she presents the assessment in 1960 of National Security

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. For an awful incident that may help explain Vann's view, see Sheehan, *Bright Shining Lie*, 104–05.

⁶³ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 335. Of course, *Vietnamese* must cope with the consequences besides contemplating them. That is not Bergerud's brief.

⁶⁴ Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 141, 215. Di Leo adds, "For LBJ, the war in Vietnam was a direct challenge to . . . the manhood of the president"; George Ball, *Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 141.

⁶⁵ See Ben Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975* (London, 1985); Kiernan, "The American Bombardment of Kampuchea, 1969–1973," *Vietnam Generation*, 1 (Winter 1989): 4–41; and William Shawcross, *Side-show: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia* (New York, 1979).

⁶⁶ Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 171, 250, 241, 50, 217, 13, 30.

⁶⁷ Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 167, 68. The latter point, notably, is little different from Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 4.

Council official Robert Komer that U.S. plans to increase troop levels would “require circumvention of the Geneva Accords” but that “we should not let this stop us”; the U.S. ambassador’s call on Diem in the same year to reform, lest Washington “begin consideration [of] alternative courses of action and leaders”; the statement in 1962 of Kennedy’s assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs that in Southeast Asia, “there is no pervasive *national spirit* as we know it”; the assessment in 1964 by the CIA, the Department of State, and Defense Intelligence that “the primary sources of communist strength in South Vietnam are indigenous”; and a RAND Corporation analysis in 1966 of the task as “to establish in the minds of the people the conviction that the Saigon regime is the legitimate government of the country.” By then, the United States had sponsored at least three successful coups in Saigon.⁶⁸

On Hanoi’s role in the escalation of the war during 1965, Young points out that “the confirmed total of North Vietnamese combat troops in the South, about one thousand in April, was only half the number of South Koreans the United States had persuaded Seoul to send to South Vietnam . . . By May 1965, when U.S. combat strength in South Vietnam stood at over 46,500, there were approximately 6,500 North Vietnamese soldiers in the South.”⁶⁹ As we have seen, Bergerud calls Hanoi’s 1965 intervention “massive” but gives no comparable figures, stressing the *rate* of the 1965 North Vietnamese build-up, “initially faster” than that of the U.S. forces (from a lower base figure).⁷⁰ The absolute numbers marshaled by Young, however, are germane not only to the impact on noncombatants but also to the origins of the war. Her Chapter 8, titled “The American Invasion of South Vietnam (1965–66),” comes much closer to the truth than the standard claim of a North Vietnamese invasion.

LBJ epitomized the official view in February 1965, when there were 23,700 U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam: “We have kept our guns over the mantel and our shells in the cupboard for a long time now. I can’t ask our American soldiers out there to fight with one hand tied behind their backs.”⁷¹ He certainly didn’t. By 1968, there were 543,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. The muster of North Vietnamese peaked at around one-quarter that level. Vietnam was not a war of foreign communist aggression or even a civil war between North and South. Its origins lay in a civil war in South Vietnam, between southern rebels and a Saigon government with far heavier foreign backing.

A major difference between the two books is Young’s coverage of the moral dilemmas. She vividly recounts the testimony of veterans, recalling not just their own predicament but also reflections on the war and what it meant for Vietnamese civilians. In November 1945, Young reveals, sailors on the *S.S. Winchester Victory* taking French forces to Vietnam sent a cable to President Truman, protesting the use of “this and other American vessels for carrying foreign

⁶⁸ Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 77, 74, 36, 113, 93, 102, 108, 138.

⁶⁹ Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 142, 160. She adds that in April 1965, “Even the total number of Vietnamese from the North since 1959, most of them returning southerners, which MACV set at 39,517, was now outnumbered by the 56,000 American soldiers in Vietnam (23,000 advisers; 33,000 combat troops)”; 142.

⁷⁰ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 332.

⁷¹ Kahin, *Intervention*, 263; Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 133.

combat troops to foreign soil for the purpose of engaging in hostilities to further the imperialist policies of foreign governments when there are American soldiers waiting to come home." She quotes David G. Marr, a Marine intelligence officer who accompanied an ARVN operation in 1962 that left behind "smoking villages, plowed-up rice fields, and several hundred dead citizens," after which "the NLF battalions resumed their operations with more success and public support than before." The late Leo Cawley, another Marine, watched ARVN troops fire an antitank round at a bus carrying Buddhist demonstrators near Da Nang in 1966: "Everywhere there were dead, spattered with blood, tatters of their bright nice clothing and banners for the demonstration . . . What did it all mean? These were the Vietnamese that we were supposed to be defending. It was some gook hassle, the gunnery sergeant explained . . . We had freed up the ARVN to crush the Buddhists." Poignant pictures of the human losses borne by South Vietnamese peasants also come from soldiers' letters home, such as one published in a local American newspaper in 1967. In that year, Vietnam Veterans Against the War was formed, and in 1971 it held hearings on the war under the title, "Winter Soldier Investigation."⁷²

None of this should be surprising: both sides used terror against civilians and occasionally committed major war crimes. The Communists may have been more ruthless, but the U.S. and the GVN side were opposed by far more civilians and were far more heavily armed. That combination caused massive civilian death tolls, even if unintended, and soldiers who did the fighting were in a position to know this.

Young reports American civilian dissent in as much detail: the officials, politicians, advisers, professors, students, and others who spoke out in various ways against the war: Paul Kattenburg of the Department of State, Oregon Senator Wayne Morse, Undersecretary of State George Ball, Cornell professor George Kahin, and the student-organized Vietnam Teach-Ins. The narrative comprehensively covers not only the large antiwar movement but also "the growing divisions between the civilians and the military in the Defense Department," including the replacement of Defense Secretary McNamara and finally the crescendo of public protest that filled the streets and reached surprisingly high levels in Nixon's administration after his invasion of Cambodia in 1970.⁷³

The war to prevent Vietnam's unification ended up dividing America. In 1969, one poll revealed that 58 percent of Americans questioned considered Nixon's conduct of the war immoral. In 1986, two-thirds of Americans polled still considered the Vietnam War "more than a mistake; it was fundamentally wrong

⁷² Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 1–2, 87, 170, 195, 255–56. A volume of critical essays on the Winter Soldier testimony, edited by Page Delano, is to be published in 1992 by the quarterly *Vietnam Generation* (2921 Terrace Drive, Chevy Chase, MD 20815). For an investigation by a Vietnam veteran of charges that Australian troops also committed atrocities, see Terry Burstall, *A Soldier Returns: A Long Tan Veteran Discovers the Other Side of Vietnam* (St. Lucia, Queensland, 1990).

⁷³ Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 98, 110, 102, 126–29, 159, 156–57, chap. 10. Young recounts that in May 1970, "Two of Kissinger's principal aides, Roger Morris and Anthony Lake, thought the invasion was not only useless but wrong, and resigned," while "two hundred and fifty employees of the State Department, including fifty Foreign Service officers, signed a letter of protest to Secretary of State William Rogers . . . Rogers was instructed to hand over the names . . . (he refused)"; 247–48.

and immoral.”⁷⁴ In his 1989 inaugural address, President Bush pleaded for an end to Vietnam: “Surely the statute of limitations has been reached.”⁷⁵

AT A CABINET MEETING TO FINALIZE PLANS for the deployment of U.S. ground troops in 1965, Undersecretary of State George Ball reminded President Johnson that his key ally, South Vietnam’s General Nguyen Van Thieu, thought “the Communists could still win any election held in South Vietnam.” “‘I don’t believe that,’ Johnson exclaimed. ‘Does anyone believe that?’ Apparently no one did.”⁷⁶ What was more crucial, no one seemed willing to have their disbelief tested. The central issue was fatefully dismissed. Of Washington’s “best and brightest,” few outdid or outshone George Ball.⁷⁷

Ball’s perceptive reminder is not discussed in David L. Di Leo’s study of his broader Vietnam War dissent, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*. An elegant portrait, it is nevertheless incomplete and at times repetitive. Di Leo is suggestive of Bergerud in his general approach to the war, though less informed about it.⁷⁸ He could have done worse than to read George Kahin’s unsurpassed *Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam* (1986), which reveals much, not only about Ball’s role as undersecretary of state until his departure from government in September 1966 but also about events in Vietnam itself. As Young notes, “Vietnamese realities had little to do with the world of memos that increasingly became the sole context of American policy choices.”⁷⁹ Di Leo’s book, based on those memos, has little to do with Vietnamese realities, either. He quotes Clark Clifford: “Each time I went to Vietnam I came back less enthusiastic about it . . . Jesus, I hated it. I hated to go there.” This illustrates what Di Leo calls “the Vietnam agony.”⁸⁰ People who had to *live* there are not the subject of his book.

Di Leo offers an interesting case study of the American cabinet system. George Ball’s penetrating critiques of the Johnson administration’s Vietnam policy, made in the privacy of the cabinet room, contrast with his staunch public defense of it. Di Leo looks closely at each in turn. He sees in Ball “an amalgam,” molded from

⁷⁴ Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 177, citing the *Miami Herald*, November 16, 1969; John E. Reilly, *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1983, Spring 1987; John E. Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987* (Chicago, 1987), 33, cited in Herman and Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent*, 238, 378. In 1978 and 1982, 72 percent of those polled saw the war as “wrong and immoral,” 66 percent in 1986. However, the figure is lower (50 percent in 1978, 44 percent in 1986) among “opinion makers.” Young’s antiwar perspective is not that of a fringe minority. It has long enjoyed more popularity than the view that the war was a tragic blunder spurred by “the loftiest intentions.” See, for instance, Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York, 1983), 439.

⁷⁵ President George Bush, Inaugural Address to the Nation, January 20, 1989.

⁷⁶ Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 159. In early 1966, a U.S. intelligence assessment noted later, there was an “almost total absence of any organized popular support, or even sympathy for the American-backed regime,” quoted in Kahin, *Intervention*, 421.

⁷⁷ Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, quotes Ball’s chief of staff as saying that there were “very few people as good as he was”; 48.

⁷⁸ Di Leo calls the Vietnam Syndrome “a backlash from failed involvement in a menacing world”; 184. His account of the end of the war, 183, is much less sophisticated than Bergerud’s, 320.

⁷⁹ Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 137.

⁸⁰ Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 119, 98.

“discordant clays”: his youth in Des Moines provided a “homespun Middle American skepticism about esoteric operational hypotheses,” such as “nation building,” and a populist belief in self-determination. From an “exceptionally rich experience as an international lawyer and investment banker” emerged Ball’s “elite cosmopolitanism.”⁸¹ These and other experiences, such as working on the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey of wartime Europe, combined with the influence of his mentors—the “toughminded,” Atlanticist world-view of Dean Acheson, the altruism of Adlai Stevenson, the economic integrationist thinking of the French industrial planner Jean Monnet, and the Realist international viewpoint of Walter Lippmann—helped develop in Ball a strong opposition not only to “storm-cellar” isolationism and shortsighted protectionism but also to ideological fervor, over-extension of U.S. resources, involvement in “peripheral” regions “where risks outweighed gains,” aerial bombardment as a military strategy, and international projects vulnerable to falling public support if casualties mounted. Ball became a knee-jerk internationalist but no knee-jerk interventionist. All this Di Leo carefully places in the context of the views and passions of the “antagonists and allies” among Ball’s political peers.

Some of Ball’s critics who managed or supported the Vietnam effort faulted him (accurately) for his Europe-centered vision and his lack of real interest in Asia. Ironically, the origins of American involvement can be traced to such a world view: in the 1940s, the United States considered that bolstering France was much more important than whatever both were doing in Indochina. Other critics of Ball, however, represented a world in which reluctance to intervene in other countries, or readiness to be neutral or friendly toward regimes of opposing ideologies, is called “isolationism.” From these regions sprang the view that intermittently carpet-bombing North Vietnam was treating it as “sacrosanct,” along with terms like the “Vietnam Syndrome” for an unwillingness to use force to determine political outcomes around the globe.

In his last chapter, Di Leo examines the Nationalist or imperialist historiography of the Cold War, which “endorsed the extension of American power throughout the world,” and the Radical Revisionist school that rose to challenge it. He then looks at the “Realist Revisionist” views of Hans Morgenthau, Walter Lippmann, and George F. Kennan. “The Realists believed that American foreign policy in the twentieth century had oscillated recklessly between isolationism . . . and missionary wars” and that “universalism was no answer to isolationism.” Di Leo places Ball convincingly within this paradigm. While Walter Lippmann asserted that global containment “was but the other side of the isolationist coin,” Ball saw parallels between isolationism and Washington’s dismissal of the concerns of its European allies over the Vietnam War. The Realists saw the war as “a gross intellectual error” but “attacked neither the moral purpose of American foreign policy nor the logic of containment.” From this critique developed the widespread view that the U.S. goal was indeed idealistic—to establish democracy in South Vietnam—but that the costs to the United States were too high for success.⁸² One of these costs was a national confusion of words and deeds. As Ball

⁸¹ Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 8, 30, 208, 211.

⁸² Noam Chomsky points out that, more generally, “virtually the entire political class has supported

said in 1967, "We have used the vocabulary and syntax of Wilsonian universalism while actively practicing the politics of alliances and spheres of influence and it is now time that we stopped confusing ourselves with our political hyperbole."⁸³

At the decision-making level, confusion was rarely the problem. In a confidential State Department study as early as 1948, Kennan wrote:

[W]e have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only about 6.3% of its population . . . In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world-benefaction.

For these reasons, we must observe great restraint in our attitude toward the Far Eastern areas . . . We should cease to talk about vague and—for the Far East—unreal objectives, such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.

We should recognize that our influence in the Far Eastern area in the coming period is going to be primarily military and economic.

Kennan defined as "absolutely vital to our security" only Japan and the Philippines: "if we can contrive to retain effective control over these areas there can be no serious threat to our security from the East within our time."⁸⁴ But, sharp focus aside, Realists and imperialists saw the Asian landscape through the same filter. A sophisticated fellow Realist like Ball could see Kennan's point in not becoming "greatly overextended" in the Far East. Yet much of the history of the United States in Vietnam can be explained by the capacity of other U.S. officials to rise to Kennan's challenge and "deal in straight power concepts" by favoring a "military" role unhampered by concern for "unreal objectives" such as democratization.

Ironically, precisely because of his early, strongly argued but private opposition to the war, George Ball epitomized the "credibility gap" closely associated with the Vietnam War.⁸⁵ Intelligent, liberal statesmen told the world almost the opposite of what they knew to be true. On the one hand, Ball's quiet dissent kept intellectual options open for future policy revision, most likely including McNamara's own changed view of the war. On the other, Ball's public statements, for instance in June 1966, when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there was "no other course to follow than the one the Administration is following," may have helped prolong the war.⁸⁶ Reading Roy Jenkins' tribute to Ball as someone who has been "more nearly right on every major foreign policy

intervention, except when it proves too costly to us"; Chomsky, *Detering Democracy* (New York, 1991), 32.

⁸³ Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 186–93.

⁸⁴ George F. Kennan, Policy Planning Study 23, February 24, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948*, vol. 1, part 2 (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 523–26.

⁸⁵ Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 140, 143, 179.

⁸⁶ Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 138. For other examples of Ball's strong public support of the U.S. intervention, see 135, 139, 141; and Young, *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, 102.

issue of the past forty-five years than anyone else I know,"⁸⁷ one is tempted to ask which George Ball he had in mind—but also to give both men the benefit of the doubt.

WHAT WAS THE RESULT OF THE WAR? In a regional sense, Vietnam might be called not a U.S. defeat but overkill. In *The Making of a Limited War, 1965–66*, for instance, R. B. Smith asserts that elsewhere in Asia, "the principal objectives which had seemed to demand an escalation of American participation in the war during 1965 had, by late 1966, been to a considerable extent achieved." One of Ball's sparring partners, LBJ's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, considers with hindsight that the U.S. effort in Vietnam was "excessive," at least "from the time of the anti-communist revolution in Indonesia, late in 1965."⁸⁸ The U.S. role in the Indonesian killings of perhaps 500,000 to 800,000 Communist-affiliated civilians in 1965–1966 has now been well documented.⁸⁹ It is not likely to be a source of pride for future Western leaders.

When President Bush launched America's Gulf War, he pledged that "this will not be another Vietnam." "Our troops will . . . not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back."⁹⁰ At the least, this interpretation ignores Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War. Bergerud stresses that "anything of importance that was accomplished in Hau Nghia during 1966–67 was due to coercion and violence, most of it supplied by U.S. forces." By mid-1972, there were 30,000 war victims in Hau Nghia alone.⁹¹ Ball once asked, "Have we learned [in Vietnam] or only failed?"⁹²

The irony of foreign intervention in order to stimulate South Vietnamese separatism suffuses the words of U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven, in mid-1967: "We must match the nationalism we see in the North with an equally strong and patient one in the South . . . Hanoi is betting that we'll lose public support in the United States before we can build a nation in South Vietnam." From the same mindset came Henry Cabot Lodge's recommendation: "Saturate the minds of the people with some socially conscious and attractive ideology."⁹³ This could not be done. "Winning hearts and minds" among a

⁸⁷ Quoted by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his preface to Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, xi.

⁸⁸ Smith, *Making of a Limited War*, 417; Bundy quoted in David Fromkin and James Chase, "What Are the Lessons of Vietnam?" *Foreign Affairs*, 63 (Spring 1985): 743.

⁸⁹ See Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1980* (New York, 1988), 180–81; Kathy Kadane, "US Officials' Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath in '60's," *Washington Post* (May 21, 1990): A5; and Roger Kerson, "The Embassy's Hit List," *Columbia Journalism Review*, 29 (November–December 1990): 9–14. A leading Indonesian security official, Admiral Sudomo, has given an estimate of around 500,000. See Robert Cribb, ed., *The Indonesian Killings, 1965–66* (Clayton, Victoria, 1990), esp. 7–14. According to former CIA agent John Stockwell, the CIA estimated the total death toll from the anticommunist killings at 800,000; *Harper's* (September 1984): 42.

⁹⁰ "Transcript of the Comments by Bush on the Air Strikes against the Iraqis," *New York Times*, January 17, 1991.

⁹¹ Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 180, 317.

⁹² Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 211–12.

⁹³ Enthoven, quoted in Bergerud, *Dynamics of Defeat*, 163; Lodge, quoted in Young, *Vietnam Wars*,

land-hungry peasant population while propping up the tiny landowning class was wishful thinking. Elections were evaded, "nation-building" imposed externally, repression substituted for reform. The best way to make Vietnam "a proving ground for democracy," as JFK called it in June 1956,⁹⁴ was *not* to cancel the democratic elections scheduled there for the following month.

Local legitimacy was probably the one resource that the U.S. war in Vietnam lacked, but it determined the result. When the irresistible force of foreign military power met the immovable object of indigenous Vietnamese nationalism and communism, with George Ball's contradictions articulating the friction between them, the force eventually proved more resistible than the object was movable. Long after the shooting has stopped, it is still too soon to predict an early end to the Vietnam War.⁹⁵ But, in one sense, it is concluding. The failures of military power in the face of mass politics, a conclusion uniting military and civilian history, dovetail Bergerud and Young toward consensus. Each has sifted a vast amount of translated and other material to clarify the Vietnamese role in the war. As a result of their books, though adjectives and adverbs remain in dispute, the basic grammar of the conflict will become more commonly understood.

Neither author has plumbed the many available Vietnamese-language sources. This needs to be done. From this point, scholarship based on Vietnamese oral and written accounts has the most to contribute to our knowledge of the war, along with local studies of over thirty South Vietnamese provinces that historians have yet to examine closely.⁹⁶ But, until then, the work of both Young and Bergerud illuminates the forgotten history of life in Vietnam before the invention of "the Vietnam Syndrome."

1945–1990, 144. Bergerud refers to "creating freely given support for the Saigon government"; *Dynamics of Defeat*, 76.

⁹⁴ Di Leo, *George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment*, 54.

⁹⁵ As Young put it in 1990, "the U.S. still declares Vietnam an enemy nation, prohibits or restricts travel, trade, humanitarian aid, and exchange visits by U.S. citizens, and exerts heavy pressure on its allies to discourage any constructive relations with Vietnam"; *Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990*, x.

⁹⁶ On 266, Bergerud describes the expression "number ten" as "the Vietnamese slang for terrible"; of course, it is an English pidgin that Vietnamese adapted for use with English speakers. Forthcoming studies by David W. P. Elliott, John Kleinen, and John Murphy of the provinces of Dinh Tuong, Quang Ngai, and Phuoc Tuy should complement the work of Elliott and Hunt on My Tho, Frost on Phuoc Tuy, and Race and Bergerud on Long An and Hau Nghia.



ROBERT A. ROSENSTONE
Contributing Editor

In one sense, every motion picture is historical—a visual record of the reflected surface of whatever portion of the world existed in front of a camera at a given moment in time. In a similar sense, every book written, every work of art, every artifact is also historical—the product of a time, a place, an unrecapturable moment. History as a practice or discipline is, as we know, something different: a conscious attempt to recall, recapture, rethink, or represent those vanished moments and—equally important—to explain and make meaningful the activities that those moments contain.

The historical film, as reviewed here in the *AHR*, parallels that discipline but cannot duplicate its methods or findings. Works of history on film must explore the past within the confines of the possibility and practices of the medium, practices that, like those of written history, change over time. A kind of “historical” film has in fact long been a staple of the motion picture screen; in countries as diverse as the United States, France, Russia, India, and Japan, the “historical” was among the earliest of film forms. The word belongs in quotation marks—most “historicals” should really be designated “costume dramas”—because almost all such motion pictures have used the past as no more than another country, an exotic setting for romance and adventure. Until recent years, it was the rare historical film that made meaningful the social, political, or cultural developments of a bygone age.

Given the thousands of films and videos made throughout the world each year, the serious historical film may still be relatively rare, but in absolute numbers such works are much more common than they used to be. One cause of this change is the independence of dozens of new nations in the last forty years, many of which subsidize film production. The growth of ethnic and gender consciousness is another. The spread of television, with its need to fill vast amounts of air time, has everywhere provided a new outlet for documentaries and docudramas, while a rising level of education may have spurred the demand for more substantial fare. No doubt, the increasing cheapness of video equipment has also contributed to the boom in visual history. Whatever the causes, the result has been that each year sees the release throughout the world of dozens, perhaps hundreds, of films that attempt to understand in depth the events, movements, and people of the past.

The touchstone of such films—the decision whether or not such works are “historical” or historical—does not depend on the issue of fact or fiction. Indeed, any dramatic historical film must *of necessity* include fictional elements (see my article “*JFK*: Historical Fact/Historical Film,” *AHR*, 97 [April 1992]: 506–11). What makes a film historical is its willingness to engage the discourse of history—that is, the facts, the issues, and the arguments raised in other historical works. This does not mean that historical films engage such issues literally. For all its apparent ability to mirror the world, the motion picture—including the documentary—can no more provide a literal rendition of the past than can the printed page. At best, film can construct a world in which images, sounds, and words combine to help the viewer feel and understand—or at least gain insight into—the meaning of events and movements of the past.

The line between the “historical” and the historical film is hardly absolute—no more absolute than the line between works of popular history (some of which are admired by

academics) and scholarly history. Ultimately, the “truth” created by the historical film, like the “truth” created by historical writing, can only be decided in the arena of historical argument, popular and scholarly. The *AHR* film section is part of that arena.

The preceding paragraphs are meant as an introduction to a question posed by several people: how are the works reviewed in the *AHR* film section chosen? Such a question is difficult to answer, for it assumes a coherence in the selection process that has always been more of an ideal than a reality. To be blunt: like history itself, this section grows out of a mixture of decisions and events at once rational and irrational, conscious and unconscious, an odd jumble of careful planning and random luck with film distributors, video companies, and reviewers. The principles that guide the selection process can certainly be outlined, but it is necessary to point out that, in the four years of its existence, this section has repeatedly been shaped by the demands of necessity.

All films reviewed here are historical rather than “historical”—that is, serious works of visual history. To that end, the contributing editor not only combs dozens of catalogues of new releases and sees, in theaters and on video, as many promising films as possible, but he also supplements his own choices with others suggested by people in the profession. Such recommendations have played an increasingly large role. In the first year of the section, I initiated virtually all of the film reviews. This year, ten of the fifteen reviews were suggested by other historians.

Since the *AHR* covers all areas of the world and all periods of history, an ideal film section would presumably do the same. But, over the years, the largest proportions of the reviews have been devoted to Western Europe (41 percent) and the United States (22 percent) and to modern (45 percent) or contemporary (24 percent) history. This Eurocentric bias can be explained in terms of both quantities of films produced and, more important, availability in the United States. (It is difficult to obtain review copies of recent Latin American films here, much more difficult to find African and Indian films, and virtually impossible to locate motion pictures made in North Africa, the Middle East, or Asian countries other than China and Japan.) The period bias reflects the choices of directors as well. Documentary filmmakers, who usually depend on earlier film footage, photos, and historical witnesses, rarely tackle a premodern subject. The great expense of re-creating historical situations keeps dramatic films focused on periods and characters with which audiences can easily identify; in American, European, and Asian cinema, this usually means the wars, revolutions, and social movements of the twentieth century.

One of the aims of this section has been to expose readers to the fullest possible range of historical motion pictures, thereby testing the limits of the medium for dealing with the past. Most of the works covered have of necessity been standard documentaries (32 percent) and historical dramas (46 percent), with an emphasis placed on films whose creators have been particularly intelligent in the way they use the medium to evoke history. There has also been a conscious attempt to look beyond the mainstream motion picture to the realm of independent and innovative filmmaking (21 percent), to explore historical works that re-vision the past in a variety of ways—some by mixing genres and styles; others by dealing with historical materials in forms akin to the essay, the rumination, or the intervention; still others by juxtaposing material from past and present or by intermixing serious and satiric elements in an attempt to create a kind of history that might be labeled postmodern.

The availability (or, occasionally, unavailability) of reviewers and their approaches to the task are two more factors that help to shape this section. Each work is covered by a specialist in the field—that is what distinguishes *AHR* reviews from pieces on historical films in cinema journals. Although these specialists may share an unspoken assumption that films have something to tell us about the past, they differ widely in the way they describe and evaluate such works. Some take the kind of common-sense, factual approach that might be suitable to written social or political history, while others, influenced by postcolonial or feminist or postmodern theory, indulge in more symbolic or interpretive readings. This variety of approaches remains

important, for after four years of this section, two things seem clear: while many professional historians are interested in the contribution of film to our sense of history, we are still a long way from any consensus on how to understand and evaluate the nature of that contribution.

The film section this year concentrates on countries whose films are not often seen in the United States. Half the works are products of the Third World, with films from Africa, Latin America (Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil), and Asian countries (India and China) that may or may not belong to this outworn but unavoidable geopolitical term. Two of the films were made in postcolonial outposts of the West (Australia and New Zealand), and another deals with the eastern margins of that civilization (Romania). Of films from the United States, two depict earlier "Third World" contacts—seventeenth-century encounters between Europeans and North American Indians—and a third assesses the success and failure of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua.

This focus accounts for the disproportionate number of dramatic features (75 percent) reviewed, for foreign documentaries rarely receive an American distribution. Most of these dramatic works are standard, illusionist-realist motion pictures. But, within that general category, one can find vast differences—the films range from a lavish Chinese period-piece re-creation (*Ju Dou*) to a star-studded French production (*Life and Nothing But*), to a re-creation of the world of fur traders and Indians (*Ikwe*) that is a model of how visual intelligence can allow one to make an important historical film on a minuscule budget. Three of the works are particularly fascinating for the ways in which they create a sense of immediacy by overlapping fiction with the historical events portrayed—*Requiem für Dominic*, shot in the streets of Timișoara while the Romanian revolution played itself out; *Rodrigo D.: No Future*, which uses Medellín street toughs to act as fictional characters much like themselves; and *Mapantsula*, a critique of apartheid illicitly shot on the streets of Johannesburg under the guise that it was a gangster movie. Three other films push beyond the boundaries of the standard historical film. The legendary-like and purposefully anachronistic drama *Quilombo* projects Carnival back into the seventeenth century; *Hard Times and Culture* employs postmodern fragmentation to depict *fin de siècle* Vienna as the first postmodern city (and receives an appropriately postmodern review); and *Snakes and Ladders* creates feminine visual metaphors to make feminist arguments in favor of a history that will recognize female concerns and consciousness.

Of further interest: To get a sense of the broad scope of Third World cinema, one would best begin with Roy Armes, *Third World Film Making and the West* (Berkeley, Calif., 1987). This may be supplemented by the following: Teshome Gabriel, *Third Cinema in the Third World: The Aesthetics of Liberation* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1982); Jim Pines and Paul Willemen, eds., *Questions of Third Cinema* (London, 1989); John D. H. Downing, *Film and Politics in the Third World* (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1987). For Latin American film, there is a substantial body of literature; one good introduction is Julianne Burton, ed., *Cinema and Social Change in Latin America: Conversations with Filmmakers* (Austin, Tex., 1986). Among writings on African cinema, see the following: Manthia Diawara, *African Cinema: Politics and Culture* (Bloomington, Ind., 1992); Françoise Pfaff, *Twenty-Five Black African Filmmakers: A Critical Study with Filmography and Bio-bibliography* (Westport, Conn., 1988); and Françoise Pfaff, *The Cinema of Ousmane Sembene: A Pioneer of African Film* (Westport, 1984).

Of major film distributors, New Yorker Films, 16 West 61st St., New York, N.Y. 10023 (212 247-6110), has a goodly number of Latin American and African titles, including almost all the works of Ousmane Sembene, Africa's best-known director and one much concerned with history, and the justly famed trilogy by Carlos Diegues on Afro-Brazilians in slavery and freedom.

California Newsreel, 149 Ninth St., San Francisco, Calif. 94103 (415 621-6196), aided by a Rockefeller Foundation grant, distributes a number of African features on video; its catalog,

Library of African Cinema, is a good introduction to the film art of Africa. Mypheduh Films, 22-D Hollywood Ave., Hohokus, N.J. 07423 (201 652-1989), and African Diaspora Images, P.O. Box 3517, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11202 (718 852-8353), both carry African titles. Other distributors that handle Third World films include The Cinema Guild, 1697 Broadway, N.Y. 10019 (212 246-5522); Women Make Movies, 225 Lafayette St., N.Y. 10012 (212 925-0606); and First Run/Icarus Films, 153 Waverly Place, 6th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10014 (800 876-1710). Videos of foreign films, including many from the Third World, are distributed by Facets Multimedia, 1517 West Fullerton Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60614 (800 331-6197).

AFRICA

Mapantsula. Produced by Max Montocchio; written and directed by Thomas Mogotlane and Oliver Schmitz. 1988; color; 104 minutes. English, Zulu, Sotho, and Afrikaans with English subtitles. Distributor of film and video: California Newsreel, 149, 9th Street, No. 420, San Francisco, Calif. 94103 (415) 621-6196, fax (415) 621-6522.

Focusing on the exploits in 1980s Johannesburg and Soweto of a character named "Panic" (Thomas Mogotlane), a streetwise petty criminal (*mapantsula*), this film evokes in compelling fashion the textures and complexities of daily life for black South Africans and argues for the substitution of collective consciousness and action in place of individual compromises in resisting and ultimately overthrowing apartheid. Unlike other recent films on South Africa (*Cry Freedom*, 1987; *A World Apart*, 1988; *A Dry White Season*, 1989), *Mapantsula* is not concerned with the individual and exceptional predicaments of the few white critics who attempted to challenge actively the South African state, nor does it dwell on the harshest aspects of life under apartheid. Rather, the film moves black South Africans to center stage as makers of their own history and conveys in a subtle way the growing self-realization and political consciousness of the black men and women who live in contemporary South Africa.

A key strength of the film is its authentic feel. The film was shot openly with the approval of the South African government (which had been persuaded that only a straightforward gangster movie was intended) on the streets of Johannesburg and Soweto, and the actors who appear are all South African. Thus the street scenes, the music, the tones and idioms of the languages spoken are much as one experiences them in South Africa, whether in the smoke-filled skies of the African townships or the fenced and gated prison palaces of the white suburbs.

Mapantsula presents Panic's life in a series of flashbacks, remembered while he is under interrogation in police headquarters. The authorities, who know him as an informer called "Johannes," are attempting to get him to implicate his cellmates in anti-government activities. The film begins by portraying the life of survival that he makes out of committing petty crimes and relying on his wits. In a society that is supposedly run by whites, he steals handbags from white women on downtown Johannesburg streets; he lifts wallets from white businessmen and dares them, when they confront him, to do anything about it (the police are elsewhere and the majority of the people on the street are black); he steals clothes from black shopkeepers by rolling up his pants, wrapping fancy suits around his legs, and dashing out of the stores like a version of the Michelin man; he gets into knife fights with fellow gangsters in Soweto *shebeens*

(illegal bars); in short, he is indiscriminate in his choice of victim. Indeed, he takes advantage of everyone. When the black residents of Soweto begin a rent boycott against the government to protest police repression and the lack of basic services such as water and electricity, Panic uses this as an excuse not to pay rent to the black woman from whom he sublets a room. He lives off the earnings of his girlfriend "Pat" (Thembi Mtshali) at the same time as he berates her for working as a domestic servant in a white household. He then causes her to lose her job by getting into a fight with her employer and throwing a brick through a window.

But, as he takes advantage of all around him, Panic is pulled into a wider world in which he has to confront the political implications of his actions. The landlady's son Sam (Eugene Majola) convinces Pat to take her labor grievances to a trade unionist named Duma (Peter Sephuma) who in turn persuades her to attend union meetings and community gatherings where the actions of those deemed to have sold out to the government (such as black policemen and town councilors) are bitterly condemned. Panic attempts to find Pat by following Sam to a funeral, where both are arrested by the police for possible anti-government activities (Sam is later killed by the police).

Panic is imprisoned in a cell along with a group of activists who impress him with their camaraderie and their commitment to political ideals, although they also condemn his life of crime. The line between Panic and his cellmates is thin. Like all black South Africans, they live in a society where to be black is to be treated as a criminal and where they are just as likely to be in prison for transgressing the pass law (20 million were arrested for this "crime" before the scrapping of the law in 1986) as for a political act. Indeed, on entering the cell, one of the "political prisoners" notes humorously about being in prison, "At least we have privacy, and we don't have to worry about being arrested anymore."

Panic's time in the cell is interspersed with numerous bouts of interrogation. The police attempt by humiliation, by promises of rewards, and, finally, by almost throwing him out a window of the high-rise interrogation building to persuade him to inform on his cellmates. Panic's recognition of his individual powerlessness at the hands of his interrogators, together with the example of the collective solidarity of his cellmates and the flashbacks to the painful experiences of his girlfriend, his landlady, and the community activists, gives him the will to refuse to comply with the policemen's demands.

Within the film's parameters, Panic's conversion from informer to participant in the collective struggle is convincing, not just because Thomas Mogotlane's performance and those of his fellow actors are extraordinarily effective but because the film is well founded in a sense of history. The action takes place during a period when South Africa's black townships were engulfed by civil war as their residents rose up against the iniquities of the apartheid system. Rent boycotts, politically infused funeral processions, struggles over domestic labor, and denunciations of township collaborators were endemic throughout the 1980s. In their depiction, the filmmakers draw from the personal experiences of the writers, directors, and actors involved. Indeed, film as a medium of interpretation and communication here seems to depict more fully and clearly the causes, consequences, and meaning of these developments for those directly involved than do more orthodox analyses such as those found in political and historical texts. In part, this richness seems a product of the multitude of voices that *Mapantsula* is able to incorporate, with a sentence or a vignette capturing what a chapter or book might do elsewhere; in part the film represents and is a product of the lived experience of black South Africans, whereas most scholarly analyses are written by white authors.

Another factor may account for the success of this film in representing black urban life: many of the attributes and mannerisms of Panic and his fellow petty criminals are themselves a homage to film stereotypes. The culture of urban criminals, or *tsotsis* as they are often called in South Africa, developed in the 1940s, as young men, often newly urbanized, unemployed or underemployed, and politically powerless, sought to emulate the images they saw on movie screens: of sharp dressers in the United States wearing "zoot suits" (from which *tsotsi* is derived), of gangsters fighting all forms of authority, of jazz musicians creating new forms of music outside the orthodox (and white) mainstream.

The power of visual representation is also well understood by the South African

government, which has consistently banned films it considers anti-apartheid while restricting local black television to a diet of *The Jeffersons* and *The Cosby Show*. Though permitting distribution of *Mapantsula* in video form, in a country where practically without exception VCRs are owned only by whites, the government censorship board, the Directorate of Publications, determined in 1988 that the film should not be shown in theaters in South Africa because "the large screen amplifies the dangerous political effects the film could have on probable viewers in this country."

William H. Worger

University of California, Los Angeles

Wend Kuuni. Produced and directed by Gaston Kabore. 1982; color; 70 minutes. More with English subtitles. Distributor: California Newsreel.

Zan Boko. Produced and directed by Gaston Kabore. 1988; color; 94 minutes. More with English subtitles. Distributor: California Newsreel.

Yaaba. Produced by Freddy Denaes, Pierre-Alain Meier, and Idrissa Ouedraogo; directed by Idrissa Ouedraogo. 1989; color; 90 minutes. More with English subtitles. Distributor: New Yorker Films.

Tilai. Directed by Idrissa Ouedraogo. 1990; color; 81 minutes. More with English subtitles. Distributor: New Yorker Films.

Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) lies quietly in the vast shadow of the Sahara desert, nestled in the heart of French-speaking West Africa. Every two years, the capital, Ouagadougou, hosts FESPACO (Festival Panafrican du Cinéma du Ouagadougou), Africa's most important cultural event and the preeminent showcase of African cinema. The country is also home to two young filmmakers, Gaston Kabore and Idrissa Ouedraogo, both internationally acknowledged as leading figures in African cinema.

Wend Kuuni, *Zan Boko*, *Yaaba*, and *Tilai* launched these filmmakers internationally. In the films of Kabore and Ouedraogo is an emerging sensibility or "fingerprint" of form, structure, and theme that is increasingly identifiable as "Burkinabe." It is too early to classify these works as a school of cinema, given the small number of films. But within the work of these filmmakers are harbingers of a vibrant and innovative movement in African cinema. This direction is part of a broader quest by African filmmakers to establish a film language that creates an African perspective in form and theme using oral traditions and language.

Renowned as the greatest Mossi polity in the precolonial western Sudan, Ouagadougou reached its zenith between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The earliest written accounts of Ouagadougou, and the other great medieval kingdoms of Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Bornu, Kanem, and Hausa, are the records of Arabic merchants and travelers. However, archaeological evidence from the region is practically nonexistent. With the exception of the Mossi, other societies in the western Sudan have undergone traumatic upheavals that have ruptured or destroyed their social and cultural systems, thus limiting the effectiveness of detailed ethnological studies. For its indigenous people, the African past is transmitted orally, from generation to generation. All oral traditions share certain characteristics in function and form: reaffirmation of identity, community history, lineage, values, and traditions; the chronicling of

myths, feats of bravery, courage, and the exploits of great leaders. Forms can range from prose and poetry to epics, structured in episodes that are sung, narrated, or dramatized. Performance, audience involvement, presentation, and innovation of text are critical components in this oral tradition.

Neither tradition, written or oral, provides a "true" representation of the African past. On the one hand, the lack of traditional primary sources impedes the construction, in a classical sense, of a linear, chronological series of events depicting the origin, evolution, and history of the region in general or of a particular society. On the other hand, the flexibility of the oral narratives and their cultural specificity limit their usage in standard historical verification or reconstruction. The quest for the African past, then, involves synthesizing a challenging and intriguing mix of written and oral traditions.

Cinema takes on a twofold significance for African societies that do not have traditions of scholarly or popular literature. First, it expands and illuminates the fragmented extant historical record of the ancient western Sudan by mirroring the cultural nuances, rhythms, language, and nonverbal aspects of African oral traditions. Second, this convergence of film and oral traditions creates a new text, a comprehensive, multi-dimensional language empowered with vast possibilities for visualizing the African past. This synergy resonates in the films of Gaston Kabore and Idrissa Ouedraogo. Set in the rural countryside, *Wend Kuuni*, *Tilai*, and *Yaaba* evoke, in graphic detail, the texture of Mossi life, the rhythm of daily tasks, family and community events. Embedded in these fictionalized stories are themes highlighting the sophistication of Mossi social, political, and legal systems.

Wend Kuuni is a fictional film, structured in accordance with African oral traditions. A fable weaving myth and poetry, the film depicts a place where people live according to their customs, and daily life unfolds according to a rhythm set by human dynamics, drama, internal contradictions, and social values. One of Burkina Faso's two main languages, More, is used in the film, and the soundtrack is based on traditional Mossi music. However, the sparse dialogue makes the film accessible to non-More speaking and illiterate audiences, even as it aesthetically underscores the bold, stark beauty of the countryside.

Gaston Kabore tells a deceptively simple tale about a young mute child found in the forest by a peddler and subsequently adopted by a family in the peddler's village. A friendship ensues between the little boy, Wend Kuuni, and Pognere, the daughter of his adopted family. The shock of discovering the corpse of an elderly man, who hanged himself after being publicly humiliated by his wife for impotence, shocks Wend Kuuni into remembering his past and recovering his voice. He recalls how he and his mother were driven out of their village for her refusal to remarry after her husband failed to return from a hunting trip. The credibility of the non-professional actors, especially the natural radiance of Wend Kuuni and Pognere, provides a palpable intimacy and warmth.

The title of *Zan Boko*, or place where the placenta is buried, refers to the close ties that Mossi have to their land. The film is a contemporary social investigation that uses fiction to address the crisis of urbanization in Africa and the role the mass media play in the process. The film opens with Tinga, a farmer, who is awaiting the birth of his child in the company of the village elders. In consultation with the midwife, the elders instruct Tinga to conduct a water ritual to help his wife through a difficult delivery.

A clear sense of Mossi patrilineal order emerges. Tinga's father is centrally involved in the affairs of the compound and village. Idle chatter throughout the day touches on feast preparations for the village chief, concerns about enrolling children in school, and the havoc that goats are wreaking on Tinga's drying mud bricks. This activity takes place against a backdrop of a busy, well-ordered day of field work, tending the animals, and domestic duties.

Scenes of women visitors coming to the compound to exchange gifts and news with their female friends and relatives are beautifully executed. A gracious elegance and courtesy permeates the conversation, which is frequently punctuated by wishes for good health and thanks, and inquiries about children, husbands, and upcoming weddings. Social intimacy and warmth, physical proximity, gentle touches, the soft "umms, umms," made as the conversation goes back and forth, are breathtaking aural and visual experiences: only through film can the

nuances and subtleties so important to the sensibilities of people in societies based on oral communication be simultaneously depicted.

This communal harmony begins to fray, however, owing to the insidious influence of urbanization. Elements of class privilege and corruption come to the surface when Tinga's new neighbor, a wealthy businessman benefiting from urban expansion, covets Tinga's land for a swimming pool. Tinga's neighbors succumb to economic pressures to sell their land. As the expansive countryside is circumscribed by roads and cars filled with strangers, Tinga's world becomes more isolated. Despite his best efforts, Tinga finds that his land is swindled away from him.

The clash between urban and rural values comes to a head when Tinga is invited to appear on a government television program. The voice of conscience is provided by a television journalist who risks his job to bring the story of Tinga and government corruption to public attention. But the transmission of the program is cut in mid-broadcast by angry officials. Tinga exhorts the journalist to stay true to his convictions, although it is clear that the privileges of the bourgeoisie will remain intact.

In Africa, the mass media impose the view of the state, providing no space for "real people" like Tinga to express their opinions. *Zan Boko* emphasizes the hope that radio and television can be used for change rather than control.

Ouedraogo's *Yaaba* is a story of friendship between an old woman and two children, a boy, Bila, and a girl, Nopoko. The old woman has been cast out from the village, where she is feared as a witch. The children risk severe reprimands when they sneak off to visit "Yaaba," an affectionate name meaning grandmother. Through the eyes of the children, particularly Bila, the life of the community unfolds. What the children see is the bucolic beauty of the countryside, the rhythms of compound and farming activities. As the caring relationship between Yaaba and the children evolves, Bila becomes very protective of the old woman and hopes to build her a new house one day.

When Nopoko falls seriously ill after being cut by a rusty knife, Yaaba, at Bila's request, solicits the assistance of her friend, a traditional healer from the bush. With the tacit approval of Nopoko's mother, who fears her husband's wrath and the village's censure, a potion is surreptitiously given to Nopoko, who recovers, thus completing the circle of caring and friendship that exists between Yaaba and the children.

Bila's swaggering worldliness and insouciance impress the adoring Nopoko, who sees him as a guide and interpreter of the village's domestic squabbles. Husbands are berated for drunkenness, women for being lazy mothers; adulterers sneak off in the bushes, not knowing they are under the watchful gaze of the children. Bila explains their actions to Nopoko by saying, "They have their reasons." Comic relief is provided by many of these interludes, which highlight discordant conjugal relationships, adultery, thievery, and drunkenness. Mossi society stresses harmony as a fundamental community value. The portrayal in *Yaaba* counters the community's law and practices, which demand the resolution of conflicts, especially conjugal differences, before they escalate to unmanageable proportions. The onus is on the family leader to resolve squabbles and mete out appropriate punishments. Culprits face severe and immediate reprimands: floggings, banishment, and often, in the case of adultery, death. In *Yaaba*, the sense of due process and accountability, of both the transgressors and their families, is unconvincing.

Tilai (community law), presents the dilemma of a "love triangle" that estranges father from son and escalates to fratricide. The scenario begins when Saga, a hunter, returns home to find that his father has married Nogma, the woman promised to Saga. The father is depicted as a rather ineffectual old man who has difficulty controlling his wives, the old one and the young one, Nogma. An ensuing affair between Saga and the woman who is now his stepmother is discovered. Saga's brother is required by *tilai* to slay Saga for this incestuous liaison but instead aids his brother's escape. Saga is joined by Nogma in a distant village, where they set up residence.

Tilai is a story of love and passion between two people who defy tradition and endure community censure. As a plot device, the possible permutations of the love story wear thin,

however, allowing the film to wander aimlessly at points. The pace quickens after Saga learns that his own mother has died. His return to the village forces his brother finally to slay him. Nogma, who had followed Saga back to the village, is left standing there, while Saga's brother storms off into the bush. It is a dramatic ending but one that lacks closure.

Both directors, Kabore and Ouedraogo, draw from the same basic elements of Mossi culture and oral traditions. There are also similarities in the film language they employ: pacing, rhythm, elegant composition, stunning visuals, the More language, sparse dialogue, and a polished professional presentation. *Tilai*, *Yaaba*, and *Wend Kuuni* suggest a pre-Islamic and pre-colonial Africa, which resonates with complex human relationships and dimensions of community life not apparent in traditional historical accounts, while *Zan Boko* details the insidious impact of urbanization in contemporary Africa.

Kabore crafts the thematic structure of his films with an eye to African sensibilities, depicting Mossi values in a way that reaffirms, if not valorizes, political and social imperatives yet retains elements of a wider accessibility. The universal elements in *Wend Kuuni*, for example, are its gentle, human story with themes of abandonment, cruelty, kindness, and conflict. Conversely, in *Yaaba* and *Tilai*, Ouedraogo uses Mossi traditions and values as a material backdrop for dramatic plot devices that represent cultural compromises for the sake of a universality that seeks to titillate: adultery, drunkenness, stealing, and disrespect for community traditions. But what is sacrificed or chosen for universality? Does the fictionalized view of *Tilai* and *Yaaba* challenge the old order or the perception of the old order? Is the dignified, pristine depiction of community and morals painted by *Wend Kuuni* romanticized? The differing emphasis in themes reminds us of the costs involved in playing to that wider audience named "anywhere" or "anyplace," for which validation of African traditions and values is secondary to dramatic and narrative imperatives.

Claire Andrade-Watkins

Wellesley College

ASIA

Ju Dou. Directed by Zhang Yimou and Yang Fengliang. 1990; color; 96 minutes. Chinese with English subtitles. Distributor: Miramax Films, 375 Greenwich St., 3rd Floor, New York, N.Y. 10013 (212) 941-3800.

Zhang Yimou's *Ju Dou* depicts a China of the 1920s that is hemmed in by its social structure and tradition. For the tempestuous lovers in this film, certainly, there is no escaping the burden of social conventions because theirs is an "incestuous" relationship and therefore doomed from the very beginning.

A beautiful young bride named Wang Ju Dou is purchased by Yang Jinshan, a cruel, middle-aged man, to bear him a male heir. Impotent and frustrated, he abuses her. Her tormented cries in the night arouse the sympathy and affection of his young adopted nephew, Yang Tianqing, who has eyes for her from the moment he sees her. Also a victim of Yang Jinshan, Tianqing watches Ju Dou constantly. A peephole he fashions in the barn wall to spy on her as she bathes becomes a means by which she returns his gaze, in a complicity that leads to a mutual relationship.

When Yang Jinshan leaves them alone for a couple of days to take his sick mule to the doctor—uncle dotes more on mule than nephew—"nephew" and "aunt" consummate their

affair. Their union produces a son, Yang Tianbai, who the uncle initially believes to be his own. When Jinshan is paralyzed by an accident, the victimizer becomes the victim: his nephew and wife carry on openly and are intent on making him suffer and pay for his past offenses.

In this household of hate and illicit love, the child grows up strangely silent, uttering his first word, "*Die* [or father]," to Yang Jinshan just as the latter is about to murder him. Acknowledged as the father—by the boy as well as the local community—Jinshan uses his "son" to mock the lovers. The "son," however, accidentally kills him and later, years later, deliberately drowns his real father/uncle whose presence around his mother he deeply resents. In the final scene, the entire edifice of this unlawful relationship literally and figuratively goes up in smoke, the dye factory that doubled as their home, along with Ju Dou in it, consumed by the fire set by her.

Much of the action in the film occurs within the confines of the dye factory; the protagonists rarely move beyond its gates. Walls, doors, and levels separate the generations—uncle's upstairs quarters from nephew's groundfloor room—as do the social conventions regulating familial and gender relationships. Illicit love in this setting exists only in the form of stolen glances, furtive exchanges that can only assume a more passionate currency in secret. When the boy is old enough to direct angry and surly looks their way, the lovers seek intimacy in the cellar, a deep underground chamber where their passion is almost extinguished by the cavern's lack of oxygen. Outdoors, away from the factory, they seek the privacy of a cave, but their liaison is found out and becomes the subject of village gossip and censure.

In adapting Liu Heng's novella *Fu Xi, Fu Xi* (translated in English as *The Obsessed*; 1991) for the screen, Fifth Generation filmmaker Zhang Yimou has followed the "New Wave" pattern of departing from the socialist-realist cinema of earlier generations. Consider his avoidance of the straightforward political tenor of the novella for the social drama that is *Ju Dou*. This shift is most apparent in the way he has changed the dates of the story. Whereas *Fu Xi, Fu Xi* unfolds on the highly charged political canvas of the 1940s to the 1960s, that is, from the period of the Communist struggles against first the Japanese and then Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government to the Cultural Revolution beginning in 1966, *Ju Dou* is set in the 1920s.

Note also the change in locale: from the countryside, which, in the period from the 1940s onward, was swept up in one radical land reform program and struggle after another, to a rural dye factory in the 1920s when Communism was just beginning to take up residence in China. Pushing the chronology back enables Zhang Yimou not to have to contend with the powerful political drama that characterized the 1940s and the revolutionary period thereafter and to stage instead a more subtle social drama highlighting the inevitable tragedy awaiting individuals at odds with traditional society.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that the film is set in the period in which the Chinese Communist Party was founded and in which an iconoclastic generation arose to challenge "Confucius and Sons" in the name of a cultural revolution that sought to overthrow tradition. Mao Zedong was part of this so-called May Fourth generation. Not yet a committed Marxist, Mao in 1919 was already firing critical salvos at the system, singling out feudal society and its institution of patriarchy for attack. When a young woman named Chao took her own life rather than accept an arranged marriage, Mao pointed to Chinese society and the families of the two parties involved as "three iron cables" forming "a cage" binding individuals to a "ten-thousand evil society." What the young Mao and the lovers of *Ju Dou* were up against was a repressive social and political system that denied individuality and difference.

Brilliantly filmed in vivid splashes of color, the dye factory and its products, richly hued fabrics, make for some spectacular shots. The striking colors also reflect the passion of the lovers, a passion depicted by the sensuality of their lovemaking. Supposedly, it was this intensity of sensuality and eroticism that led the Chinese government in the conservative atmosphere after the 1989 massacre to seek the film's withdrawal as China's official entry in the Academy Awards.

One striking image that suffuses the entire film is the picture of bolts of cloth, resplendently tinted and hung to dry from the rafters of the factory. Like the fabric of love in the film, the cloth glistens but has nowhere to go once it reaches the height of the rafters except to

plunge downward to earth. Nothing soars, nothing seemingly can in a China weighed down by its suffocating traditions.

Cloth, ever present, also serves as a visual continuum. So do events and images repeated time and again with little or no variation, a pattern and rhythm of recurrence that is a familiar and distinctive aspect of Chinese narrative art. This novelistic technique of parallelism, whereby events are constantly referring back to previous but not exactly identical occurrences, is imaginatively employed in the film to represent and evoke the changing configuration of the relationships obtaining among the three protagonists.

Ju Dou, at one level, is little more than an illicit love story, a recounting of an "incestuous" relationship that is much more fully treated in Liu Heng's novella. The title of this story, *Fu Xi*, *Fu Xi*, refers to half the legendary couple, Fu Xi and Nu Gua, a brother and sister whose union produced humanity. Fu Xi is also associated with having originated the rules of matrimony. Is that the curse of the Chinese people today? That they are the result of a tainted beginning and therefore condemned to suffer? Tianbai, the product of an "incestuous" union, grows up to be a churlish young man, a menacing Red Guard figure, who is implicated in the death of his parents. Does he embody the recent fate of China, a society that experienced the horrors of the Cultural Revolution, when everyone either became a victim or a victimizer? Such ambiguities in a Chinese film today make *Ju Dou* intriguing in the West but not acceptable in China, where it cannot pass the test of political correctness.

Anand A. Yang

University of Utah

Mirch Masala [Spices]. Produced by the National Film Development Corporation, India; directed by Ketan Mehta. 1986; color; 98 minutes. Hindi with English subtitles. Distributor of video: Mystic Fire Video, P.O. Box 1092, Cooper Station, New York, N.Y. 10276.

God was bored after creating "matter, man, and mind" and so added chilies and spices to color the world. This song begins *Spices* by Ketan Mehta, a film that evokes the pungent flavor of village politics in late colonial India. Indeed, chilies color the film with a bright red that contrasts with the sandy desert of western India, where the film is set. And chilies, the center of the village economy, also become a political and physical weapon. The film begins in fields, where the peppers hang innocuously and gracefully from the plants; it ends in the village spice factory, where the hot chili powder is used against the oppression of the landlord, the government, and, generally, of male power.

By focusing on the arrival of the landlord's agent, who is a tax collector called the Subedar, *Spices* portrays the historical conflict, fear, and struggle in the everyday lives of the villagers. Through three interconnected themes, the defense of personal honor, the construction of history, and the power and relationships among women in the village, the film represents the oppression typical of landlords and their close ties to the colonial government, as well as the difficulties of rebellion.

Central to *Spices* is the question of honor, *izzat*, and its role in the world of late colonial India. Competing senses of honor manifest themselves among villagers. For example, the village woman Sonbai's honor rests in her defiance of the social system and her personal independence. Even though she has no children, she refuses to take a talisman offered by village women to bring her fertility; she defies social customs that keep other women cowering before their husbands and other men; and, most serious, she insults and strikes the Subedar. He, on the other hand, achieves his honor within the system, in his absolute control over the

lives of the villagers and his blend of British and Indian symbols of power. He alternates princely dress with a pair of jodhpurs and prizes a phonograph on which he plays only Indian music. He refers to the phonograph as a magic box and portrays it as having mysterious powers.

Competing notions of honor in the village dictate characters' responses to the central narrative of the film, the Subedar's demand for sexual favors from Sonbai. Abu Miya, the Muslim guard of the chili factory, finds his honor in the protection of Sonbai, who has sought refuge there. Other village men debate their responsibility to Sonbai, weighing it against the wrath of the landlord.

But Sonbai's struggle is also a metaphor for larger questions of honor. For example, the village schoolteacher embodies the honor of nationalism and self-determination, which he strongly equates with education. To the men of the village, he argues that they must protect Sonbai as a sign of the honor of the village. Sonbai's struggle also inspires the wife of the Mukhi (a village official) to fight for her honor against her controlling and philandering husband.

The historical narrative of the film propels the separate characters' struggles to maintain their honor. In demonstrating the process of defining honor, *Spices* reveals postmodern concerns about the construction of history. Each character reacts to the Subedar's presence and his advances to Sonbai based on individual interpretations of the past. Therefore *Spices* ultimately contains stories within stories, each constructing a slightly different version of honor and history.

The best example of these layered stories appears in a discussion among women in the spice factory. The women factory workers initially welcome Sonbai as she flees the Subedar's soldiers, who have chased her to the factory gate; they praise her escape. But, gradually, some of them express their doubts. "Are you sure you actually escaped from him?" one asks. As the Subedar's soldiers threaten to raze the village if they do not send Sonbai out, the factory workers become even more hostile toward her. They worry about their own lives and the reprisals they will receive for protecting her. An older woman recounts a tale from her childhood when an earlier Subedar did wreak havoc on the village, beating and raping women and burning the crops. Clearly, her interpretation of this current situation has been filtered through historical memory, which has charged the events of the present. It is not history that repeats itself but people repeating history that re-creates and indeed creates the past.

Like questions of honor and memory, questions about women's power are addressed throughout the film. Sonbai's strength is portrayed in her stubbornness and defiance, despite the fact that she does not possess any of the usual sources of power for women: a strong husband or son. The Mukhi's wife also shows signs of strength and rebellion. Angry at her husband's disregard for her honor, she enrolls her daughter in school—the only girl in the class. She also secretly sneaks food to the women in the factory to show her support for their resistance to the Subedar and joins an all-women's protest, clapping pots together on the street to stop the village men from marching to the factory and dragging Sonbai to the Subedar. For each of these acts, she is chastised and ultimately locked in the house by her husband.

The final scene in the film incorporates all three of its themes of honor, history, and power; but, perhaps most significantly, it portrays women reaffirming their solidarity. After a long stand-off at the factory gate, with the Muslim guard Abu Miya protecting the women inside, the Subedar's men finally break open the door. Abu Miya, revealed behind the door, shoots at the Subedar but is killed by the soldiers. With the guard out of the way, the Subedar enters the gate ready to collect his prize. Sonbai stands—either defeated or defiant—with a sickle in her hand. Is it to defend herself or kill herself?

Suddenly, the women factory workers grab a large tarp piled high with chili powder and run toward the Subedar, hurling the powder in his eyes. They repeat the attacks as he writhes in pain. Their act encompasses the themes that pervade the film: by attacking the Subedar, they have defended Sonbai's, and perhaps their own, honor; they have rewritten the story that the old woman began to tell about soldiers terrorizing the village, giving it a more optimistic end; finally, they have demonstrated that in solidarity, women can exercise a form of power.

Ketan Mehta, in telling the story on film, gives a red "color to the world," like the red of

weddings, of auspiciousness, and also of rebellion. Ultimately, red chilies restore honor and strength to Sonbai, the women of the spice factory, and the village.

Wendy Singer

Kenyon College

AUSTRALIA

Snakes and Ladders. Produced and directed by Mitzi Goldman and Trish FitzSimons. 1987; color; 59 minutes. Distributor: Women Make Movies, 225 Lafayette, Suite 212, New York, N.Y. 10012 (212) 925-0606.

It is time for the story to be told/constructed . . . There is never only one.

Snakes and Ladders is a witty and provocative inquiry into the game of knowledge: its rules, its structures, and what happens when women venture in. This hour-long experimental work, a trenchant history of women's education in Australia, is of special interest because of the originality with which it engages issues of historical representation. Filmmakers Mitzi Goldman and Trish FitzSimons do not simply insert women into conventional histories that have excluded and marginalized them. They go on to reveal and explode those conventions, creating in the process a new kind of historical narrative: open-ended, self-questioning, and composed of many texts and voices.

The film is an account of the experiences of Australian women who have sought to enter medicine, law, science, philosophy, or teaching during the past century (with a few sharp references to midwifery, medicine, and witchcraft in England)—shrewdly observing both patterns of systematic exclusion and the historical circumstances in which women and girls have gained access, however imperfect. Interweaving archival film footage and photographs, oral histories, location filming, performance, animation, and artwork with a bit of magic realism—the film's protagonist is a fictional character named Sophia Whist, who bears more than a passing resemblance to Dorothy (another visitor to the Land of Oz)—*Snakes and Ladders* creates a complex visual, aural, and written text.

This playful, deadly serious feminist analysis takes the children's board game, *Snakes and Ladders*, as a central metaphor: a game of rules and fixed pathways, with sudden traps that surprise the player naïve enough to believe that she is in the game on equal terms. Onto this board—its paths and snares echoed in the urban landscape, from the endless stairways of housing projects to schoolyard merry-go-rounds—steps the film's protagonist, searching for the story. *Sophia is on the edges of inquiry, knowing enough to begin.* Her first stop is the library, where she takes a great, leather-bound volume from the shelf.

Sophia Whist opens the book to discover no single authoritative text within. Multi-layered stories—of early suffragists, aboriginal children, scientists, anthropologists, and adolescent girls, among others—open out origami-style. Still photos become animate. Archival films and photographs are placed within new frames. The book (like the film) offers clues to its own interpretation, beginning with the inscription set in a delicate Victorian floral design that appears in the frontispiece: *For each reader another story unfolds, and so beware—the ground of truth shifts with every footstep.*

If the game is a metaphor for social structures, the book is a metaphor for history. The

game must be analyzed, in order to understand how power works. *I see it through a network of structures. Where paths intersect, power operates at strength, then shifts its weight.* But the historical text, once demystified, may be rewritten, even re-imagined.

A dynamic interplay between present and past, personal and social, fiction and non-fiction draws the viewer into an absorbing story but also into a contemplation of history itself: who tells it, from what points of view, for what purposes, and why it matters. The educational and professional paths of seven women of diverse class and family backgrounds suggest the combination of chance, character, and situation that shaped their lives. These personal testimonies are juxtaposed with archival film, family photographs, and historical information to create a picture of historical continuities (for example, women performing "women's work") and changes over time (in what is thought to constitute "women's work" and who decides).

The film enriches the historical record by placing images of women, their voices and experiences squarely at the center and by identifying culture as an indispensable source of historical evidence. *Whether it's education or life or work or play . . . everything is grist for the mill.* More radically, it critically examines the truth claims of history and the social relations that they sustain. Finally, the film suggests ways in which we may begin to experiment with that most conservative of forms—the written historical narrative. *Must we observe a subject from only one point of view, and only one moment in time? Can we incorporate several different points of view into the one picture?*

Snakes and Ladders develops narrative strategies that are open, inclusive, and capable of representing dynamic complexities of class, gender, and race. The boundaries of book, game, and film dissolve in fluid interplay. Visual references to written texts abound. In one sequence, Sophia Whist visits an ivy-walled university, walking through Virginia Woolf's "almost unlit corridors of history where the figures of generations of women are so dimly and fitfully perceived." Whist peers into the gloom. In the flicker of archival footage, she glimpses male students observing and measuring aborigines as objects of scientific curiosity. *History is occupied territory.*

Words and images are reframed in surprising ways, calling attention to them as constructions and to the ways in which context alters meaning. Text becomes an object of play. Portraits of eminent clerics, physicians, and educators begin to speak—in women's voices. Words once accepted as universal and objective truths ("Higher mental capacity in women hinders sexual development"; Dr. Walter Balls Headley, 1894) are thrown into high relief, their presuppositions revealed. The historical specificity of language is also brought to the foreground. In a reenactment based on the memoirs of Ada Evans, the first woman law graduate in Australia, Evans describes her rejection from the bar in 1902 because of her sex. "It was a matter of gender," says Sophia Whist. "I know in your day you will call it gender," Evans muses, "but that . . . would come later."

The visual tropes and narrative devices are brilliantly edited into a historical text of a new kind. Building its arguments in thematic sequences that deal with such topics as childhood, schooling, family, feminism, and professional education, the film ends with documentary footage of a university graduation ceremony. The graduate receives honors in philosophy for her feminist thesis, which develops new models for philosophy, much as the film envisions new models for history. Her mother, an anthropologist who is interviewed throughout the film, speaks both of her personal pride and the social contradictions in this ritual of deference to patriarchal authority. *The ground shifts . . . under the footsteps of another generation.*

Sophia Whist closes the great, leather-bound volume, which can no longer be mistaken for a stable text. The book begins to turn, until it mirrors the spinning wheel of fortune of the Snakes and Ladders board—becoming an element of that larger game in which social meanings are constructed and deployed. The metaphors of game and book are joined.

This unorthodox meditation on historiography in general and visual representations of history in particular is an invitation to a game of exhilarating possibilities.

Barbara Abrash

New York University

EUROPE

The Navigator: A Medieval Odyssey. Directed by Vincent Ward. 1988; color and black & white; 92 minutes. Distributor: Kino International, 333 W. 39th St., New York, N.Y. 10018 (212) 629-6880.

The Navigator poses questions about the historical and cultural status of the “Middle Ages” in popular film. In his *Travels in Hyperreality* (San Diego, 1986), Umberto Eco has claimed that “we are dreaming the Middle Ages” (p. 64). *The Navigator* tells the story of a visionary peasant boy, Griffin, who dreams a medieval pilgrimage for his fellow villagers who wish to journey to “a great Church in the East” and offer a copper cross as tribute to protect their village from the ravages of the Black Death. New Zealand director Vincent Ward juxtaposes pilgrimage with time travel. When the medieval band emerges in the East, they find themselves in contemporary Auckland.

Who is dreaming the Middle Ages in this film? A dream overheard by Ward on a trip to Ecuador inspired its production: “A man dreamed of a city that glittered and reflected. In that place now, there is a small city of corrugated iron and glass. The thing that struck me was that it would be possible for someone who came from an impoverished background—unlike Nostradamus—to have something to contribute in terms of perception that could be vastly more accurate” (*Cinema Papers*, 69 [May 1988]: 31). Ward redreams this dream through the visions of the medieval peasant boy. Ward transposes the Ecuadorian dream to the European Middle Ages, specifically to medieval Cumbria (northwestern England) in March 1348. He then extends the medieval dream by devices of time travel to Auckland, a one-time possession of England.

This neo-colonial frame of the film, a dream-frame, allows the easy substitution of the “European Middle Ages” for an imaginary space of the “Third World.” Just as humanists of fifteenth-century Europe invented the Middle Ages as a virtual space and time to hold apart the classical world from its rebirth in Renaissance Europe, popular culture today uses the Middle Ages in the same way, as a virtual space and time, to keep different but contemporary neo-colonial histories separated.

The film can be read simply as a re-inscription of a humanist convention in a neo-colonial frame, but such a reading misses the trouble taken in the film to authorize the Middle Ages as a virtual space and time. The film opens with a warning: “DO NOT ADJUST YOUR SCREEN. The past is black and white and not a malfunction of your television.” The warning assures the visual conventions of the film. The director shoots the “past” in black and white with scrupulous attention to realist detail. The production employed a full-time researcher in England and hired accent consultants to coach the actors in a regional English dialect. The musical score by Davood Tabrizin uses medieval tones, rhythms, and vocal ranges. The film describes the medieval past as “real,” as a truth that can be approximated, exhibited, a visual museum.

Visions composed of colored fragments from some other world interrupt the black and white of the medieval past. These pieces finally begin to cohere into a story of pilgrimage to the great church of the East. Time is running out for the Cumbrian villagers. The full moon, the villagers think, bears the contagion, and the band has only twenty-four hours left of the lunar cycle to achieve their quest. They try a shortcut to the East through an old, abandoned mine shaft and travel through space and time to emerge in contemporary Auckland, the “present,” which “bursts into color.” Ward films the city as a postmodern collage of traffic, repetitive visual images such as banks of TV monitors, and dying industry. The contemporary smithies who help the peasants out are themselves working their last shift in this post-industrial city. The present is “hyper-real,” imaginary, in order to guarantee the medieval past of the film.

The humanist use of the Middle Ages as a virtual reality prevents the film from enacting

historical differences. The visual conventions of the film embody technically its historical problem. Watching the repetition of visionary colored fragments, the viewer sees them gradually take their place in a narrative mosaic of pilgrimage. This filmic device repeats uncannily the medieval notion of pilgrimage as representation rather than performance. Medieval pilgrimage did not imagine the experience of travel as difference; pilgrimage could be undertaken by proxy or simply by pacing out an equivalent distance in a maze. Ward seems to dream the Ecuadorian dream by proxy, by pacing out a filmic maze of time travel.

The soundtrack of *The Navigator* disrupts its historic and technical conventions. DO NOT ADJUST YOUR EARS would perhaps be a better warning to protect its humanist representation. At several points in the film, the audio track links the villagers waiting in the medieval past with the peasant pilgrims in the present. Ward's technique of using acoustics rather than a visual image to link the two temporal spaces alerts the viewer to an interesting narrative surprise at the end of the film.

One piece of Griffin's vision does not fit. He knows that someone dies on the pilgrimage, and the image of a falling body keeps on interrupting the narrative. He cannot, however, fit that unreadable piece into the mosaic of the present. When the film makes its final cut from the "present" back into the "past," it uses the image of the falling body as the transition and then interrupts it with Griffin's explanation: "It was me that fell."

The viewer is back in the mine shaft with the pilgrim band listening to Griffin's story. Griffin's brother, Connor, tells him, "You had a wonderful dream, a wonderful story." And like a *griot*, a performative storyteller, Griffin continues to make space in the story for his various companions in the mine shaft. If the story is to be prophylactic, if it is to save the village from the plague, then the villagers must actively take their part in the story. The story-work saves the village, apparently. The legitimacy of the story, however, wavers. Griffin realizes, upon their jubilant exit from the mine shaft, that he alone has contracted the plague. Here the unreadable part of the story reads itself mortally onto his body. He shouts to his brother despairingly, "Village saved; threat is gone; make them believe my story; they must."

The film raises important questions about storytelling, history, and narrative. How can the story work if the storyteller dies? How does the story guarantee itself? As Walter Benjamin reminds us, the storyteller borrows authority from death. The film literally buries the question of authorization in its closing shot. The viewer watches Connor set his brother's coffin to float away on the river. The problem of the staging of the Middle Ages in this film is less easily buried. Rather than displace the problem as a physical symptom, a disfiguring boil on the body of the storyteller, historians need to grapple with the problem of constructing a history of the Middle Ages for our own post-colonial times, a history that would deny us the use of the Middle Ages as a virtual space and time to mark the underdeveloped, the alien, or the pastoral. The task will require appropriating the disfigurement not as a physical symptom but as part of history itself: "'disfiguration' would result from folding back within any historical analysis the tropes and figures, conceptions and preconceptions active in both the present of analysis and the past object of study which has enabled it" (Peter De Bolla, "Disfiguring History," *Diacritics*, 16 [1986]: 57).

Kathleen Biddick

University of Notre Dame

La vie et rien d'autre [Life and Nothing But]. Directed by Bertrand Tavernier. 1989; color; 130 minutes. U.S. distributor: Orion Classics; available on videocassette.

Bertrand Tavernier's *Life and Nothing But* is about the attempt, both personal and collective, to assimilate a traumatic experience while getting on with the business of life. It is not about World War I itself but rather its memory, which resonates throughout the countryside of

northern France. Plot and characters are mostly fictional, but the film includes enough historical detail—an appearance by minister of war André Maginot, for example—to suggest that Tavernier's purpose is to reconstruct an aspect of the past. *Life and Nothing But* is an essay in the history of emotion.

Ultimately, the historian's love of the past has to be unrequited. Interaction between past and present is essential to the discipline, but who can deny an odd urge to go back, to observe the past from the past? Film, of course, cannot accomplish that, but a skillful director can establish an intimacy that seems almost to indulge that urge. Tavernier cannot document his reconstruction of emotional realities as a writer might, but he convincingly re-creates the atmosphere of postwar France by engaging the intellect as well as the senses.

The film's language is calm and brooding. The color blue dominates, from opening and (near) closing shots of the sea to the officers' uniforms. The music does not produce the emotional content, but it does enhance it. Opening the narrative in October 1920, Tavernier avoids the violence of war; although farmers still strike unexploded shells as they plow their fields, and although recovering the bodies of missing soldiers is dangerous, the viewer sees no bloodshed. The film states no grand conclusions, which may disappoint some viewers. But words cannot describe the survivors' recent ordeal; instead, the viewer must read the faces and the actions of Tavernier's characters.

The film is set in the fictional village of Vézillé. The pace of life probably never has been lively, and the main street always has been a sea of mud when it rains, yet the atmosphere of war still clings. Buildings lie in ruins, and there are soldiers everywhere. Even the sounds of war linger, as the occasional shell explodes in the distance. Valentin's café is the center of village life, and the banter among soldiers and civilians adds interesting historical detail.

In bringing out the tragedy of war, Tavernier uses touches of humor to avoid lugubriousness. A soldier in the café derisively cites a newspaper article calling France's 1.4 million war deaths, the highest proportion on either side, an "eloquent record." For the modestly talented sculptor Mercadot, the war has produced a boom. France has 300 sculptors for 35,000 cities, towns, and villages, each of which must have its own monument: this, he exclaims, is "better than the Renaissance—it's the resurrection!" Two men request a change of boundaries from the authorities so that their village, too, may claim casualties and qualify for a monument.

The task of Major Dellaplane (played by Philippe Noiret) is to identify missing soldiers—of whom there are still 349,771. (His mania for statistics enables Tavernier to insert these salient facts.) Even as he approaches his work with bureaucratic efficiency, Dellaplane struggles to make sense of his own war memories. Contemptuous of the "official" response to the war, he balks at orders to find candidate corpses for a planned "Tomb of the Unknown Soldier"; his commanding officer complains that he is "still a Dreyfusard."

Irène de Courtil (played by Sabine Azéma), a wealthy *bourgeoise*, searches the countryside by limousine for her missing husband, the son of a powerful senator. The war has made her angry and resentful. Tavernier asks no pity for her, since she suffers no material hardship. But he makes his audience empathize with this haughty Parisienne: for a middle-class woman, raised not to think or to work but to reflect the accomplishments of the men around her, the war, also made by men, has been a cruel trick. Near the end of the film, she leaves a smoky dance hall in disgust, after hearing a popular war song. She fumes that "it never ends: they are members of a club; there are other clubs, there will be other wars." She understands this, she tells Dellaplane, because as a woman she is excluded. The church also has failed her. She angrily leaves Mass just as the priest prays for the church's "errant daughter"; of course, he means secular, republican France, but the parallel is clear. Finally, she moves to America; at least she will be safe in Wisconsin.

Perhaps the most evocative scene is one at the Grézacourt train tunnel, which the retreating Germans blew up in 1918 as an Allied train passed through. Dellaplane's men have tagged items found on bodies, and people rummage through piles of canteens, bottles, wallets, and notebooks, hoping to find something belonging to a missing loved one. Tavernier uses gentle humor to complement the inherent pathos of the scene. A husband and wife find a metal cup with their son's initials, and a soldier escorts them into the tunnel to identify the body.

Opening the casket, he faints, but the parents merely remark how thin their boy has become and how the beard has changed him.

Certain themes remind the viewer that this is a film made in the present about the past. Tavernier interprets Irène de Courtil's frustrations as part of an emerging feminist consciousness. Yet confining societal structures remain intact, and Alice Vallier (Pascale Vignal) loses her job as a schoolteacher the moment a soldier returns to take her place.

Senator de Courtil turns out to have been a "merchant of death," an arms manufacturer whose factory miraculously survived the German occupation of the region. Apparently, he played both sides, finally pushing his son into uniform in 1917 to demonstrate his patriotism. After the war, he expects preferential treatment in the search for his son. "The senator has a terrifying idea of the Republic," Dellaplane shouts to Irène.

Chauvinism permeates the experience of war. Dellaplane is told that the Unknown Soldier must be French—"no Huns or Brits under the Arc de Triomphe." Naturally, one of the Africans recruited to fight for France would not do, either. Other films have dealt with the subject of racism and colonial recruits in greater depth, but Tavernier does not ignore it. Senegalese soldiers sit at their own table in the café, allegedly because of their Muslim dietary laws; but they also are assigned such undesirable tasks as checking fields for unexploded shells and mines.

If the film seems inconclusive, it has to do in part with the inherent inability of any medium to re-create experience. As Paul Fussell has suggested, a gulf always exists between those who have and those who have not experienced war directly; the public necessarily receives a sanitized version of the war. After an explosion at the tunnel, Irène de Courtil remarks that it is as if the war were still on. Dellaplane disagrees—the war was far worse. He begins to describe his memories, but she tells him to stop. He angrily says that no one wants to hear what the war was really like and that the newspapers have made nonsense of it. By focusing on the aftermath of war rather than the war itself, Tavernier presents his audience with a thoughtful essay on what it means to survive, rebuild, and remember.

Maarten L. Pereboom

Georgetown University

Mein Krieg. Produced by Känguruh-Film Berlin in collaboration with WDR (West German radio); production director, Hans-Georg Ullrich; directors, Harriet Eder and Thomas Kufus. 1989–90; color and black & white; 90 minutes. German distributor: Basis-Film Verleih Berlin; U.S. distributor: Eurofile; available on videotape.

War and fascism are deceptively easy to represent: both offer stark images of heroism, action, and destruction, deriving as they do much of their own energy from an imagery that predates and supports their appearance on the scene. Filmmakers have always been well aware that even the crudest manipulation of such images will find a readily available market. The temptation simply to recycle existing images rather than to provoke a critical attitude in the viewer is compounded in films on fascist war, whose own reality was so closely entwined with its imagery as to make them almost inseparable both for the participants and for later generations. How much of what we know, or believe we know, about the Nazi war is based on "empirical evidence" and how much on American war movies, excerpts from German newsreels of the period, popular memoir literature and military histories, the stories of our older family members and friends? Indeed, to what degree have the memories of those who were "actually" there been molded by the postwar representations of their experiences? And, no less important,

how does one avoid the fascination that the aestheticized and anesthetized images on the screen may produce in the viewer?

Harriet Eder and Thomas Kufus present us with an admirable and powerful attempt to resolve these problems. *Mein Krieg* is a view of the war as it was filmed by six Wehrmacht soldiers and amateur photographers, and simultaneously it is a view of the war by these same six men, now elderly and respectable citizens of the Federal Republic, as they show their films to the directors and reminisce on their war experience. Thus we are provided not only with a peculiar angle on the war as a quasi-touristic adventure but also with a unique sort of oral history whereby the speakers are constantly confronted with their own records of the past. It is this combination of private film material, mostly kept hidden in sealed closets and drawers since 1945, with the comments made by the very men who had filmed these scenes, this confrontation between record and memory, youth and old age, dangerous adventure and cozy middle-class existence, reality and nostalgia, that makes this film into a compelling work of major significance not merely for historians but for anyone interested in the reconstruction of the past, especially that of Germany.

The individuals who show us their films are not unaware of their importance or of the different manners in which they can be used to illustrate this or that aspect of the war. They are all proud of their filmic collections, of the quality of the material, of their achievements in photographing under often difficult and perilous conditions. They are even proud of their cameras, of which they have taken such good care over the years that they are still in perfect condition, one is almost tempted to say, ready for use in any future war. Of the six, three hold the title of doctor (medical doctor, archivist, and insurance man), one is a schoolbook publisher, one a commercial agent, and one a professional photographer. To some extent, as one of them says upon watching his film, "you are back right there in those times. What is missing is only the sounds of the period," supposedly the roar of the panzers and the explosions of artillery shells, which the directors quite rightly do not add to these silent records of the war. Yet, as some of them wrote to the directors before they agreed to collaborate, they want to make sure that their films will be used "for a serious goal." It is in this context that *Mein Krieg* raises several problems.

The filmic records of the period commonly shown before now have mainly consisted of shots taken by the propaganda companies attached to the fighting units, whose purpose was to provide the German public (and foreign audiences) with a heroic image of the German soldier and to portray the army as an invincible war machine that it would be useless to oppose. Using such material has always been problematic, because historians had to rely on images carefully selected by Nazi propagandists. This has particularly been the case with regard to the mass murders committed by the Third Reich, whose filmic representations have always taken care to show the victims as *Untermenschen* and therefore perpetuated a distancing between the observer and the hardly human forms of the murdered. It is for this reason that Claude Lanzmann's film *Shoah* (1985) rightly avoided using "documentary" material, that is, Nazi films.

Pictorial evidence stems from yet another source. German soldiers marched into battle equipped not only with orders to murder people belonging to a wide array of political and so-called "biological" categories but also with their own private cameras. We have numerous photographs of Wehrmacht troops photographing their atrocities: hangings of women, children, and youths, mowing down by machine-gun fire of alleged partisans, mass executions by the *Einsatzgruppen*. Though forbidden by the Wehrmacht authorities, soldiers could not desist from this "war tourism," and their broad smiles when observing the torture and murder inflicted on their victims have thus remained forever imprinted on our minds thanks to their own photographic obsession.

Mein Krieg makes no use of propaganda films, but neither does it contain any convincing material on the barbarous nature of the war. Whether this is due to the soldiers' interests during the war, preselection before showing their material to the directors, or even to some understanding with the filmmakers, we are exposed to a picture of the war very different from what most viewers by now know of its real nature. In this respect, *Mein Krieg* shares certain elements with the much better known film *Heimat* (1984), for it shows us how the soldiers experienced the war and how they remember their experiences, rather than what they actually

did there. When we observe a half-naked Russian woman dancing in front of a group of smiling German soldiers, and we hear the good-humored and nostalgic chuckle of the elderly gentleman who projects this scene on the wall of his living room, we might forget that the Wehrmacht killed up to 30 million Russians between 1941 and 1945, a high proportion of whom were women and children. Here, we are transported to the dangerous terrain of *Alltagsgeschichte*, which, precisely because it strives to re-create the reality of people's *experiences*, often provides us with a highly distorted portrayal of what had "actually happened." Yet even those of us who have come increasingly to question the existence of any "actual," "empirical," "objective" reality can hardly doubt that the overall horror of the Nazi war on the eastern front did occur and that the victims of the Wehrmacht and other agencies of the Third Reich did die.

Mein Krieg is nevertheless an extremely important film that should be viewed by anyone interested in the period. One should just keep in mind that it tells us more about the ability of the camera to distort reality than to record it and more of the ability of the mind to repress memory than to conserve it.

Omer Bartov

Rutgers University

Requiem für Dominic. Produced by N. Blecha/Terra
Produktion/Austria; directed by Robert Dornhelm.
1990; color; 90 minutes. Distributor: Hemdale.

"There's the terrorist! Seize the terrorist!"

"There's the motherfucker!"

"Bring the tank!"

"Don't shoot! You can't shoot him! You're not allowed to shoot!"

The above dialogue, carried out in violent, rapid-fire Romanian, never makes it into the English subtitles of Robert Dornhelm's extraordinary feature film, shot by the Austrian director during the first months of 1990, shortly after the downfall of the Romanian Communist regime and the summary and brutal execution of its twenty-five-year dictator and his wife, Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu. It is December 1989, when citizens of Timișoara, a city 300 miles west of Bucharest, apprehend secret service agents. Some are beaten, some shot, most are spit on and burned with cigarette butts. For several days, mass demonstrations and rallies in the city's central square have wreaked havoc on "law and order"; the forty-year-old repressive, totalitarian regime has suddenly, irrevocably, and totally collapsed; the army has joined the insurgents; and a wild chase for resisting party members and secret service agents, barricaded in scattered government buildings, has begun. For several days and nights, tanks patrol the crowded streets, and Kalachnikov rifles are fired incessantly and indiscriminately, mostly into the air.

Dominic Paraschiv, a "terrorist" and putative mass-murderer of eighty anticommunist fellow workers, has been apprehended by the "revolutionary forces" and has also been lying, for several days, on the heavily guarded top floor of a local hospital. He is severely wounded, strapped to his hospital bed with a net covering his naked, bleeding, decaying body. Dominic foiled the obscure, unacknowledged plans of his hard-line boss and those fellow factory workers who were hoping to hold out against the revolutionary movement; at gunpoint, he forced his colleagues to go down on their knees and pray in Latin for the redemption of their sins, to atone for the lies they had perpetrated by submitting to the Communist regime. Dominic was shot in the stomach by a soldier called in by the plant's director and was later hospitalized. Western journalists were the only visitors permitted: they would in time produce the gruesome, vivid

photographs and videotapes required for adequate coverage of the exposure and capture of this alleged bestial representative of the deposed regime.

Now the filmmaker, an émigré and former school friend of Dominic Paraschiv, travels to Romania, summoned by Paraschiv's wife. On the train ride from Vienna, Paul Weiss, the author's character in the film, meets a young journalist, eager to gather Christmas stories of happy reunions and celebrations during the first tumultuous days of the revolution. She becomes his ally in pursuing the "true" story of Dominic. Their joint, valiant efforts ultimately fail, and Dominic dies, delivering a moving, eloquent speech in French about brotherhood and love.

The action plot, underscored by fast-paced Western music, centers on the attempts of former local power brokers to impede, by intimidation and physical threats, Paul Weiss's investigation of Dominic's guilt or innocence. Weiss, the émigré, wanders in and out of hospitals and homes, is pursued and becomes the hunted, the Jack Nicholson-type, dark do-gooder, sometimes plagued by doubts but essentially committed to rehabilitating his friend. He proves steadfast and brave. But neither this plot nor the underlying political events are as persuasive as a few remarkable scenes that seem untranslatable, linguistically or culturally (and are often left untranslated in the English version). Just before a decrepit Securitate hitman knifes Weiss in a dark alley, he delivers an extraordinary soliloquy, imitating and improvising a speech by Ceaușescu with vehement accuracy and in the best tradition of Eugène Ionesco's theater of the absurd. At the mass demonstrations, the exultant crowd chants, "Exista Dumnezeu! Exista Dumnezeu!" (There is a God!)

Dominic spoke several languages. German is the native tongue of a substantial yet dwindling minority of Saxon and Swabian *Volksdeutsche* who have inhabited the Banat and Transylvania for several centuries. Together with Serbs, Hungarians, Jews, and Gypsies, they make that part of the country a *sui generis* melting pot, brewing with ethnic hatred and occasional effusions of solidarity, such as during fateful days of December 1989, when students and neighbors defended a Hungarian priest from political reprisals by the local government and thus sparked the beginning of the end of the Ceaușescu regime. The "true" story of those tumultuous weeks may need time to unravel. As Andrei Codrescu, István Deák, and others have speculated, the revolution may have been a plot by insiders, intent on overthrowing an increasingly unbearable Ceaușescu, or instigated with the help or encouragement of the Soviets; the "people" may have been misled, some argue, since most of the former Communist *nomenclatura* emerged after the revolution as the new leaders of Romania; it may have been that the students in Timișoara, perched on parapets and chanting freedom slogans, were the spark that ignited all of the above. *Requiem* attempts to be as inclusive as possible on this score. It canvases the panoply of human, ethnic, and professional types yet lapses into romantic clichés: during Weiss's escape on a Gypsy cart, the image of his falling asleep listening to Gypsy music is a melancholic idealization of a harsh Romanian reality in which Gypsies are a despised and maltreated minority.

Vincent Canby wrote in the *New York Times* that *Requiem für Dominic* "may be the first film to deal realistically with post-Communist Eastern Europe" (quoted December 19, 1991). But why? How could the violent Romanian uprising mirror the Velvet Revolution in Prague, or the politically highly conscious changes in Poland and Hungary, or the gradual, top-down, tentative crumbling of the Soviet Union? And what are we to make of the director's deliberate superimposition of an action-film plot over cuts from street demonstrations that had taken place before, during, and after the events depicted in the film, often encumbered by the fact that the multilingual dialogues identify the speakers' nationality and background only to those in the know? The essence of *Requiem* is its violence and a profound sense of alienation and chaos, of aimless injustice amid effusive mass rallies, described at the street level, from the bottom up. To some, the cobblestone streets, the invectives, the anger, the colorless façades of long-neglected houses, the drabness brought about by social, political, and environmental pollution seem quintessential images of the human condition in the twentieth century, akin to Costa Gavras's *Z*. (1968). *Requiem für Dominic* could have happened in a nameless country, in a timeless time. To others, it may represent the Romanian situation *par excellence*.

Requiem für Dominic is a rich, provocative, and piercingly painful work of art. In its cruelty and darkness, it seems to locate itself squarely within the tradition of neo-realist, socio-political critiques. In its blend of East and West, of autobiography and history, of technique and content, it is a masterful product of an entangled and yet bleak present.

Diana L. Barkan

California Institute of Technology

Hard Times and Culture—Part 1, “Vienna, Fin-de-Siècle.” Directed by Juan Downey. 1990; color; 34 minutes. Distributor: Electronic Arts Intermix, Inc., 536 Broadway, 9th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10012 (212) 966-4605.

How does one think about history? It is one thing to lecture about it, research it, or write about it, but how does one think about a period of the past one has not directly experienced? In his forty-minute meditation on the subject of “Vienna, Fin-de-Siècle,” Juan Downey presents a myriad of possibilities for the art of thinking about history that radically challenges mainstream modes of representing the past.

(A view of New York’s skyscrapers—rap music in the background, singing a quote from George Kubler, which is then rolled across the screen—“an epoch of staggering economic difficulties above which painting, poetry and the theater flowered imperishably.” An African-American woman in a traditional garb speaks—“Out of the cesspool beautiful flowers come out of there, you know?” Do I? Do we?)

Possibility 1: History as a waltz—as a soap opera—as a bad piece of drama. “Like a waltz the history of the empire can be played in triple meter, in three beats.” Each beat, representing a death in the royal family (the murder of Kaiserin Elizabeth, the suicide of Prince Rudolf, and the assassination at Sarajevo, June 28, 1914), is presented through the frame of an archaic television set, the actors playing various personages who strike exaggerated poses and convey archetypal images of superfluous pathos, as in a soap opera. A quotation from novelist Thomas Bernhard, bitterly criticizing the mediocrity of the Burgtheater actors, is followed by a reenactment of the death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. With dark red blood staining his light blue uniform, the archduke leans toward his wife and says in the least animated manner possible, “Sophie, Sophie, don’t die. Stay alive for the children.”

(Kaiserin Elizabeth—“She is solitary, evasive, melancholy—like one of Freud’s patients. The woman who . . . fled from men and from history, to which she nevertheless fell prey in the end.” She “may have been the first to believe in the decline of the empire that she ultimately incarnated.” Was she? Did she?)

Possibility 2: History as rumor. Around the Ringstrasse of today, the camera encounters people, mostly elderly, passing on rumors that are nearly a century old. On the suicide of Prince Rudolf: “It had a political reason,” “He was forced to kill himself by his father Kaiser Franz Josef,” “to save his honor,” “He had a brain anomaly.” On the kaiser and his family: “The whole thing was for the Kaiser . . . the Ringstrasse . . . Hofburg . . . all the royalty used to hang out there,” “They didn’t care for the people at all.” On power: “Power is concrete . . . yet abstract . . . but concrete,” “Anyone who has power over others is sick . . . mentally ill.”

(“Franz Josef allows neither elevators nor bathrooms in any of his palaces. No new constructions on the street [that] he takes each day from Schoenbrunn to Hofburg . . . Nothing that could remind him of the time passing, of the times changing. But in every theater in the empire there is always an empty loge reserved for the emperor. Like a museum piece, a fragment of a stage set—symbol of the spectacle the monarchy makes of itself . . . culminates in

the image of Vienna as the center of the European void of values, or the testing lab for the end of the world.”)

Possibility 3: History as stream of consciousness. Just as the thinker of history looks back in time, a man sitting behind the wheel of a car in New York looks back through the rearview mirror—at the camera—then straight into the pale blue eyes of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Thomas Bernhard: “There was another obsession, likewise to be classed as a disease which we shared. The so-called counting disease which Bruckner also had, especially in the final years of his life. For weeks and for months, for example, I feel compelled . . . to count . . . to the verge of insanity.” A statue of Anton Bruckner gazing into the sky—rows and rows of windows on the façade of Viennese buildings (which the diseased man counts compulsively)—a billboard in America counting the mounting national debt as lighted numbers flicker on and on—X-ray photos of teeth, arranged on a lighted board like the windows on buildings—rap music in the background—a homeless man in New York cleaning a car windshield—burnt-out buildings with no more glass on their window-holes—debris—the African-American woman explaining the exploitation of blacks and black music by the white establishment, her image framed in a window against a black background—Viennese windows—music by Gustav Mahler—a Viennese park—the house where Freud used to live.

(On the façade of a grand Viennese building—“To Every Age Its Art and to Art Its Freedom.” Gustav Klimt painting portraits for the newly rich; Hugo von Hofmannsthal writing of Lord Chandos, who finds it impossible to write poetry anymore; and a negative photograph of Freud and other doctors. A painter, a poet, and a psychologist—three intellectuals, a single concern with decay and decline. And retreats—retreat into commercialism, retreat from poetry, and retreat into the subconscious. As with the triviality of rumors, could history as stream of consciousness provide greater insights into the past than the conventionally concerted search for “real” and “significant” connections? Maybe not.)

Possibility 4: History/Irony/Jokes—visual, musical, and otherwise. An elderly tour guide shows us the car and the uniform in which the archduke was assassinated in Sarajevo—he explains how the killing was done and how the doctors, in vain, tried to save him. Exactly one month later, he goes on, Austria declared war on the tiny kingdom of Serbia, sparking off World War I—a cemetery, first in Vienna, then in an American city—the music in the background is the Death March, sung entirely by dog barks and bird whistles—as the dogs bark on, the front pages of various newspapers flash on the screen, featuring stories and photographs from the Middle East just prior to the Gulf War.

(“[F]or the first time modernism is not confused with the avant-garde, the utopia of the avant-garde. It is not about believing in the future, but rather about understanding the past so that the present, and therefore, what’s coming can be possible. It is about establishing the conditions that render the present possible. In this sense, Vienna is already post-modern”—blueprints of buildings rain down on the scene in shapes of cylinders, domes, and cubes—another blueprint is rolled away as a street car intrudes rudely on modernity.)

Possibility 5: History as a postmodern video; history as a review of a postmodern video. How does one write a review of a postmodern piece of history-thinking? By treating it like any other film and systematically analyzing its form, contents, and message? That would be as futile as trying to describe a surrealist painting using the criteria appropriate for nineteenth-century realism. Just as a truly postmodern work tries constantly to evade totalizing meaning, a review could do it justice only by also denying singular significance. It could, however, present different strategies the work attempts in order to break with conventional modes of representation, approximate the experience of some of its contents through impressionistic descriptions, and finally, add a paragraph at the end pointing toward some of the problems and reasons for writing the review in such a manner.

But a final and, from the viewpoint of this review, perhaps the most important question remains—would a respectable, mainstream journal publish such a review?

Min Soo Kang

University of California, Los Angeles

LATIN AMERICA

Yo, la peor de todas [I, the Worst of All]. Produced by Lita Stantic; directed by Maria Luisa Bemberg. 1990; color; 105 minutes. Spanish with English subtitles. Distributor: Moonlight Films, Geerdinkhof 236, 1103 PZ Amsterdam. 6-95-38-11, fax 6-99-43-43.

This film, based on Octavio Paz's book *Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, o, Las trampas de la fe* (1982), lyrically portrays the seventeenth-century figure in the title (1648?-1695) first as a pawn in an international power struggle and second as a dedicated feminist who believed that intelligence has no sex. Sor Juana's life from the very start of this darkly hued interpretation is set in a context of political intrigue, the struggles between church and state. These are personified by the archbishop of Mexico and the viceroy (Tomás Antonio de la Cerda y Aragón, r. 1680-1686), both ambitious, strong-willed, and determined men. Juana's life and work thrive under the protection of the viceroy until the archbishop's protests to Madrid result in his recall. The pendulum swings against Juana as the archbishop imposes a stricter order and she is separated from her books, without which, she insists, she ceases to exist. The pendulum swings back again when the crown learns of the archbishop's fanaticism and interprets it as a threat to royal power. Sor Juana, writing anew, is tricked into composing a theological critique of a sermon by a Portuguese Jesuit, Antonio Vieira, which is then used by the bishop of Guadalajara (the Spaniard Don Manuel Fernández de Santa Cruz y Sahagún) in a feud with the archbishop. Eventually deceived by even her Jesuit confessor, Antonio Núñez de Miranda, Sor Juana is silenced and reduced to scullery maid and nurse during a plague, which in the end carries her off.

Occasionally protruding from this veil of local deception and intrigue are references to the political and intellectual climate of Europe as a whole. Spain is portrayed as a Catholic stalwart in an increasingly dangerous continent drenched in the disbeliefs of the Enlightenment. Mexican intellectuals, represented by the ex-Jesuit Sigüenza, show that the creoles resented metropolitan rule—the censorship of books by the Inquisition, for example—and were aware of Mexico's colonial status when they ridiculed the crown for policy errors it was not even aware of making.

But there is another story here, too: of Sor Juana as a feminist. This curious girl-child—who taught herself to read at age three, left her mother to go to Madrid at nine, became a lady-in-waiting of celebrated wit—used the church and entered a convent at about age twenty (1667) in order to find the peace and solitude to continue her self-education and reflection. For all her free-thinking brilliance, Sor Juana miscalculates. In choosing marriage to the church, which she considers the lesser of two evils (the other being marriage and submission to a man), this lady of the Enlightenment realizes, perhaps too late, that men rule the church and that bars and thick convent walls cannot entirely guarantee the intellectual freedom she craves.

Her perhaps naïve miscalculation and trust in a politicized institution might lead the casual viewer to conclude that Sor Juana was a failure. Whatever the fact or fiction of this portrayal (the director oversimplifies in some places and accepts as fact some matters still regarded by scholars as hypothesis in others), the film does give Juana the poet occasional credit for some brilliant verses that, despite the tragedy of her short life, endure and inspire readers to this day. This is the triumph that bears remembering, and the downplaying of this triumph is the real shortcoming of the somber *I, the Worst of All*.

This flaw is redeemed manifold, however, by the technical aspects of the film that suggest and then underscore some of the less tangible and documented aspects of Sor Juana's life.

Director Maria Luisa Bemberg uses languid and light music, soft and shadowy light, and crisp, terse, and direct dialogue to succinctly create a mood and impression of sensuality and eroticism befitting many of Sor Juana's most renowned poems. In contrast to the precocious Juana, absolutely determined to develop her mind, and the good-looking lady-in-waiting at court, not shy in using her intellect to gain respect and notoriety (especially among men) is the lady of the world, coquettish, somewhat audacious, and passionate, enjoying with no embarrassment the intensity of her first kisses. This passion is not suppressed once inside the convent walls. It surfaces in her poetry and in her teasing and naughty plays. She writes of loves and desire. Her odes to the viceroy and especially his wife, the vicereine, border on the lascivious. Scenes of the vicereine and Sor Juana reading together, laughing together, and eventually touching and kissing hint at the intimacy of their relationship.

She does not hide her nature. Sor Juana openly admits that she is not particularly pious and not in the convent in order to gain heaven. Not surprisingly, some of her peers label her a stray sheep. She becomes the focus of the archbishop's wrath. Averse to marriage, Sor Juana, in answer to the vicereine's prodding, declares that she does not miss having human children. She prefers to play with her telescope, solar clock, obsidian mirror, automaton, astrolabe, magnets, and lyre. Originally, she entered the convent at the urging of her confessor so she could read, think, and write. Now she lives surrounded by her "toys" and the largest library in the Americas—this is her playpen; this her realm and comfort, her imagined dream. Her rooms are richly appointed, replete with curtains and curiosities, as opposed to the austere, sparsely furnished rooms of the others. For a woman with her aspirations, she realizes rightly or wrongly, the sanctuary of the convent is the only option. How much is she really sacrificing?

The convent walls likewise do not mean that the coquetry, vanity, and pride of her youth at court disappear. One scene shows her preparing for visitors. In a most un-nunlike manner, she douses herself with perfume, dons jewelry, rubs her cheeks to bring out the blush, and smooths her habit and veil before joining some intellectuals for a heavy discussion of philosophy. With pride and relish, she writes the theological tract that eventually brings her before the Inquisition and leads to the sale of all her possessions, to penance and renunciation. Without her books, paper, and quills, she dies a premature spiritual death, just as she had predicted, long before her body succumbs.

I, the Worst of All is like an epic poem that in measured scenes, its own form of lines in rhyme, evokes another dimension of Sor Juana and allows the viewer to contemplate her as a person, to search out her ambiguity, and to partake of her intense feelings and emotions. The flow of metered light, sound, and dialogue challenges us to rethink the irony, confusion, and complexity of the lives and times she symbolized.

Susan E. Ramírez

De Paul University

Quilombo. Produced by Augusto Arraes; written and directed by Carlos Diegues. 1984; color; 119 minutes. Film and video distributor: New Yorker Films, 16 W. 61st St., New York, N.Y. 10023 (212) 247-6110.

When *Quilombo* was released in 1984, the authoritarian military regime that had ruled Brazil for twenty years was collapsing, and millions of Brazilians eagerly anticipated the arrival of a golden era of freedom and democracy. Caught up in the spirit, director Carlos Diegues, a founder of Brazil's socially committed *cinema novo* school of filmmakers, made *Quilombo* in order to inspire a utopian vision of Brazil's future. The film attracted a large audience at the time. Even now, when the weight of corruption, debt, and inflation seems to have crushed the spirits of the most optimistic of souls, the film still merits re-viewing.

Utopia has been a theme in Diegues' work since his first feature film was produced in the ebullient period that preceded the military coup d'état. That film (*Ganga Zumba*, 1963) was the first in a trilogy on Afro-Brazilians in slavery and freedom, which is completed by *Quilombo*. (The second film is *Xica da Silva*, 1976.) Like the earlier film, *Quilombo* is based on the seventeenth-century history of Palmares, a nation that the escaped African slaves and their descendants forged within the boundaries of the northeastern portion of the Portuguese colony of Brazil. At its height in 1665, Palmares covered an area one-third the size of Portugal, hosted a population of 20,000 people, and supported a dozen fortified towns. After suffering more than sixteen military assaults by the Dutch and Portuguese, Palmares and its last leader were finally destroyed by 1695.

Most of what is known about Palmares comes from the reports of military commanders sent to crush this remarkable New World state. Diegues claims to have read these reports, as well as other written sources, such as Decio Freitas's *Palmares: A Guerra dos Escravos* (Porto Alegre, 1974). But he also relied on legend in making the film. "I had heard the legends," he told an interviewer in 1986. "I remember an old black woman who told me that Zumbi (who was the last leader of Palmares) could fly, and I believed that" (*Cineaste*, 15 [1986]: 12). As the hero of *Quilombo*, Zumbi does not take flight but he does seem larger than life. His story reveals *Quilombo*'s unique structure and content. At one level, the film straightforwardly narrates the rise and fall of Zumbi, the warrior-king. At another, it has a fantasy-like quality meant to elevate Zumbi's story to the realm of parable.

In Diegues' view, Zumbi possessed magical powers that had been passed down to him through generations of African warriors. Anxious to avenge the death of a comrade at the hands of the Portuguese, Zumbi begs Ganga Zumba, king of Palmares, to initiate him into the spirit world. In the moonlit-glow of night, Ganga Zumba calls on the ghosts of fallen warriors to welcome Zumbi into their circle. A spear appears in Zumbi's hands and, as it ignites in flames, the force is with him. In this and other scenes, the legendary world is made as real as the documentary world.

In the typical fashion of a historical film, a written preface and postscript roll up the screen like book ends on a shelf. Consistent with this form, the story unfolds in chronological order, beginning around the time of Zumbi's birth and ending with his death. But the expected narration of events is violated by scenes and music designed to deemphasize the historical drama and heighten the significance of the story for the present.

When Zumbi mounts his attack on the Portuguese, it is Gilberto Gil, the popular Afro-Brazilian singer, who does the fighting. In this segment and many others, contemporary music interrupts the action and alters the time-frame: while the image remains faithful to events, the modern lyrics and rhythms of the soundtrack take over the story and narrate it as if Zumbi had risen to power yesterday and was bound to return tomorrow.

After subduing countless Portuguese settlements and setting fire to vast fields of sugar cane, Zumbi assesses his handiwork from a hilltop outside the regional capital of Recife. In a long, fluid, and leisurely shot, the camera sweeps across the burning fields crisscrossed with fleeing colonists and victorious freedmen, then it backs away to reveal Zumbi at his lookout. The shot creates a sense of viewer participation in the story until the camera pulls away and thrusts the viewer back into the position of present-day observer. In scenes like these, *Quilombo* continues to build connections between history and the contemporary world.

At the end of the film, Zumbi is ambushed as he rests by an idyllic mountain stream. Shot dozens of times, his dark red blood blankets the earth and water. Rather than falling down to die, he thrusts his spear up into the sky, to inspire the defiance of future generations of the oppressed. The written version is different: Zumbi was killed in battle and decapitated so that his head, as his persecutors said, could be placed on display to "terrorize the blacks, who superstitiously judged him immortal" (Freitas, *Palmares*, 167). In the film, however, Zumbi lives on as representation.

Movies are a most effective vehicle for immortalizing fallen leaders, but in this case Diegues' interpretation of Zumbi varies little from written history. Scholars have often resurrected the story of Zumbi and Palmares at times of mass crisis, when a symbol of

uncompromising defiance has been most needed (see George Reid Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, 1888–1988* [Madison, Wis., 1991], 216). Curiously, the film enhances the symbolic character of Zumbi while doing nothing to humanize him. Like other characters in the film, Zumbi is an icon, not someone to identify with. Diegues draws attention away from historical personalities and toward the eternal struggle for freedom and equality.

The most startling aspect of the film is its interpretation of Palmares as a utopian community. The primary sources are silent on this matter, and the film gives us Diegues' vision of paradise, in which the people of Palmares live a Carnival-like existence. They sing and dance into the night, paint themselves with whiteface, and share the fruits of their labor equitably.

Quilombo stretches thin evidence to portray Palmares as "a land without wrongs." Yet the contrast between the abundance and vitality of Palmares and the poverty and infirmity of colonial settlements rings true. Devoted to the production of sugar for export using forced labor, Portuguese America was already mired deep in the muck of authoritarianism, monoculture, and epidemic fever. Life in Palmares could easily have been far superior to that in the colony; it certainly was for the runaways.

Diegues is also quite right in depicting Palmares as more than an exclusive refuge for blacks. *Quilombo* shows how poor, outcast whites and Indians were welcomed alongside blacks in the mountain community. For Diegues, Palmares demonstrated the potential for racial democracy in Brazil, a potential destroyed by the Portuguese rather than constructed by them. This view flies in the face of official dogma.

Diegues seems to have thoroughly inverted the documentary evidence on only one occasion. The film shows Ganga Zumba seeking peace negotiations with the Portuguese at a moment of victory rather than defeat. To fabricate this story, Palmares' greatest real-life adversary, the militia captain Fernão Carrilho, is portrayed as incompetent. According to the documents, however, repeated assaults by Carrilho brought Ganga Zumba to his knees, and his submission to terms set by the Portuguese turned Zumbi against him. Zumbi evidently had Ganga Zumba assassinated and then became king of Palmares, preserving its integrity for nearly twenty years more.

By altering the facts, *Quilombo* protects the utopian image of Palmares under Ganga Zumba before Zumbi took over. Diegues privileges mythology and makes history speak to present-day concerns by providing his Brazilian audience with a much-needed image of a paradise that was once theirs and of a legendary leader who could help inspire the search for a prosperous and egalitarian future. In its subject matter, form, and visual richness, *Quilombo* addresses not only a distinctly Brazilian social heritage and potential but also presents itself as an alternative cinematic model, one that challenges realism with fable and individualism with community.

Cliff Welch

Grand Valley State University

Rodrigo D.: No Future. Directed by Víctor Gaviria. 1990; color; 93 minutes. Film and video distributor: Kino International Corp., 333 W. 39th St., New York, N.Y. 10018 (212) 629-6880.

As society treats its youth, so it shapes its own future, the Colombian fictional documentary *Rodrigo D.: No Future* informs its viewers. Víctor Gaviria skillfully uses urban youth as a metaphor for modern Latin America. In so doing, he imbues it with transcendental significance, while also providing a wealth of information on a particular group of urban teenagers.

The film encapsulates some unmistakable truths about contemporary Latin America. For at least two decades, the standard of living and the quality of life have been declining. Key

economic indicators either stagnate or fall, while unemployment and inflation relentlessly rise. Well over two-thirds of Latin America's population live in burgeoning cities whose glittering islands of bourgeois prosperity float on a sea of human poverty. Institutional structures fail to accommodate new demands and growing needs. Consumerism and exotic foreign models awaken unrealistic hopes among poorly educated, malnourished, often hungry, and neglected youth. Their societies provide too few opportunities for employment and, as the film's title suggests, not even hope for the future.

Filmed in 1986 but not released until 1990, *Rodrigo D.: No Future* joins a distinguished and lengthening series of filmic studies of Latin America's urban youth. All respond to two historical realities. After 1950, the majority lives in urban centers rather than the countryside. Youth dominates the population. Luis Buñuel arrested international attention in 1950 with his powerful examination of marginalized youth in Mexico City, *The Young and the Damned* (*Los olvidados*). Periodically thereafter, Latin American filmmakers transposed the theme to other metropolitan centers: Aldo Francia to Chile's principal port in *Valparaíso, mi amor* (1969); Antonio Eguino to La Paz, Bolivia, in *Chuquiago* (1977); and Héctor Babenco to both São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, in *Pixote* (1981).

Víctor Gaviria expands the vision to Medellín, an industrial and commercial city of approximately 2 million, now most probably the "drug capital" of the Western Hemisphere. Registering something like 4,033 murders in 1989, 70 percent of them youngsters between the ages of fourteen and nineteen, it may well rank as the most violent city in the world. Gaviria introduces the viewers to teenagers of the lower middle class. They inhabit solidly built, decent-looking, clean houses high above the city. They share, however, some significant characteristics with their peers in the other fictional documentaries. In all of them, youth desperately searches for a future. Constant frustration, an implied or overt hopelessness, and frequent violence soon enough doom the search. In all the films, societal institutions destroy rather than comfort the young protagonists.

Through the media of film and music—the soundtrack blares vibrant Colombian punk rock—*Rodrigo D.* unfolds a dark drama. The seventeen-year-old Rodrigo, one of the few young people in the film not on drugs, not involved in crimes large or small, not packing a pistol, not given to violence, simply wants some drums to play. He dreams of forming a punk music band. Such a dream distinguishes Rodrigo from his companions, who express no goals. He manages to get a pair of drumsticks but never the drums. Unable to communicate with family or friends, without a job, without money, with no drums, Rodrigo comes to understand that he has no future. He leaves his hillside residence for the center of Medellín, enters a sterile, nondescript skyscraper, exits the elevator on the top floor, crosses an empty, featureless room, and jumps to his death.

Rodrigo inflicts violence on himself both because of and in reaction to an empty, featureless life. He thus becomes one of "a generation of helpless suicides," to quote Colombian Alonso Salazar, author of *No nacimos pa' semilla* (We Weren't Born to Bear Seeds [1990]), a recent study of teenage suicides. Salazar blames a moribund economy accompanied by the increasing prevalence of drugs and violence for an alarming upsurge of suicide among Colombia's youth. But this film provides greater causal depth and subtler, yet more effective, understanding of violence than a book. The visual reality startles and impresses the mind, whereas statistics numb it.

Testifying to the alienation of Colombian youth, the lyrics of the punk music on the soundtrack underline the grim realities that shaped and motivated Rodrigo. They declare the lack of hope and opportunities and advocate a cult of self-destruction: "There's no hope in this society . . . There's only oppression in this society. Kill yourself! Kill yourself!" They reiterate an economic fact of life experienced by frustrated urban youth: "No money, no future!" With such lyrics, the punk music effectively parallels the film's depiction of the collapse of a society.

Rodrigo D. depicts the violence enacted on youth as well as the violence of the young themselves. Both contribute mightily to the larger scope of violence that has become a major characteristic of the restive cities of Latin America. Such alarming, uncontrolled—perhaps

uncontrollable—violence in the cities, whether it be the more passive violence of hunger and despair or the virile violence of police torture, murder, gang warfare, and death squads, tests the very bonds of society. The reality of urban Latin America is that governments no longer monopolize violence but spawn it. Such societies are one step from anarchy. The film convincingly illustrates this social reality.

Rodrigo D., like the other films of its genre, suggests that basic societal institutions do not function to the benefit of the majority. The foundations of family and kinship network wobble and erode. The church is not visible nor is its voice audible. Schools seem distant, under siege, unappreciated. So far from daily reality are they that people do not even discuss them, much less attend them. Clearly, the most pervasive governmental institution is the police, whose officers show less interest in keeping order and protecting citizens than in killing children and terrorizing the citizenry. The film subtly questions whether it is possible to eradicate mounting urban problems without first restructuring basic societal institutions.

Rodrigo D. lays bare the reality of Latin American urban life that the economic platitudes of foreign aid, International Monetary Fund advice, and grandiose governmental plans ignore. Metaphorically, it captures the collapse of society. Does Latin America as we know it at the end of the twentieth century have a future? Many believe that the hoary institutional structures faithfully preserved by the few who derive benefit from them should not and cannot endure. A remarkable continuity of institutions links Latin America to the past but seems to bar it from a future. In 1980, the Brazilian poet Romano de Sant'Anna ably summed up the views of many of his generation in these few words: "I live in the twentieth century. I'm off to the twenty-first, still the prisoner of the nineteenth." A decade later, Víctor Gaviria declared in his film that the prisoner has been condemned to death.

E. Bradford Burns

University of California, Los Angeles

Pictures from a Revolution. Produced, directed, and edited by Susan Meiselas, Richard P. Rogers, and Alfred Guzzetti. 1991; color; 93 minutes. Distributor: Kino International.

"Nicaragua. A year of news, as if nothing had happened before, as if the roots were not there, and the victory not earned," Susan Meiselas wrote in her 1981 book, *Nicaragua*. "This book was made so that we remember." But what do we remember? Meiselas returned ten years later to find out, using her book of photographs as the starting point. What happened to those people whose lives she documented? What happened to the revolution? The result is the documentary *Pictures from a Revolution*.

This poignant film shows not just what happened to some of the faces in her now-famous photographs but also questions how we can ever know what happens, whether as historians or as those witnesses on whose accounts historians rely. Intricately interwoven with these questions are the issues of the supposed truth of documentary photographs and the tendency to believe that the picture tells the story.

Meiselas, Rogers, and Guzzetti set out the basic contours of the revolution, from the seemingly hopeless struggles against Anastasio Somoza to the unbelievable victory, followed by mounting U.S. aggression, the Contra war, and the eventual electoral defeat of the Sandinistas. But this history is not told in a simple linear progression. Instead, we have Meiselas's memories, her struggles to find the people she photographed, and the stories they now tell, with narrative and image jumping back and forth in time as the past and the present are intertwined. This style reveals, without adding to, the complexity of the situation.

One man tells Meiselas that the blood shed in the revolution was sacred and was lost for an important cause. Another tells her that blood was wasted. One woman speaks of the importance the revolution has for her; another says the revolution was betrayed. Meiselas is in search of some essential truth, and what she finds is *Rashomon* multiplied.

As historians, we rely on the documentary record—whether image or text—of participants and witnesses to events. But the testimony of participants here conflicts, and the witness now tells us that she was not aware of all the possibilities. Meiselas tracks down Justo, one of the first people to enlighten her during the insurrection. He had explained that a closed door in Monimbó often meant that someone was making contact bombs on the other side. It was her first realization that she could not see all of what was happening. Later, she reunites with Augusto, whom she had photographed intently holding a rifle and pointing to some unseen spot in front of him. He tells her the story she never knew of that day: he had only six shots in his rifle, and he was signaling to his *compañeros* that the *guardia* was straight ahead.

Not only is the truth elusive because each person experiences the revolution differently but Meiselas finds that even the basic premise of her search—the truth of those original photographs as documents—is questionable. At one point, Meiselas is in search of former Somoza National Guardsmen, who are pointed out to her by their neighbors in the small town of Sébaco. When she shows the supposed *guardia* the photographs, however, they insist she is mistaken. “I guarantee that’s not me,” one says vehemently. Meiselas is left unsure: “The one thing that photography should be able to do is identify, yet I don’t know if these men are the National Guardsmen in that photograph. Time changes so much of what people are and what things mean. It’s true that photographs stop time. But for people, time doesn’t stop. Maybe photographs tell a kind of truth about the moments they fix. But is it enough of the truth? . . . Is that truth of any consequence?”

Meiselas sees some of the consequences with one particular image. The day before Somoza fled Nicaragua in 1979, she made a photograph of a young man with a gun in one hand, a Molotov cocktail in the other. Years later, she saw the same image in a mural on a wall in Masaya. Later still, the image was appropriated by both the Sandinistas and the Contras—it appeared in recruitment posters and on Contra newsletters, stenciled on walls and printed on matchbooks. Meiselas says that what began as a document became an illustration and then a symbol. After the 1990 elections, Meiselas returned to find that the mural had been painted over, not by another mural but with black paint, in a monumental project by the Right to eliminate the signs of the progress and potential of the Left, as if this image with heroic power must disappear.

Has the revolution disappeared as easily as those murals? Did the revolution fail? Many Nicaraguans give tearful testimony of the hardships of the past ten years. They expected life to get better, and in many ways it did not. Meiselas tries to show the reasons for the hardships by flashing newspaper headlines about the build-up of U.S. military and economic aggression. Perhaps this is the film’s weakest point: visual images have more impact than newspaper stories, if one had the leisure to read them, even more so when the images flash sequentially on the screen. Meiselas bolsters the headlines with the calm and rational testimony of Nicaraguans who explain that U.S. aggression was to blame for many of the revolution’s failures. But neither the headlines nor the talking heads can compare with the emotional impact of the impoverished woman who wipes tears from her eyes and says the revolution has failed.

Equally powerful but more enigmatic images convey a poetic feel to the film, almost a sense of magical realism. In one scene, we are provided with the view from the passenger’s seat in a vehicle traveling up a slight incline on a narrow country road. To the left of the screen, a horse runs just ahead of the vehicle. As we come to an opening in the road, the horse veers off to the left and out of view. From Managua comes another image, shot again from the passenger side of the vehicle but this time off to the right. Along a dirt road, a naked man with unruly hair and beard wanders in a daze, his hands gesturing fitfully while a woman calmly wipes her face with her shirt and watches from her porch. Can too much be read into the juxtaposition of these two sequences? Is the horse the revolution disappearing to the left? Does the path to our right provide naked wandering and delusion?

To a certain extent, such vague but evocative images parallel the nostalgia that Meiselas seems to feel, and certainly that pro-Sandinista North Americans have felt, for the idealistic days of the Nicaraguan Revolution as a symbol and a dream. Meiselas is obviously pro-Sandinista, but she is no cheerleader for the revolution, and she wrestles with its painful complexity and present-day contradictions.

Just as Meiselas acknowledged the limited ability of her photographs to tell the story of the insurrection, she sees similar limits in the capacity of film to explore Nicaragua's next ten years. "I don't really know what it means to move on," she says near the end of the film, "to must say, 'Well, it's over.' Is it over? What's the it? What was it?"

Meiselas does not have all the answers to these questions, but *Pictures from a Revolution* is a powerful and thought-provoking exploration of the complexities of the revolution and our ways of knowing about it.

Julie A. Charlip

University of California, Los Angeles

Charly Bloomquist

California Institute of the Arts

NORTH AMERICA

Ikwe. Produced by Norma Bailey, Michael Scott, and Ches Yetman. Directed by Norma Bailey. 1986; color; 57 minutes. Distributor of film and video: National Film Board of Canada, Complex Guy Favreau, Renee Levesque West, Montreal, Canada H2Z 1X4 (514) 283-9000.

Black Robe. Produced by Robert Lantos, Stephane Rieckel, and Sue Milliken. Directed by Bruce Beresford; written by Brian Moore. 1991; color; 100 minutes. Distributor of film: Samuel Goldwyn Co. (310) 552-2255; distributor of video: Vidmart Entertainment (213) 399-8877.

These two films, one feature length, the other with a running time of just under an hour, both deal with early contact between Europeans and American Indians. *Black Robe* is set in 1634, two years after the French had regained New France from a three-year occupation by the English. *Ikwe* takes place in 1770, a few years after the final defeat of the French in North America, a time when British (mainly Scottish) fur traders were penetrating past the Great Lakes into the Far Northwest. For the chief's daughter, Ikwe, and her people, it was the first time they had seen a white man. The tribes of Quebec and the St. Lawrence Valley, by the time of *Black Robe*, had been dealing with Europeans for more than a hundred years, since the beginning of the sixteenth century. In spite of this disparity in experience, the cultural gulf is represented as equally wide in both films.

To begin with *Black Robe*. The story follows a Jesuit priest, Laforgue (played by Lothaire Bluteau), newly arrived from France and assigned to the mission at Huronia, 1,500 miles in the interior. The character of Laforgue is based on Noël Chabanel (1613-1649), who was killed by

a Huron apostate and canonized in 1930. Laforgue epitomizes seventeenth-century Roman Catholic missionary zeal; back in France, his inspiration was a priest who had been mutilated by the Iroquois but who still wanted to return to North American missionary work. Consigned to the care of the Algonquin Chomina (August Schelling) and his people, Laforgue and his lay assistant Daniel (Aden Young) set off for their destination. It does not take long for cultural differences to make themselves felt. The director, Australian Bruce Beresford, tries to balance widely differing world views but is not entirely successful: although he uses flashbacks to contrast Indian life with Laforgue's aristocratic background, he does not do the same for Daniel's humbler origins and concludes the film with the entire Huron village asking for conversion. By then, however, Daniel's desertion to the Indians has demonstrated that neither Laforgue nor his fellow missionaries will completely triumph in this struggle of cultures. Beresford, despite good intentions, has not shaken himself free from the viewpoint of the seventeenth-century Jesuit accounts on which his story is based.

An enduring impression left by *Black Robe* is of the grandeur of the land, of immense sweeps in which the human presence is little more than a minor disturbance. This approach makes a living reality of the Indian view of the universe as a web of reciprocating forces that must be kept in equilibrium if the world is to continue; in this scheme of things, humans are but one element, and not the most important one. The film also succeeds in re-creating the physical reality of life in the northern forests during the seventeenth century, with one exception. When Laforgue finally reaches a Huron village, it is presented as being wedged in between a forest and a waterway. The proximity of water is more accurate than that of the forest: Hurons were farmers as well as traders, and their extensive corn fields were always placed immediately outside their village palisades, a measure dictated by security considerations as well as convenience.

More important, the film fails to catch the humor and joy of Indian life that so impressed early Europeans. If Indians had been as persistently solemn as Beresford depicts, they would never have survived under the conditions they had to face. In the only two scenes in which laughter is heard, it is at Laforgue's expense. While Indians certainly were capable of poking fun at others, that is only part of the picture: humor was (and still is) an essential ingredient in Indian life, and anything that provoked laughter was approved, including laughing at one's self. A historical illustration of this appears in a Jesuit report of 1634, which tells of Father Paul Le Jeune accompanying Montagnais on their winter hunt. They warned him: "We shall be sometimes two days, sometimes three, without eating, for lack of food; take courage, *Chichiné* let thy soul be strong to endure suffering and hardship; keep thyself from being sad, otherwise thou wilt be sick; see how we do not cease to laugh, although we have little to eat." Here, Beresford should have followed the Jesuit account more closely.

Ikwe, a smaller-scale production than *Black Robe*, more accurately re-creates the atmosphere of an Indian encampment, in this case Ojibwa. The people engage in banter as they pursue their tasks; they joke about all there is to do, while "the chief gets to sit around all he wants." The mood quickly changes to apprehension when a strange canoe appears, bearing a trader and his entourage. The Indians wonder at the bearded stranger—"he looks as though his mother was a dog" (a popular Indian myth tells of a girl who married a dog, whose descendants became the "other").

The Ojibwa give *Ikwe* (Hazel King), daughter of the chief, in marriage to the trader, Angus (Geraint Wyn Davis), to seal the new trading arrangement. In this tale of cultural misunderstandings punctuated with moments of tenderness, the worlds of husband and wife never do merge, even after the arrival of children. When Angus sends their son to Montreal to be educated without consulting *Ikwe* or even letting her know, *Ikwe* takes her small daughter and returns to her people, only to find that the child has trouble fitting in. In the eyes of the *Ikwe*'s mother, "Your daughter does not know who she is." *Ikwe* cannot believe this; when smallpox spreads through the camp, she stays with her stricken people but sends her daughter away to work out her special role as the bearer of the spirits of two races. As *Ikwe* sees it, out of the clash of cultures a new way will emerge.

Director Norman Bailey tells his tale well, through the eyes of the Indians; there is no attempt here to balance viewpoints. His Indian characters are more sympathetic than his white ones, who are opinionated, ill-mannered, and only as considerate of the Indians as the fur trade required. While they welcome the trade that Europeans offered, the Indians had no way of foreseeing the danger that this decision would bring.

In casting this film, Bailey has filled the Indian roles with Indians, by contrast with Beresford, who uses Asiatics and whites as well as Indian actors. In this, Beresford has not endeared either himself or his film to contemporary Indians, who take strong exception to having themselves portrayed by other races.

Overall, *Ikwe's* clear message contrasts with the ambiguity of *Black Robe*. *Ikwe* has been aided by its topic: trade relations, while by no means simple, are less difficult to deal with than world views and religion. *Black Robe* is both wider in scope and more complex in its subject; visually powerful, intellectually probing, this film, in spite of its weaknesses, makes a strong impact. Both movies illustrate the long way that filmmakers have come in dealing with Indians on their own terms. If *Ikwe* is the more successful, there is still much to recommend in *Black Robe*.

Olive Patricia Dickason

University of Alberta

American Dream. Produced by Barbara Kopple and Arthur Cohn; directed by Barbara Kopple. 1990; color; 100 minutes. Distributor: Miramax Films.

The Academy Award-winning *American Dream* is a brilliant but flawed documentary on the struggle of United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) Local P-9 in Austin, Minnesota, against the George A. Hormel Company. The film opens with Reverend Jesse Jackson telling a P-9 rally, "Austin Minnesota is not just about Austin Minnesota," and it moves quickly from the heady days of Local P-9's preparation for its 1985 strike, through the climactic picket-line confrontations of January 1986, to the strike's collapse in the spring of that year. As a film, it is outstanding, but as a work of history *American Dream* has serious limitations.

The film's subject was one of the most controversial strikes of the mid-1980s. The union's determined resistance to making contract concessions, dramatic confrontations at the plant gate, and sharp public disagreements between the UFCW and Local P-9 all drew considerable public attention. The strike ended in defeat. One-quarter of the union's 1,600 members eventually crossed the picket line, and permanent replacements took the remaining jobs. One thousand strikers have yet to return to work.

American Dream showcases Barbara Kopple's extraordinary talent, already recognized in the Academy Award she received for *Harlan County, USA* (1976). Rarely has a documentary film probed so intimately into labor-management conflict and working-class motivations. Workers pour their hearts out to Kopple in their homes; union members engage in freewheeling debates in union meetings; representatives of the UFCW and meatpacking firms clash in contract bargaining sessions; P-9 dissidents and UFCW leaders scheme in secret strategy meetings; strikers confront strikebreakers and National Guard troops on the picket line. The arresting kaleidoscope of images and voices leaves one marveling at Kopple's ability to gain access to these scenes.

The primary historical contribution of the film is the forum it provides for rank-and-file packinghouse workers to articulate their "American Dream." Beneath the cacophony of opinions on the P-9 strike emerges a heartfelt picture of elemental working-class aspirations. "I don't begrudge anybody that's making \$30, \$40, \$50,000," one wife of a striker says, "but let us live in our house, our \$32,000 house." A Hormel worker justifies crossing the union picket line with, "a person takes a whole lot of pride in being a breadwinner and providing for your family. But when you can't do that . . ."; he fails to finish as tears fill his eyes. The sense of pride and aspiration for a secure family life emerge from partisans on both sides of the dispute.

American Dream also reveals the simmering anger of workers struggling against the dramatic erosion in their working conditions and living standards. "If we've got to give up 23 percent in wages and 30 percent cut in benefits when the company is making \$30 million, what are we going to have to give them when they show a loss for a quarter?" a Hormel worker asks a Local P-9 meeting. "I busted my ass for you guys for over eighteen years on production and all of a sudden you put the goddamn hammer down and we go from \$10.69 to \$6.50 when you walk back into that plant on a Monday with the production gone up," shouts an angry Wilson Food worker at a company representative during a break in negotiations.

Gripping as drama, *American Dream* falters when it presents both the actual issues in dispute between Local P-9 and Hormel and the strategic differences between the Austin union and the parent organization. The film portrays the P-9 strike as a struggle over wages—Hormel offers \$10 an hour, and the union strikes for \$10.69. This is puzzling to the viewer and an incorrect portrayal of the actual historical account. How, one asks, is a demand for 69 cents enough to provoke all the stirring rhetoric we hear in the movie? Hence the lofty "American Dream" of Hormel workers ultimately remains murky and insubstantial; what they actually wanted out of their struggle is never clear.

In fact, the P-9 dispute was over more than money. Hormel sought not only to freeze wages but also virtually to eliminate seniority as a principle of job assignment and to terminate long-established contract provisions, such as a 52-week notice for layoffs. The company also rejected union proposals to correct a spiraling injury rate. P-9 members struck to halt a slide back toward the pre-union era, when management's control over wages, working conditions, and job security were unchecked by labor organizations.

It is troubling that *American Dream* slights the non-wage issues in the Hormel dispute. Local P-9 members repeatedly emphasized in public and private statements that the dispute was over more than 69 cents. Kopple must have chosen not to incorporate their interpretation of the strike's central issues into the movie. *American Dream* thereby implicitly endorses the depiction of the strike promoted by the Hormel Company and the UFCW as one simply over wages.

As a result, *American Dream* makes the Hormel workers seem quixotic and idealistic, inexplicably following union leader Jim Guyette and labor consultant Ray Rogers to a disastrous climax. Twice, we hear Guyette summarize the spirit of the strike by reciting the refrain from a Bruce Springsteen song, "No Retreat, No Surrender"; yet we never hear him explain in concrete terms how more than wages were at stake. In contrast to the charismatic but one-dimensional figure of Guyette, Kopple sympathetically portrays UFCW Packinghouse Division head Lewie Anderson as a militant but hardheaded unionist who correctly predicts the disastrous end to the P-9 struggle. However, the UFCW's—and Anderson's—significant culpability in the failure of the strike is not explored.

It is surprising that Kopple ignores several visual opportunities to convey important information about the strikers' aspirations and the appeal of their struggle to other workers. The content of the Hormel worker's "American Dream" could have been made clearer by showing viewers the huge mural painted on the side of the Austin union hall, which depicts a powerful female worker using a P-9 meat cleaver to cut off the head of a snake symbolizing corporate greed. The extent of national support could have been conveyed through a shot of the large map on the wall of the union's main meeting room, which shows the locations of the 3,000 local unions donating money to P-9.

The other glaring weakness in the film is the way *American Dream* credits P-9's high level of membership activity solely to labor consultant Ray Rogers. The film omits the role of Local P-9 spouses and retirees in the Austin United Support Group, which actually started the outreach campaign several months prior to the hiring of Rogers. The wives who were central to the P-9 strike, such as Vicky Guyette, Barbara Collette, and Jan Butts, occasionally appear but are never identified by name. Their high visibility in the strike—and the recognition accorded them by the union—is not reflected in the film.

These omissions and inaccuracies can be attributed in part to the dramatic form Kopple employs. *American Dream* is structured as a tragedy in which four protagonists—Guyette,

Anderson, Rogers, and P-9 dissident Jim Morrison—provide coherence to the narrative. But the focus on these four men relegates rank-and-file workers to the role of a Greek chorus, commentators on circumstances beyond their control, rather than subjects who potentially shape the course of events. Thus *American Dream* ends on a depressing note and leaves the viewer doubtful that unions can struggle for, and achieve, the hopes and dreams of the American working class.

Roger Horowitz

University of Delaware

,

Reviews of Books

GENERAL

RICHARD RORTY. *Philosophical Papers*. Volume 1, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*. Volume 2, *Essays on Heidegger and Others*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. x, 226; x, 202. \$39.50 each volume.

Most historians must give some attention to the ideas of dead philosophers, so long as they are canonical. Plato and Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and Hegel generally rate a mention in any sort of survey course. But, especially in the twentieth century, no such attention can necessarily be commanded by living philosophers. Historians have been notoriously allergic even to the philosophy of history, which might seem to concern their professional lives. In its speculative or substantive mode, the philosophy of history has appeared too grandiose and too vulnerable to empirical puncturing, while analytical or critical philosophy of history has seemed at best remote from the concerns of workaday historians, at worst a misguided effort to teach them their business. It is small wonder that fewer than 1 percent of the members of the American Historical Association list "historiography and philosophy of history" as either a primary or secondary field of interest.

The other activities of philosophers have tended to arouse even less interest. This is not solely a result of historians' parochialism, for the same logic of academic specialization that confines historians has worked with equal or perhaps greater effect on philosophers. As Richard Rorty observes, few specialists in most other disciplines think it necessary to attend to what analytical philosophers are doing, and these seem not to be bothered, anyway. They appear to be engaged in an ever more refined dialogue with other professionals on issues that outsiders have neither the competence nor the interest to address. Continental philosophy, by contrast, has attacked matters of greater moment, but frequently in an oracular tone and opaque style. (Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, two of the philosophers Rorty discusses in these volumes, must be among the most difficult writers of the century.) Put crudely, then, most historians can understand analytical philosophers, but do not think it is worth reading them. It

would be worth reading Continental philosophers, if only they could understand them.

Thus, the sort of living philosopher-historian one might read would be someone who writes clearly enough for lay persons to understand and rises above the logomachies of the academy to address vital issues in political and moral life. Rorty is such a philosopher. These two volumes, although not intended as an introduction to his positions, serve that purpose quite well.

Rorty passes the clarity test with ease. His style is agreeably informal; he believes texts are no "squishier" than molecules, yet he warns about "making a big deal out of language" and about rejecting theories just because they seem "wacky" or "fishy" (vol. 1, pp. 40, 131, 193; vol. 2, p. 4). He can be extremely funny; on principle, for example, he endorses the goal of "joshing" us out of our quest for ahistorical foundations or justifications of our beliefs. There is no point, he believes, in producing arguments about such pseudo-problems as "appearance vs. reality"; the most appropriate response to such discourse is mockery.

Historians will therefore have no trouble grasping what Rorty is saying, and they will also find some of his ideas congenial. He is resolutely historicist, not just because he reads dead philosophers in the context of their times, but primarily because he accepts, indeed almost glories in, the historical conditioning of his own ideas. He warns against "trying to climb out of our own minds" by rising above the historical contingencies that have given them the words and beliefs they presently contain. "As a pragmatist," he says, "I think philosophy is at its best when it is content to be 'its own time apprehended in thought' and lets transcendence go" (vol. 1, p. 14; vol. 2, p. 181). In the book that made Rorty's philosophical reputation, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979), he deployed Thomas Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), tracing the vicissitudes in the story of how science developed to show that it should not be treated as the source of pure knowledge, whose methods should be adopted, or at least imitated, by all other disciplines. Quoting philosophers of science such as Mary Hesse, he argues that science is just as inherently metaphorical as literature or history.

Philosophy should take its place among a demo-

cratic community of equal disciplines. But although Rorty thinks no discipline can stipulate methodological or epistemological standards for any other, he has his favorites. Philosophy itself is definitely not one of them. If the works either of Heidegger—one of the philosophers whom he most admires—or Dickens could be preserved from some imagined catastrophe, he unhesitatingly would opt for saving Dickens (vol. 2, p. 68). In part this is because he prefers narrative over theory; but this preference in turn is, as one would expect from a pragmatist, congruent with his political stance.

Rorty can speak to many who have “tacitly given up on socialism without becoming any fonder of capitalism” (vol. 2, p. 67). He identifies himself with the Left and is scathing about the short-sighted greed of the American middle and upper classes and the politicians who have pandered to it. But he is equally critical of the sort of radicalism represented by many American academics (and French theorists) whose generalized desire for revolution, as he sees it, is only an abreaction to their sense of rage and impotence when confronted with imperialism abroad and social injustice at home. What is needed, he believes, is the imagination to propose new sorts of social arrangements (what if some country legislated an absolute equality of incomes?) and the ability and willingness to enter the actual electoral political arena. The great achievements of the novelists are to provide such imaginative scenarios and to bring more and more persons into our community of discourse precisely through letting us see them as persons rather than as instances of social categories.

History, too, has a vital role. Rorty refurbishes the traditional claim that history can form individual character: “Historical narratives about social and intellectual movements are the best tools to use in tinkering with ourselves, for such narratives suggest vocabularies of moral deliberation in which to spin coherent narratives about individual lives” (vol. 2, p. 163). Furthermore, history and sociology are all that is required as a “preface to politics” (vol. 1, p. 181) and “the moral justification of the institutions and practices of one’s group . . . is mostly a matter of historical narratives (including scenarios about what is likely to happen in certain future contingencies), rather than of philosophical metanarratives. The principal backup for historiography is not philosophy but the arts” (vol. 1, p. 200).

Rorty’s “sentences”—as he would probably prefer to call his “thought”—seem to offer a dignified and socially useful job to historians. Furthermore, his demotion of natural science from its epistemological supremacy offers historians a way of circumventing many of the chronic problems of the philosophy of history. The tired issue of whether history is an “art” or a “science” can finally be put to sleep, since for Rorty there is no essential difference between them. There is, therefore, no reason to lapse into Diltheyan or Collingwoodian idealism, arguing that there is

something peculiar about what historians study, be it thoughts or intentions, that requires unique methods and special justification.

Some, however, will say that these are poisoned gifts. The greatest barrier to accepting them is undoubtedly that they require, on the epistemological plane, giving up any pretense that history can merely show *wie es eigentlich gewesen* and, on the moral level, frankly pursuing historiography to satisfy our contemporary human needs and desires rather than studying the past “for its own sake.”

There is no doubt that Rorty’s antirealist and antifoundationalist stance is unsettling. Historians are accustomed to judging one another’s work, and to projecting their own, by a standard of correspondence to “what actually happened.” For at least twenty-five years philosophers have been pointing out to them that to make such a judgment, we would have to have access to the past independent of any representation of it. This would require what Rorty calls a “skyhook” giving us a “God’s-eye view,” one that is unfortunately unavailable to us terrestrial creatures. Yet despite this argument, which seems hard to refute, most historians have clung to “correspondence to the past” as the touchstone of their enterprise.

The reason for this is doubtless the fear that once it is let go, there is no way to avoid falling into the abyss of relativism. Rorty’s escape route from this difficulty is to treat all beliefs and desires about the world as a web that each person must continually reweave as new beliefs and desires impinge on it. Events in the external world, such as the results of an experiment or the release of previously classified documents, can cause us to have new beliefs, some of which may cause extensive revision of our existing ones; but the issue is not whether a belief or a desire corresponds to what is really “out there.” Rather it is how—or whether—it can fit coherently within the existing web of beliefs.

There is room for a certain amount of idiosyncrasy in what one wants or believes, but the construction of “reality” is social rather than purely individual. In other words, it is a community of discourse, or overlapping communities of discourse, that create and maintain the language and concepts in which our beliefs and desires are articulated.

Rorty claims further that abandoning the criterion of correspondence to an external reality such as “what really happened” does not mean that every story about the past has an equal claim to credibility. Relativism will loom only if we think that “the lack of general, neutral, antecedently formulable criteria for choosing between alternative, equally coherent, webs of belief means that there can be no ‘rational’ decision” (vol. 1, p. 66). Even in this most difficult case, and even if one cannot appeal to a common ground called “the evidence”—since it will be constituted differently in the different webs—“One can still debate the issue on all the old familiar grounds, bringing up once again all the hackneyed details, all the

varied advantages and disadvantages of the two views" (vol. 1, p. 67). There seems no reason why arguments within a community of discourse, like the American Historical Association, could not also proceed in the same old way, with charges of evidence ignored, texts misread, biases displayed, and with the desirable outcome that everybody reaches a broader and more comprehensive view, more congruent with the rest of what we know about the past.

Some historians will also be uncomfortable with Rorty's blatant display of political preferences. Historiography that serves present political purposes will seem "presentist" and judgment of the past by the standards of the present ethnocentric. Since Rorty believes that reality is socially constructed within our own communities of discourse, there is no way he can help sounding ethnocentric; nor does he try. Instead he defends "anti-anti-ethnocentrism." Utter cultural relativists lose any capacity for moral indignation, and they cannot formulate an answer to the claim that Adolf Hitler and the Nazis thought that they were doing the right thing; in short, they become "so open-minded that [their] brains have fallen out" (vol. 1, p. 203). Rorty insistently champions "bourgeois liberalism" and "social democracy"—terms that he, curiously, seems to treat as interchangeable. He does so somewhat in the spirit of Winston Churchill: "democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others which have been tried." He says he can give no philosophically interesting defense of positions like this, but one of the virtues he sees in liberal democratic societies is their variety and greater willingness to incorporate previously marginalized groups within the community of discourse, and thus to be less ethnocentric.

Rorty has been characterized, and criticized, as a "postmodern philosopher." He (rightly) dislikes the word, for it has been so loosely applied as to lose all precision; but he does, at the very least, provide a stimulating introduction to some "postmodernist" and "poststructuralist" thinking. At most, he might provide some stimulus for historians to join the (post) modern world.

RICHARD T. VANN
Wesleyan University

ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE. *Feminism without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 347. \$24.95.

In these nine essays, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese addresses the shortcomings of feminist politics and the contradictions of feminist theory, the inadequacy of postmodern and poststructural approaches to knowledge (especially history), and contemporary epistemological debates in the academy. She writes in the first pages of the volume that she offers no political program, and indeed she does not. The stimulating

essays demonstrate great learning, good sense, and sensibility, but also a certain lack of closure.

The central theme of the volume is individualism and feminism. Fox-Genovese defines her problem as "feminism's complicity in and acceptance of individualism—or rather [of] its contemporary atomized version that replaces the early and glorious recognition of the claims of the individual against the state with the celebration of egotism and denial or indefensible reduction of the just claims of the community" (p. 7). Individualism as it is understood today locates rights in the individual and limits state intervention with these highly valued rights. In practical politics, individualist societies have curtailed individual rights in the name of social good, but, Fox-Genovese argues, "they have done so apologetically, defensively, not on the grounds of the prior rights of the collectivity" (p. 8). The danger she perceives is too great a swing to protection of the individual to the detriment of family, community, and society.

The concept of sisterhood, according to Fox-Genovese, has been valuable in emphasizing the similarity among women and permitting middle-class women to identify and combat the constraints on their lives. At the same time, she faults "feminist individualism" for not providing "viable alternatives, notably rewarding and remunerative work and the day care that would permit women to engage in it" (p. 14). This is indeed an unsolved problem, not only for middle-class women, but is it fair to blame feminists alone for not solving it? There is no single feminist program or theory, but day care and support (private and public) for women working outside the home have certainly been part of some of them. As with all programs, there is a gap between a goal and its achievement that cannot be blamed fully on those who propose it.

Fox-Genovese proceeds in a similar fashion in the other essays on feminism: lumping together diverse strands of feminist thought and practice, downplaying their diversity, and underestimating the importance of political process, in which feminist issues compete against other demands on public resources and other programs for change or preservation of past practice.

Other contemporary theories—postmodernism and poststructuralism in particular—are likewise linked to the critique of individualism. Fox-Genovese writes that postmodern literary approaches have highlighted the plurality of perspectives about knowledge, shown the power exerted in one dominating others, and called for understanding the value of diverse and particular groups. But they have failed, she continues, in refusing to judge the intrinsic worth of an idea or other cultural product, and have too often slighted the context of group values and perspectives; thus postmodernists unconsciously accept the general American commitment to individualism. Poststructuralism is likewise limited by its "depersonalizing the subject" and "divorcing texts from experience" while being empty of political critique (at least

in its original form, in which hierarchy and inequality both went unchallenged). Representation comes to stand for, or instead of, reality. These shortcomings, too, Fox-Genovese argues, lie in Americans' "inability to shake the legacy of individualism" (p. 163).

What is needed, she concludes, is to abandon the chimera of equality and reimagine "the collectivity—society as a whole—in such a way as to take account of women's legitimate needs" (p. 243). To do this, we must cling to our cultural heritage, embrace objectivity, and insist on standards while we fight for equity, "an equity that requires a more generous social vision than individualism can provide" (p. 244). Such an outcome implies recasting the terms of both the debate and of politics itself. A politics based on community (forgetting for a moment Fox-Genovese's lack of precision on what a community is) and social responsibility may be attractive to those tired of struggle. But rights are needed in politics; it is not only states that oppress, but communities as well. The path from rights-based politics to community-based politics is a serious problem that Fox-Genovese leaves unexamined.

LOUISE A. TILLY
New School for Social Research

CARLO GINZBURG. *Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method*. Translated by JOHN TEDESCHI and ANNE C. TEDESCHI. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1989. Pp. xvii, \$24.95.

Carlo Ginzburg offers us an extraordinary array of essays written over the past thirty years. Subjects range from a Modenese witchcraft trial from 1519 to the studies of mythology by Georges Dumézil, from erotic illustration in the sixteenth century to the folkloric roots of the dream of Freud's Wolf-Man. The intellectual center of this collection rests, however, in two very important essays: a study of the methodological dilemmas of iconology and iconography from Aby Warburg to E. H. Gombrich, and a pathbreaking examination of the growth in the late nineteenth century of the use of small details (the "clues" of the title) as evidence for broad structures in a wide array of intellectual endeavors.

The essay on the epistemological history of the so-called Warburg School offers a cautionary tale. Ginzburg shows how the sequence of writers, from Warburg through Fritz Saxl and Erwin Panofsky to Gombrich, found themselves navigating difficult epistemological waters. They were tempted to move from very fine and highly empirical readings of the contents of paintings toward much broader speculations about culture and history, all the while arguing and agonizing over the potential elliptical fallacies in that endeavor. His essay shows the pitfalls of moving from the highly empirical effort of reading the contents of visual objects to the historical and morphological

efforts to link those contents to deeper structures in cultural space and time.

In the essay on "Clues," Ginzburg takes us on a breathtaking journey, as he was among the first to see that an important revolution in Western thought was achieved in the last hundred years by various techniques of pursuing wide conclusions from telltale details. He finds a fascinating family relationship in the work of persons as varied as Giovanni Morelli, Sigmund Freud, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, and F. Gaulton (one of the founders of the technique of fingerprinting).

As a historian, Ginzburg places himself in those streams of thought, relying on what he calls the "divinatory paradigm," which lures the investigator from the small detail to the wider speculations on deeper structures, what he calls the "generalizing paradigm" or "morphology" (p. 113). In writing these histories, he is therefore writing his intellectual autobiography. Exploring the dilemmas of these methods, he also agonizes about his own approach, which rests on the intuitive faith that, as he quotes Warburg, "God is in the detail" (p. 96). At the same time, at many junctures he is honest enough to wonder if there is a God to be found.

While these essays present many different resolutions, Ginzburg clearly rejects the dominance of the Galilean paradigm for the "human sciences," saying that it leaves us in the "unpleasant dilemma" of assuming a "lax scientific system in order to obtain noteworthy results" or "a meticulous, scientific one to achieve results of scant significance" (p. 124). The only way out, he finds, is a system that relies to some extent on "instinct, insight, intuition," by which he means a process not unlike some eighteenth-century definitions of genius, that is, "the lightning recapitulation of rational processes" (pp. 124–25). He finds no absolute certainty. The historian must make common cause with, among others, the hunter, the detective, the anthropologist, the aphorist, the physiognomist, and, perhaps most provocatively, the inquisitor, all the while recognizing "the perpetual inadequacies of our analytical categories" (p. 155).

In sum, these are essays that will delight anyone with a taste for erudition combined with a highly disciplined, but inevitably tenuous, movement from detail to broad speculation. Each essay has a specific subject, but gathered together, the collection is clearly about the epistemological dilemmas of doing history in a self-conscious and self-doubting age; it in turn provides clues for future histories about the history we now write.

HARRY C. PAYNE
Hamilton College

SCOTT GORDON. *The History and Philosophy of Social Science*. New York: Routledge. 1991. Pp. 690. \$70.00.

True to his title, Scott Gordon alternates chapters on the history of political theory, classical and neoclassical economics, the methodology of history, and the development of sociological theory with chapters on the philosophical issues involved in constructing social as well as natural laws, modeling, the idea of harmonious order, utilitarianism, positivism, Marxism, and the biological basis of the social sciences—and much more. This is a compendious book (almost 700 pages), occasionally repetitious, devoid of footnotes and bibliography as such, and yet intensely scholarly.

In spite of its great reach, there are many omissions, some admitted by the author. The emphasis is on individuals and ideas rather than on institutions; there is little on the sociology of knowledge or on the social construction of social science. Even in regard to individuals there are some striking absences: no Niccolò Machiavelli, only a mention of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, yet pages devoted to Henry Sidgwick (how many will have heard of him?). As for topics such as romanticism, Gordon indulges in only the briefest of discussions.

His central themes include individualism versus holism, what is and what ought to be, the role of the division of labor, and value-free research. His own position can be labeled cognitive instrumentalism, defined as viewing science “not as a body of knowledge, but as an activity—the search for truth, not the possession of it” (p. 624). Gordon’s cogent arguments are a relief for anyone who has slogged through the marshlands of deconstructionist theory.

The price for his clarity of thought and prose is a certain aridness and even narrowness of vision about social science. His is old-fashioned thinking trying to take account of some new developments. Gordon clearly favors neoclassical economics and utilitarianism, although he recognizes the limitations involved in the model of rational economic behavior. His recognition, however, does not extend, for example, to the attempt at a “science” of the irrational, psychoanalysis, which would seem to pose critical problems at the boundaries where natural and social science meet. Psychology, other than associational, is not discussed.

Nor does Gordon discuss anthropology (aside from a few pages on physical anthropology). One looks in vain for reference to detailed work on particular subjects, such as George W. Stocking, Jr.’s *Victorian Anthropology* (1987), a model of the kind of careful scholarship on which a comprehensive history of social science, and thus philosophy, can be built. Such neglect points to the question of whether the future of the history and philosophy of social science lies in Stocking-like studies and articles, Gordon-like surveys of the entire field, or some combination thereof.

In spite of such questions and criticisms, however, I view Gordon’s book as a truly valuable aid for those who would wish to see the history of the social sciences attain the same legitimacy and status as the

history of the natural sciences. The strength of the book lies in the author’s rigorous understanding of what is involved in “doing” science, especially social science. His history, narrow as it may be in some places, is deep and, most importantly, is solidly based on a professional grasp of philosophy. What Gordon’s tome does it does extremely well, and that is remarkable enough.

BRUCE MAZLISH

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

BRUCE MAZLISH. *The Leader, the Led, and the Psyche: Essays in Psychohistory*. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, for Wesleyan University Press. 1990. Pp. viii, 323. \$29.95.

Bruce Mazlish is now one of the elder statesmen of modern psychohistory. This collection of essays written between 1968 and 1987, along with two new essays and a brief introduction written for the volume, is a valuable compendium of Mazlish’s thoughts on various aspects of the field and displays to good effect his breadth of knowledge, interpretive skills, and felicity of prose. Given such strengths, this might be the best book currently available for a novice to consult as an introduction to psychohistory, while at the same time serving as a stimulating resource for the experienced practitioner. The essays discuss the methods of psychohistory; explore historical personages as diverse as the Ayatollah Khomeini, William Jevons, Max Weber, Henry David Thoreau, George Orwell, Richard Nixon, and Michel Crèvecoeur; and attempt to shed special light on the related subjects of group psychology, leaders and led, and the “American Psyche.”

There are of course limitations and disadvantages to the plan of the book. Given Mazlish’s special interest in intellectual and political history, there is precious little mention of relevant issues of gender and race, and the geographical focus of the essays is predominantly Anglo-American. Since fifteen of the seventeen essays were written anywhere from twenty-four to five years ago, and because most are very brief and have a particular focus (one is a book review), a lot of current (and not so current) work goes unmentioned. For example, the essay on “The ‘Real’ Richard Nixon” (1970) even antedates Mazlish’s own *In Search of Nixon* (1972) as well as Fawn Brodie’s 1985 psychobiography. In a note to this essay, the longest in the book, Mazlish argues that events since 1970 have simply confirmed his original analysis. One can understand the value of presenting an essay as originally written as well as the desire of an author to defend an interpretation, but Mazlish’s Nixon essay and book were heavily criticized for being reductionist. Brodie, while also subjected to heavy fire, diverged from Mazlish’s approach in significant and fruitful ways that merit discussion here.

The brevity of the other essays renders their case

studies suggestive and speculative, rather than conclusive. Even in the essays written for this volume there are omissions, of necessity but also, ostensibly, by choice. In "The American Psyche" there is no mention of either John Demos's *Entertaining Satan* (1982) or Charles Strozier's *Lincoln's Quest for Union* (1982), surprising in view of Mazlish's enthusiasm for psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut, whose theories concerning the self and group-self inform both works. Often timing is the problem here: a 1974 call for a psychological study of Kemal Atatürk has since been answered (*The Immortal Atatürk* [1986]); and the chapter "Darwin, the Bedrock of Psychoanalysis" (1990) just missed two important works on this very subject by Lucille Ritvo (*Darwin's Influence on Freud* [1990]) and by John Bowlby (*Charles Darwin: A New Life* [1990]). Such near misses are inevitable, but still one yearns for a longer introduction than Mazlish provides to bring the issues and references more successfully up to date.

Mazlish displays a loyalty to the Freudian school of thought which has in fact provided almost all of the basis for psychohistorical work. But one will have to look elsewhere for much of the ongoing critique of psychoanalysis and psychohistory and to works such as those by William McKinley Runyan (*Life Histories and Psychobiography* [1982] and *Psychology and Historical Interpretation* [1988]) on other psychological models potentially and actually useful to historians. Yet Mazlish is a pluralist when it comes to psychoanalytic methods and always displays a fine historical sensibility for multiple causes as well as for continuity and change over time. He tackles the thorny question of the psychology of the group in history and explores the applicability of the relatively recent work of avant-garde psychoanalyst Kohut to this question and others.

GEOFFREY COCKS
Albion College

YOSEF HAYIM YERUSHALMI. *Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991. Pp. xix, 159. \$25.00.

The recent historical literature on the life and times of Sigmund Freud has grown in proportion to the rediscovery and new importance of psychoanalytic theory for the humanities. Only at two other periods, first during the 1920s when psychoanalysis came to be the formative influence on modern thought, and again in the 1950s and 1960s when it regained its centrality in areas as diverse as clinical practice and the academy, was there as wide an interest in Freud's life and personality as there is today. Both of those periods were marked by questions—very different questions—concerning the meaning (or lack of it) of Freud's identity as a Jew. During the 1920s, Charles Maylan first presented the thesis that being a Jew was a central factor in Freud's development (*Freud's tragi-*

scher Komplex [1929]). But what Maylan understood the term "Jew" to mean was shaped by the racial and ethnopsychological definitions of his (and Freud's) own day. During the 1950s, David Bakan, in a reading of Jewish identity shaped by the Shoah, argued for a purely religious understanding of Freud's Jewishness and thus focused not on his racial identity, but on his supposed religious training (*Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition* [1958]).

Recently there have been a number of books on the topic of Freud's Jewish identity, just as Freud again becomes of concern to the academy. Emmanuel Rice has continued Bakan's general thesis, seeing the word "Jew" as a marker of religious identity and therefore finding religious analogues in Freud's sense of Jewish identity. Peter Gay has responded in an odd way in his own work to the thesis of the religious nature of Freud's Jewish identity. Gay seems to accept the religious definition of the Jew but responds by rejecting it out of hand, arguing that such a definition had nothing at all to do with Freud's sense of self. The alternative idea, that being Jewish might be primarily a cultural phenomenon, has been touched on by Ken Frieden (*Freud's Dream of Interpretation* [1990]), whose own readings owe much to the paradigm proposed in the mid-1970s by John Murray Cuddihy (*The Ordeal of Civility* [1974]). But none on these discussions has been grounded in an understanding of the shifting meaning of the concept "Jew" during Freud's own time. It has taken one of the great historians of European Jewry to accomplish this.

Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi's long-awaited monograph on Freud's final published work, *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), fulfills all of the interest which its announcement generated. A "teaser" appeared in the *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* in 1989, but Yerushalmi's book supplies much more than an expanded version of the paper. Indeed, the rather interesting excursion in that paper on Freud's sense of himself as a writer (in opposition to his image of himself as a scientist) is missing from the present book. Freud, who called his study "a historical novel," had clearly thought through the fictionality of his undertaking. This is noted in the present volume, but without the detail and clarity of Yerushalmi's earlier argument. What is reprinted in detail from that essay is the English translation as well as the German original (as an appendix) of the preface to the study left unpublished by Freud.

In the present book, Yerushalmi provides a detailed context for *Moses and Monotheism* as well as a strong reading of the text. His point of departure is in opposition to that which Gay takes in both his book on Freud and his Jewishness as well as in his biography of Freud (*Freud* [1988]; *A Godless Jew* [1987]). Unlike Gay, Yerushalmi takes very seriously the implications of being a Jew for Freud. He dismisses, quite correctly, any association between any traditional definition of Judaism as a religion and Freud's writings or system. Freud is neither a crypto-Kabalist (Bakan)

nor a hidden traditionalist (Rice). Gay's assumption that Freud's Jewish identity was canceled by his overt atheism confuses Judaism as a religion with an internalized image of the Jew which may (as in Freud's case) have nothing at all to do with a religious identity, and which, indeed, may be antithetical to one. For Yerushalmi, Freud is an acculturated Viennese Jew of the *fin de siècle* and that is complicated enough. Given the very good work on this question in recent years (Robert Wistrich, *The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Josef* [1989]), it is important to have a serious discussion of Freud's own major contribution to the study of the image of the Jew, *Moses and Monotheism*, in the light of Austrian fascism and the political as well as cultural implications of the climate in which the work was conceptualized and written.

Yerushalmi provides in his study the best contextualization of the background of one of Freud's works. It is more detailed in its reading of the implications of claiming Moses as an Egyptian (in terms of the literature of the period) and more sensitive in its placement of this work in the cultural climate of the late 1930s (in both Austria and England) than any other work on the text. It makes absolutely no claims about Freud's Jewish interest in terms of a hidden definition of the Jew. It assumes (quite correctly) that being Jewish was something with which Freud, given the rampant anti-Semitism of his day, had to come to terms. The external definition of the Jew—with all of its anti-Semitic overtones—becomes the baseline for Yerushalmi's sense of how Freud saw his own Jewish identity. The centrality of Freud's answer to how and why the Jew had become the central object of the hatred and fear of his Christian neighbors is examined with clarity and sensitivity by Yerushalmi. He notes in the introduction that, as much as he understands Freud's position, he does not necessarily accept it. This, from the leading Jewish historian of our day, is a position of strength. For Yerushalmi writes after the Shoah; he struggles from that perspective to understand a writer who wrote and lived on its brink. The two very different perspectives are mutually illuminating.

Having said all of that, Yerushalmi personally does want to see Freud's Jewishness as something deep in his psyche rather than something reflected from the world about him. He has a most puzzling appendix, citing the curator of the traveling exhibition of Freud's collection of art and artifacts about the "Jewishness" of some of the objects. The medieval menorah in Freud's collection (the one "Jewish" artifact actually present) was purchased because Freud believed it was an ancient artifact. The missing Kiddush cups—missing, that is, from the Freud collection, but present in Edmund Engelmann's (*Berggasse 19* [1976]) photographs of the Freud apartment in 1938—were Martha Freud's, not her husband's. One must remember that on his death, she returned to the ritual practices that their marriage had barred for her. Ritual objects do not an observing Jew make, nor

even one interested in ritual, except as the object of study.

Yerushalmi's study has become the new baseline for Freud studies. Its engaged and intelligent approach makes the study of the work and times of Freud, and especially the question of his Jewish identity, no longer territory for the speculations of those with specific ideological readings of Freud, but part of the complicated woof and warp of his own intricate thought. Perhaps no writer has ever written more about himself and told his readers less than did Freud. Yerushalmi takes these writings and begins to unravel their complexity. What one can now hope from him is as detailed and provocative a study of German-Jewish identity formation as his earlier study of the problems of memory in Jewish history.

SANDER L. GILMAN
Cornell University

MAX OELSCHLAEGER. *The Idea of Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age of Ecology*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 477. \$29.95.

Ecological thought, philosophical speculation, and intellectual history are the main components of Max Oelschlaeger's book. The first two elements shape its extensive opening and closing sections. Intellectual history provides the continuum for the intervening section. This is the weakest part of the work for it shows the influence of Clarence J. Glacken, to whom the book is dedicated, without coming quite up to *Traces on the Rhodian Shore* (1967). In another perspective, however, the book goes considerably beyond the span of Glacken's magisterial study, which covered the period from antiquity to the turn of the eighteenth century. Oelschlaeger probes the subject not only from the Paleolithic Age to the present but also seeks to guide future thought through his exhortation on the necessity to recognize and accept the equality of all forms of life.

The author tackles his awesome task with determination, which accounts for several characteristics within his study that diminish its clarity. His conviction "that reason influences cultural outcome" (p. ix) may have led him to adopt a didactic mode of exposition laden with fashionable jargon. Passages reiterate significant statements, then spill over into lengthy notes and continue to buttress specific points by relating them to variant views found in the secondary literature. Furthermore, the range of the study may account for its soft focus. Although concepts like wilderness, nature, land, and culture seem to mean whatever we use them to mean, it does not absolve authors entirely from stating what they mean with the words, particularly when their work deals with shifting attitudes toward these concepts and covers millennia. In order to ensure greater clarity, the author relies on eight tables. They summarize stages of the exposition from "Conjectures on a

Paleolithic Idea of Wilderness" (p. 12) to "Defining Characteristics of Ecofeminism" (p. 310).

Much of the argument guiding the reader from the Paleolithic into the future rests on a critique of major phases of Western thought from the perspective of what the author calls posthistoric primitivism or post-modernism. These vantage points allow him to avoid problems of interpretation that he considers connected with the use of the lens of history. Synthesizing the discoveries of specialists such as Herbert Schneidau, who warned about the lens of history, the author assesses the rise of Yahwism in Judeo-Christianity in the context of the transition from hunting-gathering to farming-herding. Subsequently, the ecological yardstick finds medieval Christendom and modernism, with a few exceptions, falling short in their relationship to nature. In broad outlines the argument turns around the impact on nature of the conventional view of God towering over an anthropocentric, hierarchical world, with nature's significance undermined by mechanisms reinforced or qualified but rarely questioned by the familiar sequence of great minds of the Western world.

In light of the author's perspective, the course of the argument seems predictable, but despite its length there are rather startling omissions. The contributions of Native American cosmic thought for an understanding of the relationship between people and nature are not taken into account. Also missing are Meister Eckhart, other fourteenth-century mystics, and some radical Franciscans who came close to espousing pantheism. To be sure, they are centuries away from the author's futuristic ecological view of God as part of nature's evolutionary process. The author reaches his advanced position of so-called deep ecology through his interpretation of the writings of Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, and Aldo Leopold, as well as the poems of Robinson Jeffers and Gary Snyder.

The concluding chapters, together with the opening chapter on the Paleolithic view of nature, mark the author's contributions to ecological thought. Building on the familiar division of U.S. environmentalists into preservationists (John Muir, for example) and conservationists (Gifford Pinchot), this part of the book discusses ecological, ethical, and aesthetic perspectives on people's relationship with what Leopold calls collectively the land (soils, waters, plants, and animals). Oelschlaeger seeks to fuse these sometimes conflicting perspectives into a body of thought that he variously calls deep, holistic, or arcadian ecology in contrast to the conservationists' shallow, resource, or imperial ecology. Convinced that it is necessary to live up to the implications of the organic links between society and the land, he finds his solution in a world that ensures the equality of all living beings. In his role as a futuristic philosopher, he is mute about ways to reach this much-needed goal. That does not detract, however, from the fascinating insights into the crucial significance of ecology

contained in a book that often seems deliberately distant from the ordinary concerns of historical writing for perspective and context.

GUNTHER BARTH
University of California,
Berkeley

KEITH TESTER. *Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights*. New York: Routledge. 1991. Pp. vi, 218. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$15.95.

This book by Keith Tester is multiply mislabeled. It is not, as the title suggests, about animals and society. Instead, it focuses on what a few, mostly English, people with particularly strong views have said and thought about nonhuman animals in the course of the past several centuries. Nor is it, as the subtitle suggests, about animal rights. Instead, it discusses a much broader range of positions, some of which are explicitly described by those who hold them (most significantly the philosopher Peter Singer, the author of *Animal Liberation*) as not involving the attribution of rights. (Tester acknowledges his mischaracterization near the beginning of his book, but nonetheless deploys it consistently throughout.) Finally, it is impossible for any work on this traditionally inflammatory topic to be, as the cover blurb suggests, merely interpretive and "not to come down pro or anti." Of course, authors are not responsible for the marketing decisions of their publishers, and the significance of titles and subtitles is easy to overstate. In this case, however, the claims of the titles accurately reflect those made elsewhere in the book, as the assertion in the blurb is supported by many features of Tester's own account. Most pervasively, his assumption of a rather removed and magisterial tone seems intended to put him above the fray he describes. Yet, from this position he repeatedly makes judgments that reveal his lack of sympathy with his protagonists and their positions. Ultimately, he denies that advocates of what he calls animal rights care about other animals at all; rather, he argues, their sole concern is with the question of what constitutes the human.

Near the end of this work, which apparently began as a sociology dissertation, Tester offers a more accurate characterization of his subject: "the history and sociology which made possible the claims which are currently made on behalf of animals' moral status" (p. 194). (In fact, he is only concerned with the most enthusiastic subset of such claims.) He begins his exploration with a rather quirky survey of modern views. For example, he asserts that "rights" philosopher Tom Regan has effected the "convincing demolition" (p. 7) of Singer's utilitarian arguments, and, more sweepingly, that "writers like [ethologist Konrad] Lorenz, [biologist E. O.] Wilson, and [philosopher Mary] Midgley are wrong" (p. 46). Then he summarizes the related views of a series of scholars and social theorists, including Claude Levi-Strauss,

Norbert Elias, Keith Thomas, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Robert Darnton, among others. Some theoretical context having thus been established, he traces the intellectual roots of modern animal advocacy, beginning with Bentham, Kant, and Rousseau, as well as its institutionalization, proceeding through the nineteenth-century anticruelty and antivivisection movements, to the recent disruptive protests of the Animal Liberation Front and its allies.

Most of the ground Tester covers in the course of this survey, which relies on secondary works and readily available primary sources, will be familiar to the growing number of historians interested in the subject. The concluding discussion of the radical wing of the current animal advocacy movement in Britain, which has in recent years moved from confronting fox hunters to burning laboratories and setting car bombs, is, however, a fresh contribution.

HARRIET RITVO

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

DAVID HENIGE. *In Search of Columbus: The Sources for the First Voyage*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 359.

On his return from the first of his four voyages to the Americas, Christopher Columbus presented his log, or *diario*, to his regents who arranged to have it copied. Both the autograph and the copy presumably made have been lost. The *diario* survives only in the collection of excerpts, digests, and notes made by Bartolomé de Las Casas; these were probably revised over a period of several decades in the first half of the sixteenth century, as Las Casas worked on the *Historia de las Indias*. Las Casas's version of Columbus's *diario* disappeared for some centuries but was recovered in 1791 by the Spanish scholar Martín Fernández de Navarrete, who printed it in 1825 in his *Colección de los viajes y descubrimientos que hicieron por mar los Españoles*. In 1892, Cesare de Lollis published an authoritative edition of the text in volume 1 of the *Raccolta di documenti e studi pubblicati della R. Commissione Colombiana*. More recently a cluster of editions and translations that supplement the *Raccolta* edition in various noteworthy ways have appeared. These include Manuel Alvar's *Diario del descubrimiento* (1976), Oliver Dunn and James E. Kelley, Jr.'s *The Diario of Christopher Columbus's First Voyage to America* (1989), and Consuelo Varela's *Diario del primer y tercer viaje de Cristóbal Colón*, in *Obras completas de Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas* (vol. 14, 1989).

It is the complex *fortuna* of this text known as the *diario* that is the subject of David Henige's volume. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1, "The Documents," sifts through the sediments of problems and issues that have accumulated in the transcribing, editing, and translating of this vexing piece. Henige painstakingly contextualizes the *diario* in several ways that will engage specialists. These include an intricate

tracing of the alterations made by Las Casas himself to his own manuscript and a comparison of the *diario* with two important contemporary sources, Las Casas's aforementioned *Historia* and Ferdinand Columbus's biography of his father.

Part 2, "The Historiographical Debate," grows out of the latter chapters of part 1, which examine complex questions regarding the inconsistencies in observations and figures recorded by Columbus at various stages of the first voyage. In the main, this section consists of an exhaustive presentation of the landfall debate, which only the most indefatigable *aficionados* are likely to navigate completely and successfully. Unless definitive archaeological evidence surfaces, the issue is likely to remain unresolved.

The extraordinary and fascinating detail of Henige's book and its technical scaffoldings are likely to make it inaccessible to all save specialists. The full import of its arguments cannot be grasped without (at the very least) the publications of Alvar, Dunn and Kelley, and Varela at hand. Yet the author unremittingly postures adversarial relationships between his study and the sources and products of collective scholarly endeavor that make it possible in the first place. Put somewhat differently, the line between constructive grapplings with this protean text, between Henige's self-avowed stance of "pyrrhonist skepticism" and tilting at windmills, can be thin indeed.

It is difficult to imagine that any scholar who has even cursorily examined the *diario* could remain unaware that we lack the autograph, that we know it only in Las Casas's version. While the issue of authorship may have been blurred by some who work with the text, this tends to occur in less-rigorous editions and translations, surely not in the ones mentioned above. So what seems to be one of the underlying stances of the book—that the confusion or conflations of Columbus's words and those of Las Casas is widespread—seems somewhat overstated. So, too, the implication that scholars who work on Columbus and the late-medieval and Renaissance cultures out of which he emerged are unaware of the vagaries and complexities of manuscript traditions. Such scholars know only too well that "pure" texts are illusions, that what we have to work with are always pastiches, palimpsests of the gradual painstaking accretions of collective endeavor. By way of ending, I offer Henige some words from Caroline Bynum's introduction to her *Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion* (1991): "the writing of history must come to terms gracefully with the incomplete . . . I suggest that the pleasure we find in research and storytelling about the past is enhanced both by the awareness that our own voices are provisional and by confidence in the revisions that the future will bring" (p. 10).

PAULINE MOFFITT WATTS
Sarah Lawrence College

ALAN K. SMITH. *Creating a World Economy: Merchant Capital, Colonialism, and World Trade, 1400–1825*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1991. Pp. viii, 318. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$18.95.

Alan K. Smith's book awkwardly combines the format of a monograph with the content of a textbook. Trained as an African historian, he had the courage to ask big and obvious questions about how Western Europe was able to dominate so much of the world in early modern times; but a conventional Marxist vocabulary leads him to explain what happened in thoroughly familiar ways, as due to the rise of capitalism and the victory of the bourgeoisie in Holland and England.

Smith begins with a hasty survey of the non-European world as it had developed up to about 1400. The next chapter seeks to anatomize medieval Europe, explaining that, before the disaster of the Black Death, Europe was a backward part of the globe and began to assume new form and formidability only after 1346. There follows a chapter on Iberian expansion and decline; another on the rise of capitalism in Holland and England. Dependency theory gives structure to the next two chapters, which deal with "peripheries" and "dependencies" respectively. The next pair of chapters describe how in the eighteenth century imperial rivalries led to revolution so that "the first world economy was threatened with extinction" (p. 230). But, of course, as Smith explains in the conclusion, a new world order swiftly emerged, based on "the ascendancy of industrial capital and the tremendous increase in productive capacity that followed in its wake" (p. 246).

This is all familiar, and not very convincing to me. Ideas, technology, disease, and military-political organization (not to mention individual actions and discoveries) are not merely results of "adjustments that were being made in the structure of the world economy," as Smith affirms (p. 204). Moreover, his writing is as flabby as his thinking, making his meaning sometimes obscure. Thus, we are told, with reference to the church reforms of Henry VIII, that "England lost not only the advantages of an official church but also much of its monastic lands through confiscation by the crown" (p. 111). One wonders what Smith meant by "England" in such a sentence, and what official advantages the Anglican church lacked. Or again, "These were social formations that developed intensive trading relations with the capitalist regions of northwestern Europe. One factor that made this possible was that the peripheries were spatially situated in such a position to give them easy access to their markets" (p. 124). Grammar notwithstanding, in this instance I presume that Smith means to say that northwestern Europeans had easy access to peripheral markets.

A further defect of the book is that Smith is not at home in centuries before 1500. His first two chapters abound with dubious and some flatly erroneous as-

sertions. He dates iron smelting in southwest Asia to 3500 B.C. (p. 19), says that the Nile valley supported "numerous cities . . . before the founding of the Old Kingdom" (p. 21), declares that Mayan steles sometimes weighed "more than fifty thousand tons" (p. 22), and claims that Europe "was too impoverished and underdeveloped during its Middle Ages to play a significant role" in long-distance trade (p. 24). Lastly, the notes to this chapter have been scrambled at the back of the book so that one cannot discern what authorities he used in arriving at these and other absurd conclusions.

Investigation of world history is a worthy and appropriate exercise for historians, and our professional training does not prepare us well for the task. Pitfalls are many and Smith has succumbed to rather more than his share of them. His ambition seems admirable to me; his performance regrettable.

WILLIAM H. MCNEILL
EMERITUS
University of Chicago

JAMES DEFONZO. *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1991. Pp. xvi, 336. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$16.95.

James DeFronzo's book is a well-written, seriously researched volume on revolutions in the twentieth century. It is an excellent undergraduate textbook on twentieth-century revolutions. Informed by some theoretical notions, it develops a series of case studies on Russia, Eastern Europe, China, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and South Africa. The work stresses five features of revolutionary success: mass frustration, elite divisions, unifying motivations across groups, severe political crises, and tolerant world contexts. While three of these are familiar, the stress on cross-class motivation and tolerant world context are useful and somewhat newer and interesting in the literature. For students, this book would be highly recommended and a useful complement to the earlier, more theoretical volume by Jack Goldstone (*Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies* [1986]).

The problem, however, comes with the broader question of its value to scholars in the field. Here there are serious shortcomings. The omission of the earlier pre-twentieth-century cases of the American, English, and above all French revolutions is serious. All theorizing must begin with these cases and yet they are omitted. So, too, are the numerous French tries at revolution in the nineteenth century (1830, 1848, 1871). There is little sense of history in this book, little sense that anything important happened before 1917. Furthermore, the rapid developments of a new revolutionary era from 1989–92 have outdated much of the book. The new Russian and Eastern European revolutions, plus radical changes in South Africa and Nicaragua and lesser ones in

Vietnam have left this book dated and in need of major changes.

There is no discussion of why these particular cases and not others even in this century were chosen. The methodology is quite weak here, as is the very definition of revolution itself. There is no discussion of the tantalizingly difficult problem of revolution and counterrevolution, of whether countries such as Germany in 1933 and Iran in 1979 were undergoing perhaps counterrevolution and not revolution.

Most importantly, the attack on other theorists in the field of revolutions is a bit too easy. DeFronzo never mentions in his critique that other theorists were concerned largely with pre-1950 cases of major actors in the European (England, France, Russia) or Asian (China, Japan) political systems. Many of DeFronzo's revolutions were neglected dependent revolutions, often national liberation movements in the Third World. This accounts for the classic neglect of the permissive world environment that DeFronzo observes. His cases are simply different than theirs and differently situated in the international environment. Furthermore, he does not develop these ideas in more than a fragmentary way.

The book is uncritically and unabashedly prorevolution. The massive depredations practiced by revolutionary regimes in Russia (Great Purges, the gulag, the Ukrainian famine), China (mass executions in the countryside in 1948, large-scale violence in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution), Cambodia (a veritable holocaust), as well as poverty and expansionism in Vietnam are slightly mentioned and no conclusions are drawn. In the last paragraph of the book we are told that even the United States may experience revolution (albeit nonviolent) because its economy sustains "tremendous inequalities [that] give rise to the abysmal violations of human rights represented by poverty, crime, child abuse and escapist drug abuse" (pp. 318-19). Others may care to draw different conclusions and make a different balance sheet.

Finally, there are problems with specific cases. How can the 1905 Revolution in Russia be described without also discussing the Moscow uprising, military mutinies, or regional variations, topics developed in a series of fine recent books? Georgii Nosar, not Leon Trotsky, led the 1905 Petrograd Soviet until the end, and *zemstvos* were not peasant political bodies. Similarly, the work on China tells us that Han were 95 percent of the population (really 91 percent); ignores the 1927 Autumn Harvest Uprising, the Canton uprising, and the 1936 Xian incident; and devotes three lines to the massive and decisive Chinese civil war (1946-49).

In short, DeFronzo's book is an excellent undergraduate text for students: it offers some interesting ideas for scholars but needs much more work to make a real contribution in the field. The book succeeds admirably in its first goal and falls, almost inevitably,

quite short of its second. Nevertheless, it is a book that fills a void in the field.

JONATHAN ADELMAN

*Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver*

GLENN ANTHONY MAY. *Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991. Pp. xxiii. 382. \$30.00.

This book by Glenn Anthony May joins others of recent vintage, notably Brian Linn's *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines* (1989), in revising interpretations of what used to be called the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902) and is now often called the Philippine-American War. Linn emphasized the local variations of American counterinsurgency in four regions of Luzon, exploding the older notion that centralized American leadership divined and imposed a single solution throughout the Philippines. May examines developments in one province, Batangas, emphasizing the Filipino experience and questioning standard views about the social background of the insurgents. He provides a fascinating social history of Batangas during the 1890s and the early years of the twentieth century, concluding with the events of the insurgency, that lends credibility to his causal analysis.

May's principal accomplishment is to demonstrate convincingly that the local elites in Batangas supported the insurgency and provided its leadership, refuting the views of Teodoro Agoncillo, the leading Filipino student of the insurgency. Agoncillo, a class theorist, believed that the lower classes provided the main support for Emilio Aguinaldo and that local elites supported the Americans. May notes, however, that lower-class elements finally rallied to the insurgent leader Miguel Malvar only during the final desperate phases of the battle for Batangas. Rivalries among the elite leadership frequently interfered with the efficiency of insurgent operations.

Despite his rejection of Agoncillo's views, May is no apologist for the campaign of General J. Franklin Bell that finally stamped out the insurgency in 1902. These operations contributed to the suffering of the local populace by reducing the food supply, especially rice, and by killing many carabaos.

Of considerable methodological interest is May's use of medical statistics, painstakingly culled from local church records, to explain the demographic effect of various diseases in Batangas, especially malaria, although smallpox and cholera also took their toll. American military operations, especially those led by General Bell, contributed to epidemics, but May shows that developments before 1899 had already created dangerous levels of mortality from malaria and other diseases. Malaria increased among the Batangueños after rinderpest killed many cara-

baos, forcing the disease-bearing mosquitoes to seek blood meals from human victims.

This epidemiological finding is a particular aspect of a more general conclusion: the war, although disruptive, "did not alter—and in some respects merely reinforced—certain fundamental realities of provincial life" (p. 290). Throughout this excellent work, May's emphasis is on continuity, not on change.

May believes that historians of Southeast Asia for the moment should work on monographic studies like his rather than on sweeping syntheses. This emphasis will build a firm foundation for generalizations later. He modestly notes of his own study that "much of the story remains to be told" (p. 292). Perhaps so, but future investigators of other Filipino provinces during the insurgency will rely heavily on this model analysis, which is one of the most important studies available on Philippine history at the turn of the twentieth century, a moment of fundamental importance for the Philippines that is still shrouded in the mists of mythology and propaganda. Unlike many others, May does not let his personal sympathies distort his judgment. This restraint may not endear him to partisans, but it ensures that his enviable book will remain useful for many years and will influence all future study of the Philippine-American War.

DAVID F. TRASK
Washington, D.C.

KEITH KYLE. *Suez*. New York: St. Martin's. 1991. Pp. xii, 656. \$35.00.

The release since 1987 of voluminous British and American documents on the Suez crisis of 1956 has prompted a surge of scholarship that moves beyond the polemical and speculative accounts in memoirs and early surveys. In this book, journalist and historian Keith Kyle "tells the story of a single year" (p. 4) by surveying the domestic political, diplomatic, and military dimensions of the crisis. The narrative is based on research in British, American, French, Israeli, and Egyptian records; a careful reading of memoirs; and the author's notes from producing television documentaries.

The book surveys the roles of and relationships between several states, but it is Anglocentric in its research and its treatment of politics, press commentary, foreign policy making, and military planning and operations. Although Kyle purports to write "at the human level a story about two men" (p. 5), Anthony Eden and Gamal Abdel Nasser, the former commands the center stage while the latter is overshadowed by John Foster Dulles and others. Britain's debacle at Suez is attributed to Eden's poor health, limited ability, and entrapment "by cruel circumstances" (p. 557).

The central strength of this book is the author's use of recently declassified records to reject or modify

early interpretations of the crisis and to defend his observations on important issues. He excels in explaining the domestic political influences on British policy making and Eden's reaction to intragovernmental dissent. Kyle documents the evolution of tripartite collusion against Egypt, further discounting the myth of British innocence long perpetuated by officials' memoirs. He suggests the novel view that Eden approved collusion because it offered a means to preserve Jordan and depose Nasser in a single stroke. Kyle's survey of British military plans and operations, and of American interference in them, surpasses other accounts.

Kyle also discusses clandestine activities, including the covert dimension of the Omega initiative, the apparent Western conspiracy in Syria, the use of black radio, and the quality of American intelligence about Anglo-French intentions. He judiciously pieces together fragments of information that have eluded government security nets into a discussion unlikely to be improved for some time. It is unfortunate, and no fault of the author, that restrictions on information more than thirty-five years old make Kyle's points tentative. These restraints occasionally force the author to rely too heavily on the memoirs of Winthrop Aldrich and Miles Copeland, which Kyle himself demonstrates are not entirely credible.

A few flaws afflict the work. First, Kyle often fails to distinguish vital points from mundane ones. So inclusive are his summaries of cables and memoranda that pertinent thoughts are hidden among points of no apparent relevance. A second and related shortcoming is that the author's analysis of important matters is occasionally overwhelmed by his devotion to chronology and detail; some central questions are addressed only in passing. The book reads in places like a television documentary: interesting, colorful, and dramatic, but short on penetrating analysis.

Third, Kyle does not pursue some contradictions in policy. No explanation is provided as to why the Pentagon shifted from sympathy for Anglo-French war aims in August to anger at actual operations in October. Left unresolved are the disparities between American opposition to war against Nasser and Washington's quiet encouragement of London and Paris to attack. And minor errors, like dating the Czech arms deal in October 1955 and referring to Chester Cooper as Chester Crocker (pp. 74, 496), will cause discomfort in some readers.

Despite these quibbles, the copious research in recently released documents render this the best available account of British policy toward Egypt in 1956. Scholars will appreciate its encyclopedic detail and its informed observations about many of the key issues of the Suez crisis.

PETER L. HAHN
Ohio State University,
Columbus

DIANE B. KUNZ. *The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 295. \$39.95.

The Suez crisis of 1956–57 ranks among the most important and complicated episodes in postwar history. Diane B. Kunz focuses on a key aspect of the crisis, economic diplomacy. U.S. withdrawal of an offer to aid Egypt for the Aswan High Dam “triggered” Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company; the potential economic consequences of loss of control of the canal were an important consideration behind Britain’s decision to seek to reverse nationalization by force; and economic pressure was central to the U.S. strategy for dealing with Egypt before the crisis and with Britain, France, and Israel after their attack on Egypt. Although her claim that “economic diplomacy defined the course of the Suez crisis from beginning to end” (p. 2) is overstated, she is on firm ground in stating that “the economic diplomacy of the Suez crisis provides an excellent (and neglected) case study of the use of economic sanctions in international relations” (p. 4).

Drawing on extensive research in U.S. and British diplomatic and financial records, Kunz does an excellent job of detailing the degree of Britain’s financial dependence on the United States. British determination to preserve the sterling area, she explains, further limited Britain’s freedom of action. Her account of how the U.S. government used its economic power to force the British to withdraw from Egypt is likewise clear and convincing, as are her much briefer remarks on why economic pressure was significantly less successful against France and Egypt. Her discussion of U.S. economic pressure on Israel is less satisfactory. She writes repeatedly that the U.S. government suspended economic aid to Israel (pp. 3, 124, 163, 166), but documents published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* volumes on the crisis make it clear that the Eisenhower administration quickly reversed its initial decision to halt aid (see *FRUS, 1955–57*, vol. 16, pp. 890–91, 928–29; vol. 17, pp. 40–41). Kunz rightly notes, however, that the Eisenhower administration did not freeze Israeli bank balances, permitted both aid in transit and ongoing projects to continue, took no action to halt U.S. private donations to Israel, and approved an increase in Israel’s International Monetary Fund quota in December 1956 (pp. 3, 163; 265, n. 55). And one must agree with her conclusion that economic sanctions were mainly of symbolic importance and that Israel’s need for U.S. political support was the key factor behind the withdrawal of Israeli forces (p. 193).

In comparison to her sophisticated analysis of financial factors in Anglo-American relations, her discussion of other issues is not as persuasive. For example, while her demonstration of British dependence on the United States justifies her description of

British behavior as “almost incomprehensibly foolish” (p. 194), her account does not provide any new answers as to why British leaders acted as they did. Kunz is particularly harsh on Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan, whose performance she criticizes as “incompetent,” and who misled Prime Minister Anthony Eden as to U.S. intentions before the crisis and the Cabinet as to Britain’s financial position during the crisis (pp. 107, 132). Although she speculates that Macmillan may have been motivated by political ambition, this comment, like far too much other substantive material, appears in the endnotes rather than in the text where it belongs (p. 243, n. 63).

It is probably unfair to expect anyone to cover completely the highly complex set of decisions and events that made up the Suez crisis in a book of less than 200 pages, at least not until many more monographs such as this study are available. In the meantime, scholars should add Kunz’s valuable study of Anglo-American economic diplomacy to the already bulging bookshelf of works about one of the most important crises of the postwar world.

DAVID S. PAINTER
Georgetown University

JOSEPH SMITH. *Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Brazil, 1889–1930*. (Pitt Latin American Series.) Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1991. Pp. vii, 296. \$39.95.

Writing a history of U.S. relations with most Latin American countries before the 1930s is a difficult assignment. There is no overarching theme, such as American territorial ambitions, strategic concerns, or investments, around which to create a coherent narrative and analysis. As a result, these studies tend to break up into fragments—boundary disputes, claims cases, and the like—treated in short-winded and often repetitive episodes that make generalization difficult.

Joseph Smith’s history of United States–Brazilian relations between 1889 and 1930 is a good case in point. His terminal dates are political landmarks: at one end the overthrow of Emperor Pedro II and the creation of a Brazilian republic and at the other the coming to power of Getúlio Vargas, who soon became a dictator. Smith concludes that during these four decades the relationship between these two “unequal giants” evolved into “a tradition of diplomatic friendship that would endure into the future” (p. 205). A pleasant if bland thesis, but unfortunately it stretches the facts as Smith presents them. During the 1890s U.S.–Brazilian relations showed partly successful efforts to adjust to new conditions, the Americans to their international commercial power, the Brazilians to their unfamiliar system of government. Relations improved for a time after 1900, thanks in part to the influence of two sympathetic policy makers, Elihu

Root and the Baron of Rio Branco. But Woodrow Wilson did not understand Latin Americans, and the United States' involvement in European affairs during and immediately after World War I disappointed Brazilian hopes for cooperation. Smith himself characterizes the 1920s as a time of "misunderstandings and bruised feelings" (chapter title). The reader can hardly help concluding that at the end of Smith's four decades the United States took Brazil for granted almost as much as at the beginning, to the continuing discontent of the Brazilians.

In other respects, this is a fine addition to the shelf of books on hemispheric relations, for Smith has diligently and judiciously plumbed Brazilian as well as American documents, memoirs, newspapers, and monographs, and his detailed judgments are balanced and sound. He also develops quite a few leitmotifs along the way: Brazil's desire for international status; its rivalry with Argentina, both political and economic; the intermittent American desire for Brazilian support in the hemisphere or (more rarely) the world arena; the disagreements over economic questions, especially reciprocity and coffee valorization; the play of personalities; and the everlasting accompaniment of sour comments from the suspicious British ambassador in Rio. None of these is a major theme on which to base a compelling thesis. But they resemble dilemmas in American relations with the Third World today, and it is good to have them analyzed in an earlier period, when they were not entangled with European or Asian problems as well. Through studying this early U.S.-Brazilian diplomacy, American readers of Smith's book will better appreciate the modern problems confronting the two nations since 1930, when the United States began to pay more (if still intermittent) attention to South America and its giant quasi-power.

DAVID M. PLETCHER
Indiana University,
Bloomington

THOMAS M. LEONARD. *Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability*. (The United States and the Americas.) Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 245. Cloth \$35.00, paper \$15.00.

Thomas M. Leonard has written the third scholarly survey of U.S. relations with Central America to appear in the past decade. He justifies his effort by arguing that his predecessors—Walter LaFeber (*Inevitable Revolutions* [1983; 1989]) and John Findling (*Close Neighbors, Distant Friends* [1987])—have misunderstood the complex nature of the diplomatic relationship. LaFeber emphasized the economic imperatives of U.S. policy, whereas Findling stressed its geopolitical nature. In Leonard's view, the relationship is dynamic. The United States has consistently tried to secure Central America from foreign intrusion and has employed a variety of methods, includ-

ing trade and investment, to achieve hegemony. But Central Americans have also tried to direct U.S. foreign policy for their own purposes. In particular, Central American elites have used the U.S. desire for external security and internal stability to maintain the domestic status quo.

Leonard is insightful when he demonstrates that even small, weak nations are occasionally capable of manipulating powerful neighbors. Honduran strongman Tiburcio Carias readily signed in 1935 an unfavorable trade agreement with the United States, calculating that the easy bargain he struck on trade would induce the State Department to overlook his illegal extension of presidential power. During the Cold War, Central American tyrants, such as the Somozas of Nicaragua, won military aid from the United States by labeling their political opponents as Communists.

The United States, however, usually dominated Central America. Unlike his analysis of the motivations of Central American leaders, Leonard's description of the exercise of U.S. power in the region does not measurably contribute to existing scholarship on inter-American relations. Whether he is surveying the Marine Corps campaign against the Nicaraguan revolutionary Augusto Sandino or the covert war against the popularly elected government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán of Guatemala, Leonard is covering familiar ground. He also divorces his study of Central America from the Latin American policy of the United States, barely mentioning such critical events as the Venezuelan Boundary Crisis of 1895 and the Spanish-American War. When he does review larger issues, his comments tend to be cursory. In the mid-1960s, State Department officer Thomas Mann instructed U.S. diplomats that thwarting Communism in Latin America had priority over the promotion of constitutional practices. Leonard summarizes this by noting that "the Mann Doctrine meant that there would no longer be a differentiation between good guys and bad guys" (p. 153).

Leonard is undoubtedly correct when he points out that the United States did not anticipate the consequences of its actions when it tried to impose its institutions and values on Central Americans. Those consequences, however, need to be explored fully in the way historians Bruce Calder, Louis Pérez, Jr., and Hans Schmidt have in their studies of U.S. policies for Caribbean nations. To be sure, Leonard suggests that U.S. military training and counterinsurgency policies contributed to political polarization in Central America. But he does not pursue the subject. Notwithstanding his solid efforts to consider the foreign policy goals of Central American leaders, Leonard has offered an intelligent but traditional diplomatic history of U.S. relations with Central America.

STEPHEN G. RABE
University of Texas,
Dallas

SUSANNE JONAS. *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power*. Foreword by EDELBERTO TORRES RIVAS. (Latin American Perspectives Series, number 5.) Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1991. Pp. xx, 288. Cloth \$42.00, paper \$16.95.

Susanne Jonas originally began this book as an update to a textbook chapter she had written twenty years ago. The purpose of this study was then to cover the period from 1970 to 1990 in Guatemalan history. From that the project expanded into a book interpreting Guatemalan history in the modern age going back to the era of Jorge Ubico, covering the revolution period of 1945–54, the repression of the 1960s, and then, in somewhat more detail, the last twenty years. As she herself states, this is not meant to be a comprehensive history, and some chapters, such as the one on rebels and death squads in the 1960s, are disappointingly short of detail.

The purpose of the book lies in its interpretation of the nature of the violent struggle for control of Guatemala. Jonas's view centers on social class and ethnicity as the major movers in this struggle. She finds that Guatemala has been and is dominated by an unreformed oligarchy, which she designates the bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie has modified itself over the last century to accept agricultural diversification, capitalism, and technology, without undergoing a true transformation of its nature. The author sees this class adopting allies such as the counterinsurgency army's officer class and the technical and managerial class of civilians. Despite the aggrandizement of power and wealth by the army over the last two decades, she rejects the view accepted by many that the army is now the dominant partner. In her view the bourgeoisie has not held political power directly "because it historically has no legitimacy beyond itself" (p. 92) and thus rules through a coalition, but internally it remains tightly knit and powerful.

The revolution badly frightened the bourgeoisie. In Jonas's interpretation of the downfall of the revolution, the army, the bourgeoisie, the urban petty bourgeoisie (which turned against the revolution), and the United States all played a part. And she sees U.S. intervention more as an effort to protect international economic interests than as a Cold War response to a government mistakenly seen as communist, although she does admit this as a factor.

Quite rightly, Jonas sees in the collapse of the revolution the roots of the guerrilla movement that developed in the 1960s. This movement is shown to have had distinct peaks and valleys, being almost wiped out in the late 1960s by the army aided substantially by the United States. Only in the early 1980s does she see the guerrillas effectively making contact with the indigenous population, which she attributes to their class and ethnic prejudices. But the link to the Indian community was to prove disastrous to the Indians, whose ruthless massacre Jonas labels genocide.

The best and most thorough parts of the book analyze the situation during the 1980s and the transition to a sort of democracy, still dominated by the bourgeoisie and the military. Jonas castigates the democratically elected President Vinicio Cerezo for not using the maneuvering space available to him at the start of his presidency. The book ends with the new elections and the start of peace negotiations.

Although she finds no military victory for the guerrillas, Jonas does not see them being defeated either, and it is her thesis that the revolutionary struggle has permanently transformed Guatemala and its people and will lead to still more unpredictable changes. This is a well-written and useful analysis, but one that suffers from a rather mechanistic view of social classes and, perhaps, from an overemphasis of the role of the United States, especially over the last decade.

THOMAS P. ANDERSON

Eastern Connecticut State University

ANCIENT

ROBERT A. BAUSLAUGH. *The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xxiii, 305. \$45.00.

Robert A. Bauslaugh's thorough survey of neutrality among Greek *poleis* down to the battle of Chaironeia (338 B.C.) is divided into two parts: one with a conceptual and synchronic presentation, and the second with a chronological treatment of the neutral states, naturally divided by events such as the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. A second volume on Hellenistic neutrality is promised. It is important to note that Bauslaugh is striving for an overview that is not only useful to students of ancient history at all levels but also generally accessible to historians and social scientists. A conscientious attempt has been made to introduce modern international law and, in the conclusion, to juxtapose its paradigm with classical realities. Admirably, the sources are quoted extensively, with translations often provided. These diverse renderings, however, differ considerably in style and terminology. The author might have been better advised to supply his own translations throughout, just as he has sometimes translated inscriptions. Similarly, he has amply cited bibliography—some may well think excessively—and appended lengthy indices of topics and sources.

Many of the modern difficulties in weighing the significance of ancient neutrality lie in the absence of a single term (or related words) delimiting the concept. Thus, Bauslaugh starts sensibly with an isolation of the relevant terminology in his first chapter, explicating phraseology like "to keep quiet," "to keep the peace," or "to be allies of neither side" (pp. 3–8, 15–16). The second chapter is more diffuse, treating the ancient historiography on neutrality; much could have been left for the conclusion. Its essential point is

the singularity of Thucydides's insights on the predicament of the neutral in a context of hegemonic power blocs.

In chapter three, diplomatic usage is analyzed on some congruent topics, such as the inviolability of heralds, the *asylia* of sanctuaries, and arbitration. A discussion of the customary rules of war contains a valuable refutation of G. E. M. De Ste. Croix's exaggeration of the power-political aspects of fifth-century interstate relations (*The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* [1972]). Here is sounded a theme that resonates throughout: official *philia* "friendship" (semantically singular by its appearance in treaties) can justify neutrality by creating equal loyalties toward both combatants (pp. 56–64). Chapter four attempts a balance sheet on neutrality, an exercise better postponed to an expanded conclusion. Here I would question Bauslaugh's claim that neutral shipping benefited from an immunity from interdiction during the fifth and fourth centuries. I suspect that the discursive character of sections of the first part of this work betrays rewriting in the face of readers' criticism. This process of improvement has occurred at some cost to integration of subject matter.

Regarding Bauslaugh's discussion of the decisions to abstain from hostilities which constitute the second, longer part, I cannot go into detail here. Specialists will doubtless have criticisms of particular points from the perspective of more narrowly focused research (as my own work on Aigina leads me to do). And it should not detract from the author's many thoughtful remarks (on, for example, the neutrals during the Syracusan campaign) to observe that neutrality is a useful concept in categorizing incidents of differential military commitment rather than a powerful analytical tool for most individual episodes. The roster of neutral states has also been unduly expanded by the inclusion of states marginal to theaters of war and by equating the absence of active Persian intervention with neutrality. Moreover, one might question the inclusion of instances where neutrality describes a decision not to provide forces, owed by treaty, to a stronger ally. The supervening obligation shades neutrality into dissension and rebellion.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, Bauslaugh has done a commendable job, intelligently synthesizing the ancient evidence and modern scholarship on neutrality into our first serviceable treatment.

THOMAS FIGUEIRA
Rutgers University,
New Brunswick

AVERIL CAMERON. *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse*. (Sather Classical Lectures, number 55.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Pp. xv, 261. \$39.95.

Averil Cameron's Sather lectures of 1986 carry out the program that the author outlined in an important review article published in that year, "Redrawing the Map: Early Christian Territory after Foucault" (*Journal of Roman Studies* 76 [1986], 266–71). The book retains both the structure and the stylistic presentation of the original format. Despite a complaint that "very little ground can be covered in six lectures" (p. 9), Cameron offers a wide-ranging essay in historical interpretation, following the development of Christian discourse from its beginnings in the "unpromising conditions" of the first century (p. 2) to its triumph as "totalizing discourse" in the early Byzantine state (p. 206). The main focus is on Greek texts and authors, on which Cameron makes many perceptive observations. Latin writers such as Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome are also discussed, but the value of the book lies in its last three chapters (pp. 120–221), which analyze, respectively, the public dimension of Christian oratory in the fourth century, the growing importance of "the rhetoric of paradox" and of "the discourse of virginity" (p. 171), and the emergence of "a Christian discourse of representation" (p. 193).

Unfortunately, Cameron's valuable and illuminating interpretations of Christian texts are set in an overall interpretation of the historical phenomenon conventionally styled "the rise of Christianity" that is old-fashioned and (I believe) mistaken. For Cameron, "Christianity came out into the open in the fourth century" (p. 41) and cities only "began to look and sound Christian" toward 400 "after the official condemnation of paganism under Theodosius" (p. 191). Most recent historians of the early church, with approaches as diverse as those of Peter Brown and Fergus Millar, have on the contrary emphasized the growing prominence of the Christian church and its bishops in Roman society during the third century. Cameron says little about Origen, and nothing whatever about the triumphalism that led him to claim that Christianity was true because it was successful—before 250.

Cameron uses the fashionable term "discourse" as a tool of analysis throughout the book. A definition is offered at the outset: "I hope that it may be legitimate for convenience to use the singular term 'discourse' without being accused of distortion" because "I mean by it all the rhetorical strategies and manners of expression that I take to be characteristic of Christian writing" (p. 5). This is of course a definition of "Christian discourse," not of the wider term "discourse" itself. On this definition, however, phrases such as "the struggle of Christians to control their own discourse" (p. 21) sound virtually tautologous, while the terms "pagan discourse" (p. 7), "public discourse" (p. 123), and "political discourse" (p. 152) are left undefined.

From a technical point of view, there is too much in the book that is irritating. The anonymous *Epistle to Diognetus* is attributed without argument to Athena-

goras (p. 35, n. 70); books with similar titles by E. R. Dodds and Robin Lane Fox are confused (p. 138); and the bibliography not only contains minor inaccuracies and fails to provide the series titles of some volumes where they will be needed by users of most libraries but also omits the author's own review article cited above (and in the book, p. 93, n. 12). Moreover, in a book that consistently (and rightly) stresses the figural quality of much ancient Christian writing and thought, it seems odd that most of the seventeen illustrations are late medieval or later.

T. D. BARNES
University of Toronto

THOMAS W. GALLANT. *Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece: Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 267. \$39.50.

This is a highly provocative study of what Thomas W. Gallant calls the risk-management strategies adopted by ancient Greek peasants to cope with fluctuations in food production. The chapters include discussions on size of household, life expectancy, slave labor, the average size of farms, taxation, kin and patronage networks, communal storage, debt, and much more. Bristling with quantitative analyses and computer simulations on subjects such as daily caloric intake, crop yield variability, and the impact of weeding on the yield of lentils, this book will undoubtedly delight as much as it will exasperate the practitioners of the various specialized disciplines, notably anthropologists, agrarian economists, and, last but by no means least, ancient historians, to whom it is addressed. It is a reflection on the current rifts that exist between these disciplines that any judgment on the book's merits can hardly be but highly prejudicial either in favor of or against the undertaking.

For my own part, while acknowledging the brilliance with which Gallant brings for the first time within our range and scrutiny an important and fundamental aspect of life in the ancient world, I have to declare my unease at the implementation of a methodology that tends to privilege comparative data over historical data. Perhaps the most critical question for the historian reading this book—a question that the terms of Gallant's investigation pushes constantly to the forefront of his attention—is whether the “coping mechanisms” that are described here to account for the survival of the Greek peasant as a generic category, so to speak, should and can be extrapolated from so little case-specific evidence. I would also suggest that although Gallant's introduction reveals him to be alert to the pitfalls inherent in an investigation that has such paltry primary material, his use of it is occasionally lacking in finesse. Just to take a small example, it is highly questionable whether the speeches of the orators, which largely reflect the life-patterns of the wealthy, can aid us in

determining the size of an “average” Greek household (p. 23). In addition, it would have been useful to have some discussion of the qualifications of the widely quoted Theophrastus to be the spokesperson of what might be called the grassroots agricultural technique used throughout Greece. An index locorum would have assisted the reader in assessing the extensiveness of the literary sources. Except in the final chapter, there is insufficient acknowledgment of the impact of historical or regional diversity on the life and indeed mentality of peasants in Greece, although the author places considerable emphasis on the life-cycle of the individual ancient household over time. It would have been interesting to have had Gallant's thoughts on the implications of Athens' increasing dependency on imported grain from the beginning of the sixth century onward, insofar as his model can be related to the agricultural realities of fifth-century Attica.

These reservations notwithstanding, this book is an accomplishment and there can be no doubt that it will make an important contribution to our understanding of what it meant to live life perpetually at the edge of the economic abyss—a condition that, although only sporadically alluded to in the historical record, was an ever-present and grim reality for at least half the Greek population, who, according to Gallant, turn out to have been canny, resourceful, resilient, and creative.

ROBERT GARLAND
Colgate University

RICHARD E. MITCHELL. *Patricians and Plebeians: The Origin of the Roman State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1990. Pp. xvi, 276. \$28.95.

The history of the Romans prior to 218 B.C. is terribly fragile; a great deal of it depends on complex reconstructions devised much later than the events in question, and relatively little can be said that is not subject to challenge or to serious reservations. In this book, as in previous articles, Richard E. Mitchell attempts to replace accepted views about one of the main elements in every standard account, the Struggle of the Orders, the conflict between the patricians and plebeians that makes up much of the internal history of republican Rome before 287 B.C. (but it is strange to argue that the Struggle of the Orders is “usually considered the central theme of Roman Republican history” [p. 221]).

Mitchell's contention is that no such struggle ever took place, and that the *patres* who take up so much space in the sources were not the patricians as usually understood, a caste of aristocrats, but a caste of priests; all the *patres'* genuine privileges, he argues, were in the sphere of religion. The basis of this view is that classical writers give divergent accounts of the *patres* and plebeians, which is taken to justify a way of identifying the *patres* that was unknown—as far as we

know—to the Romans themselves. The Struggle of the Orders as usually described is for Mitchell no more than a concoction by later Roman historians (perhaps Livy himself; see pp. 221–26), elaborated by those of the nineteenth century.

The author has valuable things to say about some individual problems. He is refreshing, for example, on the “publication” of the Twelve Tables, and intriguing on the subject of quasi-hereditary succession to priesthoods in the late Republic. But his principal argument falls down at essential moments; thus, he fails to establish that Roman writers frequently called plebeian *nobiles* patricians (although he tries; see pp. 22–23), and he fails to give any plausibility at all to the notion that at one time priests alone could be *patres*. Religious and political power were without doubt inextricably linked in the early Republic, but this theory about a sort of Roman theocracy is not likely to convince very many.

Loosely linked to the author's theory about the Struggle of the Orders is a second thesis, to the effect that the Roman state grew not out of the family and the conversion of family institutions into public institutions but out of a military system and the need to organize the citizens for war. This is an attractive hypothesis, but it is hardly novel. Max Weber might have been cited, and there exists an entire literature about state formation that deserves more attention here.

Mitchell is an erudite scholar, but this book seems to have an uncertain sense of intellectual geography. Another sign of this may be the author's persistent habit of criticizing “scholars” or “modern scholars” without specifying who they are or where their opinions are to be found (there are innumerable examples). This practice is tiresome at best; a student is likely to find it entirely baffling.

WILLIAM V. HARRIS
Columbia University

JOHN K. EVANS. *War, Women and Children in Ancient Rome*. New York: Routledge. 1991. Pp. xvi, 263. \$45.00.

Complaining, with some justice, that recent books on Roman women “are divorced from the issues of perennial concern to the broader community of political and social historians of Rome,” John K. Evans “attempts to link the study of Roman women and children to one of the most venerable topics in Roman history . . . the domestic consequences of Roman ‘imperialism’” from the late third to late first century B.C. (p. x). Or, to look at developments the other way around, he finds the explanation for the transformation of the sociolegal situation of the family between the Twelve Tables of the fifth century and the comparatively rich literary sources of the first in the hard realities of incessant foreign campaigns. This must be right; the difficulty is to document it.

Evans's contribution is to argue the case and to adduce what sources are available. Four substantial chapters discuss the archaic subordination of women and the explanations for their comparative freedom in the developed legal system; evolving customs on dowry and inheritance as imperialism brought unprecedented wealth, especially to the propertied classes; the socioeconomic problems of the poorer peasants created by military service and an agrarian revolution (a subject Evans has explored elsewhere) and what would happen to countrywomen driven to seek subsistence in the towns; and the changing emotional content of the parent-child relationship.

Alert to the nature of sources and skeptical of monocausal explanation and of several influential recent reconstructions, Evans gives an independent assessment of evidence familiar to specialists, keeping the complex interrelations of law and life clearly before the reader. He moves from the inheritances of the Scipionic ladies or the investments of Caesennia to the employment opportunities open to *rusticae* (a full examination of the evidence, chiefly inscriptions, leads inevitably to the conclusion that streetwalking or the sweatshop were most accessible). The problem of evidence remains. Is it valid to use the Bithynian rhetorician Dio of Prusa's idyllic portrayal of peasant life in Euboea (A.D. late first–early second century) to support the evidence of the Aelii Tuberones for the possibility of horizontally extended households in Italy in the second century B.C. (pp. 19–20)? Does the existence of small-holders at Ligures Baebiani in A.D. second century help round out our picture of peasants in the second century B.C. (p. 109)? Can Pompeian graffiti or remarks in Ulpian illustrate the involvement of freeborn women in prostitution in an earlier period? Does lack of literary and archaeological evidence for play and toys in the Republic, compared with the Principate, point to a “world in which freeborn children either had far less opportunity to play, or one in which their activities were of less consequence to adults” (p. 171)? If precise descriptions of stages of childhood do not appear in early literature (comedy, for example) but words like *anniculus* (one-year-old) are found in writings of the late Republic, does this prove an invention of new words that would mark a change in perceptions or is it attributable merely to gaps in our knowledge of the development of Latin (pp. 175–76)? These are judgment calls and Evans does not shirk them.

SUSAN TREGGIARI
Stanford University

EDWARD CHAMPLIN. *Final Judgments: Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills, 200 B.C.–A.D. 250*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 217. \$29.95.

At the beginning of his elegantly written analysis of the social world of Roman wills and testaments,

Edward Champlin is careful to warn that his "is not a work of Roman law or legal history" (p. 2). Indeed, he is not as much concerned with the complex legal intricacies consequent on the death of a testator as he is with the living world in which the final testament of that person was created. In pursuit of the latter objective Champlin moves systematically from the initial stages of the creation of a will, through the persons involved, to the composition of the document itself. That continuity of thematic development is broken only by a useful excursus on the nature of the surviving evidence (chap. 2). In these foundational chapters, Champlin's command of traditional textual analysis and of the norms of the Roman law is supported by his judicious use of quantification of the available data. The latter permits him to make reasonable estimates about the universes of data on which his generalizations are based—for example, to specify more clearly who the testators were: mainly males (80 percent or more, although with significant regional variations) and usually rather wealthy ones. The reconstruction of this background context is necessary given the stark recognition that, no matter how many millions of *testamenta* were drafted in antiquity, "no complete Roman will in its original form survives from the classical period of Roman law" (p. 29). This technical core of the text is supplemented by valuable appendices listing the main primary source materials surviving on Roman wills.

The latter half of the book concentrates on reconstructing the social world of family, friends, and community revealed by the testators' intentions in drafting their final wishes. The chapters on the social networks of the testators are perhaps the most significant, providing much new evidence that both substantiates and advances recent work on the structure of the Roman family (for example, on the centrality of the "nuclear" family) and on the most significant social relationships outside the family. A small criticism might be that in emphasizing the central "truths" (such as the importance of propertied males) Champlin might have been led to underestimate the novelty of a society in which, according to his own powerful arguments, at least one-fifth of all adult women constantly had access to real property through inheritance.

Champlin does two precise things that bring a particular life to his analysis. First, he is constantly attuned to the gaps between the default provisions in the law and actual social practice (for example, as regards women and wealth). Second, he situates the making of the will within a peculiar space between the public and private spheres of behavior that give the Roman will its distinct function (and, indeed, much of its use to social historians). There are perhaps a few points where some readers might like to have had the revisionist implications of Champlin's analysis pressed home. To take a striking example, the substance of his study of the relationship between bequests to communities, prevailing Roman social val-

ues, and the significance of "philanthropy" hits directly at the assumptions and claims made by Paul Veyne. The absence of a debate with Veyne's arguments is therefore somewhat disappointing. It would have been interesting to know what Champlin would make of the Veynean (actually Derridean) thesis of "distancing" or "delaying" (*différence*) in the function of funerary bequests and in their deployment in the public sphere of communal gift-giving. But desiderata such as these in no way detract from the substance of this important work. In a subject where pitfalls of legal interpretation abound, Champlin's analysis is characterized by clarity and acuity of exposition. Readers are therefore left in a good position to draw their own conclusions.

Indeed, Champlin's study provokes so many suggestive ideas for historians of Roman society that reviewing it is a model of frustration. A brief notice such as this cannot adequately describe the frequency with which any sympathetic reader will discover insights into central aspects of Roman social structure, behavior, and, not least importantly, values and emotions. Suffice it to say that it is as good a demonstration as one could reasonably demand of what can be achieved in the historical sociology of the Roman law. It is to be hoped that the publisher will move quickly to a paperback edition that will make this work more readily accessible to the large number of students who ought to read it.

BRENT D. SHAW
University of Lethbridge

R. J. A. WILSON. *Sicily under the Roman Empire: The Archaeology of a Roman Province, 36 B.C.–A.D. 535*. Warminster, Wiltshire: Aris and Phillips; distributed by Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J. 1990. Pp. ix, 452. Cloth \$249.00, paper \$135.00.

This encyclopedic book is a compendious assembly of the information available for Sicily in the period from 36 B.C., the end of the war with Sextus Pompey, to A.D. 535, when it became a province of Byzantium. The evidence is largely archaeological, and R. J. A. Wilson knows it intimately; he relies little on the opinions of others, although he seems to have taken pains to consult at length everyone working at all seriously with Sicilian material of his period. The notes and bibliography are full and informative, and there is an ample index.

The text is divided into ten chapters. The first is background: geography, geology, and a brief survey of Sicily as a province under the Roman republic, one of its more interesting periods and the one for which our information is fullest, thanks especially to Verres, the rapacious governor prosecuted by Cicero. The tenth chapter is aftermath, the era of Vandal raids and the disruption of normal life prior to Belisarius's conquest of the island for Justinian. The second chapter examines the Augustan reform and reorga-

nization of the island, the deduction of five veteran colonies to the most important centers in 21 B.C. and the distinction observed by Pliny between towns *Latinae condicionis* and *stipendarii*, the gradual extension of enfranchisement and the evidence for the use of Latin as the official language. But little attention is paid to provincial administration and none at all to the history of individual cities, so no city emerges with a clear character, not even Syracuse.

The remaining chapters are all archaeological. First comes a long chapter on urban monuments, divided by types of building, in which theaters and amphitheaters predominate while temples are few and unimpressive, and a shorter chapter on domestic architecture in which no clearly Sicilian form of house or villa is identified. These are followed by a long chapter on urbanization, especially the differences between towns of the coast and towns of the interior, being more about the situations of towns and the communications among them than about their planning and individuality, and a chapter on the countryside, especially the spectacular large late villas. Discussions of industry and the patterns of trade, religion, and romanization complete the collection. There is abundant illustration, almost all in halftone with lengthy explanatory captions, but often at small scale and sometimes scattered. The illustrations of the "Basilica" at Tindari, for example, appears in four widely separated places. The maps and plans are not detailed, being intended simply as an aid to the reader, and the maps are hard to read. In his text the author locates sites by the abbreviations for their modern provinces, and a reader needs to be reasonably familiar with the areas of these, since no map of them is included.

Sicily under the Roman empire was not an exciting place, much of its enormously productive agriculture being owned by and organized to benefit absentee landlords and few of its cities able to boast an enterprising aristocracy. There was little industry and less art. Sculpture of any quality seems all to have been imported, and even the good mosaic pavements, such as in the villa of Piazza Armerina, seem to have been the work of African artisans. Buildings are distinguished more by their oddity than by their style or use of volumes. Wilson has patiently brought all this material together, but it would have been more meaningful had it been arranged in some other way than by type, especially since Wilson does not really compare the Sicilian cities and their buildings in any detail. One theater or bath seems much like another, and the descriptions do not bring out their individuality. It would have made more sense to assemble the evidence for each site chronologically to show how thin and unsatisfactory the record still is. As it is presented the reader plods without direction, and the descriptions of this scrappy material make for dull reading. Much of the book is a jeremiad on the inadequacy of the evidence, the lack of fixed dates, and the need for further excavation to clarify the

picture, and the author makes no attempt to construct a larger edifice of his subject. Yet archaeology without interpretation is stones without mortar.

Finally, one asks what has become of the Sicilian natives. Although the author is deeply interested in the survival of Greek and Punic elements and the process of romanization, the Sicels and Sicani are never mentioned.

L. RICHARDSON, JR.
Duke University

MICHELE RENEE SALZMAN. *On Roman Time: The Codex-Calendar of 354 and the Rhythms of Urban Life in Late Antiquity*. (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage, number 17.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1990. Pp. xxii, 315. \$65.00.

A calendar is both a chronological and a historiographic device, commemorating crucial events and individual achievements that help define a society. For this reason, the calendar of A.D. 354, the only document of its kind to survive from fourth-century Rome, is worthy of extensive study. It came in the form of a codex with depictions of the planets, signs of the zodiac, and an Easter cycle, as well as lists of consuls, episcopal depositions, bishops of Rome, martyrs, imperial birthdays, urban prefects, and holidays. As such, it provides us with a picture of the adaptation of Roman history to a developing Christian context under the protection of the house of Constantine (A.D. 306–63).

The calendar also offers some curiosities. One of these is a list of urban prefects that begins in A.D. 254 (the office is Augustan). Another is a brief chronicle of the city's history that mentions only autocrats—the legendary kings, both Alban and Roman, Republican dictators, and the emperors—a peculiarity that is also a feature of Byzantine city chronicles. A third point of interest is that, of the 231 days given over to celebrations of one sort or the other, the vast majority are concerned with the deeds of the house of Constantine or with cults that were supported by Aurelian (A.D. 270–75) and his immediate successors. A fourth curiosity is that the four cities singled out for representation at the start are Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, and Trier. All four of these items reflect the lasting impact of the profound political and economic crisis that shook the empire in the mid-third century and took from Rome its place as the center of imperial government. The calendar also reveals a view of history that placed the person of the reigning emperor, rather than the Roman people, at the center. As the great fourth-century historian Ammianus Marcellinus put it, "the venerable old city, after binding down the proud necks of unbridled nations and creating laws that are the foundations and bonds of liberty, like an honest, wise, and rich parent, has passed on the control of its patrimony to be admin-

istered by the Caesars, as if to its children" (*Rerum gestarum libri* 14.6.5).

Michele Renee Salzman's thorough analysis of the codex calendar aims at defining its proper social and intellectual context. Salzman argues that, with its combination of pagan and Christian elements, the calendar "reveals a world in which the peaceful coexistence of the city's two powerful religious groups had been achieved" (p. 204). The codex is the work of the famous Christian calligrapher Furius Dionysius Filocalus, made for a Christian member of the aristocracy named Valentinus (perhaps too confidently identified by Salzman as a member of the family of the leading pagan aristocrat Symmachus [pp. 201–02]). In the course of this discussion, Salzman also provides an extensive, thoroughly illustrated study of the pictures that preserve the essential features of Filocalus's work. These have been transmitted, with varying degrees of reliability, in four sixteenth and seventeenth-century manuscripts copied from a Carolingian manuscript lost sometime after December 18, 1620, and by one sixth-century manuscript that may have been based on another edition of the codex.

It is Salzman's aim to show, against the earlier and even more thoroughly illustrated study of Henri Stern (*Le calendrier de 354: Étude sur son texte et sur les illustrations* [1954]), that the iconography is linked specifically with cult practice in Rome. In this Salzman is certainly successful, and her account of the manuscripts is superior to Stern's in that she is able to take full account of one manuscript whose importance only became clear to Stern after his work went to press (pp. 73, 251). The second part of her study is the festival calendar, and here too she has numerous useful observations.

The final section of the book opens with a study of pagans and Christians in Rome in the fourth century, arguing that it is wrong to think that the two religions were in constant conflict. Here Salzman has little to add to other recent discussions, and her extended critique of A. Alföldi's view (*Die Kontorniaten: Ein verkanntes Propagandamittel der stadtrömischen heidnischen Aristokratie in ihrem Kampfe gegen das christliche Kaisertum* [1942–43]) that contorniates with representations drawn from traditional pagan iconography that were distributed at fourth-century Roman festivals were a form of "pagan reaction" against Christianity (pp. 213–18) is little more than an assault on a dead horse. This said, it might have been better if Salzman had shown more sensitivity to a style of interpretation that came more naturally to scholars such as Alföldi, who had lived under the shadow of the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s, than it does to those whose views were fashioned after World War II. In another sense, her discussion of the imperial rescripts and laws limiting pagan practice in the fourth century (pp. 205–09) is hampered by her insistence on calling all of them "codes," instead of trying to distinguish among the different types of imperial actions that they represent. The final chap-

ter, carrying the story down to the fifth century with the aid of the calendar of Polemius Silvius and examining the more thoroughly Christianized city, contains less redundancy and is far more interesting.

Although many of her points are less controversial than Salzman makes them appear, and thus require less discussion than she allows them, this book has restored an interesting text to its proper place in the intellectual history of fourth-century Rome.

DAVID POTTER

University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor

MEDIEVAL

GEORGES DUBY and MICHELLE PERROT, editors. *Histoire des femmes en occident*. Volume 2, *Le Moyen Age*. Edited by CHRISTIANE KLAPISCH-ZUBER. Paris: Plon. 1991. Pp. 567.

This multi-authored volume contains some wonderful articles, organized in a somewhat old-fashioned and disappointing framework. Beyond the excellence of certain of the chapters—particularly those by the younger, less well-known contributors—the volume is also useful as an indication of the present state of women's history.

The introduction to the volume and its organization draw to a surprising extent on the women's history done by Americans in the 1970s, and not always on the best of that. Although the editor admits that the history of attitudes toward women is not the history of women and that research is opening up new areas so fast that sweeping generalizations are impossible, the volume nonetheless begins with a survey of "norms of control." Two of the articles in the second section (in general the weakest in the book) return again and again to the question of the rising or declining "status of women," while admitting that this is not the way to ask the question. But for all the rather anachronistic and awkward framework into which the book is forced, author after author escapes its limitations and produces analyses of originality and power.

Many of these authors understand that the study of attitudes toward women is a study of gender, not women; the construction of "woman" tells us more directly about male anxieties concerning self and sexuality, male understandings of masculinity, than it does about women's sense of self. What women thought about themselves must be studied through what they did, particularly in familial and class settings, and what they in fact talked about (which was usually not "woman"). Thus, although Georges Duby discusses the impact of "*fin amour*" on women, his chapter quite correctly situates courtly mores in the context of changes in family structure, particularly as they affected male roles. Jacques Dalarun understands that the major historical question about misogyny is not how women internalized an ideological

constant but how and why misogyny was constructed at particular moments, especially at the moment of the Gregorian reform. Carla Casagrande's sophisticated discussion of space and the female body and Silvana Vecchio's exploration of the changing ideology of the good wife rightly treat their topics primarily as events in the history of male attitudes while not ignoring the burden such attitudes laid on women. Diane Hughes gives a marvelous and nuanced survey of dress and sumptuary legislation, which suggests that the game of clothing and consumption could be female "self-fashioning," liberation as well as limitation. And Claudia Opitz's complex and lengthy survey of recent research on women and work demonstrates, among other insights, that decline for one social class could be opportunity for another.

Such themes and subtleties come together in the gem of the collection: Danielle Régnier-Bohler's study of literary and mystical voices. Making deft use of current literary theory, Régnier-Bohler delineates the ways in which women's language incorporated and inverted both the variegated themes of misogyny and the facts of female lives. If proof is needed that women's history must, in some sense, be gender history and that the 1970s approach of charting oppression or diagnosing "the status of women" can be discarded, this brilliant article provides it, and in so doing shows us that we can know far more of the experiences and thoughts of medieval women—and men—than earlier generations of historians ever dreamed of being able to discover.

CAROLINE WALKER BYNUM
Columbia University

MYRIAM GREILSAMMER. *L'Envers du tableau: Mariage et maternité en Flandre médiévale*. Foreword by JACQUES LE GOFF. Paris: Armand Colin. 1990. Pp. 368.

For the last twenty years historians have speculated about the effects that the introduction of free consent had on women's choices in contracting a marriage. By the late twelfth century, canon lawyers were arguing that a marriage was not valid in the eyes of the Church unless both the prospective bride and groom consented to it; the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) included free consent among its reforms. From a twentieth-century perspective, it would seem that allowing a woman to refuse a union would make great inroads into the predominant medieval practice of arranged marriage. Any family with property, be they barons, bourgeoisie, or peasants, wanted to preserve and augment their wealth and prestige through advantageous marriage alliances. Would such parents really allow their children to refuse an arranged marriage? Yet since only the consent of the two spouses was necessary to create a valid marriage, parental consent and religious ceremonies could be entirely bypassed. The debate has been over how

much freedom women gained over their marital possibilities from the new canon laws.

Myriam Greilsammer has drawn her evidence largely from chronicles, liturgies of marriage, and artistic representations rather than from a thorough study of archival sources. Late-medieval Flemish liturgical texts, she finds, had marriage vows and ceremonies that placed the emphasis on mutual consent rather than the earlier form, in which the husband was the predominant voice. The Council of Trent in the sixteenth century removed this semblance of liturgical equality. One of the author's strengths is carrying her inquiry into the Counter-Reformation period.

Historians seeking evidence for the influence of consensual marriage on actual practice in Flanders are bound to be disappointed. The chapters dealing with urban marriage practices turn out to be a discussion of rape, a rather unusual form of "free consent." Rape could be a means of achieving marriage without the initial consent of the friends and family of the bride and groom, especially in cases where a difference in family fortunes made a marriage unlikely. Greilsammer, however, has pushed the evidence far beyond what it actually tells a researcher. First, it was by no means easy to abduct a wealthy woman, because her friends and family had the good sense to keep such a valuable marriage-market commodity well guarded. Second, rape was also a violent, felonious action punishable by loss of life and limb and was not necessarily perpetrated with any intention of marriage. Third, rape was a very rare occurrence even if we assume that, then as now, we know about only a small proportion of actual rapes. By its nature, rape tells us little about ordinary marriage. The choice to dwell on rape rather than on marriage contracts is all the more disappointing since a large number of late-medieval Flemish notarial records survive. Now the subject of active historical research, these will tell us much more about the actual practice of marriage than Greilsammer's conclusions from reported rapes.

Fortunately, Greilsammer moves beyond the formation of marriages to other implications of the married state. Her discussion of maternity lends itself better to the history of mentalities approach that she has adopted. She explores the "second sex" status of women in medieval culture, and how the impurities associated with female fertility and childbirth played a role in the treatment of women. We know little about the ordinary process of birth in medieval Europe, so her additions to this subject and her discussion of cultural attitudes toward motherhood in Flanders are welcome. The illustrations drawn from Flemish art, relating to the birth of Mary and of Jesus, add considerably to the value of this treatment of motherhood.

BARBARA A. HANAWALT
University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis

CAROLYN L. CONNOR. *Art and Miracles in Medieval Byzantium: The Crypt at Hosios Loukas and Its Frescoes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 132; 100 plates. \$65.00.

Most tourists visit the Byzantine monastery of Hosios Loukas only because it is a stop on their bus trip to Delphi, site of the most famous oracle of ancient Greece. At Hosios Loukas, as at Delphi, the spectacular material residue of history is witnessed in order that it might be exported in the form of snapshots, postcards, painted plates, decorated spoons, and other conventional touristica. But, again like Delphi, Hosios Loukas was once itself the object of pilgrims for whom the spectacle of the site was not a commodifiable past, but a numinous present of prophecy and healing.

Hosios Loukas offers an unusual opportunity to investigate Byzantine spectacle. Enough of the medieval complex survives to persuade us of its authenticity. The churches and several subsidiary structures are colorfully rendered in patterns of burnt sienna brick, warm ocher limestone, and white pointing; they are further adorned with skillfully wrought marble reliefs and architectural sculpture. The brilliant mosaics of the interior of the Katholikon, the principal church of the monastery, are powerful signifiers of all that we have learned from Yeats of Byzantine hierarchy and opticality, no doubt in part because (not despite) of the nineteenth and twentieth-century restorations. Below, in the Katholikon's low-ceilinged crypt, are frescoes of a remarkably indexical character: the painter is present in the marks of thick, layered paint. The coercive materiality of the monastery's buildings and decoration is complemented by an equally compelling text: the *Vita* of the monastery's miracle-working founder, St. Luke of Steiris, provides a contemporary account of the rich yield (spiritual and economic) of asceticism and piety.

Although Princeton University Press might be reproached for revealing the monographic character of this volume only in its subtitle, Carolyn L. Connor's book does deal with both the staging ("Art") and the action ("Miracles") of Byzantine spectacle. Connor investigates the architecture and liturgy of the monastery (chapter 2), as well as its social history and patronage (chapter 3). She integrates into her reading of the monument excerpts from the *Vita* of Loukas from a translation of the text that she and W. R. Connor have prepared for future publication. The author's presentation of this diverse documentation appears to be structured by one of her stated objectives: the revisionist redating of the Katholikon from the first half of the eleventh century to the second half of the tenth. This shift involves Connor in a number of methodological complexities. For example, she makes the novel claim that images of St. Athanasius of Athos and St. Luke the Stylite of Constantinople were "painted from life" (p. 52). Offered without an explanation as to how such a

sitting might have been practically managed, however, this proposition seems less an argument for a new dating than a necessary result of the revised chronology. Although Connor's argument will remind specialists of the instability of the evidence for the chronology of Hosios Loukas, it may not persuade them to redate the church.

The other stated purpose of the study, which was first presented as a Ph.D. dissertation at the Institute of Fine Arts of New York University in 1987, is to make the impressive paintings of the crypt of Hosios Loukas more accessible to an Anglophone audience. The author's goal is admirably accomplished in splendidly reproduced color and black-and-white plates, which are accompanied by a descriptive catalog and a discussion of the style and program of the paintings (chapter 1). These sophisticated mechanical reproductions, framed as they are by an academic apparatus, resist the authenticity and power of the sacred locus that adhered to even the crudest *eulogia*—souvenirs—of the medieval pilgrims. Scholarship is, after all, like tourism, preoccupied with an appropriation of the past.

ANNABEL WHARTON
Duke University

SHARON FARMER. *Communities of Saint Martin: Legend and Ritual in Medieval Tours*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 358. \$43.50.

Tours sheltered many communities, including three that were particularly connected with St. Martin (315/36–396). The first of these was the cathedral church, where Martin had been bishop; the second was the monastery of Marmoutier, founded by him; and the third was the basilica of St. Martin, where his body was buried. Sharon Farmer uses the case of St. Martin to investigate how the internal structure of religious communities shaped their relationship to the cult of saints. Usually, as she notes, historians of saints' cults have asked questions about how particular cults were manipulated to enhance the status, power, and wealth of individuals or communities.

Beginning in 460, Archbishop Perpetuus called a first community into being: "Martinopolis," as Farmer felicitously calls it. St. Martin's memory and his physical remains were mobilized to promote civic unity, local pride, and eventually royal patronage. The bonds of this community persisted through the Carolingian period, when royal power tended to complement, even intensify, episcopal authority. The community of St. Martin, then, was the populace of Tours guided by the bishop who was Martin's successor.

The tenth and eleventh centuries saw the transformation of the Carolingian system in many ways. For St. Martin's communities, the relevant developments were two: Marmoutier was reformed by Cluniacs, participated eagerly in the movement for exemption

from episcopal authority, and severed many of its bonds with the bishops; and, as the Capetians turned more to St. Denis, the local Blesois and later Angevin nobles became Marmoutier's key patrons. By the twelfth century, the monks of Marmoutier had become a quite distinct community of St. Martin, now heir to his ascetic heritage.

The basilica of St. Martin was important as a major pilgrimage site. In 815 the status of the house was settled with the introduction of canonical life. Thereafter, canons struggled to maintain their independence from both the archbishops and the burghers. With the former, the struggles were about ecclesiastical precedence and power; with the latter, it was the lucrative incomes from the pilgrim trade that were at issue. The canons maintained their independence effectively through the thirteenth century and became a third community of St. Martin.

The struggle for St. Martin's heritage, the breakdown of civic unity, and the transformation of the Carolingian political and ecclesiastical order are, thus, three major themes worked out persuasively in this important book. But there is more. Farmer incorporates interesting discussions of the different ways in which liturgy was used at Marmoutier and St. Martin's to exclude the bishops. Farmer's observations here are especially important because liturgy is usually thought of as integrative, not disjunctive. Tours produced a bewildering fund of evidence, and it is one of Farmer's main achievements to have thought her way through this material systematically. She is especially good at showing how and why Marmoutier and St. Martin's invented or altered history to serve the interests of their particular communities. Sometimes these writings served to achieve the "rhetorical exclusion" (pp. 49–51) of the bishop; sometimes they sustained a flow of patronage and protection (and Farmer has here a fascinating set of reflections on the appeal to women); sometimes there were words of moral exhortation and instruction for local notables. The author also has interesting things to say about changes in the nature of St. Martin's communities. For example, canonical prebends made absenteeism a real problem at St. Martin's while the emergence of priories, daughter houses, and affiliates of all kinds created a Marmoutier that was no longer bound together by the intimacy of daily service in choir but instead by "abstract concepts, bureaucratic organization, written documents, promises, contracts, and money" (pp. 145–46). Farmer connects the communities of St. Martin to the major movements in twelfth-century spiritual and intellectual life as well. The life of these communities may have been intensely local, but that did not mean that they were provincial in the worst sense of that term.

Although this book taught me a great deal, it did leave me with a few questions. Farmer concentrates on the attempts to "exclude the center" (p. 38–62), that is, the bishops, but she does not tell us whether the bishops fought back. I suspect that there must be

a tale to tell here. Indeed, after dealing with establishment of the cathedral community, Farmer really lets go of it. It gets neither the institutional analysis nor the *Quellenkritik* that Marmoutier and St. Martin get. One of Farmer's stated objectives was to explore the relationship between the structures of groups and the connection of those groups to the cult of saints. I learned a great deal from this book about the use of the cult of saints in Tours, but I did not really learn much about the structure of those communities. Whence the monks and canons? Whence the bishops? What was the status of these people? How did they relate to local society? Is there anything especially distinctive about Tours, apart from the relative abundance of its surviving sources? I wish to emphasize that these are questions, not criticisms.

THOMAS F. X. NOBLE
University of Virginia

PIERRE BONNASSIE. *From Slavery to Feudalism in South-Western Europe*. Translated by JEAN BIRRELL. (Past and Present Publications.) New York: Cambridge University Press or La Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris. 1991. Pp. xi, 352. \$64.50.

Pierre Bonnassie is already well known for his work on Catalonia, a region with unusually rich documentation for the tenth and eleventh centuries. In this book he sets out to address the questions of the end of slavery and the transformation of peasant status around the year 1000. These questions have been addressed, sometimes peripherally, by a number of French scholars starting with Marc Bloch, but Bonnassie is the first to attempt an overall synthesis.

His theme is that "traditional" structures, going all the way back to Roman times, persisted until the end of the tenth century. Until that time, he argues, both slavery and free peasant status persisted. But in the early eleventh century, with the rise of feudalism, even free peasants were forced into new forms of servitude. The change he depicts was not gradual but violent. Extended civil war led to massive recruitment of military troops, the breakdown of a system of justice based on written law, and the abandonment of the peasants by their old allies, the counts, who instead supported the newly powerful castellans.

This model is not as compelling as it should be, in part because of the way the book is structured and in part because of conceptual problems. The book is not a monograph but a collection of ten linked essays, originally published or given between 1968 and 1990. Because they address the central theme from different angles, they sometimes appear noncomplementary or even contradictory.

For example, Bonnassie prefers "slave" to "serf" to characterize early medieval peasants, yet he also describes the pre-1000 period, this period of peasant slavery, as one of peasant freedoms in order to draw a sharper contrast with the "feudal" period that

followed. He defines peasant freedom by legal or political criteria such as access to public justice and the right to bear arms but also, curiously, by the economic criterion of owning land outright rather than renting, and even by having traditional peasant songs to sing. His definition of "feudalism" is so sweeping—including as it does fief-holding, the building of castles, the multiplication of knights, the rise of banal lordship, and the decline of the counts' traditional courts—that "eleventh-century society" seems as useful a term. He says that peasants were forced into new vassal relationships, similar to those of knights, under the system of feudal exploitation, and yet he also argues that with the rise of feudalism peasants became separated by an unbridgeable gulf from knights and nobles.

Even though there are problems with the way the argument is structured and presented, the book is valuable for emphasizing the changing social structures of the year 1000. Bonnassie crystallises what many other scholars have hinted at, that many aspects of antiquity, including (at least around the Mediterranean) a system of public justice, persisted through the tenth century. By describing the rise of castles and fief-holding in southwestern Europe in the first half of the eleventh century, he makes it clear that one cannot refer to the Mediterranean basin as "slow" in developing these institutions (as was once thought) because regional monographs have shown the same chronology of development farther north. Whereas scholars have often treated the collapse of Carolingian hegemony at the end of the ninth century or the "renaissance" of the twelfth century as key turning points, this book should focus attention on the originality of the eleventh century.

CONSTANCE B. BOUCHARD
University of Akron

PAUL FREEDMAN. *The Origins of Peasant Servitude in Medieval Catalonia*. (Cambridge Iberian and Latin American Studies.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xvii, 263. \$49.50.

Paul Freedman's tightly argued and highly nuanced treatment of Catalan peasant servitude between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries gives testimony to the complex patterns and regional variation of medieval rural society. Old Catalonia (the region of the principality east of the Llobregat River), unlike the lands of manorial serfdom, was a country of small, fragmented holdings where some, but not all, peasants became serfs. Seeking to combine social and legal perspectives, Freedman describes the imposition of serfdom and peasant resistance to it.

Building on Pierre Bonnassie's study of Catalan feudalism (*La Catalogne du milieu du X^e à la fin du XI^e siècle, croissance et mutations d'une société* [1975–76]) and Thomas Bisson's examination of comital government (*Medieval France and Her Pyrenean Neighbours: Studies*

in Early Institutional History [1989]; "The Crisis of the Catalan Franchises (1150–1200)," *La formació i expansió del feudalisme català* [1985–86]), Freedman cites three milestones in servitude's evolution. The first, an aristocratic uprising between 1020 and 1060, by eradicating Visigothic public law, created a privileged society in which the monarch, the count of Barcelona, functioned simply as the most powerful military lord. A second rebellion in the late twelfth century placed unenfranchised peasants outside the jurisdiction of comital courts; the third milestone, the Black Death, provoked an increase in servile exactions. The serfdom so created was one of tenure, not person; it was not legislated, or even premeditated, but instead imposed in stages on once free peasants opportunistically through a process of seigniorial terrorism. It took the form of the *mals usos* (payments owed in instances of arson, death without heirs, uxorial adultery, intestate death, and various nuptial arrangements) and redemption payments (in Catalan, *remença*, from which the name *Remences* for these serfs derives) levied on peasants who left their holdings.

Before 1200, peasants resisted these exactions as illegitimate and abusive, but afterward the payments received the sanction of law. As redemption and the "bad customs" became more common, they acquired servile overtones and were defended as traditional, even Carolingian, in origin. Two pieces of parliamentary legislation gave legal standing to the new servitude. The first, in 1202, established the *ius maletractandi*, which closed comital courts to peasant complaints against aristocratic violence; the second, in 1283, acknowledged that peasants abandoning aristocratic lands for royal lands must pay their lords a redemption. This new power over tenants originated in the aristocratic resistance to Alfonso II's (of Aragon, I of Catalonia) centralizing policies; Freedman's observations should invite others to consider why no subsequent ruler seriously challenged these aristocratic usurpations before John I's effort in 1388. The reception of Roman law into the principality during the thirteenth century, by clarifying and defining the difference between free and servile tenures, also helped to fix servile institutions and to simplify the myriad of social distinctions that had evolved. Freedman argues it was no coincidence that the parliamentary enactment of 1283 defining servile tenures was followed by another in 1284 delineating free (emphyteutic) tenures. Why did the proximity of the "frontier" fail to blunt the onset of these servile customs? Overpopulation, peasant sense of place, and the security of servile tenures are among the suggested explanations.

The Black Death, which in Catalonia inaugurated a prolonged population decline (reduced by 52 percent by 1497), provoked increases in servile exactions. Aristocratic power to coerce, at least initially, was strong enough to frustrate the new demographic realities. *Remences*, however, particularly those who

were better off, began to agitate for the abolition of servile customs. John I in 1388 and Alfonso V (IV of Catalonia) in 1447 supported these demands, as did Catalan jurists who found the *ius maletractandi* increasingly difficult to defend. After a number of peasant uprisings and a civil war in which John II had to rely on peasant armies, Ferdinand II in 1486 issued the Sentence of Guadalupe, which, in return for monetary compensation, abolished redemption and the *mals usos*. Although the seignorial system itself remained unchallenged, this still represented an unusual and unique victory for peasants.

Freedman's patient and detailed reconstruction of Catalan serfdom revises older datings of its origins and challenges more recent efforts to minimize its impact on peasants. The distinctiveness of Catalan history demonstrates that circumstance and geography are more important than chronology in understanding the appearance of servile institutions. The abundant use of charter evidence underscores the infinite gradations of privilege that characterized medieval society, but at the same time Freedman correctly argues that law, despite its sometimes arbitrary distinctions, was important in legitimizing custom and defining status. If the "bad customs" were in the end overthrown, it was due to the ultimate incompatibility of servile institutions and seignorial terrorism with Catalan law.

JAMES W. BRODMAN
University of Central Arkansas

EMMA MASON. *St. Wulfstan of Worcester, c. 1008–1095*. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell. 1990. Pp. x, 363. \$49.95.

This monograph examines the life of St. Wulfstan, bishop of Worcester from 1062 to 1095, and his impact on religious life in eleventh and twelfth-century England. The subject is of particular interest because St. Wulfstan was one of the few Anglo-Saxon bishops who retained their offices after the Norman Conquest. Emma Mason's study thus offers the potential for understanding the ways in which English traditions persisted after the Conquest and continued to shape the character of religious life under the Normans.

The book is divided into two sections. The first seven chapters give a chronological account of St. Wulfstan's life and his impact on English history. The remaining three chapters deal with Wulfstan's transmission of English values to the Anglo-Norman world, the regard in which he was held by his contemporaries, and the development of his cult in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The first section offers the most detailed modern biography of Wulfstan. Although it does not depart radically from brief assessments of Wulfstan's character published in general studies of the English church, it does provide a far more detailed analysis of

the role Wulfstan played as a monk, bishop, and royal advisor. This approach is especially successful when Mason is able to draw on material from a variety of primary sources, mainly from the period of Wulfstan's episcopate. Here Mason sketches a convincing portrait of an individual who survived the transition to Norman rule because his exemplary conduct as a diocesan bishop made him acceptable to a king who wanted to be viewed as ruling with the cooperation of his English followers.

The biographical account is less successful in areas where Mason relies on one primary source, the *Vita Wulfstani* of William of Malmesbury. Her attempt to use the *Vita* as a historical document in reconstructing Wulfstan's early life is problematic. For example, in discussing Wulfstan's reactions to the advances of a seductive young woman (pp. 39–40), Mason concludes that Wulfstan's monastic upbringing may have rendered him frigid and impotent and quite possibly homosexual in inclination. By interpreting the *Vita* literally here and elsewhere, she overlooks the obvious parallels between this saint's life and other works in the genre. Repulsing sexual advances is such a standard *topos* in a saint's life, following the gradational model, that it casts doubt on Mason's unquestioning interpretation of this passage and others discussed in the chapter.

The second section of the book, dealing with Wulfstan's impact after the Conquest, expands on an article by Mason published in *Anglo-Norman Studies* (1986). This is probably the most original section of the book. Here Mason draws on a wide range of evidence to establish the ways in which Wulfstan facilitated the retention of English customs, liturgical formulae, and textual traditions in Worcester until the end of the eleventh century. Questions can be raised, however, concerning her discussion of the spread of Wulfstan's cult after his death in 1095. Mason makes the general statement that twelfth-century bishops used English saints as a means of defending the rights and furthering the interests of their churches (p. 197). Unfortunately, she does not develop this idea when she discusses the *Vita Wulfstani* commissioned by Prior Warin, ca. 1124–42. Mason remains vague concerning Warin's motives for spreading the cult at this particular time and the relationship of Warin's designs to the tomb miracles she mentions.

In spite of these occasional problems, this book is an important contribution. Mason sheds additional light on Wulfstan and especially on the broader issue of the integration of English traditions into the Norman church after the Conquest.

KRISTINE E. HANEY
University of Massachusetts,
Amherst

RICHARD SHARPE. *Medieval Irish Saints' Lives: An Introduction to Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae*. New York: Clar-

endon Press of Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 427. \$118.00.

Dating problems have plagued the study of Irish hagiography written in Latin and severely limited its usefulness for related disciplines. For other areas, hagiography has recently become an important historical source, offering the discerning reader information about attitudes, customs, and events in particular times and places. But for Ireland the case has been different because, whereas almost all saints are very early, most texts are preserved in very late manuscripts, leaving date of composition unresolved and undermining the contribution these texts could make to any historically based discussion.

As Richard Sharpe demonstrates in his study concentrating on the lives of Irish saints written in Latin, it is possible to make progress on this problem. Sharpe makes a significant contribution toward writing the history of Irish hagiography. Part 2, the core of the book, is a meticulous and detailed study of the three major compilations of Irish saints' lives written in Latin. Recognizing the major contributions to the field made by Charles Plummer, Sharpe respectfully reworks Plummer's studies. The evidence he extracts through meticulous word-by-word comparisons of different versions of individual *vitae* allows him to draw conclusions that often substantiate and sometimes revise Plummer's views. Surrounding the core formed by these detailed studies, parts 1 and 3 provide a clear and valuable synthetic sketch of Irish hagiography from its beginnings. For the general reader, part 1, the concluding chapter of part 2, and part 3 have much to offer. For a specialist in Irish studies or in hagiography, close analysis of part 2 will be highly rewarding.

Perhaps Sharpe's most concrete and immediate contribution is to identify what he calls the O'Donoghue group, nine or possibly ten lives of Irish saints preserved in the late-fourteenth-century *Codex Salmanticensis* whose composition is datable to the period 650–850: Ailbe, Lugidus, Fintán of Clonenagh, Finán, Ruadán, Aed, Cainnech, Munnu, Colmán Elo, and possibly Columba of Terryglass. Since the entire text of the *Codex Salmanticensis* was published by Charles de Smedt and Joseph de Backer, the firm dating of these readily available saints' lives, which increases by a factor of three the number of *vitae* from this early period, is a boon to medievalists.

Sharpe's contribution to hagiographical studies lies in his clear demonstration that there are reasons for *vitae* to appear in different versions, reasons related both to the social, religious, and historical conditions in which they were written and to the purposes of the writer, who may be author, redactor, or compiler. Especially sensitive to the preservation of these *vitae* in collections, Sharpe follows the trend in recent manuscript studies of considering each collection as a whole. Thus, he not only identifies the nature of each compilation but also untangles their post-medieval

history so as to demonstrate which manuscripts were used by which modern scholars and how this affected the available edition.

With this book, Sharpe has taken a major and necessary step toward restoring to the *insula sanctorum* the history of its saints.

PAMELA SHEINGORN

Baruch College

Graduate School and University Center,
City University of New York

CONSTANTIN FASOLT. *Council and Hierarchy: The Political Thought of William Durant the Younger*. (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, fourth series.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xix, 415. \$64.50.

Two William Durants occupied the see of Mende in southeastern France at the close of the thirteenth and the opening of the fourteenth centuries. The elder Durant (ca. 1230–96) is often called the Speculator, a cognomen that refers to his masterpiece, the *Speculum iuris*, which became the standard treatise on procedure in church courts, much admired for its learning by lawyers throughout the later Middle Ages.

The junior William Durant (ca. 1266–1330) was the nephew of the Speculator and he, too, became a scholar and what we might call a political activist, as well as an important bishop. The younger Durant's reputation rests largely on two works, now described as the *Tractatus maior* and the *Tractatus minor*. Published versions of these treatises, however, conflated the two texts as a single *Tractatus de modo generalis concilii celebrando*, a title quite unknown to Durant.

Constantin Fasolt analyzes in detail the political theories embedded in the younger Durant's two treatises on the reform of the church and civil society. Durant wrote the *Tractatus maior*, the earlier of the two, for consideration by the Council of Vienne in 1311. Fasolt accurately describes the treatise as "forbiddingly technical," since it bristles with legal references and allusions. Durant's *Tractatus maior*, however, was not merely technical or legal. Rather it presented radically innovative proposals for the reconstruction of the Christian church and the reordering of Western society. Durant maintained that the papacy should abandon its long-standing legislative role, which he argued ought to be transferred instead to general councils that would meet on a regular schedule, once each decade, to deal with issues that required new laws or the modification of older ones. The popes, Durant continued, must be held in check by the periodic general councils and for that reason he proposed that papal powers of dispensation be drastically curbed. He further advocated that the councils assume control over papal finance so that the papacy's budget would depend on conciliar approval of the pope's conduct. In brief, Durant envisioned the

creation of a system of parliamentary government for the church.

Not surprisingly, Pope Clement V was appalled by these ideas and many conciliar fathers also found them shocking. In view of the opposition that his proposals aroused, Durant tempered some of his more radical ideas in the *Tractatus minor* in an attempt to gather support while the Council of Vienne was still in session. In this second treatise he sought compromise positions that the council might actually adopt. And indeed many of Durant's modified proposals ultimately were adopted—but by the Council of Trent, not the Council of Vienne. During the interim between Vienne and Trent, moreover, the Council of Constance actually did enact a scaled-down version of the most radical of Durant's reform schemes, his proposal that general councils meet periodically to oversee the administration of the church and the conduct of the popes.

Fasolt's book presents the result of a prodigious amount of research in a wide range of both manuscript and printed sources. His studies of the crucial texts provide a sounder and more comprehensible account of Durant's thinking than was previously available.

Fasolt's analysis of Durant's program of church reform—and, more broadly, political reform—is well conceived and generally persuasive. He links Durant's experience and objectives in the local arena of French politics elegantly with the broader issues of the reform of the church and Christian society at large. But although the overarching conclusions and broad generalizations in the final chapter of his book are interesting, even provocative, they seem rather less than compelling. Fasolt naturally wishes to place his arguments about the political thought of the younger Durant within the context of the work of Brian Tierney and Walter Ullmann; quite properly, too, he wants to distinguish his conclusions from theirs. But I am not entirely comfortable with the polarization that he posits between the views of Tierney and Ullmann, and he seems to me to give the views of Gaines Post and Francis Oakley remarkably short shrift. But these are matters of opinion about which historians can legitimately differ. Indeed, the fact that Fasolt's opinions are entitled to a place in the company of such heavyweight scholars as these testifies to the fact that his book is a major addition to the literature on medieval political thought and ecclesiology.

JAMES A. BRUNDAGE
University of Kansas

PETER W. EDBURY. *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191–1374*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xvii, 241. \$44.50.

Conquered by King Richard Lionheart from a Byzantine usurper in 1191, Cyprus was sold first to the

Templars and then to Guy of Lusignan, formerly king of Jerusalem, whose right to that crown had been vested in his wife and had lapsed on her death. The island remained in western hands until 1571, when Famagusta fell to the Turks. During most of this period, it was under the rule of the Lusignans. Peter W. Edbury has chosen to focus his study on the years from 1191 to 1374, during which the dynasty was continuously in power. Thereafter, the island fell under Genoese and later Venetian dominance, although Lusignans held power during a significant part of this later period as well. The history of medieval Cyprus has been neglected in the English-speaking world, although Crusade historians have generally paid attention to the relations of the island with the Latin states on the mainland. Nevertheless, Edbury's is the only modern account in English of the history of Cyprus during one of its more important periods. On the whole, Edbury has fulfilled his role well. The reader seeking a strong narrative of the history of the monarchy in Cyprus in the age of the Crusades will be quite satisfied. The volume does not, however, provide much about the existing population. Cypriot merchants and Greek officials move briefly onto the stage and then disappear. The ordinary business of the island receives only cursory attention.

Not so the house of Lusignan. The royal family and the Latin nobility provide the major focus for the work. The vicissitudes of the monarchy, weakened by long minorities in the thirteenth century and under the dominance of the Ibelin family, fought over by Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, who asserted his right to rule during the minority of King Henry I, form one of the major themes of the book. Another equally important theme is the relationship between Cyprus, its rulers, and the Armenian and Latin lands in Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine. In the fourteenth century, following the loss of Acre, Cyprus loomed briefly as the springboard for renewed western efforts to retake the lost territory on the mainland. Its kings, from Hugh III (1267–84) onward, held title to the kingdom of Jerusalem as well as Cyprus. Although the title was disputed—the Angevins of Italy were among those who asserted a claim—the recognition of the rights of the Cypriot kings was virtually universal. Moreover, until the suppression of the Templars and the capture of Rhodes by the Knights of St. John, Cyprus was the chief center for these crusading orders in the East after the loss of Acre in 1291. Despite these reasons for attaining a position of leadership in the later Crusade movement, Edbury makes clear that the kings of Cyprus, with the possible exception of Peter II, were minor figures both in terms of the formulation and the implementation of Crusades.

The geographical position of Cyprus might logically support the view that Cyprus could have played a more important role in Latin relations with the East. Edbury, however, asserts that such was not the case.

If the island did not serve as a cockpit for the crusade, neither was it, at least for any prolonged period, an important depot for international trade. Efforts on the part of the monarchy to favor local merchants in the fourteenth century only led to conflict with the Genoese and to disaster for the ruling house. At no time was the island important in international commerce. It served chiefly as a haven for refitting after Mediterranean storms and for revictualing on the way to Alexandria. We ought not to deduce from this that Cyprus was without an economic base and even a measure of prosperity. Elusive mentions of lands and incomes suggest that the Latin nobles did rather well for themselves from their Cypriot holdings, although not sufficiently well to arouse envy among visitors. Likewise, commerce provided some income in the towns. Genoese, Venetians, Catalans, and others kept colonies of varying sizes there. But, in the final analysis, it was the vagaries of royal policy rather than economic advantage that spurred the Genoese to action against the house of Lusignan. Small wonder that Cyprus was in no position to play a significant role in the later struggles with the Ottomans. Edbury has provided a valuable introduction to medieval Cyprus. It should serve to stimulate further interest in this somewhat neglected chapter of Mediterranean history.

JAMES M. POWELL
Syracuse University

PETER F. AINSWORTH. *Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History: Truth, Myth, and Fiction in the Chroniques*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1990. Pp. xvi, 329. \$79.00.

Until about 1970, the reputation of Jean Froissart as a reliable historian was summed up by Johan Huizinga: "Froissart, himself the author of a super romantic epic of chivalry, *Méliador*, narrates [in his *Chroniques*] endless treasons and cruelties without being aware of the contradictions between his general conceptions and the contents of his narrative" (*Waning of the Middle Ages* [1924], pp. 56–57). More recent studies by such literary scholars as George T. Diller (*Attitudes chevaleresques et réalités politiques chez Froissart* [1984]) and such historians as John J. N. Palmer (ed., *Froissart: Historian* [1981]) have modified this old attitude. Peter F. Ainsworth's important book continues and accentuates this trend.

In part I, Ainsworth, the historian, introduces us to Froissart and to his contemporary chroniclers. He also examines here the relationship between Froissart's *Chroniques* and the various institutions and ideological currents of the last years of the fourteenth century. Ainsworth knows that Froissart never really understood certain new developments taking place outside the world of the nobility (for example, the changes in the role assumed by Parliament in England from 1380 onward), but he corrects numerous

stereotypical views of Froissart's supposed indifference and callousness vis-à-vis the suffering and miseries of the common people.

In part 2, Ainsworth, the philologist, analyzes the specifically literary qualities of Froissart's writing in several pertinent passages of the *Chroniques*. These analyses are crucial to Froissart's methods, for such nonhistoriographical devices as the presentation of a historical incident as if it were a *nouvelle*, or putting himself in the midst of a described scene as one of the *dramatis personæ*, are part and parcel of his history writing. Only through fine textual analysis can we appreciate Froissart's growing awareness of the inadequacy of established chivalric values for resolving the political problems of kingship and nobility.

We know that Froissart began by rewriting Jean le Bel's chronicle and then proceeded to rewrite his own *Chroniques*. Thus, for the materials comprising Froissart's First Book, historians have at their disposal the text of Jean le Bel, Froissart's first redaction, his Amiens MS redaction, and finally his Rome MS redaction. The Rome version (treating the good old days of the reign of Edward III) was rewritten in the last years of the fourteenth century (during the bad days of the reign of Richard II). Part 3, which I consider the most significant of Ainsworth's achievements, examines the differences between the first redaction and the Rome version of the First Book. Ainsworth demonstrates that Froissart saw and understood much more than he has traditionally been given credit for.

The philological method used by Ainsworth is of real importance for historians who wish to use Froissart as a source for history in general and the *histoire de mentalités* in particular. He demonstrates effectively that Froissart was far more complex a historian than traditional judgments imply and that he was certainly aware, especially in his later writings, of the contradictions between the ideology of chivalry that he defended and the political realities that he described. Ainsworth's study is thus an important contribution to the study of the age-old problem of the conflict between *Dichtung* and *Wahrheit* and, more pertinently for us, between ideology and truth. But if George T. Diller had not taken pains to edit the Rome redaction of the First Book (*Chroniques: Début du livre* [1972]), Ainsworth's excellent study would have not been possible. *Vivat philologia!*

PETER F. DEMBOWSKI
University of Chicago

GUY LLEWELYN THOMPSON. *Paris and Its People under English Rule: The Anglo-Burgundian Regime 1420–1436*. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 276. \$69.00.

For a decade and a half in the early fifteenth century, following the Treaty of Troyes, English regents ruled

Paris and its environs. A study of this period and region might seem to promise only limited results, given the rather narrow chronological and geographical focus, but Guy Llewelyn Thompson draws on a wide range of evidence and a variety of interpretive approaches to produce this book. In the process he has much to say about the intersections between politics, governance, and society in the later Middle Ages generally.

The book is divided into three major parts. The first explains the shifting political relations between the English and the French, divided between feuding Burgundian and Armagnac parties. The second part examines the actual governance of Anglo-Burgundian Paris, its jurisdictions, administrative structures, police, and defense. The final part, as much social as political history, looks at the people of Paris themselves as they lived through the changing fortunes of the regime.

Above all Thompson presents an analysis of "a society administered and governed largely by consensus" (p. 149). The Anglo-Burgundians, he shows, had little choice, given their resources. The effective center of English power in France was actually in Normandy and specifically in Rouen, that old rival of Paris. Few English were regularly at work in Paris itself and so nothing like a deeply rooted English party ever emerged on the basis of clientage.

Of course property changed hands as the new regime took charge (and Thompson shows that Henry V—contrary to his generous policy of landed rewards in Normandy—kept all he could in royal hands in Paris), but basically the old institutions had to go on working. After the murder of John the Fearless, large numbers of Parisians came, without great enthusiasm, to accept an alliance with the English against the Burgundians as a means of securing peace and continued supplies for their city. They had to choke down any old feelings against the English as "the old enemy." Thompson finds the elite of Paris in the 1,602 men (a quarter of them clerics or officers of the municipality) who were expected to take a loyalty oath in 1418; but he insists, in some of the most interesting passages of the book, that the elaborate political symbolism modern historians so delight in interpreting exactly may have been less important to the citizens of Paris who participated in processions and ceremonials than the sheer fact of their participation. Consensus politics, in short, may have been more significant than a particular and specific line of propaganda.

This book, then, covers its subject and has an importance beyond its specific focus. Thompson asks crucial questions, makes the most of the scattered evidence, and constructs a clear and thought-provoking analysis. The book will prove useful to anyone interested in medieval urban communities, the problems of governance, or the exigencies of war.

RICHARD W. KAEUPER
University of Rochester

MODERN EUROPE

ULRICH MUHLACK. *Geschichtswissenschaft im Humanismus und in der Aufklärung: Die Vorgeschichte des Historismus*. Munich: C. H. Beck. 1991. Pp. 460. DM 98.

The history of historical theory has been a favorite theme of historians since the nineteenth century. Ulrich Muhlack's analysis of the origins of historicism is not only thought provoking but it is also one of the most important works to appear on this subject in over a decade. The primary focus of this monograph is on the development of German historicism between the 1490s and 1800. Almost as much attention is given to French and Italian humanist writers as to German ones. Jean Bodin and Voltaire, for example, are frequently cited, but German humanists such as Jacob Wimpfeling less so. Muhlack has cast some new light on the importance of the four empires theory in European historiography. Still dominant among German humanists, and for longer than elsewhere, it had begun to wane by the 1690s. This theory was never as simple or naive as has been believed. Conceptions of ages and epochs seem to have coexisted with it in the minds of historians from Saint Augustine to Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet. Bodin demonstrated his conception of the theory with his idea of six world ages and three constitutional stages.

How important was humanism for the later development of historicism? Muhlack argues that the humanist paradigm for the writing of history, complete with all its critical apparatus, remained typical for 200 years. By the eighteenth century, the new Enlightenment conception of history as the history of civilization had emerged. Earlier ideas about the critical use of sources were modernized and not rejected. The traditional emphasis on universal or world history, once part of the Christian theological doctrines of Western culture, had become completely secularized. Muhlack demonstrates that a new faith in the progress of humanity now emerged. Secular universal history became identical with philosophy of history. This trend reached a high point in the work of Johann Gottfried Herder. Muhlack prefers the lesser historians of the Enlightenment to types such as Herder, because writers like Johann Christoph Gatterer and Johann Martin Chladenius had more to say about the nature of history. They and the entire Göttingen School prepared the way for nineteenth-century professional history. Arnold Herman Ludwig Heeren, for example, transformed the old study of states into the history of the modern state system.

Did this mark the end of humanism and the beginning of historicism? Leopold von Ranke certainly emphasized political history, yet he never lost sight of the importance of the cultural factors in history. If it is true, as Muhlack argues, that the Germans moved away from the history of civilization while the French and English did not, then this point deserves further analysis. Did the history of civilization become merely a specialty in cultural history in nineteenth-century

Germany? Does not the work of Jakob Burckhardt illustrate the continuity of the earlier Enlightenment ideals?

Muhlack's work ends with the commencement of the age of historicism. The shift to the new historiographic paradigm took the form of a new theory of historical objectivity. History had become an autonomous discipline able to offer truths according to its own rules.

By the eighteenth century, world history had become the history of civilization, and this was more than the history of the nation-state. Why did interest in the universal subject decline just as historicism emerged? Why did the history of state systems come to the fore to replace the humanist and Enlightenment traditions that had endured for so long? Perhaps the author has overlooked the strength of the Vichian tradition and the meaning of its assumption that only others can know the actions of those who have lived before them. This principle is developed in historicism a century later and it marks a significant change from the goals of the humanists who are so aptly described by Muhlack, and whose primary aim was to achieve a mirror image of the phenomenal world in their historical writing.

HELEN LIEBEL-WECKOWICZ
University of Alberta

SAMUEL Y. EDGERTON, JR. *The Heritage of Giotto's Geometry: Art and Science on the Eve of the Scientific Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1991. Pp. x, 319. \$39.95.

Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr., takes a new approach to the question raised by Joseph Needham and others as to why China lagged behind the West in scientific development even though it had preceded the West, for example, in the development of printing. Edgerton finds part of the answer in the development of *disegno* during the Italian Renaissance.

Edgerton's book is learned and richly illustrated with paintings and drawings from the Middle Ages, the Italian Renaissance, and contemporaneous Chinese dynasties. These illustrations are necessary to the author's arguments, for his case is built on the issue of the ability to create essentially geometric and sometimes even unimaginative perspective drawings such as those of the blue fly in Robert Hooke's *Micrographia* (1667), the engravings of the moon in Galileo's *Sidereus nuncius* (1610), and the "Trombe da rota per cavar aqua" in Vittorio Zonca's *Novo teatro di machine e edifici* (1607). Those who had not learned *disegno* might create sensitive and even fanciful drawings such as those of the flying insects from Ch'ien Hsüan's *Early Autumn* (thirteenth century), Thomas Harriot's manuscript drawings of the moon (based on his own telescopic viewing of the moon months before Galileo's), and the anonymous woodcut from *Gu-jin Tu-shu Ji-cheng* (1726), but these are not works

that could be used to teach others how to "know" insects, "see" the moon, or "create" facsimile machines.

Edgerton's argument is intricate and flawless. Dedicating his book "to the memory of Erwin Panofsky, the imagination of Leo Steinberg and the common sense of E. H. Gombrich," Edgerton fittingly deals with the intersections of Renaissance art, science, and technology. It also tells us something of the pass into which modern scholarship has fallen that a work of this importance must devote seven pages (pp. 4–10) to countering the "relativism" or "multiculturalism" espoused by so-called "critical theorists." These obscurantist theorists would make of Euclidian geometry and perspective drawing (*disegno*) tactics for the "marginalization of the other" (women and non-Europeans). Politics and economics may marginalize. It is difficult to see how *disegno* does.

Indeed, it was quite the opposite. For example, the Jesuits in China hoped to impart technological knowledge to those who, according to Father Matteo Ricci (1602), did not yet "know how to paint with oil . . . or draw with cast shadows . . . so [that] their pictures are pallid and without life" (p. 254). Chinese artisans could operate technologically, but mandarin scholars who tried to imitate Western technological drawings could not do so. Centuries later the Chinese finally learned to do Italian-style *disegno* and world-wide developments of this sort eventually led to useful drawings such as that of a front wheel assembly of a Yamaha motorcycle. This is a drawing that instructs every person in its taking apart and reconstruction.

Humans were not, *pace* the critical theorists, duped but liberated by the geometrization of the world around them. A larger work force could work from drawings by skilled draftsmen. This was ultimately to the benefit of all.

EDWARD A. GOSSELIN
California State University,
Long Beach

KATHRYN M. OLESKO. *Physics as a Calling: Discipline and Practice in the Königsberg Seminar for Physics*. (Cornell History of Science Series.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1991. Pp. xviii, 488. \$39.95.

If physics had its conceptual roots in the seventeenth century, the modern interplay of theory, experiment, and measurement arose in the nineteenth. So, too, did institutionalized careers and opportunities for specialized training, as well as the disciplinary identities, ethical commitments, and affective patterns characteristic of the professional physicist. In this remarkable book, Kathryn M. Olesko examines one locus of these nineteenth-century developments, the mathematics-physics seminar at the University of Königsberg. Physicist Franz Neumann, with the cooperation of mathematician Carl Jacobi and the lukewarm support of the Prussian ministry of education, founded

the institution in 1834 to train a new class of teacher/researchers: professional physicists, or *Physiker von Beruf*.

Olesko explores the local factors that shaped Neumann's pedagogical endeavor: the vagaries of the state teaching examination, the divergent mathematical background and secondary-school preparation of his students, the absence of a laboratory, the rivalry of other professors, the methodological example afforded by astronomy, and the need to assess and assimilate French mathematical physics. She re-creates from an array of primary sources the *Alltagsgeschichte* of Neumann's seminar: the lectures he delivered; the seminar exercises he assigned; the identities, aspirations, careers, and scientific work of his students.

The genius of this book lies in Olesko's insight into how Neumann's pedagogical strategies, many of them responses to local constraints, shaped his students' professional consciousness. Neumann initiated students into physics through lectures on mechanics, yet his was a unique "physical mechanics," designed to introduce the properties of measuring instruments and to be self-consciously distinct from French analytical mechanics. Although Neumann often justified his enterprise with the rhetoric of research, he aimed in practice at the more realistic pedagogical goal of technical skill in experimental procedures. He stressed routine measuring exercises and a search for precision achieved not through instrumentation *per se*, but through exhaustive analysis of systematic and accidental errors, using the then relatively new method of least squares. Olesko says too little about the history of error analysis or how it was taught, but she shows brilliantly how its use in the seminar promoted a "preoccupation with error and precision," which molded students' professional identity and their conception of scientific truth.

Olesko is not uncritical of Neumann's enterprise, and she makes surprisingly modest claims for his influence. His approach sacrificed conceptualization and creativity to technical mastery; promoted suspicion of interpolated values, graphical techniques, and empirical formulas; and gave rise to the paradox that in Neumann's school "theory was scrutinized and sharpened, but also skirted" (p. 303). His approach was not shared in other centers of physics education such as Berlin and Göttingen, and his students gradually fell away from Neumann's philosophy even as they spread the seminar model. Olesko breaks new ground in her fine-grained, comparative analysis of rival traditions in experimental physics and in her provocative claim for the "demise and disappearance of exact experiment from the practice of German physics" by 1900 (p. 393).

To appreciate the full range of Olesko's achievement, readers should be aware of the literature on the emergence of disciplinary forms of knowledge, the rise of the so-called research imperative, and the transitions of the German term *Beruf* in its cultural

odyssey from "calling" to "profession." Readers may also require a passing familiarity with experimental physics. None of these demands should deter general historians from coming to grips with this multifaceted, innovative, and deeply original work. It speaks not only to the history of science but also to the larger history of education, to the origins of professions in Germany, and to the lived experience of scientists and scholars.

STEVEN TURNER

University of New Brunswick

TIM UNWIN. *Wine and the Vine: An Historical Geography of Viticulture and the Wine Trade*. New York: Routledge. 1991. Pp. xvi, 409. \$29.95.

The history of vine growing and wine production has almost become the special preserve of geographers. The number of professional, academic historians specializing in the subject is limited. Tim Unwin is a lecturer in geography at the University of London and the founding co-editor of the *Journal of Wine Research*. The main value of his book is its breadth (he tries to cover the world) and its temporal depth (he goes back to prehistoric times). It is natural that he concentrates on Europe. Although wine production undoubtedly originated in the Near East and flourished there for several millennia, the Moslem conquest effectively suppressed it. With the spread of Christianity, which absorbed the grape and wine as major ceremonial symbols, Europe became the center of wine production and has remained so up to the present.

The importance of wine as a symbol is not a new theme, but Unwin analyzes it masterfully. Yet his original contribution is his recognition that religious sanction, however important, cannot explain the emergence over centuries of an industry of vast commercial dimensions. Once the church denied wine to lay communicants, its need for wine was limited. He recognizes that monks created vineyards throughout Europe and in the New World. But the lay wine traders who encouraged grape and wine production beyond the needs of monasteries and farm families created a demand among the population at large, a market augmented and preserved by merchants investing heavily in equipment and expecting a profit worthy of their efforts and risks.

Unwin uses economic and social theory to show that more than religious symbolism was involved; wine was also a sign of social and economic status. It was the beverage of the elite where vines were scarce because of climate. Where it was plentiful and consumed by all, as in the Mediterranean, quality signified status. The seventeenth century marked a turning point in the history of wine. More capital was invested in vineyards and wineries as distinct from trade, and new wines were created, such as champagne and port, plus improved claret. Foreign mer-

chants from nonproducing countries, mainly English and Dutch, initiated many of these innovations. The notion that increased wine consumption was a result of expanding demand by the wealthy is "incomplete" (p. 348). Rather, profit-seeking merchants induced higher consumption by playing to class identity. The masses drank beer; the elite drank wine. From these changes Unwin brings his story up to the present. He deals with the vastly complex wine codes, the formation of multinational companies, and the creation of various types of monopolies.

What have all these themes to do with geography? Undoubtedly a lot, and Unwin provides some interesting insights into the geographic location of vines and wine consumption. Yet historical geographers tend to think and write like historians knowledgeable about geography. My main reservation is his inattention to viti-vinicultural cooperatives. Their geographic spread is revealing. One of Unwin's objectives is to discover the interrelationship between wine, politics, society, economy, and culture. He has admirably attained his goal save for failing to note that cooperatives are one of the most powerful lobbies in major wine-producing countries. Despite this weakness, the book is a major and original contribution to the literature.

LEO A. LOUBÈRE
State University of New York,
Buffalo

ANNE HOLLANDER. *Moving Pictures*. Paperback edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. 512. \$18.95.

Movies have shaped the way we view people and things, including works of art. In this engaging, thought-provoking book, now available as a paperback, Anne Hollander looks at Western painting and graphics from the Renaissance to the twentieth century through the lens provided by the cinema, sketching a history of "proto-cinematic" art—that art that engages the viewer with haunting suggestions of narrative—a history whose giants include van Eyck and Dürer, Elsheimer and Callot, De Hooch and Vermeer, Rembrandt and Chardin, Goya and Turner, Friedrich and Menzel, Homer and Sargent, Manet and Degas. This sketch in turn provides a lens with which to look at movies, opening our eyes to the many ways in which their makers consciously or unconsciously have appropriated "arrangements that guarantee emotional responses" (p. 12) and had proven their effectiveness in countless paintings, so that, as the very expression "proto-cinematic art" suggests, cinema, this "newest form of illustration" (p. 9), appears as the culmination of a long development.

As the cited names suggest, proto-cinematic art cannot be equated with what we have come to think of as the mainstream of Western painting. Cinematic art does not want the observer to feel in the presence of

a masterful artist, who, as a second God, wrests ideal order from what is confused, chaotic, and vulgar, making "delicious whole sense out of the unpalatable, indigestible world, especially out of partial and often incomprehensible views of it" (p. 7). The cinematic work is not to be experienced as a virtuoso performance. Ideally, it should efface itself before the "variable appearance of things" (p. 17) that insistent in their seemingly unmediated presence seem charged with hidden meaning, inviting the viewer to dream, to invent stories to supplement the image. The cinematic work is haunted by absent meaning. Just this absence moves the viewer. On the whole, this is a Northern European tradition, "a mode of rendering visible reality in art that was fundamentally different from the classicizing tradition established by Italian Renaissance artists and theorists" (p. 14).

As Hollander challenges us to rethink the history of Western picture-making and the place of cinema within that history, so she challenges us to rethink taken-for-granted assumptions about what art is and should be, including the distinction between "high" and "low" art. As her title hints, she challenges us especially to rethink the relationship of art to time. The book's first sentences raise this key issue in a way that recalls Michael Fried's distinction between absorption and theatricality (*Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot* [1980]). Theatricality, Fried suggested, is profoundly opposed to the pursuit of presentness that governs authentic modernist art. Cinematic art, as Hollander understands it, would seem to side with presentness: "Theater is ephemeral," while movies, like paintings, are "intended for all time" (p. 4). As Hollander argues: "Just as God and Adam perpetually lose touch on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, so Fred Astaire and Ginger do the Charioca in exactly the same way now as then, and forever" (pp. 4–5).

But this easy distinction is soon called into question. Just as there can be a pictorial approach to the theater—Hollander mentions Richard Wagner and especially Henry Irving—so there can be a theatrical approach to painting, where the former keeps what is represented inside the frame and "the spectator breathless outside" (p. 334), while the latter refuses such a sharp separation. In this sense, Hollander calls films "essentially dramatic and not theatrical" (p. 25) and discusses Botticelli's *Birth of Venus* as a theatrical apparition that lets eternity triumph over linear time. The reader may wonder what happened to the initially asserted opposition of ephemeral theater and movies or paintings "intended for all time." But pictorial representations of the ephemeral are not themselves ephemeral. This offers a key to their special magic: "A particular sort of picture seems to be in motion even while it does not move, seems to be showing a much larger section of time than the frame can contain and seems to invite our participation in the movement of its potential narrative" (p. 4). To be sure, all of this is only a matter of seeming. Art

redeems ephemeral reality only at the price of illusion. Hollander leaves the reader to ask about the price.

KARSTEN HARRIES
Yale University

STUART WOOLF. *Napoleon's Integration of Europe*. New York: Routledge. 1991. Pp. ix, 319.

Stuart Woolf has produced a masterful work of synthesis that reveals in precise detail how Napoleon conquered, administered, and ultimately lost control over the Continent. Neither a biography nor a military history, this book examines the structure of the Grand Empire in an original fashion: it focuses less on individual territories than on the policies that bound them together and the mechanics of imperial rule that exploited them.

Taking conquest as his theme, Woolf organizes his study into concentrated chapters that, like Napoleon's legions, advance relentlessly forward. An economical style, insightful analysis, and thorough documentation mark the author's examination of the ideological origins of revolutionary and imperial expansion, policies of conquest (both administrative and exploitative), and varying responses of foreign peoples to French rule.

More than simply Napoleon's vaulting ambition and will to power underlay his policy of conquest. As Woolf explains, it was the "attempt by the political class that had emerged from the Revolution to extend their ideals of progress and civilisation to every region of Europe touched by French armies" (p. vii).

These ideals included principles born of the Enlightenment, notably the superiority of French culture, as well as those forged by the revolution, especially constitutional government, political nationalism, economic liberalism, and the "provision of appropriate institutional, administrative, financial and judicial structures" (p. 12).

Military victories won during the revolution had established France's power far beyond its Old Regime boundaries and nurtured in France a sense of the "Great Nation." The author describes how Napoleon developed instruments needed to administer his constantly expanding domain, namely the generals, diplomats, and prefects who sought to accustom foreign peoples to French rule. Hierarchical and centralized, Napoleonic administration employed coercion, persuasion, as well as rewards to encourage obedience by subject populations. Integrating and modernizing his captive possessions, the emperor introduced the civil code, confiscated church property, abolished guilds, ended serfdom, and established land cadasters. Woolf emphasizes how difficult it proved to accomplish these ambitious policies given the vast size of the empire, the limited time that Napoleon had available, and the resistance to fundamental change imposed by foreigners.

French occupation and control also entailed exploitation. Woolf explains how Napoleon's administrators, carrying out their master's orders, subordinated the conquered territories to France's economic and military needs, reorienting European manufactures and trade to suit its purposes. Intended to weaken Great Britain, the elaborate Continental System largely served to consolidate Napoleonic hegemony.

These economic policies and conscription, which grew increasingly burdensome as Napoleon waged one war after another, aroused general resentment throughout the empire. While Napoleon could entice most social elites to collaborate with his regime, he never won over the masses, whom he always considered (as Woolf puts it) "ignorant, normally passive and rationally unknowable" (p. 187). Aroused by heavy fiscal demands and often motivated by religious passion, the lower classes turned to banditry or (as in the notable case of Spain) guerrilla warfare, thus debilitating the Grand Empire.

In the end Napoleon's integration of Europe, despite the many progressive reforms it introduced, proved a failure. Woolf concludes that it nonetheless stirred powerful forces—national awareness, political liberalism, administrative modernization—that persisted through the next century. He curiously maintains that the "final and most profound heritage of the Napoleonic experience was the widening social gap that developed between the propertied and property-less" (p. 245), as if Napoleon's accomplishments anticipated the doctrines of Karl Marx.

Woolf's succinct text is supplemented by a double index of names and subjects, an extensive bibliography, and a lengthy chronology. Unfortunately, the publisher has included only five small maps of Europe that omit numerous places cited by the author, particularly the 130 departments that formed the basis of imperial administration. Nevertheless, its wealth of information, clear argument, careful organization, and grand scheme guarantee this volume a secure place among the classics of Napoleonic history.

JAMES FRIGUGLIETTI
Eastern Montana College

RICHARD F. HAMILTON. *The Bourgeois Epoch: Marx and Engels on Britain, France, and Germany*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 293. Cloth \$37.50, paper \$13.50.

In this book, Richard F. Hamilton provides a critical assessment of some of the writings by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels—including notably Marx's *The Class Struggles in France* (written in 1850) and Engels's *Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (written in 1851–52)—to test the "empirical adequacy" (p. xi) of their portraits of England in the seventeenth century, France from 1848 to 1850, and Germany from 1840 to 1875. In a process he likens to zero-based budgeting, Hamilton, a professor of sociology and political

science and author of numerous other books and articles including *Who Voted for Hitler?* (1982), finds copious examples of errors and inconsistencies. He shows that, as even Marx and Engels recognized in places, the historical record failed to support their theory, but they did not alter it to account for the discrepancies.

Marx and Engels declared, for example, that the bourgeoisie overthrew the aristocracy in England during the seventeenth century, yet they did not provide a detailed study to support that claim and, as Engels later admitted, the demise of aristocratic power in England still had not occurred by the end of the nineteenth century. Hamilton finds similar flaws in the accounts dealing with France and Germany. Marx and Engels's analyses of specific periods, he says, failed to support their overall system. One might ask whether, in the light of the overthrow of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the conventional wisdom that Marxism is a failed system, Hamilton's extended argument does not constitute flogging a dead horse. Such a suggestion, however, would be unfair to him, as his target is not Marxists in former Communist countries but those in the capitalist world and especially scholars who have unduly praised the brilliance and profundity of Marx and Engels's historical writings.

A much more serious flaw in the book is Hamilton's procedure, which is not so much to do the kind of empirical research he faults Marx and Engels for not doing as to compare their writings with those of later scholars. Although he is fully aware of the complexity of historical events, his methodology suggests a certain naiveté about the elusiveness of historical truth and the tenuousness of all historical interpretations, including the ones he develops based largely on secondary works. At one point he even refers to "actual history" (p. 129) as if he were some sort of latter-day Rankean, although elsewhere (pp. 163, 255 n. 47) he seems aware of Leopold von Ranke's failings as well as his achievements.

Similarly, although Hamilton is obviously quite knowledgeable about Marx and Engels's lives and works—and rightly (in my view) attacks those who argue for "divergences and differences" (p. 10) between their writings—his account largely ignores the context in which they wrote. He treats them as if they were professional historians or sociologists. In fact, while a case can be made that Marx was an economist by profession, both men were partly professional journalists but primarily the founders and intellectual leaders of a political movement to which they subordinated their other endeavors. Engels, in addition, had a successful career in the textile business, as Hamilton recognizes at one point (p. 144). In short, they led extraordinarily busy and variegated lives. Against this background, the range of their intellectual achievements and the number and accuracy of many—although far from all—of their insights seem astonishing, but Hamilton is right to argue that many

scholars have gone too far in praising the profundity of their historical writings. Thus, his book provides a useful corrective for anyone who believes Marx and Engels were bona fide historians.

J. D. HUNLEY

History Division

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

GARY P. STEENSON. *After Marx, Before Lenin: Marxism and Socialist Working-Class Parties in Europe, 1884–1914*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 353. \$39.95.

A hotly contested issue among the European Left during the nineteenth century was whether positive social change would come about through economic organization or through political activity. At the end of the century, Marxists were prominent among those who favored organized political action to prepare for socioeconomic transformation, a stance that distinguished them from anarchists and syndicalists. What this entailed in terms of program and tactics, however, was the subject of fierce debates, even among self-professed Marxists. Gary P. Steenson's book focuses on the politics of socialist parties in four continental European countries in the thirty years before World War I. His intention is to assess the degree to which these parties may be called Marxist.

Judging "the marxness of political parties" (p. 278) is a tricky business, of course; it assumes that there is a standard, a Marxism. Steenson recognizes this problem and argues that the appropriate criteria should be extracted from the voluminous correspondence of Engels, in which he counseled and criticized activists and parties, and from the infrequent analyses of specific party programs made by Marx, such as his critique of the 1875 Gotha Program of the German SAPD. Different sets of criteria could easily be applied, but Steenson makes a good case that these particular choices make historical sense, because they come from published writings available at the time and because Engels's political counsel was seen by contemporaries as a continuation of the counsel of Marx, who died in 1883.

Briefly, Engels encouraged the formation of independent socialist workers' parties that would engage in politics in order to accelerate the division of capitalist society into proletariat and bourgeoisie. Political action was not an end in itself; it was to be utilized to clarify class divisions and thereby prepare the industrial working class for the expected revolutionary transition from capitalism to communism.

With his chosen criteria in hand, Steenson devotes separate chapters to Germany, Austria, France, and Italy; he discusses how the writings and counsels of Marx and Engels became known; how (and if) Marxism came to inform the official programs of the national parties; and how closely the organization and tactics adopted by these parties followed Engels's

recommendations. It comes as no surprise that this approach illuminates more about the working-class parties in Austria and Germany, where Marxism was central, than about those in Italy and France, where it was not. Steenson is on familiar ground in his discussion of Germany—he is the author of an excellent political biography of Karl Kautsky (*Karl Kautsky, 1854–1938* [1978]) and a book on the German Social Democratic Party before 1914 (*“Not One Man! Not One Penny!” German Social Democracy, 1863–1914* [1981])—and he clearly prefers the programs drawn up by Kautsky in Germany and Victor Adler in Austria. But in his discussions of the French and Italians, Steenson seems to sigh with regret when parties fail to measure up to the Marxist criteria, as when he concludes that the Program of the Italian PSI in 1892 was “severely wanting” when “judged as a marxist doctrine” (p. 247). This assessment would not have surprised or worried the majority of PSI members, who never considered it a Marxist party. In his analysis of France, Steenson focuses on the Guesdists and their party, the POF, which was considered Marxist, but which remained much less important in France than either worker syndicalism or reformist socialism.

Steenson recognizes all of this, and he does a good job of indicating the ways the movements in Italy and France failed to meet his criteria. But his discussion of the French and Italian cases is still frustrating, too often resembling a lament about what these left-wing groups were not (that is, Marxist), instead of moving on to consider the actual ideological roots, programmatic goals, and preferred tactics of the dominant left-wing movements. A more interesting historical question concerning Marxism in these countries is not when socialists and programs became Marxist—before 1914 they seldom did—but rather how Marxism affected socialists and their programs when it did gain some recognition.

K. STEVEN VINCENT
North Carolina State University

LEE KENNETT. *The First Air War, 1914–1918*. New York: Free Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 275. \$24.95.

The historiography of the first air war, 1914–18, has long been dominated by accounts of the daring exploits of the “aces” and the aircraft themselves. Existing operational histories have not only tended to exaggerate the importance of the airplane but also have largely neglected to evaluate air power both in the total context of its prewar development and its evolution in wartime. Lee Kennett’s comparatively brief one-volume survey uniquely demonstrates the multidimensional aspects of the air war and corrects many of the myths and omissions that have obscured our understanding of the origins of military aviation—a major feat considering the variety and in

some cases the paucity of records in this field. This book is solidly researched with an excellent “Essay on Sources.” The author has provided an indispensable tool for scholars seeking to expand on the topics and issues he raises in this study.

Kennett begins with an overview of the three decades of aviation development that occurred before 1914, demonstrating that far from being the cinderella of the military establishment as so often claimed by its proponents, the air services had been recognized as having a defined mission and function and were achieving recognition both in organization and relationship to the older services as well as being included in the military’s prewar expansion programs.

Although the air forces’ role in reconnaissance during World War I has received the least attention, Kennett shows how this function was first in importance and, in the case of artillery spotting, made a significant contribution to the waging of war in all theaters of World War I. Other functions of air power evolved out of the airplane’s role in reconnaissance and observation. Tracing the development of the bomber, the fighter, naval aviation, and the function of close air support during the various campaigns in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, Kennett concludes that the fundamental role of air power in World War I was not a major one. Although the air arm had captured the imagination and attention of the public and the attention of the military establishment, as demonstrated by the growth of the air forces over the course of the war, air power played no decisive role in a battle or a campaign. The war itself, however, provided the impetus for the subsequent rise of air power, not just in technical development but also in the perception that military aviation would be a major player in the future of war itself.

Beyond his thoughtful analysis of the significance of the introduction of this new weapon onto the battlefield, Kennett provides insight into the machines and the men who flew them, their selection and training, and their response to combat in this new dimension of warfare and explains the similarities and differences between the various air services and their development during this first phase of military aviation. The creation of a new military “caste” and a new breed of heroes to a postwar generation had much to do with the special demands placed on the relationship between pilot and aircraft—on the interaction of humans with technology. The interplay of these factors, Kennett suggests, may be as responsible for the distinctive behavior among the various air services as the cultural-institutional differences of each of the belligerents. Given the display of air power in the recent Gulf conflict (perhaps the culmination of aircraft’s effect on the battlefield) and the role of technology and the pilot and the future of military aviation in the new world order, the ideas

raised by this investigation deserve closer attention and further study.

KEITH W. BIRD

New Hampshire Technical Colleges and Institute

JOHN N. HORNE. *Labour at War: France and Britain 1914–1918*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xix, 463. \$110.00.

Against the grain of a literature that has been dominated by studies of shop stewards, communists, and other radical movements, John N. Horne argues that the experience of World War I significantly strengthened reformist tendencies within the labor movement in both France and Britain. Such "reformism" has often been conflated with a simple capitulation to patriotic appeals, but Horne argues that, while the majority of the labor movement in both countries certainly loyally supported the war effort, their support was by no means unconditional or uncritical. Rather, labor and socialist leaders repeatedly set terms for labor's continued participation in the war effort, demanding that any wartime sacrifices be exacted across class lines, that the state exhibit as intense a commitment to postwar reconstruction as it did to the prosecution of the war, and, finally, that belligerent governments abjure annexationism or other punitive war aims. "Reformism," then, involved more than a rejection of revolution, it was a flexible strategy for working-class defense and progressive social reform. In tracing the origins of "reformism" to the unique circumstances of the war, Horne lends support to Arthur Marwick's old claim that the "total war" of 1914–18 was an agent of wider social transformation.

This is an important argument, and one that Horne sustains particularly well in his discussion of France, which absorbs fully two-thirds of the book. Here, Horne not only restores the much-maligned *majoritaires* of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (C.G.T.)—and Léon Jouhaux in particular—to center stage, he also explains why their positions and actions can by no means be dismissed as simple opportunism. While its Jacobin tradition proved enough to rally the *Parti Socialiste* to "the nation," the C.G.T.'s *ouvriérisme* and shop-floor ties made its leaders far more insistent on labor's rights within the wartime social contract. Their collaboration was, Horne argues, both practical and farsighted: not only were labor leaders able to use even the minimal partnership offered by Albert Thomas to win concessions on wages and bargaining but they were also able to develop their own vision of a high-wage, rationalized postwar economy, in which labor's representatives and institutions would be incorporated as full partners. Often attacked during the class-conscious 1920s, such *majoritaire* ideas can nevertheless be seen as the basis for much C.G.T. planning in the interwar period and after 1945.

The discussion of the British case is less successful,

both because it is briefer and because Horne's claims about reformism do not fit comfortably with the wartime stance of British trade unionism. Horne rightly locates reformism in Britain primarily within the political rather than industrial wing of the labor movement, yet he argues that the ideas of the Worker's National Committee and such exemplary "reformist" statements as the 1918 manifesto "Labour and the New Social Order" found support among trade unionists as well. But was such support more than merely rhetorical? Certainly British trade unionists had almost no interest in rationalization or in the types of consultative machinery advocated by the C.G.T.; their principal demand was that prewar industrial practices be restored. Such apparent conservatism was indeed, as Horne argues, a result of the unions' prewar strength, but it is hard then to see how the process of wartime mobilization—in which British unions were far more intensely involved than their French counterparts—deepened their "reformist" tendencies. To Horne's credit, however, such differences between the cases are not papered over. While some may in the end dispute his claim that a similar "labor reformism" developed out of the war experience in France and Britain, all should welcome his lucid and detailed account of the two cases.

SUSAN PEDERSEN

Harvard University

TOM BUCHANAN. *The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xvii, 250.

For the British Left, labor's failure to give meaningful support to the embattled Spanish Republic became a symbol of the inability or unwillingness of labor leaders to confront the crucial questions of the 1930s. In his preface, Tom Buchanan claims that this view helps to explain why, to date, there has been no detailed account of British labor's response to the Spanish Civil War. The depressing story was already known. An eager and deeply felt desire by labor's rank-and-file to aid Spanish comrades was largely thwarted by an anticommunist cabal of right-wing trade union leaders and Labour politicians, including Walter Citrine, Ernest Bevin, and Hugh Dalton. Insofar as useful aid was provided, this version continues, it originated in the independent activities of an antifascist Popular Front of communists and other left-wingers. But, alas, the story concludes, such support as this coalition managed to muster, including the formation of the British International Brigade, was insufficient to overcome the inertia of labor's "official" leadership.

Buchanan believes that this traditional view is "dangerously deceptive" (p. 223), ignoring not only the practical limitations labor faced but also the strong element of opposition to the Spanish Republic among Catholic workers that posed a serious threat of divi-

sion within labor ranks. Furthermore, Buchanan asserts, the role of anticommunism in determining "official" labor policy was more complex than is generally depicted. This book is not an apologia for British labor leaders, but it is an attempt to look at the Spanish crisis from their perspective.

Buchanan's early chapters trace the evolution of labor's initial responses, including its year-long support for non-intervention in the sincere, if self-deluding, belief that this was in the best interests of the Republic. Subsequently he discusses the Left's Popular Front strategy, the attempts by left-wing trade union activists to provide alternative, "unofficial" forms of solidarity with Spanish comrades, and the opposition to the anticlerical Spanish Republic within the labor movement.

The core of Buchanan's well-argued and thoroughly documented, if sometimes rather plodding, analysis is the importance of labor's bureaucratic internationalism in fixing the narrow path on which British labor trod in response to Spain. From this point of view, Buchanan says, the labor movement's Spanish policy was not a failure but a success. Faced with the daunting task of maintaining control over labor's relations with a chaotic Spanish Republic while attempting to supervise various attempts, sometimes locally and independently initiated, to provide material or humanitarian aid to Spanish workers and simultaneously working to accommodate anti-Republican Catholic trade unionists, labor leaders managed somehow to hold the movement together without surrendering the initiative to communists and other radical leftists. Citrine and Bevin may have "regularly and flagrantly misled their members . . . [but] they did so in order to protect the institutions of which they were the executives" (p. 224).

Buchanan's book will not be popular with leftists who have an ideological axe to grind, but he has provided a carefully researched and admirably detached corrective to an oft-repeated but previously untested version of labor history during the 1930s.

THOMAS C. KENNEDY
University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville

ANITA PRAŻMOWSKA. *Britain, Poland, and the Eastern Front, 1939*. (Soviet and East European Studies.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. viii, 231. \$42.50.

The purpose of this book is to disprove the thesis, which Anita Prazmowska regards as traditionally accepted, that in "March [1939] Britain had made a definite commitment to fight Germany" (p. 1), a commitment that led, fitfully but inevitably, to a declaration of war on September 3. Hence, 1939 marked a watershed in interwar British foreign policy that resulted in London's involvement in Eastern Europe, an area it had disdainfully avoided for two decades.

By contrast, Prazmowska argues that in 1939 the British demonstrated a "high degree of continuity" (pp. 19, 107) in their policy, which was characterized by a "lack of concern for developments east of Germany" (pp. 28, 135) and a constant desire to propitiate Germany. Indeed, London encouraged Berlin in its policy of revisionism in the east (pp. 21, 35). The heralded "guarantees" given to Poland in Romania were merely "bluffs in Chamberlain's continued policy of appeasement" (p. 189). These empty gestures inevitably failed to "signal to Germany an unequivocal message of 'this far and no further'" (p. 135). Whereas the author's "continuity" theory of British foreign policy is not as original as she implies, she has made the first thorough demonstration of the case.

Prazmowska's point of departure is the series of aggressive moves in central Europe in March 1939: Germany's occupation of Prague, the seizure of Memel (Klaipeda), and the exposure of Berlin's economic extortion of Romania. London reacted hastily, deciding to cobble together some sort of "eastern front" and in vain pursuit of its coalition issued guarantees to Warsaw on March 31 and Bucharest on April 13. Prazmowska proceeds to demonstrate that London's resolve proved remarkably evanescent.

Poland, the putative keystone of this eastern front, was treated with virtual indifference by its supposed British allies. This reflects the fact that prior to March 1939 there was "no trust, no unity of interest . . . no common ground" (p. 47) between Warsaw and London. After the heralded "guarantee" there was no military collaboration, little financial support for Warsaw's desperate defense needs, and no diplomatic coordination. The author's careful search of British archives to prove her case is the strongest contribution of this monograph. Britain's interest in the east was based on "meagre" knowledge of "geo-political realities" (p. 42) and died aborning.

Although Prazmowska has been admirably thorough in reconstructing British policy, there are a number of weaknesses in her thesis. Given the centrality of the Moscow negotiations of summer 1939 for the "eastern front," the author's decision to treat this marginally is unfortunate. As a result the real focus of the book is London's Polish, not eastern, policy. Here a second problem arises: Prazmowska has used Polish archival or published materials sparingly and a number of errors result. In general, the Polish side of the picture is weakly developed.

In sum, this is a convincing demonstration of the haphazardness of British policy toward Eastern Europe in 1939. Even if we were convinced of it before, the demonstration is edifying.

M. B. BISKUPSKI
St. John Fisher College

CHRISTOPHER DUFFY. *Red Storm on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany, 1945*. New York: Atheneum. 1991. Pp. xi, 403. \$27.50.

This idiosyncratically structured book by Christopher Duffy consists of six parts and a seventy-page appendix that is longer than any of the parts. Part 1, in a swirl of generalities and specifics, provides background on total war, on the war in Europe since 1939, on Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin and their generals, and on the Soviet and German situations in January 1945. Part 2 sets the stage. In it, the Soviet Vistula-Oder Operation of January 1945, after covering some 300 miles in two weeks, terminates prematurely on the Oder River just thirty-five miles east of Berlin.

The "storm on the Reich," from early February to April 1945, occupies parts 3 through 5. In them, Duffy undertakes to make a two-month sideshow east of the Oder River comprehensible by parceling it into categories: East Pomerania, West Prussia, and East Prussia; the two Silesias; and the sieges of cities, Königsberg, Danzig, Breslau, and so on, which Hitler had declared to be "fortresses." The author's previous specialization in early modern warfare, particularly fortresses and sieges, may have attracted him to these areas and places that other British and American historians have largely ignored. Part 5 is the first comprehensive treatment of the sieges in English, and the other two contain details not available in English elsewhere.

In part 6, Duffy delivers a valediction to the German eastern territories, brings the war after the first week of April 1945 to an end in six pages, carries the story forward to 1990 in another four, and provides a summary and conclusions that probably ought to be read first because they set in a chronological framework what has come before.

Two essays on styles of warfare make up the appendix. The essay on Soviet style describes weapons and organization and, drawing on the intensive Soviet postwar effort at quantification, judges the Vistula-Oder Operation to have been a veritable masterpiece of military art. The Germans, he concludes while reviewing aspects of their style in both its early and late periods, clung to faith in mobility and neglected the alternative, positional warfare, until it was too late.

Unfortunately, the parts in their entirety do not convincingly address the central question: why did the Vistula-Oder Operation, conceived as a true storm on the Reich, degenerate into two months of random sieges and skirmishes? Duffy accepts the standard Soviet contention that an unseasonable thaw in late January complicated an already considerable Soviet supply problem, thereby allowing the Germans to get a second wind and shifting the strategic balance in their favor. While this rationale meets the minimum requirement, it at least slights the possibility that three other, more significant, strategic shifts took place. At the Yalta Conference in early February 1945, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill refused to endorse Stalin's projected disposition of the German eastern territories. On February 10, the Germans flooded the Roer River valley and stalled

the Western allies' advance into the Reich, giving Stalin what could have appeared to be ample time to impose his will east of the Oder and Western Neisse rivers unilaterally. At the end of March, while the Soviet army groups were engaged in completing a half-dozen sieges, American forces, advancing fast east of the Rhine River, were approaching the demarcation line between the eastern and western zones in Germany and coming into position to compete, if they wished, for the distinction of capturing Berlin. These developments might have been given some attention in a book that, as the author states, "is the story of a decisive but as yet little understood episode in the most terrible war in history" (p. ix).

EARL F. ZIEMKE
University of Georgia

MICHEL MARGAIRAZ. *L'État, les finances et l'économie: Histoire d'une conversion 1932-1952*. In two volumes. Foreword by FRANÇOIS BLOCH-LAINÉ. Paris: Comité pour l'Histoire Economique et Financière de la France, Ministère de l'Economie des Finances et du Budget. 1991. Pp. xvi, 717; 722-1456. 490 fr. the set.

Thirty years ago Charles Kindleberger observed that the postwar renovation of the French economy was largely due to "new men" and "new attitudes" ("The Postwar Resurgence of the French Economy," *In Search of France*, eds. Stanley Hoffmann *et al.* [1963], 156). Thanks to a young French historian, Michel Margairaz, we now can firmly say that Kindleberger's *aperçu* was correct when applied to the state. This monumental *thèse d'état* documents and explains the changes in the direction of the nation's economic and financial affairs, especially those at the Ministry of Finance, between 1932 and 1952.

Margairaz poses the big question about these two decades: do they represent upheaval and rupture or conversion and assimilation? His answer is the latter. He argues this thesis at three levels: practice, that is, economic and financial policy; structure, meaning the socioadministrative apparatus and personnel; and society and politics, the dimension that helps explain the evolution of policy and structure.

At the level of practice, a strict, liberal policy that awarded priority to financial stability gave ground to spending on productive equipment, but the shift was neither abrupt nor total and it came more from shifting budgetary priorities than from increased volume and deficits. With respect to structure, new agencies and functions that addressed the economy were grafted onto traditional ministries in a process that dated back to the Popular Front and Vichy. Margairaz stresses the strategic role of Jean Monnet in planning these structural changes. These "new men," like François Bloch-Lainé at the Treasury, were new only in outlook and in their identification with the Resistance. Otherwise they had conventional backgrounds: "raised in the same seraglio," as the

French say. The conversion was mental, not social. The austere liberal ethos that dominated the world of financial experts before the war gave way to an expansionist view that supported spending generously on the productive base while striving for financial stability and an end to wartime controls. The new enemies were economic stagnation and policies like deflation that sacrificed growth to financial equilibrium. By 1948 the planners, the technical ministries, and the Treasury combined forces to expedite the new expansionist orthodoxy. The *grands corps d'état* survived the upheavals of 1936, 1940, and 1944 through conversion.

Instead of the simplistic black-and-white view that contrasts the 1930s with the post-1945 years, Margairaz's thesis offers a revised chronology, arguing that in financial policy the major change occurred in 1948, not 1945; that the new economic diagnosis and equipment plans dated from the 1930s and the war era; that administrative innovations occurred steadily over the entire two decades; and that the mental break with liberal orthodoxy began long before 1945. Explaining such changes, Margairaz assigns considerable weight to exogenous forces both domestic, such as the popular explosion against deflation in 1936, and foreign, such as the influence of Germany during the occupation and the United States afterward. Yet Margairaz emphasizes that the state administration was seldom in phase with outside sociopolitical pressures. Thus in 1936–37, Treasury officials checked the demand-side policies of the Popular Front; in 1950, they blocked efforts by conservative politicians to curtail investment. The state, then, was both the object of exogenous factors, which it sometimes resisted and at other times assimilated, and an actor, exercising decisive action to assure the transition of the French economy at mid-century from stagnation to growth.

Margairaz's reach is wide. His view extends beyond the economic bureaucracy to include government, political parties, interest groups, and international affairs. His judgments are always balanced and rarely confrontational, although he does challenge other historians on several major issues, such as those who have questioned the economic importance of either American aid or the Monnet Plan, or those who have asserted that the Monnet Plan was conceived to secure French hegemony over German heavy industry. In assessing American influence on French policy, he argues for a pattern of convergence, anticipation, and connivance that, for Paris, often ended in disappointment. This is a dense, rich text that amplifies and corrects not only the big picture of continuity and change but much of the subplot as well. For example, it narrates in detail how the Resistance formulated its economic program.

Like most French theses, this one cites seemingly every available archival source and secondary study. The only oversight is the absence of U.S. sources, especially those of the State Department and on the

Marshall Plan, and some of the most recent American secondary works.

The author was a student of the late Jean Bouvier, to whom he gives ample credit. Thanks to a new committee for economic and financial history sponsored by the Ministry of Finance, Bouvier's goal of rejuvenating economic history in France has received a major boost. Publication of this superb thesis under the ministry's auspices announces this promising development.

RICHARD F. KUISEL
State University of New York,
Stony Brook

JOHN GILLINGHAM. *Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xv, 397. \$44.50.

Jean Monnet's disgusted resignation as president of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) only two years after its creation in 1952 left contemporary observers and future historians dubious about whether the ECSC had advanced Monnet's goal of creating a United States of Europe. When the six ECSC member countries endorsed the creation of the European Economic Community in 1955, they implied that broader economic unity was needed because partial integration limited to coal and steel had failed. John Gillingham's valuable book undertakes a new appraisal of ECSC and of the role of coal and steel in European international relations.

Gillingham's major contribution is to demonstrate that Robert Schuman's proposal on May 9, 1950, for the creation of a pool of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe was not the sudden product of a few weeks of brainstorming at Monnet's Commissariat du Plan in Paris but the result of attempts over a quarter century to organize harmoniously the conflicting interests of Europe's heavy industry. In chapter 1, on the interwar years, Gillingham describes France's seemingly punitive policy toward Germany as a somewhat paradoxical attempt "to coerce Germany into accepting agreements that would . . . [create] the basis for a more equitable long-term relationship; by demonstrating their good will, the Germans could be raised from economic subjection to industrial partnership" (p. 3). The original Schuman Plan could be described in similar terms. But, Gillingham continues, progress was made more by the collusion, or at least cooperation, of business groups in the 1930s, and even resulted in "economic appeasement" of Adolf Hitler which itself, ironically, prepared the way for the "functional integration" of the post-1945 period (pp. 43–44). In chapter 2, he shows that the economic entry of the United States into World War II after 1940 transformed the conflict from a "lesser war" based on coal and steel to a greater one involv-

ing total economic mobilization, thus showing the implausibility of Schuman's claim in 1950 that the creation of a coal and steel pool would make war between France and Germany impossible. From the moment it entered the war, Gillingham shows, the United States became a major actor in all European economic diplomacy, including the preparation and negotiation of the Schuman Plan.

Throughout the book, Gillingham sees the direct influence of Monnet, for whom, he admits, he is developing "a lifelong fascination" (p. xiii), an interest which may have led him to exaggerate slightly the constructive character of Monnet's background influence. Monnet is everywhere in the book: changing French economic strategy in 1914 when he was only twenty-five; persuading the United States to become the "arsenal of democracy" in 1940 and to support French reconstruction in 1946; and acting as "standard bearer for American policies of trade liberalization and political integration" in 1948–49 (p. 145). But Gillingham is far from blind to Monnet's failings. In a long, fascinating account of the negotiation of the Schuman Plan treaty in 1950–51, he demonstrates how business interests, especially German and French, were able to change totally Monnet's original concept of ECSC, primarily by weakening its supranational character, and how, as the Community's first president, he was unable to restore that character.

The book is based on painstaking combing of archives of individual companies, business groups, the occupation authorities in Germany, and the foreign affairs archives of France, Germany, Britain, and the United States. In his determination to leave no memorandum uncited, his style slips into the weakness of which he accused the ECSC High Authority: "inexhaustible in the production of investigations, analyses, statistical surveys, reports, and memos" (p. 332). This is a political study of economic issues that does not attempt to contribute to the theory of economic integration, partial or total. It is, however, an exceptionally valuable reconstruction of the intricate diplomatic and economic negotiations by which the character of ECSC was shaped and a valid demonstration of the crucial role of the coal and steel industries in European international relations in the first half of the twentieth century.

F. ROY WILLIS
University of California,
Davis

KENNETH R. ANDREWS. *Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 240. \$44.50.

"Rather than a general and potentially boring account of Caroline maritime enterprise" (p. ix), Kenneth R. Andrews chooses to investigate a number of intrinsically fascinating themes. Andrews knows the

primary sources and secondary works and shows a fine appreciation for the implications of his findings. Yet the book exhibits a certain awkwardness characteristic more of a collection of essays than of a tightly constructed volume. Still we should be happy that Andrews persuaded a publisher to unite his efforts in a single volume rather than scattering fragments in other publications.

In the introduction, Andrews surveys the book's major themes and explains the dependence between naval and maritime affairs in Charles I's England. The following four chapters deal with the history of English maritime enterprise between 1625 and 1642. The chapter on the expansion of the shipping industry illustrates the maxim of being in the right place at the right time. Although the English had developed new trade routes after 1603 to the East Indies and Mediterranean requiring larger ships (over 100 tons loaded), the entry of the Dutch into the Thirty Years' War allowed England to dominate (presumably with shares to Scotland and Ireland) the European carrying trade (p. 33). The British advantage nevertheless was susceptible to rapid erosion once the Dutch were at peace. Chapter 2 deals with the owners of the enlarged merchant marine. In Bristol and the west sole ownership of ships was common. In London and other eastern ports, however, the division of ships (down to sixteenths or even thirty-seconds) predominated even among the elite. Andrews next discusses mutiny, a chronic problem of the early modern English sea world. The growth of the merchant marine and the crown's demand for (and ill-treatment of) sailors placed the common seaman in a pressure-filled situation where mutiny offered the chance to lodge grievances about management, wages, and politics. Andrews moves on to an in-depth study of the papers of Thomas Anthony, a ship's purser, where he gives insights into England's overseas trade. These chapters form a unity that is lacking in the remainder of the book.

The following chapters examine naval aspects of civilian and royal shipping. In chapter 5 Andrews describes Sir Kenelm Digby's Mediterranean voyage as an example of privateering expeditions during the wars with France and Spain. Andrews's chapter on ship money challenges the commonly accepted antipiracy rationale for the policy, replacing it with the king's claim to sovereignty of the seas (pp. 134–56) and foreign policy considerations (pp. 132, 137–38) as the justifications of Charles's scheme. The ship money fleets marked a move away from a Royal Navy in which hired merchant vessels outnumbered the crown's ships. Andrews provides a detailed discussion of the ship money fleets' most successful counter-pirate operation, the campaign against Salée, Morocco. The brief final chapter explains how Parliament grabbed the fleet from the king and how radical Protestant shipowners took control of the navy. The book concludes with four transcribed documents giv-

ing details on the growth, distribution, and ownership of shipping and the number of seamen.

In addition to Andrews's informative essays the book has a number of virtues. Notes are placed at the bottom of the page. There is both a serviceable bibliography and a good index. I recommend this book not only to those interested in early modern European maritime history but also to scholars of English political, social, economic, and naval history. The book illuminates an important slice of English history (allowing its use as a reading in upper division courses) and forms the foundation for further studies on a myriad of topics.

EDWARD M. FURGOL
The Navy Museum
Washington, D.C.

MARK NICHOLLS. *Investigating Gunpowder Plot*. New York: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's. 1991. Pp. vii, 254. \$39.95.

This volume offers both a critical reexamination of the conspiracy in 1605 to blow up the House of Lords where King and Parliament were to have assembled for the opening session of Parliament and a study of the administrative response of James I's government to the discovery of this plot. The book is thoroughly researched, and Mark Nicholls is able to reconstruct part of the proceedings of the Privy Council during the period from 1602 until 1613, for which the Privy Council Registers are missing. Nicholls finds that the government, led by a fourteen-member Privy Council, was remarkably efficient but had no foreknowledge of the conspiracy, as some polemicists have suggested over the centuries. Some of the participants in the plot were inveterate plotters: Robert Catesby, Francis Tresham, and John Grant had all been on the fringe of the Essex Revolt, and Lord Monteagle, who revealed the plot to the government, had negotiated with the Spaniards toward the end of Elizabeth's reign to bring about an invasion (mention of this was omitted from the official government account of the Gunpowder Plot for reasons of diplomacy and propaganda). Considering the subsequent uses of the "Gunpowder Treason" to whip up popular anti-Catholic hysteria, it is remarkable how much restraint King James and Sir Robert Cecil used in trying to avoid a witch hunt against Catholics.

Nearly two-thirds of the book is devoted to discussing the involvement of Henry, ninth earl of Northumberland, in the conspiracy. Although the evidence against Northumberland was largely circumstantial, it was at the same time very damning. With their deep-seated sense of hierarchy, it was difficult for contemporaries to imagine a conspiracy such as the Gunpowder Plot being mounted without the leadership, patronage, and financial support of members of the peerage. Given the predilection of the aristocracy for carrying on violent feuds, this was

not an unreasonable assumption. There was good reason for thinking that both Northumberland and Monteagle had been warned about the plan to blow up the House of Lords, but Northumberland, despite his frequent protests of loyalty to James I, gave the appearance of remaining silent. The reputation of the Percy family also weighed against Northumberland when the king and council came to assess the evidence pointing toward his complicity. Even Northumberland's brother recognized the burden of the family's reputation when he admitted that many people thought that there was "'seldom Treason without a Piercy (*sic*)'" (p. 206). But one difference between the ninth earl and his bolder forbears of the medieval period was that he, like so many other peers of his generation, preferred to let others take all of the risks.

Nicholls has much to say that is useful about the wizard earl's career, but he failed to investigate Northumberland's relations with his tenants, whom the earl ill-treated in order to increase his rents and revive his sagging fortunes. In this respect, Northumberland was very much like the heads of Catholic families such as the Treshams and Catesbys, whose marginal status drove them into desperate political schemes as well as tempting them to oppress their tenants. Northumberland made a poor conspirator. He was unable to keep a secret and he could not bring himself to make a commitment to the Gunpowder conspiracy. Although undoubtedly a man of learning, he lacked the experience, political acumen, and common sense to play the game of politics even at its most elemental levels, and he had nothing in the way of leadership to offer.

Since one of Nicholls's purposes in writing this book is to strip away the myths that later generations laid over the evidence concerning the Gunpowder Plot, a chapter discussing those myths would have been helpful. The author also missed an opportunity in not discussing the social dimension of the small gentry who participated in the conspiracy. A firmer editorial hand would have made the book more accessible as well. Even the most attentive readers can find themselves well into the book before they realize that the Jesuits John Gerard (1564–1637), author of "Narrative of the Gunpowder Plot," and John Gerard (fl. 1897), who wrote *What Was the Gunpowder Plot?*, are two different people. Similarly, Nicholls refers to Hugh Owen and Nicholas Owen on the same page (p. 58) without distinguishing the one from the other by first name. Only by careful attention to context or by consulting the index can one make the distinction.

ROGER B. MANNING
Cleveland State University

PAUL LANGFORD. *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689–1798*. (Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford, 1990.) New York: Clarendon

Press of Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 608. \$89.00.

It is not easy to convey in brief a sense of the richness and complexity of this heavyweight version of Paul Langford's 1990 Ford Lectures. Those familiar with his earlier volume, *A Polite and Commercial People, 1727–1783* (1989), will have some appreciation of his learning and an awareness of his stance in the continuing debate over the character of eighteenth-century England, not least the prominent place he accords to the activities and interests of "a broad-based middle class" (p. 586). Langford's goal is to examine the political life of the period, conceived in a "very broad, often local sense," to explicate how propertied Englishmen (including men of relatively limited substance—shopkeepers, tenant farmers, and the like—who manned the lower tiers of local administration) responded to "economic growth, commercial competition and social change, in respect of the exercise of public responsibilities and powers" (p. vi).

How these themes are developed may be illustrated chiefly from the chapter on "Parliamentary Service." Describing who sat in the Commons was Lewis Namier's point of departure, but only in a later chapter does Langford discuss the lower House's social composition (by way of emphasizing how the qualification act of 1711 failed to make St. Stephen's Chapel the preserve of the landed). Rather, he seeks in this chapter to delineate how the two Houses functioned in an era when Parliament's supreme legislative authority was reinforced by regular sessions of predictable length and when much of its expanding legislative activity affected subjects' variegated property rights. The picture that emerges is that of members responding to ministerial initiatives on a narrow range of issues (chiefly revenue raising) and to a wide range of private, local, and sectional pressures for statutory action. In dealing with enclosure petitions, proposals for creating small debt tribunals, schemes for revamping the administration of the poor law, and projects for the building of turnpikes and canals, or in trying to mediate the competing claims of sectional interests such as the dispute between woolen and linen producers, Parliament men were satisfying, or seeking to satisfy, the avowed desires of their constituents: "the mighty legislative force of Blackstone's omnipotent Parliament resembled nothing so much as a gigantic rubber stamp, confirming local and private enterprise, but rarely undertaking initiatives on its own" (p. 166). Indeed, the problems were how to cope with the mounting volume of requests for action and how to make sure that proposed measures accommodated the interests of at least most of the property owners likely to be affected. Hence, a high priority was attached to avoiding contested legislation, while the costs and delays of parliamentary process and the waning of partisan animosities after mid-century also worked to limit the intensity of conflict. At the same time, Langford contends that

because MPs were increasingly non-resident and because their primary residences were not necessarily located where their principal properties lay, the geographical maldistribution of seats in the Commons was offset to a significant degree; although the eight southeastern counties were notoriously underrepresented by comparison to the eight southwestern ones, by 1781 the latter had only 106 resident members while the former had 179. So it was not difficult for local men to find sponsors, peers or MPs, for the statutes they sought, and for this reason, in no small part, many larger unenfranchised towns stood aside from the campaign of the early 1780s for electoral reform. If, then, "the test of an effective parliamentary system was its capacity to meet the requirements of the most vigorous creators of wealth, there is not much doubt about the credentials of the eighteenth-century legislature" (p. 206).

It remains to say that this new book should be required reading for all students of the era who can (or whose libraries can) afford to purchase it.

HENRY HORWITZ
University of Iowa

CLIVE DEWEY. *The Passing of Barchester*. London: Hambleton. 1991. Pp. xvii, 199.

Faced with the daunting task of persuading readers to pay attention to a book about William Rowe Lyall, Dean of Canterbury from 1845 until 1857, and his patrons, family, and clients, Clive Dewey chooses to exploit the widespread current interest in the novels of Anthony Trollope. Dewey shares with Trollope an ability to write in loving detail about the world of old-fashioned High Church clergymen who never felt comfortable with the new Anglo-Catholic High Church Party that emerged in the 1830s and 1840s. He complains persuasively that the older-style High Churchmen portrayed in the Barchester novels have been slighted by church historians.

A good storyteller with great sympathy for his characters, Dewey respects traits that have fallen out of fashion. Few historians could match his admiration for Lyall's patron, the sycophantic William Howley, who became Archbishop of Canterbury through sheer skill at self-abasement. Convinced that patronage and merit are not mutually exclusive, Dewey demonstrates that influential clergymen of the old High Church school played an aggressive role in helping the Church of England to survive and even flourish well into the late nineteenth century. His account of the transformation of the Lyall family from an influential network of clergymen into an influential network of Indian civil servants and barristers calls to mind another elite connection, the evangelical Clapham Sect, and the literary achievements of their Victorian descendants.

Although Dewey's close identification with his subjects helps the story along, it also limits his field of

vision. He not only dismisses the role of Protestant Dissenters, who are discussed in language normally reserved for disease, but also slights the well-documented contributions of both Whigs and Evangelicals to the broadly based Victorian renewal of religious institutions. His greatest failure, however, lies in accepting the Victorian church's own definition of success and failure, which robs him of the perspective needed to understand its decline. For Dewey, a successful church is one that maintains and expands its influence with the wealthy and powerful. His successful clergymen were scholars, hymn writers, publicists, architects, and men of affairs, attracted to the church by its social standing, its beauty, and its opportunities for scholarship and leisure. For ordinary parishioners, however, old High Churchmen seemed to have little but amused tolerance.

It is precisely that kind of snobbery and contempt for recruitment, far more than science, secularism, or industrialization, that has left the Church of England one of the most ineffective institutions in modern Europe. The very professionalism that Dewey celebrates prevented Anglican clergymen from recognizing that elite influence alone cannot sustain a religious denomination in a pluralist society.

JEFFREY COX
University of Iowa

MARGARET STROBEL. *European Women and the Second British Empire*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 108. Cloth \$27.50, paper \$8.95.

Much recent scholarship has begun to reexamine traditional imperial history. This attractive and small volume by Margaret Strobel, dealing with the second British empire, provides a clear exposition and synthesis of this scholarly revolution in the new and growing field of women and empire. Drawing primarily but not exclusively on secondary works that focus on India and Africa, Strobel assesses how recent perspectives on gender, race, culture, and sexuality have been used to reevaluate traditional assumptions in British imperial history.

Strobel opens her book with a discussion of recent scholarship refuting the "Myth of the Destructive Female." The coming of European women into the colonial scene has traditionally been blamed, by imperial men and imperial historians, for an alleged deterioration of relations between colonizer and colonized. Exposing this myth galvanized the earliest scholarship in this field (Claudia Knapman's *White Women in Fiji 1835–1930: The Ruin of Empire?* [1986] and Helen Callaway's *Gender, Culture, and Empire: European Women in Colonial Nigeria* [1987]), yet it continues to flourish (see Ronald Hyam's *Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience* [1990]). Strobel notes that ignoring the element of subordination in concubinage to read it as "closeness" only indicates "how

little understanding there was and is of gender and power in the dynamics of colonialism" (p. 6).

Strobel similarly takes on the stereotype of petty, frivolous, dependent women who contributed nothing to colonial empire or its indigenous inhabitants. She challenges "its inaccuracy and its lack of understanding of gender roles in colonial society" (p. 7). Her chapters discuss the domestic duties assigned women; the variety of women who traveled, wrote, and acted as scholars and administrators; and the presence of women missionaries and reformers in the colonies. She presents the gender and cultural constraints placed on women's actions and women's achievements within those limitations. She also confronts the issues of complicity and "maternalism" involved in colonial women's relations with colonized women.

Strobel carefully notes differences of class and nationality among European women and the wide spectrum of their activities from incorporated wives to activist reformers. She acknowledges that European women did not often transcend cultural barriers, including imperialist beliefs in their own cultural superiority, but they failed no less often than the men who created and administered the empire. As women professionals—physicians, nurses, educators, or even prostitutes—they were allowed to function primarily in areas where men could not compete, in female health and education and male sex services. Even charity work and the rituals of status maintenance, justified as women's special "civilizing" roles, contributed to the reproduction of empire as a male-centered system of domination.

In this useful introduction to a new field, Strobel lays out clearly the arguments on which it is built. Her book makes it possible to acquaint students with the initial array of scholarship that is already growing. She also demonstrates that rewriting an imperial history that is sensitive to gender, culture, race, sexuality, and power is an exhilarating enterprise.

DOROTHY O. HELLY
Hunter College,
City University of New York

JOHN BARRELL. *The Infection of Thomas De Quincey: A Psychopathology of Imperialism*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 235. \$30.00.

John Barrell's latest book touches on the most important issues currently animating literary criticism, namely imperialism, the construction of masculinity, and the self-representation of the writing subject. The book analyzes the writings of Thomas De Quincey in terms of his Orientalism (in the light of Edward Said's *Orientalism* [1978]), the trauma and sexual issues surrounding the death of his younger sister Elizabeth, the sexual politics of his representations of women, and De Quincey's use of these themes in writing his autobiographical and literary

essays. Barrell's most interesting theoretical insight occurs in this area; rather than seeing De Quincey's self-representation as a question of the interplay of Self and Other, Barrell proposes a tripartite model of "this/that/the other" to explain De Quincey's psychopathology (p. 10). Barrell eschews a simple dichotomizing of Self and Other and thereby captures the complex interplay of identity and difference in De Quincey's self-representations.

The most provocative and intriguing sections of Barrell's book are his introduction and conclusion (or "Concussion" as he playfully entitles it). In the opening pages Barrell analyzes De Quincey as "flâneur," viewing the working classes as spectacle in an opium-induced state. Barrell astutely describes De Quincey's combined fascination and fear of the working classes in such texts as *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater* (1822; 1856).

In the conclusion Barrell makes his most controversial point, suggesting that De Quincey's role as patriarch of a Victorian family and his representations of the oriental women in his writings are implicated in the expansion of the British empire. Barrell asks, "did the notion of eastern woman as the image of violence, serve to confirm the English gentleman in his sense of sexual civility at home?" This comment subverts the domestic/foreign dichotomy that depoliticizes the family, and suggests the way in which apparently private issues play into the large-scale processes of history.

The middle chapters of the book are more problematic. Barrell himself apologizes for their length and repetitiveness, saying that "the result, I know, is too much" (p. 24), but justifies this as an attempt to capture what De Quincey himself termed his "involute" (p. 32). The middle chapters are an overly convoluted psychological analysis of De Quincey's texts. This is disappointing given the provocative implications of the introduction and conclusion. Surely there is more to De Quincey's "fully social guilt" (p. 21) than this? Barrell has missed an opportunity to explain in more detail the complicity at which he hints in his concluding remarks.

Barrell becomes autobiographical at the end of his introduction when he defends the procedure adopted in the middle chapters. This leads one to wonder to what extent Barrell himself identifies with his subject, and whether Barrell's analysis of the contradictions in the texts of a Victorian middle-class intellectual mirror those affecting male academics today. His analysis raises the question of how far the current academic interest in imperialism reflects the continuing complicity of such Western institutions as the family and the university in the foreign adventurism of their governments.

MARTIN A. DANAHAY
Emory University

PATRICK JOYCE. *Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class 1848-1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. 449. \$49.50.

Eleven years ago, Patrick Joyce published a path-breaking study challenging the then prevailing orthodoxy in social history that assumed that the predominating consciousness of working people in nineteenth-century Britain was a consciousness of class. Since then, a revisionist generation of social historians has followed in Joyce's footsteps and his present book is best understood as an attempt to characterize and consolidate a new general interpretation that may be built on their work. Unlike extreme revisionists, Joyce does not entirely deny the reality or significance of working-class consciousness. Rather, he insists that due to the slowness and unevenness of British industrial development, it was very little in evidence before the twentieth century. Hence, the culture and consciousness of working people throughout the Victorian period must, in his view, be conceptualized in radically different terms. Departing considerably from his original emphasis on industrial paternalism and deference, Joyce now proposes "populism" as a more inclusive rubric for interpreting the beliefs and behavior of what is normally called the working class.

Joyce's "populism" is, indeed, a capacious category, encompassing antiestablishment radicalism, Gladstonian liberalism, reformist trade unionism, traditional notions of moral economy, civic and communitarian consciousness, northern provincial broadside ballads, and dialect literature, as well as mass entertainments such as the cinema and the music hall. According to Joyce, what all these phenomena share is an inclusive spirit of universalism that transcended strict class divisions and sought to encompass the vast majority within a positively valued moralistic frame, as well as a manichean vision that portrayed the world in terms of a primordial struggle between a dispossessed people and a tyrannical elite, rather than as an economic class conflict between expropriated laborers and their capitalist exploiters.

Joyce is right to stress the universalism of the cultural phenomena he calls "populism," but his attempt to use this as evidence against the class interpretation reflects a questionable understanding of the relationship between ideology and class. Class ideologies are rarely, as Joyce supposes, narrowly self-interested. Those that succeed do so precisely because they are able to recast the self-interests and self-images of particular, socially located individuals into idealized world visions and universal moral frames. Most of what Joyce interprets as populism can be (and sometimes has been) thus interpreted in a neo-Marxist or Gramscian theoretical frame. That so much of plebeian consciousness in nineteenth-century Britain was conceptually cast in liberal/radical rather than in Marxist/class terms can be seen as an ideological response to the imperatives of living in a

free-market capitalist society where an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie had successfully achieved hegemony.

Those who continue to find class a useful analytical category are not likely to be persuaded by Joyce's substitution of "populism" or "a family of populisms" (p. 329) in its place. Nevertheless, they will appreciate the keen insights and innovative analyses that abound in this book. Chapters 10 through 12, based on Joyce's original research into broadside ballads and dialect literature, make a particularly valuable contribution to our understanding of popular culture and consciousness. Other portions of the book are equally incisive, although their relentless focus on historiographical debates and discussions may occasionally leave the nonspecialist reader cold. Others will be annoyed by Joyce's repeated insistence that social historians become deconstructionists and that they abandon what he dismisses as their outmoded assumption that society actually exists outside the linguistic framework in which it is portrayed.

Ironically, Joyce's own adherence to this deconstructionist program may weaken his substantive argument that the class interpretation of nineteenth-century Britain has been oversold. His ingenuity in decoding the discourses of populism is not matched by a comparable commitment to clarifying the complex interactions between actual social groups. It is clear, however, that alternative social identities, particularly those of ethnicity and gender, played a critical role in mediating and sometimes displacing working-class consciousness. In Joyce's account, these alternate identities appear only obliquely, through the screens of signification about nationality, religion, or respectability in which they were expressed. Yet, like class consciousness, such codes of cultural difference were much more than disembodied discourses. They were the products of equally "real" conflicts and solidarities between men and women, between English and Irish, and between northerners and southerners that are notable by their absence from Joyce's book. Surely such active struggles and agencies made a critical contribution to the historical process by which working-class consciousness was distorted and reshaped. Joyce is right that the first generation of British social historians oversimplified their readings of the people's visions by framing them too monolithically in the language of the capitalist class. Nevertheless, these pioneers knew something that Joyce seems to have forgotten: that language itself is a product of social conflict and circumstance and that if we wish to fully understand the visions of the people, we must study their experiences and identities first.

THEODORE KODITSCHKE
University of Missouri,
Columbia

ANN POTTINGER SAAB. *Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria, and the Working Classes, 1856–1878*. (Harvard

Historical Studies, number 109.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 257. \$39.95.

Ann Pottinger Saab's point of departure in this book is less 1876 than 1963. Two books published in 1963 command her attention. In historical terms, Saab measures her work against R. T. Shannon's classic *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876*. And she tries to fit her account into "the sociological framework developed by Neil Smelser" in his *Theory of Collective Behavior* (p. 2). The first endnote in seven of her ten chapters cites one of these two authors, Smelser five times and Shannon twice.

Saab's attempts to mix history and social science are not wholly satisfactory. The material from the two subjects does not blend smoothly. The author at one time emphasizes her sources, at another the process in which she employs them. The sociology seems to be weakly added on to the historical narrative, or worse, William Ewart Gladstone and his contemporaries appear to be acting out roles scripted to meet the needs of a theory invented long after their deaths.

Saab's intention is to analyze both the agitation that erupted in Britain after newspapers revealed Ottoman massacres in the Balkans in mid-1876 and the role of Gladstone in that protest. Yet after her introduction she takes four more chapters, out of a total of ten, to reach the "first stirrings of protest" in chapter six. She uses this background to sketch the recent history of the Ottoman empire and British policy toward it, political and religious developments within Britain, and Gladstone's views. Such preparation, based almost exclusively on published works, seems unduly lengthy.

On the atrocity protests Saab makes an original contribution by enumerating meetings and petitions and tracing them to their geographical and social sources, relying on Shannon for her information for 1876 and on sources to which he pointed the way for the following years. She uses graphs and a table to illustrate her argument, although they do not always convey information readily. Unfortunately, the real strength of the protestors, impossible to measure precisely, remains uncertain when she admits that in her count "petitions for and against the government have been lumped together" (p. 220, n. 16).

Saab's sympathies obviously lie with the agitators. Her admiration for Gladstone is reminiscent of John Morley's worshipful biography written at the beginning of this century. So are her criticisms of Benjamin Disraeli, whose difficulties in the Cabinet Saab does not fully appreciate. Members of the Eastern Question Association emerge from this account as neither politically astute nor likable. Saab quotes from, but fails to remark on, a letter in which William Morris betrays the anti-Semitism that contributed to the opposition to Disraeli—in low as well as high society (p. 156). Shannon's book, while more limited chronologically than Saab's, remains the best analysis of the Bulgarian agitation.

Saab writes clearly, except for an occasional borrowing from the jargon of a social science. She does not supply a bibliography or a list of primary sources.

MARVIN SWARTZ
University of Massachusetts,
Amherst

GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB. *Poverty and Compassion: The Moral Imagination of the Late Victorians*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1991. Pp. xii, 475. \$30.00.

Like E. P. Thompson, a historian for whom she has little use, Gertrude Himmelfarb is an enemy of historical condescension. Thompson, in *The Making of The English Working Class* (1963), asked his readers to take the radicals and visionaries he discussed with the seriousness their convictions deserved and to take them on their own terms. So with Himmelfarb. She insists, in this work, that late-Victorian philanthropists and social theorists had important things to say and that their deeds produced ameliorative social change of considerable magnitude.

Her quarrel with Marxists—Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Gareth Stedman-Jones, and others—is that their dedication to the construct of class and class consciousness has compelled them to interpret her reformers as little more than the predetermined and reflexive voices of economic structure. Her equally serious quarrel with historians of the British welfare state—Bentley Gilbert, for example—is that their Whiggish fixation on the path from an individualist, moralistic past to a collectivist, value-free present has precluded them from an appreciation of the achievements of men like Charles Booth and T. H. Green, who thought it only right to link morality with social policy. Welfare statists and their historians, Himmelfarb contends, by devising and celebrating “value-free” reform, have condescended to those whose words and deeds have stood opposed to that goal.

Although she oversimplifies to make her case, Himmelfarb has written a book as worthy of attention as her equally provocative study of early nineteenth-century social reform, *The Idea of Poverty* (1984). She is at her best when linking the ideas of men like Green and Alfred Marshall with those of John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. Few can weave analysis of this sort as surely or as elegantly as she. Disappointingly, however, she has followed an urge to include short chapters on movements that seem no more than peripheral to her argument; her treatment of land nationalization and religious socialism are cases in point.

To prove her thesis, Himmelfarb rightly spends considerable time discussing the work of Charles Booth, whose seventeen-volume *Life and Labour of the People in London* (1889–1903) has often been understood as the genesis of value-free scientific social analysis. She argues, however, that Booth never for a moment imagined that morality and social science

ought not to be conjoined: “Nor would he have thought it scientific to ignore the objective, empirical, demonstrable facts about the poor—moral and religious facts as well as economic and social facts” (p. 149). It is because he thought in this way that Himmelfarb admires him.

She admires Booth as well—as she admires the all but universally disparaged Charity Organisation Society—for insisting that reformers could not address the needs of one monolithic working class but instead must design programs that would respond to the problems peculiar to each of the six categories into which Booth divided London’s workers and their families. Here, according to Himmelfarb, “lies the essential ideological import of Booth’s work” (p. 167), separating him from Marxists, who spoke of a working “class” and not “classes,” and from Welfare Statists, who insisted that class divisions mattered little since all citizens should together enjoy a universal system of social services. Yet how does one square Himmelfarb’s assertion with the fact that Booth argued for old age pensions “to be given to everyone regardless of means or need” (p. 166)?

Himmelfarb thinks little of the Fabians. She points out, however, that far from advocating value-free social services—and hence far from being architects of the welfare state—they professed a morality as insistent as that of the Charity Organisation Society. They, too, wanted improved conduct in return for increased benefits. Himmelfarb, however, attacks the Fabians, and in particular Beatrice Webb, for arguing in the same fashion as those whom she admires. Indeed, her treatment of the Fabians smacks of a desire, echoing in its tone some of Margaret Thatcher’s shriller pronouncements, to do little more than put them in their place. She belabors the Fabians for their aversion to democracy: “They were all in favor of government *for* the people but not necessarily government *of* or *by* the people” (p. 369). So, in fact, were men such as Green, unless the electorate was prepared to accept his prescriptive course for the attainment of Idealist “citizenship.”

Himmelfarb’s heroes and heroines, despite their worthy intentions and despite the often impressive results of their thoughts and labors, did what she insists her readers must not do: they condescended. They assumed themselves “disinterested”—above class—and therefore particularly suited to the business of social reform, of deciding for others what was best for them. Yet they were no more disinterested than any other class of late Victorians. They belonged to one of the several middle classes that existed alongside the several working classes. And they spoke with the authoritative voice of their class, a voice that, despite its authority, nevertheless trembled when it pronounced the word “democracy.”

STANDISH MEACHAM
University of Texas,
Austin

JANE LEWIS. *Women and Social Action in Victorian and Edwardian England*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1991. Pp. vii, 338. \$39.50.

Beginning her survey with the mid-1860s, Jane Lewis examines in this volume Octavia Hill, Beatrice Webb, Helen Bosanquet, Mary Ward, and Violet Markham as representatives of three generations of social activism. She argues convincingly that each woman shaped her life around complex questions about individuals, families, and the state to reconcile the strong demands of domestic duties and late-Victorian views of appropriate female behavior with a strong commitment to social action as citizenship. Lewis demonstrates that although there were many different forms of feminism, all of them were rooted in a larger middle-class culture informed by reformist, moral, and spiritual ends that found the *laissez-faire* ethic wanting but never abandoned persistently individualistic ideas of duty. Separated by the politics of suffrage and party, these women were united by a rejection of female assertiveness, especially in the militant suffrage campaign, and by an insistence on womanly behavior as a guarantor of male protection. All five put family obligations over any other demands. Webb, Bosanquet, Ward, and Markham married; only Ward had children. But they all saw marriage as a form of social service and discipline. These strong and successful women accepted and served the class and sex to which they were born.

Lewis portrays Octavia Hill's influential work with the Charity Organisation Society (COS) as derived from F. D. Maurice's Christian Socialism and notes its emphasis on self-giving and duty rather than self-interest. A shrewd businesswoman who managed and acquired working-class housing, Hill wanted middle-class women to improve the character of poor women. While accepting the common humanity of rich and poor, she took for granted the superiority of middle-class values, including natural beauty, and the need for such values to encourage family responsibility and a corporate sense of place. She opposed state intervention that affected personal responsibility, such as public works, but welcomed the Artisan's Dwelling Act of 1875, which provided for amenities such as adequate ventilation that were beyond the range of individual effort.

Beatrice Webb worked for the COS initially because philanthropy was the easiest way to leave home and enter the larger society. With her marriage to Sidney Webb in 1892, she left the feminine world of social work and entered the more problematic, masculine world of intellect, social investigation, policy, administration, and reconstruction, where she felt uncomfortable until deciding that she had a male intellect. She gave up what were thought to be the unique womanly qualities of imaginative, sympathetic, psychological observation and explanation because she thought that they were not sufficiently

scientific. Lewis suggests, perceptively, that what she actually rejected were her most original insights.

Helen Bosanquet appears as an ethical idealist, even before she met Bernard Bosanquet. She emphasized mind and character as the crucial determinants of poverty, but insisted that the poor have power over their own lives. Married women should not work, but the unmarried were to be trained. Men were to be the heads of families but paternal authority was to rest on loyalty and mutual aid rather than on woman's submission. Remaining in the predominantly female world of charitable work, she understood the lives of poor women, supported women's suffrage, and published her own ideas on social problems.

Mary Ward, born into the Victorian intellectual aristocracy, saw herself as a disciple of T. H. Green and Matthew Arnold. She combined social action, criticism, and religious inspiration with the writing of twenty-three socially didactic and very successful novels. In common with Hill, Webb, and Bosanquet, the stresses of her life created episodes of illness. As a Liberal Unionist, she supported state intervention to improve the race, nation, and empire and saw social action as a ransom that property had to pay. Emphasizing religion and marriage in her novels, she urged that women's moral guardianship of the private sphere, in which maternalism endowed a citizenship different from but equal to that of men, be used to raise the moral standard of the public world.

Violet Markham, the most publicly active woman in the anti-suffrage campaign, was also the most public of the five women, serving as a government committee member and public servant. She saw the state as necessary to the welfare of its citizens, but continued to believe that the voluntary sector and the state, like male and female activities, should be separate. As the most pragmatic and modern of the five, she recognized that since both environmental circumstances and character were equally to blame for poverty, the state and the private sphere of philanthropy had to work together.

Lewis concludes that the remarkable position of women as social activists was due to both external and internal factors. The voluntary sector, larger and more responsible for developing and administering welfare policy than the government, welcomed an army of middle-class women to the front. Social problems, dealt with locally in terms of family and community, allowed women to pursue these activities as an extension of their domestic duties. Moreover, as amateurs, social workers were not bound by newly professional requirements that generally excluded women. Women activists, Lewis points out, because of the personal nature of their social work and their own family and social obligations, found it very difficult to move into administration and policy positions or to influence the making of the welfare state. After World War I, she argues, when the state increasingly took over welfare functions, women social workers were deprived of a platform. Unable to fulfill their

ideal of participatory citizenship, they were relegated to increasingly marginal positions as social reformers. This interesting book suggests a novel perception of late-Victorian and Edwardian thought, conduct, and society.

REBA N. SOFFER
California State University,
Northridge

OLIVER MACDONAGH. *Jane Austen: Real and Imagined Worlds*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 186. \$32.00.

Over an amazingly productive career, Oliver MacDonagh has truly earned that honorific epithet, "a historian's historian," for his range, his style, his generalizing insight, and, particularly, his remarkable eye for historical detail or circumstance, which again and again he has used to give new reality and understanding to a historical situation or dynamic that we would otherwise have continued to regard in some traditional or formulaic way.

In this book, he appears also as a literary person's historian. Its publication is well timed. After half a century in which the text has reigned supreme, there is now much talk of a new historical awareness in literary criticism. This is no mere revival of the kind of literary history against which the New Criticism so rightly, if excessively, rebelled; it grows rather (as I understand it) out of a sense that the formative power of context, or even specific social messages, lies behind or embedded in the façade of text. But what was available historical knowledge when the two disciplines moved in tandem early in this century has grown exponentially and is accordingly far more complex and subtle, so the new historicists in literature have their work cut out for them. Modest in intent and stunning in accomplishment, MacDonagh's book offers a salutary example of both what can and what must be done.

Deeply devoted to Jane Austen, and an amateur as well in disclaiming professional critical skills, MacDonagh asks what historians' knowledge of Jane Austen's time can tell us about her novels and what those novels can tell historians about her time. Each of the seven chapters is based on a close reading of a specific novel or cluster of novels (including surviving fragments and one piece of juvenilia) to illustrate a single theme.

In the middle four chapters—on the "female economy," on money (a subject on which Jane Austen is shown to be impressively well informed), on girlhood, and on families, all related to the central question of marriage and its consequences—the preponderance of argument runs from novels to history; in the other three chapters, it runs the other way. Religion as exemplified in *Mansfield Park* and Jane Austen's own views on the subject are set against a background of change both structural and spiritual, just beginning

and soon to be drastic in the Church of England. In a discussion of *Emma* the author and her characters are located in the delicately articulated, infinitely complex strata of a society where the usual crutches of class or economic change support very little. And in *Sanditon*, her last, incomplete novel, Jane Austen is shown taking on the speculative fever, the medical enthusiasms, and the Romantic taste of the Regency period with an asperity (as MacDonagh argues) more akin to Thomas Love Peacock's contemporaneous *Nightmare Abbey* than to anything that went before in the Austen canon. One is led to speculate, as we have been led recently to speculate about Mozart, what might have happened but for early death.

R. K. WEBB
University of Maryland,
Baltimore County

WILLIAM S. PETERSON. *The Kelmscott Press: A History of William Morris's Typographical Adventure*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 371. \$95.00.

Although it lasted seven years and published only fifty-two books, the Kelmscott Press proved to be an example of Victorian medievalism that exerted a powerful influence on twentieth-century publishing. In a beautifully produced volume, worthy of its subject, William S. Peterson chronicles in detail the history of an organization that sought to restore the art of the book.

Appalled by the standards of nineteenth-century printing, William Morris experimented with book design as early as the 1860s, when he attempted an illustrated edition of *The Earthly Paradise*. Efforts at calligraphy followed a decade later, and by the 1880s Morris's knowledge of typography and book design, combined with his friendship with Emery Walker, a central figure in the story, led to the founding of the Kelmscott Press in 1891. Morris loved Gothic, not Roman type, and he spared no effort to eliminate white space from the margins and between words. He also selected paper, vellum, ink, and bindings with extraordinary care, although when an English publisher attempted recently to emulate the Kelmscott *Chaucer*, he discovered that the original ink never dried completely. The illustrations by Edward Burne-Jones, often derived from paintings, became emblematic of the press's quality. Kelmscott proved a surprising commercial success, but it could not long survive the death of its founder. Two years after Morris's final illness in 1896, the Kelmscott Press closed, leaving a legacy of fine publishing that inspired the private press movement of the early twentieth century. Later book designers often derisively rejected many of Morris's specific principles. Kelmscott nevertheless helped reestablish publishing as an art.

From the beginning, however, the attempt to elevate the aesthetics of publishing embodied troubling

paradoxes noted by Peterson and not entirely lost on Morris. By denying the commercial efficiencies of the division of labor and in his intrinsic suspicion of the machine, Morris published beautiful books in limited editions that only wealthy connoisseurs could afford. He priced himself out of the market that, within the framework of his socialism, most needed to be improved. Moreover, by distancing itself from the ugliness of commercial printing, the Kelmscott Press also undermined at least one function of publishing. Morris designed books whose elaborate typography and intricate illustrations transformed each page into an ornament easier to contemplate than to read, especially for modern readers accustomed to high standards of legibility. More than one critic observed that Morris's books resembled his wallpapers.

Peterson's history of the Kelmscott Press, which easily supplants the only previous study published in 1924, covers thoroughly a complicated chapter in the history of typography and modern communication generally. Although Peterson might have explored in greater depth the tensions between Morris's politics and his aesthetics, he provides an elegant account of one of the last manifestations of the Gothic Revival in Victorian Britain.

D. L. LEMAHIEU
Lake Forest College

ROBERT W. D. BOYCE. *British Capitalism at the Crossroads, 1919–1932: A Study in Politics, Economics, and International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 504. \$54.50.

Robert W. D. Boyce's flawlessly researched and deeply learned study should win immediate recognition as the standard account of British foreign economic policy from the Versailles treaty of 1919 to Britain's departure from the gold standard in 1931.

Boyce does for foreign economic policy in the 1920s what Maurice Cowling did for high politics at the time of the Second Reform Bill and in the period before Labour's first assumption of office. The author shows with appropriate complexity just who had power and influence, what the powerful thought, how they related to each other, and how they exercised responsibility. He has ploughed through the ministerial files at the Public Record Office, scrutinized fifty-eight private manuscript collections, and consulted every relevant institutional archive from the Transport House to the Federation of British Industries repository at Warwick. City potentates, industrial lobbyists, Treasury mandarins, Fleet Street sharpers, Trades Union kingpins, and politicians with a surer feel for electoral advantage than economics all make their appearances. Boyce employs a pointillist approach and works on an expansive canvas. Hence nonspecialists may occasionally lose perspective in the thrust and parry of individual rivalries, compelling as these often prove to be. What emerges for those who

stand back far enough to perceive the woods instead of the trees is the picture of a proud nation coming to terms, hesitantly and confusedly, with an all but inevitable economic decline. The model does not lack interest for students of the United States in the 1990s.

Boyce reviews the familiar division, which originated with Joseph Chamberlain's tariff campaign, between the industrial forces of the Midlands and the mercantile-financial communities centered in the City of London. He shows that, even before the guns fell silent in 1918, the financial group had imposed as self-evident an internationalist strategy for postwar recovery. This meant working toward restoration of the gold standard so as to recapture British leadership in financial, insurance, and shipping services. That implied in turn, as an almost necessary consequence, throwing the burden of adjustment to the changed structure of global trade on manufacturing and labor. Boyce demonstrates that the Federation of British Industries, as opposed to its German homologue, remained weak throughout the 1920s. He indicates that organized labor, practically devoid of constructive economic ideas, proved slow to abandon the shibboleth of free trade. The operative question thus became not whether Britain should return to the prewar gold parity, but only the specific timing.

As Boyce neatly demonstrates, the Baldwin government could not logically maintain labor peace after 1925 and also impose the cost reductions required to make the new gold standard a success. But in pursuit of its "Center party" strategy, it attempted that very thing. The author provides a detailed account of Whitehall's efforts to square the circle through Central Bank coordination, obstruction of direct American investment, suitably disguised Safeguarding duties, non-tariff barriers, attempts to build a regional bloc at the Geneva Economic Conference, a tariff truce, and beggar-thy-neighbor war-debt schemes. He traces, finally, the British decision to abandon the gold standard in 1931. That determination did not derive, as Boyce implicitly concedes, from an unwillingness by France or the United States to lend further support to sterling. Rather, British elites concluded, in a crisis, that the social costs of overvaluation exceeded the benefits of preserving Britain's reserve currency role.

Boyce uses sources scrupulously, but his interpretive passages sometimes echo the Yankee-baiting line of the British Treasury. He attacks Werner Link, Melvyn Leffler, and me for suggesting that the United States led the way in rebuilding an open world economy after World War I in face of an "unhelpful and often obstructive Britain" (p. 375). Boyce, by contrast, seeks to define authentic internationalism as the Treasury view writ large. He quotes with satisfaction John Maynard Keynes, one of the avatars of John Bull internationalism, as rejoicing after the 1931 devaluation: "A week ago the pound looked the

dollar in the face. Today it is kicking it in the arse" (p. 367). The prosecution rests.

STEPHEN A. SCHUKER
University of Virginia

ANDREW THORPE. *The British General Election of 1931*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 323. \$72.00.

Andrew Thorpe has treated the election of 1931 as an event in high politics rather than electoral history; we are over halfway through the book before the House of Commons is dissolved and the election begins, and the voice of the ordinary voter is hardly to be heard in the second half of the volume. The study of the campaign is based on a wide-ranging knowledge of party organization in the constituencies rather than on the general statements that are sometimes extracted from election statistics by mathematical ingenuity, but this is not the same as analyzing the mood of the public. It may be true that the nature and even the dimensions of the National Government's immense majority had largely been determined before a single speech was made in public and certainly, if this is the approach to be adopted, it is useful to have the internal disputes of all the parties (at a particularly disputatious time) explained. The heavy emphasis on the problems of the Labour cabinet in August 1931 suffers a bit from the fact that the subject has already been worked over so thoroughly that it is hard to say anything very new about it. Thorpe shows clearly how little the Labour Party was able to do to help itself in the crisis that overtook it, and he also shows how much the Conservatives had done by the summer of 1931 to deal with their own internal problems and prepare a base for the coming election. The Conservatives, as Thorpe shows, may not always have treated their allies in the election as well as they might have done but perhaps that was the natural result of their work beforehand; they had every reason to expect success from their own efforts and to have enemies suddenly converted into friends rushing to share their good fortune was not always welcome.

One general statement drawn from a study of high politics may deserve attention. Thorpe argues that students of the history of the Labour Party sometimes underestimate the dimensions of the Labour defeat. Suppose, however, that there is some substance in Trevor Wilson's argument that the Labour Party wanted to drive the Liberal Party out of the left half of the political spectrum, if necessary by destroying it. This may not have been the best strategy available but, if it was what Labour wanted, then 1931 certainly helped in that direction. In 1929 people could speak of "Labour's second chance," as though the electorate might turn back to the Liberals if the second Labour government did no better than the first. But although it did rather worse than the 1924 government, the 1929-31 government failed in circumstances that

removed the Liberals as an effective force on the Left for half a century. Perhaps the emasculation of the Liberals in 1931 left Labour, however heavily defeated, with the political opportunity for which it had hoped and worked since 1918.

TREVOR LLOYD
University of Toronto

JANE McL. CÔTÉ. *Fanny and Anna Parnell: Ireland's Patriot Sisters*. New York: St. Martin's. 1991. Pp. xix, 331. \$69.95.

Fanny Parnell and Anna Parnell, sisters of the legendary Irish Nationalist leader Charles Stewart Parnell, were equal to their brother in taking political action against British rule in Ireland. Nevertheless, unlike their famous (and infamous) brother, Fanny and Anna have been confined to the footnotes of the history of Irish nationalism. In her superb and highly readable biography of the Parnell sisters, Jane McL. Côté restores Fanny and Anna to their rightful places in the pantheon of nationalist leaders. As Côté demonstrates, the sisters were integral to the ultimate success of the Land Wars in late-nineteenth-century rural Ireland.

While Charles busied himself with parliamentary and romantic intrigues in London, his sisters sought more direct ways of furthering the cause of Irish freedom. Anna was a founding member of the Ladies' Branches of the (all-male) Irish Nationalist Land League—or the Ladies' Land League (LLL). Fanny, who lived with their American-born mother in the United States, founded the New York branch of the LLL, tapping into Irish-American enthusiasm for Irish nationalism. The LLL was designed in part to outsmart British authorities in Ireland who had begun arresting members of the male Irish Nationalist Land League, which had been founded by none other than Charles Stewart Parnell himself. Operating on the correct assumption that the British would hesitate to arrest and imprison respectable women, Fanny and Anna's group was bent on continuing the work of land reform in Ireland while male Land Leaguers—including Charles—languished in jail.

At first, male nationalists applauded the LLL, expecting it to be an organization devoted to "Woman's peculiar province" (p. 161), that is, to ladylike charity work among the growing number of evicted peasants in rural Ireland. But members of the LLL had no intention of confining themselves to the role of "Ladies Bountiful" in the midst of political and economic crisis in the countryside. Rather, they intended to function as a political as well as a charitable force.

Almost immediately the bastions of male supremacy in Ireland attacked the "impropriety" of the LLL. The church hierarchy preached against it, seeing its work as "degrading to the women of Ireland" (p. 169). Even the Fenians, among the most radical of the physical force revolutionaries, could not escape the

misogynist dogma of the day. They too recoiled in horror from the idea of women taking public political action.

Despite male opposition, however, within a half year of its founding in January of 1881, the LLL had 420 branches in Ireland and the United States. In July, the LLL was providing desperately needed relief to over three thousand evicted tenants. Anna and her associates were speaking for land reform and against landlords to enthusiastic crowds throughout the country. By October, the LLL had become the strongest and most effective Nationalist force in rural Ireland.

Once they were released from jail, however, male Land Leaguers—including Charles Stewart Parnell—worked swiftly to destroy the LLL. By mid-1882, the LLL was disbanded and women were thereafter consigned to subservient clerical roles within male-dominated nationalist circles. As a result of his role in the dissolution of the LLL, Anna never spoke to her brother again.

Because most of the sisters' published pamphlets and personal letters have been lost—reflecting the unimportance of their efforts in the eyes of their contemporaries and perhaps in their own—Côté has done a remarkable job of historical detective work in piecing together the life stories of Fanny Parnell and Anna Parnell. By investigating published and unpublished material found in archives in Ireland, the United States, Canada, France, and New Zealand, and by studying Anna's own account of the LLL, *The Tale of a Great Sham* (published only in 1986), Côté demonstrates that historians of Irish nationalism can no longer ignore the vital role of these sisters in the cause of Irish freedom. This biography is a major addition to the growing literature on the contribution of Irish women at home and abroad to the course of political, economic, and social revolution in Ireland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

JANET A. NOLAN
Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

ELIZABETH A. MUENGER. *The British Military Dilemma in Ireland: Occupation Politics, 1886–1914*. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas or Gill and Macmillan, Dublin. 1991. Pp. ix, 254.

Elizabeth A. Muenger chose the years 1886–1914 as the focus for this study because of the profound changes that were effected in Anglo-Irish relations during that time. It is also one of the more frequently examined eras in British/Irish history, making this lucidly written study all the more impressive given the sound analyses and valuable insights that it affords. The author has consulted virtually every published source of consequence, examined all of the pertinent British and Irish government records, and used no fewer than twenty-seven private paper collections. It

is not surprising, therefore, that this book contains informative and authoritative judgments, many of which transcend the rather narrow confines of the subject suggested by the title.

Muenger's study compliments Stanley Palmer's magisterial work on the English and Irish police (*Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780–1850* [1988]). Although her principal focus is for an entirely different time period, both books compare the armed paramilitary force, known as the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), with the Dublin Metropolitan Police, who, like their London counterparts, were unarmed. And both see the RIC as an experimental model that was later adopted by the British in other parts of the empire. Muenger perceptively considers the several reasons for the eventual failure of the RIC. She notes, for example, how some members of the RIC sympathized with their victims, Irish tenant farmers, against whom they were compelled to implement eviction notices. Moreover, during the land agitation of the 1880s, the RIC became all the more unpopular among the Irish people when it was used to augment the British military in suppressing unrest. Muenger relates how, on the eve of World War I, some discussed making the RIC more civilian, as happened under the Free State a few years later, but the contemplated reforms never were acted on. The RIC paid the price as terrorist casualties and resignations decimated their ranks during the subsequent War for Irish Independence.

This is, of course, essentially a study of occupation politics, with attention given to both the civilian and military administrations in Ireland. Muenger is especially good at analyzing the psychology of imperialism, as represented by the mind-set of British officers, and she effectively portrays the society and culture that helped to produce such attitudes. The author uses the pioneering work of Charles Townshend, on the British military experience in Ireland, and that of L. Perry Curtis, on specific models of Anglo-Irish stereotyping, to show that, time and again, British misunderstanding of the native population was one of the principal liabilities to good government in Ireland.

There are, however, a few points in this otherwise exacting work that are either unclear or unconvincing. We are told, for example, that after the Act of Union, Britain was concerned with how to govern a restive Ireland. But Ireland was never integrated within the United Kingdom, as were Wales and Scotland, a fact worth recalling when reflecting on the British dilemma. Moreover, Muenger finds it curious that the British chose not to include the Irish in the National Reserves before World War I. She assumes, perhaps correctly, that the Anglo-Irish almost certainly would have had a controlling leadership in the National Reserve. Yet she overlooks the fact that virtually every national organization at this time had been infiltrated by the revolutionary Irish Republican Brotherhood, a greater concern to British military

intelligence. By any measure, however, this book represents a significant and welcome contribution on a critically important era in the history of Anglo-Irish relations.

THOMAS E. HACHEY
Marquette University

FAITH E. BEASLEY. *Revising Memory: Women's Fiction and Memoirs in Seventeenth-Century France*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1990. Pp. x, 288. \$42.00.

In this study of three seventeenth-century French writers, Faith E. Beasley argues that, when women hold the pen, they tell a different story than men: herstory rather than his story. The writers she examines are Mlle. de Montpensier, Mme. de Villedieu, and Mme. de Lafayette, all active from 1660–80 and all removed from the court of Louis XIV. Mlle. de Montpensier was exiled for ten years after playing an active role in the Fronde rebellion; Mme. de Villedieu was regarded as a libertine; and Mme. de Lafayette, living apart from her husband, formed a close relationship with La Rochefoucauld, who fought with Montpensier at the Battle of Saint-Antoine.

While the victory of monarchy was absolute in 1660, memory of the Fronde was not dead; oppositional groups were silenced politically, but a subversive spirit remained. Political protest was impossible, but dissidents could differ with the established order over interpretation of the past. The official history favored by the king was public, general, exterior, panegyric, and exclusive. It strove to erase memory of the Fronde and was patriarchal in character. Poised against official history was a counter-history that was particular, interior, and concerned with motives and causes.

None of Beasley's three writers were historians in the accepted sense of the word, but through memoirs, biography, and novels they provide a rescripted, female version of the past. Villedieu and Lafayette wrote novels set in the time of the sixteenth-century religious wars, but those wars are not dwelled on. The focus is on the court and the amorous intrigues that involved men and women alike. Women are in the foreground and they see beneath the surface of events. This feminocentric interior history, unlike exterior, patriarchal male history, is concerned with motives. As such, it is a counter-history that subverts the official version favored by the monarchy. Montpensier's *Mémoires* (1718) are doubly subversive. They justified the princely party, which the one official history of the Fronde ridiculed, and they glorified a female warrior, the author herself, who fought against Mazarin. Besides praising herself, Montpensier included a wide array of other women in her *Mémoires*, valorizing the female experience.

When Montpensier died in 1693, her funeral eulogy referred to her "thoughtless zeal" (p. 92) and

said she went into voluntary exile after regretting her role in the Fronde. In fact, she was ordered into exile and took pride in her military role. Her *Mémoires* express a spirit of protest not completely suppressed by Louis XIV. Villedieu, a libertine, created space in her fiction in which men and women had equal importance. Lafayette outwardly conformed to accepted norms; she avoided any hint of scandal and observed the *bienséances* in her fiction. Yet her close friend La Rochefoucauld poured out bitterness in his *Maxims* (1665–78) and scrupulously avoided the court, and Beasley argues that her fiction is a feminocentric and subversive record of the past. This volume is more than a probing study of three women writers and their rescripted version of the past; it also reveals an undercurrent of protest in the ordered, classical world of Ludovician France.

WARREN ROBERTS
State University of New York,
Albany

ROGER CHARTIER. *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*. Translated by LYDIA G. COCHRANE. (Bi-centennial Reflections on the French Revolution.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1991. Pp. xix, 238. Cloth \$34.95, paper \$8.95.

Dominant in France and ascendant elsewhere are interpretations of the French Revolution that largely focus on formal political discourse. Even though the effort is to understand political culture broadly, the sources for these studies usually range from memoirs to treatises. In this volume, Roger Chartier provides a serious alternative to that agenda. The first half of the book essentially attacks the reigning paradigm. In a key chapter, "Do Books Make Revolutions?" he replies that they do not. Radical or challenging ideas must be understood by readers who, if not already favorably inclined, will turn a deaf ear to them. Readers are not passive objects to be inscribed but active agents able themselves to situate texts. Consequently, Chartier concludes, in his most radical recasting of this point of view, that the Enlightenment did not make the revolution; indeed, revolutionaries even helped to create the Enlightenment by rethinking the eighteenth century in terms of their own innovations.

Having disposed of the thesis that intellectuals led the French toward the explosion of 1789, Chartier proposes another solution in his next three chapters. This part of the book elaborates an argument that explains, as general prelude to the revolution, a loss of faith in king and church and the fabrication of a political practice in which "people acquired habits of free judgment" (p. 167). These sections represent an extraordinary mastery of a vast literature and are important for another reason. For more than a decade, Chartier has been producing a succession of important volumes with novel research and scintillat-

ing insights on education, reading, the world of print, and related subjects. In this book he applies his vast knowledge to a particular problem, providing an example of how to relate his more specific investigations to a traditional historical question. Such a basis helps to translate and illuminate his earlier efforts.

In the chapters where Chartier develops his alternative analysis—labeled cultural to differentiate it from the intellectual/linguistic and tacitly also from the social (class) interpretation—he first demonstrates the process of dechristianization. Evidence for the retreat of the Catholic church comes mainly from changes in attitudes toward death and sexual practices. Chartier deduces that these transformations sprang from the alienation of parishioners from a church made more rigid both by the Counter Reformation and Jansenism. Thus, the author links the rejection of the church not, as so many others have, to attacks by the philosophes, but to its own internal problems. Chartier finds a similar disaffection for the king, related in part to the general loss of confidence in a religion that supported him and additionally to the growth of a more critical public opinion. Here as well, the Enlightenment remains on the sidelines.

An important third piece of Chartier's cultural alternative is the formation of a new political environment. According to him, both peasants and workers became more politicized, an attitude more and more directed against the monarchy. For the middle and upper classes, this politicization manifested itself in the birth of a critical "relationship between morality and politics" (p. 166). This new political culture also owed nothing to the philosophes.

Chartier thus develops an analysis that—describing growing uneasiness with the Old Regime—might be labeled exclusively cultural. While many would quibble over specific details and others would find the systematic exclusion of intellectuals strained, he makes his points eloquently. And Chartier might have ended his book there if he had stuck to his announced intention simply to explain the conditions that allowed the revolution to resonate throughout society. But in a final chapter he pushes ahead to try to explain not only the malaise affecting state and church but also the specific causes of the revolution. These, everyone concurs, must be a body of ideas because the revolution was essentially made, at least in 1789, by a group of representatives acting consciously as revolutionaries. Invoking the factors listed by Lawrence Stone to explain the decisive move toward the English Revolution (*The Causes of the English Revolution* [1972]), Chartier endeavors to find French complements. He explicates the actions of the French by claiming for them an almost religious enthusiasm that had been displaced from its traditional object. He also views them as motivated by the revolutionary potential in legal language, by a country ideology peculiarly French, by the erosion of authority treated earlier in his book, and by the frustration of an oversupply of the highly educated in

an insufficient market. It is barely worth mentioning that such factors once again completely exclude the contributions of intellectuals like Montesquieu and Rousseau.

But Chartier himself seems undecided about his own efforts to explain the events of 1789. In his conclusion, he wonders whether it is ever reasonable to attempt discussion of origins and causes. The violence of the revolution and its rupture with the past in particular undermine connections with any earlier period. In a contradictory manner, he tries to overcome this problem by joining the Old Regime and revolution, not as cause and effect, but rather as two manifestations of a larger phenomenon of secularization and individualism. Either solution raises doubts about attempts to link culture and the events of 1789, but some readers may not be as generally pessimistic as Chartier. They may turn to what he has summarily rejected: the climate of intellectual life, including the work of the philosophes. If many historians currently emphasize only intellectual history and ought to heed Chartier's brilliant reconstruction of culture as a general context, he in turn ought to rely on political discourse as an important ingredient leading up to 1789. And, in particular, the social as well as political events still require consideration. Somewhere between these two camps lies profit.

JACK R. CENSER
George Mason University

VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT. *Democratizing France: The Political and Administrative History of Decentralization*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 406. \$54.50.

This study by Vivien A. Schmidt is about a relatively neglected, but nonetheless important, element of French history since the revolution. France's addiction to centralization in matters governmental is accepted as self-evident; the dominant role of the prefect in departmental and local affairs, for example, is interpreted as integral to the design of the tentacular state. Prophets and practitioners of concepts of political liberty and principles of equality were at one with authoritarians in the conviction that the nation's unity and well-being were best served by centralization. Attempts to peel away layers of authority over the past 200 years, attended by so much rhetoric, especially concerning the devolution of power to local officials, normally came to little result, save for two crucial moments. These were the early years of the Third Republic and the first years of Socialist government under the Fifth Republic. It is to these two moments that Schmidt devotes nearly all of her attention, offering analyses, largely separate divided into two formal parts, of political and administrative decentralization.

First inspection suggests that the history of decentralization is dramatically abridged in this volume.

Unsuccessful efforts to loosen the bonds of the state, from the Restoration through the Fourth Republic, receive summary attention, their only commonality being failure. Yet if successes were few, their political impacts were, in the case of the Third Republic, dramatic, and in the case of the Fifth Republic potentially so. Decentralization, carried out by the Left, was intended to promote local liberty and to enhance citizen participation in decision making. But it was also a calculated political venture, designed to appeal to new classes who were in search of a new political home. In the case of the Third Republic, Léon Gambetta and his heirs, by a cautious cession of powers to local officials, essentially mayors, fashioned a broad alliance of "middle-income peasants and shopkeepers" (p. 51) that became a secure social base for the Republic and many of its politicians. A century later the Socialists, developing a strategy that Schmidt judges to be brilliant, directed their appeal to the new *salariés*, defined as middle-level managers and workers. In a real sense the Socialists "invented their new electorate" (p. 157), which was enfranchised regionally and locally at the expense of the old notables. Surely some will quarrel with Schmidt's definitions of groups and classes, others will question her concentration on successful efforts at decentralization, and some will challenge her conclusion that the Socialists may have guaranteed their future by their investment in the new electorate.

The second part of this volume is concerned with the impact of decentralization on local politics and administration, principally in the 1980s. Convinced that France was less centralized than its reputation held, Schmidt explores ways in which central authority was bypassed, especially by mayors and prefects working in covert tandem. Numerous informal circuits of power suggest the existence of more actual decentralization than anyone would admit; and Schmidt is highly critical of Michel Crozier's and Stanley Hoffmann's views of an increasingly centralized system. Since the early 1980s, decentralization, now a legislated fact, means that there is new rhetoric and new reality in local government; "powerful, locally elected officials" (p. 342) now exist and are held accountable. Thus, they must be more political, and localities and regions are arenas of increased politicization. As a richly detailed and clearly argued account and interpretation of recent events, this work surely warrants the attention of historians.

NATHANAEL GREENE
Wesleyan University

DONALD REID. *Paris Sewers and Sewermen: Realities and Representations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. 235. \$39.95.

This book is organized as a triptych. In its first part Donald Reid seeks to determine how and why the pre-Haussmann sewers, which elites perceived to be a

source of myriad dangers, physical and social, were tamed and the sewage they once but imperfectly drained was sanitized and used as life-giving fertilizer. Its second part examines contrasting and changing elite representations of nightmen and sewermen in order to explore wider issues and especially mindsets, fears about social stability, and attitudes toward labor. Its final section contrasts these images with the reality of labor recruitment and work in the sewers in the late nineteenth century, and above all the solidarity of the sewermen's union.

In its object of study and its aim to seize not just realities but also how realities were perceived, Reid's book promises much. Our understanding of the impact of the urban environment and how large cities like Paris dealt with pollution problems is seriously incomplete. Other scholars have already demonstrated that decoding elite discussions of crime and marginality or medical and social reform discourse can help us uncover half-articulated anxieties about social order and reveal how shifts in perceptions of madness, sexuality, and even dirt, smells, and bodily functions, often underpinned major policy changes. Rereading discussions on sewers and sewermen therefore offers the possibility of further exploring how sociopolitical and cultural values are encoded and naturalized in reform discourse. Just as importantly, examining how "the other" perceived themselves and lived their "marginality" promises to help us deepen our understanding of the solidarities and cultures of excluded groups, long the objects of debate between defenders and opponents of the concept of the culture of poverty.

Unfortunately, these opportunities are largely missed in Reid's disappointing study. His analysis draws on but goes little beyond the suggestions about attitudes toward pure and impure that the anthropologist Mary Douglas made a quarter of a century ago, the stimulating studies of changing elite sensibilities to smells and pollution that the historian Alain Corbin made a decade ago, or even the research on the debates about sewers in late-nineteenth-century Paris carried out by the late Gérard Jacquemet. The explanation for this lies in the problematic and the research strategy the author adopts.

The principal weakness of Reid's discussion of how and why sewage removal was radically altered is that it is chiefly based on contemporary printed sources and work already done on facets of this change. It is not the result of sustained research. Not only has Reid failed to consult obvious printed sources such as reports of the *Conseil de salubrité* or the *Annales d'hygiène publique et de médecine légale* but, above all, he has not used dossiers in Parisian archives, rich not just for the period after the Communards fired the Prefecture of Police and City Hall and destroyed many records, but even for the earlier part of the century. This narrow and uneven source base limits the analysis and leads to errors. Reid assumes, for example, that reformers' dreams of recycling waste were new

and that only in the last third of the nineteenth century were sanitary engineers able to close the circle by using sewage in irrigation fields. This is to forget that recycling was already a crucial element in the urban economy and that refuse, be it rich street sweepings or dried solid human waste, had long been used to enrich the intensive agriculture of the Paris basin. Similarly, Reid's chapter on the closing of the Montfaucon sewage dump is flawed because he does not realize that as early as 1817 an alternative site had been established or that the problem of disposing of liquid human waste was largely solved, not as he assumes in the 1880s, but at the mid-century.

Even Reid's attempt to use images of sewers and sewage workers to explore elite attitudes fails to yield a fully convincing analysis. There are two reasons for this. One is that such decodings are notoriously difficult to effect. The other is that discussions of sewers and sewage workers in literature or in social criticism are quite simply not dense or sustained enough to yield the insights into mindsets that the author seeks. He is thus forced to analyze a limited number of texts, the most significant of which have already been widely discussed. Again, however, he misses opportunities. Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables* (1862), with its preoccupation with the old sewers and how Paris failed to recycle its human waste, is inevitably considered at length, but Reid has not examined the draft manuscripts of the novel now held at the Bibliothèque Nationale and does not debate with—though he mentions—the psychological insights into Hugo's concern with sewers offered by at least one of his biographers. Reid also accords considerable attention to Alexandre Parent-Duchâtelet, a high-profile hygienist already studied by several scholars. There is reason to believe, however, that Parent-Duchâtelet was unrepresentative, since his conclusions about the dangers of mephitisms and reputedly dangerous professions like the sewer men's were questioned by other hygienists. Many other reformers and engineers, not discussed by Reid, also studied these problems, and their discourse is similarly rich in symbolism and metaphor.

One reason why the third part of Reid's book is by far the shortest is, as the author admits, that the sewer men's union archives are sparse. It is still legitimate to claim, though, that his analysis of labor and cultures could have been more rigorous. Scattered sources exist that would have permitted Reid to study the nightmen, whom he discusses as representations and ignores altogether as reality. Data are also available that would have enabled him to make a much denser study of recruitment and accidents among sewer men. Future scholars might even regret that, in view of the changes that the Chirac municipality introduced into hiring and work practices since 1977, no sustained attempt was made to interview sewer workers. It must be hoped that an urban anthropologist will soon carry out this fieldwork.

"Like a body of water," the author announces in his

introduction, "this study shimmers for some reader-visitors and has depth for others" (p. 5). I saw shimmer in some of Reid's metaphors, in some of the thought-provoking leaps of imagination in his text, and even in the self-conscious pleasure he takes in speaking about the unspeakable. The surface glare should not blind us to its lack of depth.

BARRIE M. RATCLIFFE
Université Laval

LENARD R. BERLANSTEIN. *Big Business and Industrial Conflict in Nineteenth-Century France: A Social History of the Parisian Gas Company*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 348. \$42.50.

Only eight years ago, in a masterful survey of Parisian workers in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Lenard R. Berlanstein advanced the notion that workers' experience had to be construed broadly to be understood properly, as fashioned by conditions off the job as well as at work, and as including white-collar employees among the group about whom assertions concerning workers should be made (*The Working People of Paris, 1871–1914* [1984]). In this book that notion is given full play, with the addition of employers to round out the context of lives of work. By close analysis of a single company, this study illuminates the identities, interests, behaviors, and, especially, mutual relationships of managers, clerical employees, and industrial workers in the economics, politics, society, and even culture of the same period as the earlier study. The availability of exceptionally abundant and revealing documentation makes this a fertile monograph in its own right. But its conclusions have much broader significance, for the history of the Parisian Gas Company speaks to larger themes of early Third Republic history in more than a marginal way.

At least three lines of analysis lead to inquiries of general significance. One is the company's strategy of maintaining profitability as a mixed private/public enterprise affected nonetheless by an evolving consumer-driven market. This strategy reflected the identity and ethos of managers as much as competitive market pressures. The former nurtured the pursuit of microeconomic efficiency for its own sake, which made the firm economical despite managers' avoidance of market confrontation, an interesting finding for interpreting French entrepreneurship. A second line of analysis is the intrusion of municipal politics, especially Radical and Nationalist politics, into the internal life of the firm. By the very peculiarity of the firm's reliance on municipal authority, the external history of its negotiations for charter renewals and the internal history of struggles between management and subordinates highlighted the post-1890 dynamics of militant consumerist populism and leftist agitation to extend republican liberties

to the workplace. The third analytical theme is the ambiguity of professional identification, managerial authority, and organizational structure within the firm when more personalized, career-based models began to give way, although incompletely, to more bureaucratic, routinized forms. This ambiguity crystallized into ultimately self-defeating intransigence when confronted with the generalized late-century "crisis of authority" within culture, society, and politics. The ambiguity also reflected the effect of the state providing simultaneously a model of professional bureaucratic norms and recruitment for the firm and being advanced, especially after 1890, as agent of both social defense and social change.

This is one of those special studies that contributes as much by its empirical detail as by its analysis. The portraits of specific functional and status groups within the firm, relating structures of work and interest to behavior, are especially illuminating, particularly for managers and clerical employees, about whom less is known than industrial workers. From these portraits emerge intriguing comparisons. Managers and clerical employees shared patterns of career-based employment, assuming loyalty to the firm and a professional identity modeled after that of the public official. The same clerical employees, however, shared with stokers, the most militant industrial workers in the firm, a sense of grievance over managerial arbitrariness, provoking militant job action by both. Employees' and workers' history of mobilization and collective consciousness uncouples proletarianization from these developments as necessary or sufficient conditions for them, emphasizing instead the rift between managers' authoritarian paternalism and nonsocialist, republican egalitarianism as the deeper source of job conflict. The interpretation of this rift may employ too sharp a distinction between calculating, interest-centered and "benevolent" motives in the paternalist behavior of managers, but this is a minor reservation about a study deserving the most enthusiastic praise for its overall achievement.

GEORGE J. SHERIDAN, JR.
University of Oregon

HENRY ROUSSEAU. *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944*. Translated by ARTHUR GOLDHAMMER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 384. \$37.50.

This volume, first published in France as *Le syndrome de Vichy, 1944-198* . . . in 1987 and then as *Le syndrome de Vichy de 1944 à nos jours* three years later, is the third update of Henry Rousseau's study of the postwar remembrance of the Vichy period in France. The current version, ably translated by Arthur Goldhammer, should be read by anyone interested in postwar France and the nature of political discourse. Ongoing controversies over Vichy and the electoral successes of Jean-Marie Le Pen's *Front National* will

undoubtedly keep open the possibility of future updates.

Rousseau's working hypothesis is that a civil war in France in the 1930s and 1940s and the acts of the Vichy government, more than war, defeat, and foreign occupation in 1940, "played an essential if not primary role in the difficulties that the people of France have faced in reconciling themselves to their history" (p. 9). In the postwar controversies over Vichy, he sees a "syndrome," and his use of the medical metaphor even includes a "temperature chart" (p. 219), reminiscent of the model of revolution as fever in Crane Brinton's *Anatomy of Revolution*, first published in 1938. Rousseau claims that contemporary historiography in France has lost the therapeutic value of legitimizing the Third Republic that he believes it had at the turn of the century (p. 2), although the example of Taine suggests caution here, and the evaluation of history as therapy is speculation beyond the scope of this review.

In a brief foreword to the book, Stanley Hoffmann notes that the French have not "faced their crimes and prejudices as deeply as the West Germans have" (p. ix), suggesting comparison of Rousseau's Vichy syndrome to postwar *Sonderweg* and *Historikerstreit* debates in the Federal Republic. The Vichy syndrome, Rousseau reminds us, is but one case of defeat, collaboration, and exile in French history, other examples including *afrancesados* of Napoleonic Spain (p. 65) and Communards of 1871 (pp. 7, 52). Collaboration and resistance, and history and memory, also figure in the recent work of Benjamin Stora on the Algerian War (*La Gangrène et l'oubli, la mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie* [1991]). Post-collaboration recriminations in France also followed the fall of Ceaușescu in 1989, when Communists and conservatives publicly accused each other of having courted the late Romanian dictator, recalling the "allusive insult" analysis borrowed by Rousseau from Evelyne Largueche (pp. 188-89).

Rousseau emphasizes the reactions to Vichy of filmmakers and historians, and he minimizes the literary revival of wartime writers, including Drieu la Rochelle, Brasillach, and especially Céline, whose postwar following has spread to a fictionalized biography by a writer as far removed as Berkeley, California (see Tom Clark, *The Exile of Céline* [1986]). Rousseau's description of Vichy as a revenge by business interests and technocrats against the Popular Front (pp. 7, 253) is countered by Richard Vinen's more recent *The Politics of French Business, 1936-1945* (1991), which suggests that industry, having achieved its social aims before the fall of France, took little interest in Vichy's social program. On a minor note: Pompidou's death is given incorrectly as 1971 in the text (p. 100) but listed accurately as 1974 in the chronology (Appendix I, p. 313).

In summary, Rousseau has written an important book but shows an ambivalence when he describes the French as "obsessed with the memory of Vichy and

the Occupation" (p. 272) and also suggests that, on the basis of polling information, the French public has been less engaged by World War II memories than is suggested by the literary and political debate. Public interest has focused more on Pétain, he argues, suggesting perhaps a "Pétain syndrome" rather than a Vichy syndrome (p. 294). Rouso concludes that the Vichy syndrome has split France along political fault lines present since the Dreyfus Affair (p. 300), but also that French society has not really been torn by this syndrome even if occasional retrospective controversies about Vichy have spectacularly lit up the political sky (pp. 305–06). The Republican consensus was effectively restored after, if not during, the war. Perhaps the syndrome has not really been all that traumatic.

BERTRAM M. GORDON
Mills College

DAVID SVEN REHER. *Town and Country in Pre-Industrial Spain: Cuenca, 1550–1870*. (Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy, and Society in Past Time, number 12.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 337. \$49.50.

Historians specializing in early modern Spain, and foreigners in particular, know how difficult it is to manage the impressive number of heterogeneous local publications that have come out during recent years. David Sven Reher has managed to overcome this hardship. Basing this book on his earlier published work on Cuenca, he goes beyond local analysis to write a demographic study that aims "to understand human behavior patterns," and to chart the extent to which cities were "motors of change in pre-industrial societies" (pp. 2–3).

With these social and economic questions in mind, he analyzes urban systems from 1500 through 1870. Comparing data from Cuenca with information from the rest of Spain, he deals with nuptiality, fertility, and mortality, and the influence on them of short-term economic fluctuations. Reher's main thesis is that in spite of some differences between towns and the countryside, common regional patterns united them. A "culture of mobility," with permanent movement of population between rural and urban areas and within the town itself, linked these different poles of the same world. Far from being agents of change, towns bolstered "traditional structures in the countryside" (p. 300) by diversifying peasant economies, providing supplementary incomes, and regulating the marriage market.

Other important achievements include explicitly testing widely dispersed Spanish data against general hypotheses within this field, thus providing both unique information on Iberian history and interesting insights on preindustrial Europe as a whole. Through his analysis of the process of deurbanization, Reher traces a broader profile of the decline of

Castile, although apart from a Malthusian assertion that he admits contributes little to the debate, he does not try to explain it. Meanwhile, his study of the family from two different angles, that of the predominant nuclear group as well as the kin relationships that transcended it, opens new ways of understanding preindustrial economic and social behavior.

Intellectual honesty (Reher explicitly separates tested conclusions from his own speculations) and courage are well balanced in this book. There are reasons to agree on the importance of mobility in the sense in which he studies it, although other social and economic studies not cited in the book could have reinforced some of his arguments. One wonders if the 1843–47 census, his main source of evidence (pp. 216–98), is sufficient support for his theses on long-term behavior. Temporary urban labor markets and peasant economic flexibility helped to reproduce "traditional structures," although only a long-term study could prove the extent of change taking place. Yet these were double-edged phenomena that in many other areas of Europe consolidated capitalist development. One must therefore study how and why these structures came into being.

This book provides a fine counterweight to preconceptions like the monolithic view of cities as universal agents of change. Nevertheless, its exclusively demographic approach shows its own limitations, since it is to the analysis of the economy, society, and politics that one must look for explanations of the balance of inertia and dynamism. To that end, one should include in the relations between city and countryside such topics as the propensity (or not) of merchant capital to change rural society, a subject neglected in this study.

In any event, generating doubts about commonplaces is merely one of the services that a sectorial analysis can render to historical knowledge. This work provides many such services.

BARTOLOMÉ YUN
University of Valladolid,
Spain

MARY ELIZABETH PERRY. *Gender and Disorder in Early Modern Seville*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. 206. Cloth \$37.50, paper \$12.95.

Seville's economic and demographic expansion in the sixteenth century, due to the city's role as a launching pad for trade with and colonization of Spain's overseas empire, was reversed in the seventeenth century, when the silting up of its outlet to the sea led to the shift of traffic to Cadiz. What Theodore Rabb called "the crisis in the location of authority" (*The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* [1975]) in early modern Europe is given a new face by Mary Elizabeth Perry. Seville, she persuasively argues, "offers an example of patriarchy in crisis" (p. 13). The authorities of Seville, both secular and ecclesiastical, defined

disorder in terms of gender relations. They sought remedies for it by shutting women out of economic activity and enclosing them in homes, convents, and brothels.

Perry's expertise in social history presents both advantages and disadvantages for the task she has set herself. Covering the full range of social groups in the city, as opposed to concentrating on a single segment of the population, she makes effective use of exemplary stories about individuals to flesh out her analysis. Quantitative information is gracefully woven into the text rather than deployed in speciously scientific tables. Her grasp on religious and cultural history, however, is somewhat less firm. A probationary member of a religious order, for instance, is properly called a "novice," not a "novitiate." Her handling of prescriptive literature and women's poetry is judicious, but she marshals artistic evidence in a rather naive fashion. The paintings of Bartolomé Murillo, with which the book is copiously illustrated, would have contributed more to the argument if the city's artistic milieu had been more precisely delineated.

The title means exactly what it says: this is a book about Seville. (A map of the city should have been included.) The author lifts her eyes beyond the Guadalquivir only to glance toward the New World, to which many of the city's male inhabitants had departed. Without at least passing reference to recent work on gender relations in other early modern European cities, Perry cannot substantiate her claim that "the case of Seville presents more than one atypical city in disorder" (p. 13).

The strengths of this book, however, more than compensate for its shortcomings. Clearly and succinctly written, adequately documented with a bibliography and footnotes (rather than inconvenient endnotes, on which all too many publishers now insist for dubious reasons), attractively produced, and modestly priced, this monograph is an excellent choice for undergraduate and graduate courses in early modern European social history and the history of gender. Scholars will profit from the opportunity to test Perry's hypothesis in other historical contexts.

ANNE JACOBSON SCHUTTE
University of Virginia

THORKILD KJÆRGAARD. *Den danske revolution 1500–1800: En økohistorisk tolkning* [The Danish Revolution, 1500–1800: An Ecohistoric Interpretation]. Copenhagen, Denmark: Gyldendal. 1991. Pp. 440. 268 KR.

In this pioneering study, Thorkild Kjærgaard undertakes to write "total history," extending the insights and methods of the French *Annalistes* to the North Sea and Baltic littorals, while going beyond them by placing the underlying ecology at the center of his interpretation. Thanks to its administrative unity, Denmark proper (excluding the rest of the Olden-

burg monarchy) during this period provides him with an ideal field of study.

Kjærgaard presents a neo-Malthusian scenario of the pressures of a growing population, combined with the demands of the rising military state, on an ecosystem, leading by the early eighteenth century to its progressive breakdown. Thereafter, through an interrelated complex of technological innovations in both agriculture and energy sources—the "Green Revolution" and "Energy and Raw Materials Revolution"—a new ecological balance was attained, averting mass impoverishment like that of the Third World today, but ultimately clearing the way, there as elsewhere, for the ecological dilemmas of our time.

In describing these developments, Kjærgaard reveals how the apparently most disparate phenomena formed interlocking and mutually reinforcing patterns of deterioration or recovery. With insight and ingenuity he follows these trends out to their widest ramifications in Danish economic, social, political, and cultural life over three centuries. Throughout he combines a vast, overarching perspective with the most exacting mastery of detail. His treatment of clover cultivation is a virtual monograph in itself. The excursions, for instance, into ecologically caused changes in epidemiology and the impact these had on mentalities, literature, and the arts strikingly reveal his outreach and integrative skill. Statistical, scientific, and technological data are counterbalanced with a wealth of concrete human situations from all walks of life, providing immediacy, color, and the atmosphere of time and place.

Placing ecology at the center, Kjærgaard challenges accepted orthodoxies while raising some specific questions. To designate the entire period as a "revolution" seems somewhat misleading since most of it involved the growing crisis leading to the actual ecological revolution in the eighteenth century. More significantly, so long-range and deterministic an approach reduces to mere "histoire événementuelle" aspects of the period that may not be so easily dismissed. Historians have traditionally stressed the destructive seventeenth-century foreign invasions of Denmark, a point Kjærgaard passes over. In discussing the problems of deforestation, he leaves out of his account the exchange of Danish grain for forest products from Norway, Denmark's companion kingdom within the monarchy, and he fails to describe the nature of eighteenth-century trade with Britain, which brought in the coal needed to overcome the energy crisis. Especially noteworthy is his relegation of governmental action to a secondary, essentially derivative role in the transformation of society, challenging head-on the traditional emphasis on the agrarian reforms of 1784–1814. Most controversial may be Kjærgaard's questioning of the long-range economic viability of these reforms and misgivings toward the individualistic liberal society they helped to create. Danish historiography will surely never be the same.

Kjærgaard demonstrates the contemporaneity of all history at its most basic level, constantly calling to mind analogous ecological problems at that time and since. Seldom does a historian of a smaller country break new ground for international historical scholarship. Kjærgaard has done so brilliantly. We confidently await an English translation of this important work.

H. ARNOLD BARTON
Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale

E. H. M. DORMANS. *Het tekort: Staatsschuld in de Tijd der Republiek* [The Deficit: Public Debt in the Dutch Republic]. (NEHA, series 3, number 14.) Amsterdam: NEHA. 1991. Pp. xi, 276.

Although bonds and annuities were known in Burgundian times, Holland's debt, according to E. H. M. Dormans, did not become large until after 1600. And it was Holland's debt that was important, for neither the States General nor the other provinces could raise much money. Thus, the single province of Holland paid not only 58 percent of the Dutch republic's taxes but it provided the credit for this enterprise as well. And this was vital, for the scheme of Jan van Oldenbarneveltdt and his successors was to use ordinary income to pay for peacetime expenses, and then to borrow whatever was needed for war, paying only the interest of any debt out of extraordinary taxation. Although the republic's credit held up, on the whole, until 1787, there was no real incentive to make payments on the debt and little of it was paid off. Jan de Witt did not reduce the debt between 1653 and 1672; instead, he stopped its growth and refinanced it at lower interest rates. A century later Pieter Steyn did even better, cutting the debt by 10 percent. In the last fifteen years of the republic the debt was on the rise again.

The Dutch republic was the first to live on paper credit. In this as in many other respects it was a century ahead of the British. But there was a price to pay, not only in taxes—twice as high as English taxes per capita in 1790—and interest but also in the gradual shaping of the Dutch character.

As it grew the debt created its own constituencies. Men wanted to be tax farmers or to hold government office. Richer men, by buying the bonds and annuities, gave themselves the leisure needed for political careers. The regent class that governed the republic down to 1795 needed the security provided by these investments, even though they paid as little as 2.5 percent. Even at that rate the Dutch propensity to save was such that by about 1750 there was an annual accumulation of ten million guilders, which rose to thirty million a year by 1780. This money was pushed by tax policy into foreign bonds—which were tax exempt as domestic issues were not—and helped to fund enterprises in England, France, Sweden, and

Russia. There was little innovation at home after 1700, for the comfortable classes were too comfortable to innovate. Wages were high enough to pacify the common people. And so the Dutch slept through their Age of Periwigs, dreaming of former glories, until they were awakened by the battle songs of revolutionary France.

Dormans provides useful figures for the entire period, both for Holland and for the States General. Here is one dissertation that really is a contribution to knowledge. The interpretation is more old-fashioned than the figures themselves, still giving credit to de Witt and not, for example, to William IV, who ended tax farming. Surely, too, the Dutch were never in a position to choose their agenda. In the sixteenth century they were bullied by Spain, in the seventeenth century by France, and in the eighteenth century by England. Whether they fought or remained neutral, suffering at the hands of greater powers was their lot.

STEPHEN B. BAXTER
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

CARL-JOHAN GADD. *Självhushåll eller arbetsdelning? Svenskt lant- och stadshantverk ca. 1400–1860* [Self-Sufficiency or Division of Labor? Rural and Urban Crafts in Sweden, ca. 1400–1860]. Summary in English. (The Institute of Economic History of Gothenburg University Series, number 64.) Göteborg: Gothenburg University. 1991. Pp. 425.

The picture of preindustrial Sweden in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries traditionally painted by economic historians, going back at least to the work of Eli Heckscher, is one of an extremely poor and economically backward country. A sparse, overwhelmingly rural population supposedly struggled for bare subsistence. Contributing to low productivity was a lack of specialization, there being a remarkably small number of specialized artisans at work, either in the unimpressive cities or in the rural areas. In short, excessive rural household self-sufficiency meant lower levels of productivity and, consequently, lower levels of income.

While there is no doubt that the level of population density and the degree of urbanization in preindustrial Sweden was low by Western European standards, the other aspects of this portrait recently have undergone a wave of revisionism. The new consensus is that Sweden's per capita income in the mid-nineteenth century was similar to the average level for Western Europe as a whole. Similarly, it is generally agreed that Sweden was not particularly backward in terms of other characteristics, prominently including the techniques and the equipment used in agriculture.

Carl-Johan Gadd has taken on the task of reexamining the traditional belief that Sweden's rural areas suffered from a lack of artisans and a resulting lack of

specialization among rural households. Since the principal basis of this belief has been the small number of rural artisans listed in the various official population and taxation records, most of the book is devoted to a careful and critical analysis of these records with respect to the reliability of their listing of rural artisans. The widespread acceptance of these records has been a by-product of their unquestioned accuracy with regard to other matters, such as the level and distribution of the population, its level of literacy, and the level of government revenues. Until this work, however, no one has made a systematic study of the accuracy of the records when it comes to the listing of the principal occupation of each rural inhabitant.

The convincing conclusion that Gadd draws from his both clever and meticulous examination of the records is that the records cannot be trusted with regard to the distribution of occupations. More particularly, they consistently and substantially tend to underestimate the number of rural artisans. To complicate things further, the extent of this undercounting varies both geographically and over time.

Gadd reaches this conclusion first of all by demonstrating that the variations in the listing of rural artisans over time and space make no economic or historical sense. In addition, the mix of crafts reported is, at the very least, improbable. It is clear that the records cannot possibly be complete. More generally, the book demonstrates that for most rural persons it was their ownership or tenancy of land, not their actual principal economic activity, that determined their "occupational" classification. Being classified as a rural artisan was likely to result in a (naturally) unwelcome tax obligation, thus encouraging individuals to avoid such a listing. On those occasions when being a rural artisan promised exemption from onerous, not to say dangerous, military service, however, there was a predictably sharp increase in the number of persons so categorized.

Although Gadd has demonstrated that the traditional beliefs concerning the extent of rural handicrafts in preindustrial Sweden, and indeed concerning the overall economic sophistication of the country, are misleading, he does not replace these notions with any new quantitative results. Such calculations are left as a task for further research (p. 345).

This book represents high-quality scholarship and its conclusions are of importance to our understanding of the preindustrial Swedish economy (and therefore of the process of early Swedish industrialization); yet it probably will be read only by a very limited number of scholars. Three hundred and fifty pages of text, albeit well-written, on the subject at hand will discourage most economic historians, even those who have no difficulty in reading the Swedish language.

LARS G. SANDBERG
Ohio State University,
Columbus

GERHARD SCHORMANN. *Der Krieg gegen die Hexen: Das Ausrottungsprogramm des Kurfürsten von Köln*. (Sammlung Vandenhoeck.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1991. Pp. 204. DM 36.

A decade after revealing the existence of the fullest modern guide to surviving German witch trials, Gerhard Schormann now undertakes to describe the largest German witch hunt from which extremely few trials survive. The "extirpation" program undertaken by Elector Ferdinand of Cologne in 1627 must be documented primarily from the records of his privy council, because the trials themselves and most other related documents (such as financial records) perished in a fire in 1689. Even the most interesting contemporary source, a book attacking the abuses of the Elector's witch hunters finally published in the Netherlands in 1676 by a fugitive from them, survives in only two copies (p. 70). Given the exaggerations of critics and the equally careless boasting of the principal witch hunters, it is impossible to estimate how many "witches" died in the Elector of Cologne's lands between 1627 and 1635 (a thousand? more?), but it seems undeniable that this was a major German persecution.

Schormann strains every parallel between Ferdinand's "extirpation" of witches (the term was used constantly by the Elector's *Hofrat*) and the Nazi "final solution" for Jews, but he also recognizes the major differences between these programs. On the one hand, the witch hunters lacked totalitarian controls and worked in tiny states; on the other hand, they probably enjoyed more genuine popular support for their activities than the Nazis. The paucity of sources, however, creates a sketchy picture of the Elector's witch hunt and produces blurry comparisons both with other such hunts in the Holy Roman Empire and with twentieth-century "extirpation" programs. Perhaps the most valuable parts of Schormann's account are his comments on the often overlooked role of the Imperial appellate court, the *Reichskammergericht* (pp. 157–60), and especially the more effective aulic court, the *Reichshofrat* (pp. 161–66), in eventually curbing Germany's major witch hunts.

Schormann's book includes an unreliable section on witch trials outside the Holy Roman Empire that repeats outdated errors about early persecutions in southern France (p. 98), the Basque lands (p. 100), and early modern France (p. 106). Yet it also includes an excellent revision of accounts of witch hunting in the lands of the Abbot of Fulda (pp. 115–20) and tartly debunks legends about the Saxon jurist Benedikt Carpzov (p. 143). Overall, it tantalizes rather than satisfies.

WILLIAM MONTER
Northwestern University

DAVID WARREN SABEAN. *Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700–1870*. (Cambridge Studies in

Social and Cultural Anthropology, number 73.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1990. Pp. xxiii, 511. Cloth \$54.50, paper \$18.95.

David Warren Sabean's exhaustively researched study of kinship and property relations in a south German village spells bad news for two widespread theories of European social development. The first of these holds that the rise of "individualism" in "pre-modern" times was, in some important respects, a function of systems of partible inheritance, which worked against the preservation of fixed family holdings and so also against the sociopsychological subordination of household members to the intergenerational imperatives of conserving their patrimony. Instead, partible inheritance brought forth a market in land that undermined residential stability and commodified familial property. Although first formulated by the nineteenth-century social theorist Wilhelm Riehl, these views are challenged by Sabean in the form given them by Alan Macfarlane's *Origins of English Individualism* (1978). Without contesting Macfarlane's interpretation of conditions in England, Sabean rejects their broader applicability and cautions against "individualistic assumptions" in the historical study of European kinship (pp. 14, 185, 410).

The second of Sabean's theoretical targets is the "modernization" model, representing until recently a "general consensus" that in the "'traditional' rural society" of the premodern age "people lived in a world of kinship and that industrialization [and] mobility . . . brought the isolated nuclear family into being and reorganized society so that it moved away from solidarity toward competition and away from corporate groups to individuals sorted out into classes" (pp. 36, 432). Against this view Sabean argues, in what constitutes the most valuable and original aspect of this book, that during the "transition from feudalism to capitalism"—or "modernization" process—of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "kinship became more rather than less important" (pp. 41, 37). Society did not shift from "kinship to contract," but instead kinship "was reordered toward a complex, flexible—modern—system of alliance and exchange" (p. 432).

On the methodological level, Sabean rejects the widespread practice of constructing "taxonomies of household type," arguing instead that "the house" must be understood as an ever-shifting zone of confrontation between the varying interests of its inhabitants and the demands of the outside world (pp. 100–01). In the Württemberg village of Neckarhausen, Sabean found a peasant society practicing radical egalitarianism among male and female heirs, contracting marriages favoring the property rights of the partners' respective lines over their own reciprocal claims, open to class-exogamy in the early eighteenth century but moving toward class-endogamy thereafter, and favoring relatively early inheritance

in the late eighteenth century only to move toward a pronounced gerontocracy in the nineteenth century.

Sabean discovers interesting developments in the lives and fortunes of Neckarhausen's women, whose agricultural labors greatly increased in consequence of the cultivation of new fodder crops and conversion to stall feeding of livestock in the late eighteenth century. The early nineteenth century imposed heightened standards of household cleanliness on married women, as well as new financial insecurities that wives shared with their husbands. The result, Sabean argues, was a crisis of marital relations during which divorce rates soared.

As for the land market, Sabean finds that only intermittently did the villagers sell their holdings in monetized transactions. More frequently, land changed hands as the result of trades and exchanges within kinship groups, often mediated by godfathers. Far from dissolving ascriptive ties, the market functioned as "an instrument for kinship interaction" (p. 413). Similarly, class relationships and conflict, when they crystallised in the nineteenth century, arose from a matrix of kinship and retained, through endogamy of the dominant groups, a prominent association with it.

Sabean, invoking poststructuralist anthropologists and philosophers, presents a polemic against the "irritating" expectation that he should generalize his study's results or locate them on a scale of typicality (p. 8). But, nonetheless, at several points he makes claims for the representativeness (at the level of Württemberg) of his findings (pp. 34, 290). More importantly, he advocates, quite reasonably, the re-theorization of European kinship history by means of a comparison of the results of many microanalyses such as his own (p. 37).

Sabean's archival records yield up many a vivid phrase and image, and he often succeeds in deriving good analytical points from well-told stories. But he also succumbs too frequently to the temptation to bury the reader under mountains of anecdotal evidence. Translations into English, especially of colloquialisms and obscenities, are sometimes awkward or inaccurate (and the ubiquitous eighteenth-century epithet *Kanaille* is misapprehended). But these are the dangers of total immersion in such rich, if often murky and confusing, empirical waters. From his soundings in them, Sabean has written by far the best historical study of kinship and family relations in the German countryside.

WILLIAM W. HAGEN
University of California,
Davis

JÜRGEN MÜLLER. *Von der alten Stadt zur neuen Munizipalität: Die Auswirkungen der Französischen Revolution in den linksrheinischen Städten Speyer und Koblenz.* (Koblenzer Beiträge zur Geschichte und Kultur.) Koblenz: Görres. 1991. Pp. 385.

Historians have rarely viewed the French presence in the Germanies after 1792 in a favorable light. At best, it seemed a necessary evil, stimulating long overdue reforms. Jürgen Müller takes a more positive position, stressing "the radical modernization program that followed in the wake of the French 'expansion révolutionnaire'" (p. 23). Between 1792 and 1814, he asserts, "a deep and in many ways irreversible metamorphosis of the existing political, social, economic, and mental structures" (p. 23) took place, creating the "preconditions for a [later] unfolding of the modern municipality, free of [the bonds of] privilege and economically more dynamic" (p. 312). Müller thus transforms the occupation into a crucial, even necessary stage in Germany's evolution from an early modern *Ständestaat* to a nineteenth-century liberal state. The author also seeks the origins of this transition in the tensions and conflicts that existed long before the coming of the French.

Müller focuses on the experiences of two cities, Speyer and Koblenz, concluding that the general effect of French jurisdiction proved very similar (but not identical) in both places, although the two had differed markedly throughout the eighteenth century. Speyer was a free imperial city in decline: small, relatively poor, and homogeneous in its social composition. Koblenz was a *Residenz* and a city on the make. Much larger than Speyer, its social organization was characterized by a greater heterogeneity. According to Müller, French administrative reforms recast political, economic, and social structures in both cities, creating new elites. The men who rose to the top tended to maintain their positions and power throughout the *Vormärz*, despite the divergent political destinies of the two cities (Koblenz became part of Prussia, while Speyer went to Bavaria). In demonstrating this reshuffling of power and wealth, Müller looks closely at the people involved in municipal government, at the fate of economic elites, at the rise of new groups to social prominence, and at the impact of immigration.

This is a well-founded treatment of urban societies in flux. Yet it is plagued by some unresolved problems. Müller never quite smoothes away the tension between the two sides of his argument. On the one hand, he denies a simple premodern/modern dichotomy, preferring to draw connections between pre-revolutionary and post-Napoleonic worlds. On the other hand, he concludes that the occupation was indeed a major turning point in the history of the Rhineland.

Müller has assiduously evaluated tax records, deeds of sales of secularized lands, lists of political appointments, and the membership rolls of prorevolutionary groups in Speyer and Koblenz to establish the socioeconomic and political bases of the move toward modernity. And this is carefully and convincingly done. One wonders, however, if perhaps other measures might not have revealed other patterns. For instance, did attitudes toward social welfare and char-

ity shift? What about labor policies? Müller touches on the latter, documenting alterations in the definitions of citizenship and pointing out the abolition of guild restrictions, but these themes might have been explored at greater length to extend his study of social mobility beyond a circle of elites. Finally, although Müller's analysis of the social, economic, and political foundations of modernization is well developed, he has rather less to say about how changes in "mental structures" proceeded. Instead he moves somewhat facily from social and economic realities to mental states. But these quibbles aside, Müller's book handles an important and undervalued period in German history with considerable skill, and provides a significant contribution to urban studies as well.

MARY LINDEMANN
Carnegie Mellon University

ROBERT D. BILLINGER, JR. *Metternich and the German Question: States' Rights and Federal Duties, 1820-1834*. Newark: University of Delaware Press or Associated University Presses, London. 1991. Pp. 230. \$37.50.

The dates in this book's title are a bit misleading. Robert D. Billinger, Jr., gives a brief outline of Metternich's role in helping found the German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*), his use of it to curb German liberalism and south German particularism from 1815 to 1824, and the difficulties he encountered thereafter. The heart of the book, however, concerns Metternich's renewed contest with south German particularists and Prussian liberals or reform conservatives over questions arising from the revolutions and war dangers of 1830-32. The issues included federal foreign policy (especially ideas for a south German-Prussian alliance for neutrality in case of war between France and Austria over Italy); federal military reform; and the renewal of *Bund* machinery for repressing revolutions, disturbances, and constitutional liberalism. All the issues involved important constitutional questions, pitting federal law and functions against state sovereignty. Metternich won all the battles in this war, although with defensive victories; at the same time Prussia, through the *Zollverein*, was winning the struggle for economic leadership of Germany almost by default.

The story is not new, but Billinger tells it reasonably clearly and in great detail on the basis of thorough archival research, adding interesting details and some valuable points of interpretation. As an account of Metternich's motives, aims, tactics, and actions, and the reasons for his relative short-term success, it represents a valuable contribution. As an overall interpretation of this chapter in German and European history, it is more open to challenge, especially in the argument of the final chapter. Metternich, Billinger argues, tried to make the *Bund* a monarchic,

pacific, federalist school of nationalism for German princes.

Monarchic, certainly. Pacific, yes, in the sense that Metternich wanted to avoid violence, although he would use force and even international war in the last resort to repress revolution or prevent the loss of monarchic power. Federalist perhaps, in wanting federal laws and agencies to stop liberal constitutionalism in the various states, although for no other positive purpose. "School of nationalism," hardly. One does not, as Billinger supposes, have to accept a *kleindeutsch* version of German nationalism to reject this proposition. Of course there are different valid versions of German nationalism and patriotism, especially in the early nineteenth century. But Metternich's vision was specifically antinational: nothing like any nationalism, including the nationalism of the antebellum American South to which Billinger compares it. Nationalism by definition involves a people's emotional attachment to a homeland, culture, government, or fellow citizen. Any such popular attachment to the *Bund* was precisely what Metternich's federal policy was designed to prevent and repress (see, for example, pp. 92–93). A stable mass apolitical apathy in Austria and Germany was the goal.

This is not to quarrel over definitions or take sides with Metternich's Prussian or south German opponents; pettiness and opportunism were present on all sides. There was a serious clash of principles here between Prussian reform conservatives like Foreign Minister Count Christian Bernstorff, who wanted a *Bund* capable of useful joint action so that Germans would be weaned from revolution and attached to it, and Metternich and his kind of conservatives, who fought to keep the *Bund* an instrument through which frightened princes could preserve the status quo. Metternich won, but it is hard to see that the *Bund*, Austria, or Germany gained anything by it.

PAUL W. SCHROEDER
University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign

WOODRUFF D. SMITH. *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 1840–1920*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 298. \$39.95.

What a timely topic! Woodruff D. Smith argues that a cluster of new disciplines took shape in late-nineteenth-century Germany around a novel focus on culture. Their makers, he writes, "regarded culture itself mainly in its anthropological sense. That is to say, they were interested primarily in the patterns of thought and behavior characteristic of a whole people rather than the intellectual and artistic activities of the elite" (p. 3). By this definition such thinkers as Adolf Bastian, Wilhelm Wundt, and Friedrich Ratzel look strikingly like ancestors of our own anthropological and populist preoccupations. But what is a historically faithful definition of "cultural sciences"? The book

makes little attempt to reconstruct the contemporary understanding of *Kulturwissenschaften*, an oceanic subject for nineteenth-century Germany. Nor does it settle on a disciplinary or institutional boundary. Instead it focuses on "nomothetic" sciences—a methodological category with no intrinsic connection to the concept of culture—and follows a loosely strung path across political thought, ethnology, psychology, geography, and economics.

Smith argues that cultural explanation served after 1848 as a corrective to perceived deficiencies of German liberalism. He turns to the famous compendium of liberal political thought, Rotteck's and Welcker's *Staatslexikon* (1834 ff.), in order to establish an intact model of liberal social science with three essential characteristics: use of the rational individual as unit of social explanation, an aim of discovering social laws, and an attempt to balance social change and equilibrium. The *Staatslexikon* is a problematic starting-point for the rest of the book, one never adequately linked to the "sciences of culture."

Persuasive nonetheless is Smith's argument that the failure of the Revolution of 1848 led W. H. Riehl, Adolf Bastian, and others to turn to folkways as the elements of stability and change. Bismarck's unification of Germany and the subsequent fragmentation of liberal politics shaped a new generation of cultural theorists, above all in Smith's story the geographer Friedrich Ratzel, who insisted on the dynamic, expansive character of the German people and their need for colonies overseas. After 1900 radical nationalists inside and outside the university adopted Ratzel's notorious concept of *Lebensraum*, the notion that a people maintains its vitality through outward expansion, as legitimation for their dreams of unlimited German territorial conquest. By World War I, the narrative has traveled from gradual progress impelled by rational individuals to a blind dynamic mass will to expansion, following the stereotypical course from liberalism to German *Sonderweg*.

This is a richly researched guide to little-known byways of German anthropology. Graduate students and experts alike will find new names and ideas to explore. There are odd omissions, though. Heymann Steinthal and Moritz Lazarus, two of the most important mid-century ethnologists, are entirely absent. Franz Boas appears, but his concept of culture, of lasting importance for the cultural sciences, is not discussed. Steinthal and Boas mediated a humane—and distinctively German—cosmopolitan tradition from the Humboldts and the Romantic era to later generations. They and others created alternatives to the *Sonderweg* on which this book ends. There were many paths and many German sciences of culture, not just the disastrous ideology of racial expansion.

HARRY LIEBERSOHN
University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign

RALPH JESSEN. *Polizei im Industrieviertel: Modernisierung und Herrschaftspraxis im westfälischen Ruhrgebiet 1848–1914*. (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, number 91.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1991. Pp. 408. DM 68.

Until recently, German historians have displayed little interest in policing, with the exception of political policing. They have only begun to investigate the experiences of rank-and-file policemen and the character of day-to-day law enforcement. Provincial developments have been especially neglected. Ralph Jessen's work represents a significant step toward filling this gap.

The focus of Jessen's valuable case study is the Westphalian half of the Ruhr coal field. His book describes the development of police forces in rural and urban areas, whether locally or state financed. Although the subtitle of Jessen's book announces coverage of developments from 1848 to 1914, his account is rather sketchy up to the Ruhr coal strike of 1889. The years from that confrontation to World War I claim most of his attention. The greater availability of sources for the last prewar decades doubtless accounts at least in part for this emphasis. Jessen has drawn extensively on the rich documentation available in national, regional, and municipal archives.

Among changes he notes in Ruhr police forces during the last prewar decades, Jessen particularly stresses evidence of demilitarization. He views a less-militarized police partly as an unintended consequence of rapid urban growth and partly as a result of the preferences of municipal leaders. Certainly, as he documents, recruits who qualified for police employment through long years of service as noncommissioned army officers had become the exception rather than the rule in Ruhr cities before 1914. But Jessen's emphasis on demilitarization requires qualification. First, men with extended military experience continued to dominate the police ranks of sergeant and above. And second, as Jessen himself indicates, where the Prussian state had serious reservations about increasingly proletarianized municipal police forces, it had the option of replacing them with more-militarized state policemen.

In his attempt to chart changes in police function in the eastern Ruhr, Jessen concentrates on police efforts to identify and penalize violators of minor ordinances. He correctly sees such initiatives as creating a useful measure of police intervention in the everyday life of the community as well as providing a guide to the identity of groups most likely to experience sanctions. Jessen finds that police-imposed penalties fell disproportionately not only on industrial workers but also on small tradesmen, although for very different reasons and with very different consequences.

As illuminating as Jessen's analysis of the monitoring of minor contraventions is, readers may regret

that he chose not to give more attention to some of the many other functions of the Prussian police. Readers may also regret that his study does not offer more of the color and drama of the encounters that took place in the streets of Ruhr cities. Nevertheless, Jessen has provided much-needed insight into previously inadequately examined aspects of the relationship of the Prussian state and its citizens.

ELAINE GLOVKA SPENCER
Northern Illinois University

WILLIBALD GUTSCHE. *Wilhelm II: Der letzte Kaiser des Deutschen Reiches; Eine Biographie*. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften. 1991. Pp. 260. DM 32.

Benjamin Disraeli, who met Prince Wilhelm of Prussia as a young man and formed a good impression of him, recommended the reading of biography, which he described as "life without theory." Willibald Gutsche's account of the last Kaiser assaults the prime minister's dictum, reversing his proposition almost completely. This is a biography in which theory is relentlessly forced on life, with the result that the man it purports to depict is in fact not the subject of the book but merely the vehicle for the argument that historical personalities, no matter how exalted, are merely representatives of economically determined forces. Kaiser Wilhelm II is therefore understood as the articulator of aggressive designs by reactionary class interests rather than as an individual conflicted by a variety of psychological, physical, and circumstantial factors.

In Gutsche's scheme, virtually all of the significant events of Wilhelm's life, from his dismissal of Bismarck in 1890 to his aggressive behavior on the eve of World War I, are due to the pressure of class interests rather than personal considerations. Earlier biographers and historians who have negligently failed or ideologically refused to understand this are waved aside in order for Gutsche to have an untrammelled opportunity to present his case. It is not a convincing plea, notwithstanding its being advanced in forceful prose following an energetic investigation of many East and West European archives. The Iron Chancellor, to deal with only one example, was certainly embroiled in quarrels with socialists, liberals, and others who represented economic interests at variance with those of his own class, but his problems with the Kaiser lay elsewhere. What divided Wilhelm and his first chancellor (and all Bismarck's successors) were personal differences, itemized by the Kaiser in a farrago of imperial accusations against his servants for their insufficient loyalty to the crown. Only one person could rule Germany, and Wilhelm II intended to permit no competitors. Wilhelm's insistence on this point can be understood only by reference to his personality and surroundings, not to the operation of socioeconomic forces at work in imperial Germany.

Politics is not the only area in which Gutsche

represents Wilhelm II as a creature of impersonal forces. The Kaiser's long interest in science and technology is held to be based at least in part on his realization that progress in these matters was a prerequisite for a "successful imperialist struggle for world power" (p. 114). Wilhelm was certainly attuned to the economic and military ramifications of applied science, but his inquisitiveness was always dilettantish and inconstant, focused often on the prestige rather than on the power that new discoveries or inventions would confer on him and his empire.

Driven from his throne by his own incompetence, Wilhelm II as ex-Kaiser was a figure of marginal consequence, no longer either the symbol or the leading actor of a Germany manipulated by capitalist imperialism. Gutsche therefore has to shift his indictment to new ground, arguing that from about 1927 Wilhelm was by fits and starts a supporter of Adolf Hitler, believing that in Nazism lay the hope for a Hohenzollern restoration. Gutsche tends to attribute the enthusiastic support given to the Führer by various of Wilhelm's children, his second wife, and a great many of his minions at Haus Doorn to the Kaiser himself. It is certainly true that Wilhelm rejoiced in the renewed sense of nationalism engendered by Hitler, that he was duped for a while into believing that Nazism might provide the path for his return to the throne in Berlin, and that from 1939 until his death in June 1941 he applauded the lightning victories of the Wehrmacht (for which the Kaiser claimed credit, inasmuch as Hitler's generals had received their training in his own Prussian army). What Gutsche needs also to record is the copious record of Wilhelm II's social contempt for Hitler, a man he once mistakenly imagined to be a Czech rather than an Austrian corporal. The German people, the exiled Kaiser disdainfully though mistakenly observed, would never accept a ruler who had seeped from a beer hall.

LAMAR CECIL
Washington and Lee University

THOMAS A. KOHUT. *Wilhelm II and the Germans: A Study in Leadership*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 331. \$35.00.

In this study Thomas A. Kohut examines the "mirror image" between Kaiser Wilhelm II and his subjects, that is, the psychological congruence that "allowed [Wilhelm] to function as a national symbol and . . . to inspire the enthusiasm of the Germans" (p. 118). Based on a sensitive, jargon-free application of the self-psychology of Heinz Kohut, part 1 delivers a nuanced and convincing psychological portrait of the gifted but unstable and contradictory Kaiser. Indeed, Thomas Kohut's study is the best psychological analysis of the Kaiser to date. The voluminous, often shockingly frank correspondence between Wilhelm's

English mother and her own mother (Queen Victoria) provides especially strong grounding for Kohut's interpretation that Wilhelm's troubled, intense relation to his difficult mother made him a "narcissistically disturbed" individual (p. 9) whose later personal and political interactions were largely designed to compensate for this personal legacy of fragmentation and vulnerability. Wilhelm's relations to his father are, in contrast, scantily documented, and here Kohut lets the theory drive the interpretation more than is perhaps warranted. Nonetheless, his account of the systematic psychological effects of Wilhelm's upbringing supersedes previous psychological efforts whose biologicistic determinism (the curse of Wilhelm's withered arm) and eugenic fantasies Kohut demolishes in his conclusion. These previous armchair psychologists (Kohut himself is a graduate of the Cincinnati Psychoanalytical Institute) were intent on labeling Wilhelm as pathological. Perhaps in his successful effort to avoid these pitfalls, Kohut pays less attention than he might have to certain of the Kaiser's repetitive psychological patterns such as projection, paranoia, or seeming manic-depression, which all had demonstrable effects on his decision making. And Wilhelm's noticeable attraction to *Männerbünde* is rather too gingerly and inconclusively handled. The insights of self-psychology into these aspects of the Kaiser's psychology would have proved interesting.

Part 2 is rather less successful and less original in dealing with its subject, "the personalization of politics." This section is relatively underconceptualized and does not always sufficiently engage the secondary literature on Wilhelmine high politics. An exception is Kohut's fruitful disagreement with Peter Winzen, Barbara Vogel, and Volker Berghahn on Wilhelm's goals for the fleet. Otherwise, Kohut's interpretive framework relies heavily on the excellent work of Elisabeth Fehrenbach, arguing that "the essence of Wilhelm II's symbolic leadership [the only kind Kohut believes he practiced] was to rule by covering over conflicts of interest through the creation of an emotional consensus [in the nation]" (p. 198). Symbolic politics is a complex subject. Kohut assumes too readily an easy antithesis between rational "interests" and "emotional politics." Despite a nod at differentiation (pp. 118–21, 319–20, n. 38), he assumes an entity called "the Germans," who functioned as Wilhelm's mirror, foil, impetus, and judge. This umbrella term substitutes for an admittedly difficult analysis of Wilhelmine political culture, without which, however, no study of Wilhelm's symbolic leadership is possible. In the end, the striking similarities that contemporaries noticed between the Kaiser and especially the louder sections of the German middle class remain unexplained: while Wilhelm's psyche is now clearer, "the Germans" are a black box. The "mirror image" remains a puzzling objective correlative whose mystery is still best expressed by Heinrich

Mann and Walther Rathenau, whom Kohut cites to advantage.

ISABEL V. HULL
Cornell University

MARION A. KAPLAN. *The Making of the Jewish Middle Class: Women, Family, and Identity in Imperial Germany*. (Studies in Jewish History.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 351. \$39.95.

This exciting new social history of Jewish women in Wilhelmine Germany constitutes a pathbreaking contribution to the fields of Jewish, German, and women's history. Marion A. Kaplan sets out with three principal goals: to reassess Jewish history in light of women's experiences; to integrate both women and Jews into German history; and to introduce ethnicity into women's history. Using a rich array of sources—including memoirs and diaries, Jewish newspapers and periodicals, rabbinic sermons, census data, novels and short stories, and even cookbooks—Kaplan fulfills this agenda admirably. By focusing on the intersection of gender, class, and ethnicity in both the private and public lives of bourgeois German Jewish women, Kaplan not only expands our understanding of the German-Jewish symbiosis but significantly reshapes that understanding as well.

How then does the introduction of women into Jewish history alter our perceptions of the modern Jewish experience, and especially, of the process of assimilation? All too often, Kaplan insists, assimilation has been measured in terms of either ideological transformation or changing patterns of public religious observance, factors that suggest a sharp decline in traditional Jewish practice by the end of the nineteenth century. Yet such factors, according to Kaplan, tell only part of the story because they largely ignore the experience of women. Exempted by Jewish law from most forms of public worship, women had developed a domestic cult of religious observance that did not slacken during this period, in sharp contrast to synagogue attendance. Rather, domestic Judaism actually thrived as Jewish women were increasingly relegated to the private sphere as a result of embourgeoisement. Even highly acculturated women often maintained a host of domestic Jewish rituals: they prayed at home; lit Sabbath candles (frequently against the will of their husbands, as in the Freud household); often kept kosher and cooked traditional Jewish foods; celebrated Jewish life-cycle events; and preserved family and friendship networks. Jewish women also tended to convert and intermarry less frequently than their male counterparts.

Whether such behavior signaled the persistence of ethnicity or religion might well be debated; yet, as Kaplan shows, women's religiosity had always been bound up with such domestic rituals. In any case, the inclusion of women in the larger picture of the modernization of Jewish life reveals that assimilation

occurred more gradually than previously believed, and that it did not lead to the abandonment of Jewish identity, but rather to its transformation. It also suggests that women and men experienced assimilation differently. Whereas men often felt a sharp contradiction between retaining a Jewish identity and assuming a new middle-class Germany identity, since both these identities were expressed primarily in the public sphere, women were generally spared this conflict, since their Judaism was essentially a private matter.

When it came to the propagation of bourgeois German cultural values, however, Kaplan demonstrates convincingly that Jewish women acted not as "keepers of tradition" but as "bearers of modernity," and it is here that the author adds a significant new dimension to our understanding of German history in general. *Bildung*, Kaplan argues, cannot be understood simply as high culture or the attainment of a university education. Rather, we must also examine the way cultural values and norms were transmitted within the family, and here women played a pivotal role. It was women who kept up the family's appearance of bourgeois respectability and made sure that their children adopted the manners, speech, clothing, and education of the German bourgeoisie. Moreover, Kaplan shows, acculturation did not simply involve adaptation to prevailing social and cultural norms. It also entailed the creation of those values, and in this sense Jews in general, and Jewish women in particular, played key roles.

Indeed, Jews often pioneered in those demographic trends most identified with the middle classes. They tended to marry later than their gentile counterparts due to their disproportionate representation in commercial professions, which often required considerable time to establish financial security. And they began to limit their fertility nearly a generation before other Germans, making the two-child household the norm. These demographic trends had enormous cultural repercussions: since Jewish families had fewer children, Jewish women had more leisure time than their gentile counterparts, and they devoted this time to the consumption of bourgeois culture. They read the latest novels; they attended concerts and theatrical performances; they introduced the latest fashion trends, even in rural areas; and they cultivated their own musical talents and those of their children.

Jewish families were also able to provide better educations for their children, both boys and girls. When German universities first began to admit women in the early twentieth century, Jewish women, not surprisingly, were vastly overrepresented. They were similarly in the avant-garde of women entering the job market, due in part to their educational attainments, as well as to the late age of marriage among Jews and the fact that many Jewish women never married at all due to the demographic "oversupply" of Jewish women (pp. 5, 17). Thus, Jewish

women flocked to the burgeoning field of white-collar jobs; they pioneered in the development of modern social work (which Kaplan sees as the transformation of traditional Jewish philanthropy); and they were disproportionately represented among women who embarked on careers in liberal professions, especially medicine and law, that previously had been exclusively male domains.

Finally, Kaplan illustrates poignantly that while the experience of Jewish women often mirrored that of other German women, in other respects it was unique due to the impact of anti-Semitism. While acknowledging Richard Evans's admonition not to read German history backward "from Hitler to Bismarck" (p. 13), Kaplan nevertheless unearths abundant evidence to confirm the view that anti-Semitism was rife in Imperial Germany, permeating every level of society, from the highest ranks of the government bureaucracy down to the most basic everyday interpersonal relationships. Indeed, Kaplan's study constitutes a damning indictment of Imperial Germany's failure to integrate its Jewish minority and suggests, in sharp contrast to recent trends in German social history, that anti-Semitism was far more embedded here than elsewhere in the West.

Despite their successful embourgeoisement, middle-class Jews socialized almost exclusively among themselves, and only rarely did professional or organizational contacts translate into real friendships. In universities, women's organizations followed their male counterparts in adopting anti-Jewish membership practices. And in the workplace, anti-Semitism effectively determined career choices made by Jews. University-educated Jews, unlike their Christian counterparts, generally steered clear of civil-service jobs, where anti-Semitism was rampant, and instead tended to congregate in the liberal professions. Moreover, while teaching became the most attractive career option for gentile women, it remained largely closed to Jews, both men and women, given the prevailing view of education as "practical Christianity for the masses" (p. 183). So powerful a force was anti-Semitism, Kaplan maintains, that it consistently overrode shared class and gender interests.

Kaplan's highly original study offers striking proof that social history remains a most effective tool for reconstituting the everyday lives of those who hitherto have been invisible, in this case middle-class Jewish women. Clearly written, handsomely produced, and expertly edited, Kaplan's book significantly deepens our understanding of Jewish history, women's history, and German history, three realms which she shows were inextricably interconnected. By bringing to center stage the experiences of those who in the past either have been ignored altogether or relegated to the margins of German history, Kaplan's book dramatically reshapes the way we understand the German-Jewish past.

VICKI CARON
Brown University

PETER S. FISHER. *Fantasy and Politics: Visions of the Future in the Weimar Republic*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 289. Cloth \$40.00, paper \$13.25.

This interesting and well-written study is an attempt to grasp the popular mood of the Weimar period through an analysis of its visionary and future-oriented literature. During the 1920s and early 1930s, there was a wide German readership of *Zukunftsromane*, or futuristic novels which roughly resemble what we might call works of science fiction. It is Peter S. Fisher's contention that by carefully reading these novels as cultural and historical documents, one can learn a great deal about the underlying concerns and anxieties of both the individuals who wrote them and the audiences who read them. Hence, this volume is not simply a thematic study of a popular literary genre; it is, more importantly, an exploration of "the contours of certain group mentalities that were consolidating themselves" (p. 20) during the fifteen years of the Weimar Republic.

Altogether, Fisher discusses the *Zukunftsromane* of some thirty different authors of the Weimar period. In order to deal with such a large number of writers, he conveniently arranges them into three distinct groups and then deals with each group in a separate chapter.

The first group Fisher calls the radical nationalists. The authors in this camp (including Ernst Otto Montanus, Hans Heyck, and Alfred Reifenberg) all wrote from an extreme right-wing perspective. Although the settings of their novels were always the near or distant future, what they expressed in these works were the psychological and emotional preoccupations of the Weimar era. For example, Fisher finds this rightist fantasy literature suffused with longings for victorious wars of revenge and retribution, which he convincingly links to German feelings of humiliation following World War I and the dictated peace of Versailles. At the same time, much of this literature manifested a fear and resentment of other races, not only Jews but blacks and Asians as well. And not surprisingly, the nationalist novel of the future also expressed yearnings for a German savior, usually in the form of a political genius who miraculously rescues the world from chaos and then establishes a new world order under benevolent German leadership.

The second group Fisher labels the technological visionaries. Although the writers in this camp were generally conservative (for example, Hans Dominik, Friedrich Freksa, and Curt Abel-Musgrave), they were, according to Fisher, not as far to the right as those just mentioned. Once again, the message was that the nation and indeed the whole world needed saving; the bringer of peace and harmony, however, would be not a political leader, but an engineer or biologist "messiah" who would rescue humanity by some new technological or chemical invention. If it is the entire world that is saved, the hero is invariably a

German scientist, for it was simply assumed that the Germans were superior not only in scientific inventiveness but in moral authority.

Assembled in Fisher's third group are Weimar's socialist and pacifist writers of futuristic fiction. Most of the novelists in this camp (Ludwig Dexheimer, Werner Illing, Hanns Gobsch, and others) portrayed the future as a harmonious classless society, free of the influence of religion, national hatreds, or capitalist greed. What separated members of this group from one another was less their ideal vision of the future than their notions of how to get there. Some, for instance, imagined that a better world would come about gradually and peacefully, while others indicated that it could only be the result of an approaching total and decisive class war.

This brief summary in no way captures the subtlety of Fisher's arguments. On the whole, the author has done an excellent job in opening to view some of the ideological undercurrents of Weimar popular culture. The book can be faulted on only two counts. One is that it would have been helpful if more biographical information could have been provided about the various authors with whom Fisher deals. Although he does supply useful background sketches of a few individuals, others remain only names. The other is that his reliance on Freudian, and more especially Reichian, insights to explain the symbolism and imagery of the *Zukunftsromane* sometimes gets out of hand. Although his use of "body armor" theory is employed to good effect, his interpretations of the supposedly hidden meaning of space ships, submarines, tunnels, trenches, child dwarfs, and even pipe organs are often far-fetched and unconvincing. These minor shortcomings notwithstanding, this is the best book now available in English on the political implications of Weimar's rich vein of visionary and science fiction literature.

DAVID GROSS
University of Colorado,
Boulder

ROBERT S. GARNETT, JR. *Lion, Eagle, and Swastika: Bavarian Monarchism in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933*. (Modern European History, Germany and Austria.) New York: Garland. 1991. Pp. xviii, 394. \$58.00.

In 1953, Walter H. Kaufmann described Bavaria as "the citadel of monarchism" in the Weimar republic. Over the following four decades, numerous articles and several books, ranging from Kurt Sendtner's biography of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Wittelsbach to Karl Otmar von Aretin's study of Bavarian nobles, have examined various aspects of Bavarian royalism during the interwar period (Kurt Sendtner, *Rupprecht von Wittelsbach* [1954]; Kurt Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, "Der bayerische Adel: Von der Monarchie zum Dritten Reich," in *Bayern in der NS-Zeit*, vol. 3, eds. Martin Broszat et al. [1981], 513–67). But Robert

S. Garnett, Jr.'s generally impressive book is the first comprehensive, scholarly study of organized Bavarian monarchism during this era. The author relies primarily on central and regional Bavarian government and police files but also makes effective use of the personnel records of "Nazi monarchists" in the Berlin Document Center. With the exception of the papers of Franz Ritter von Epp and Fritz Schäffer in the Bundesarchiv, however, he was not permitted access to the private papers of leading Bavarian monarchists or of those of Crown Prince Rupprecht.

Garnett focuses on the organization and activities of the Bavarian King and Country League, Germany's largest monarchist organization. Much more thoroughly than Rudolf Endres was able to do in his short chapter on the League ("Der Bayerische Heimat- und Königsbund," in *Land und Reich: Stamm und Nation; Probleme und Perspektiven bayerischer Geschichte*, ed. Andreas Kraus [1984]), Garnett examines the League's relationship with other monarchist groups, the conservative government, the popular Crown Prince Rupprecht, and even Nazi monarchists. Like Jack Sweetman ("The Unforgotten Crowns: The German Monarchist Movements, 1918–1945," Ph.D. diss. [1973]), Garnett finds that the League, although closely associated with the Catholic Bavarian Peoples' Party, attempted to act as a massive pressure group to force the government to restore the monarchy. Until late 1932, however, the Bavarian government, which included numerous monarchists, maintained only a "benevolently neutral attitude" (p. 171). The League was also plagued by internal conflicts and, unlike the Nazi Party, was unable to achieve any degree of effective "organizational bonding." The League equated Bavarian states' rights with the Wittelsbach dynasty, a position the general public rejected despite widespread sympathies for Rupprecht. Garnett concludes that in the Weimar Republic there was no chance for a "legally and peaceably restored Bavarian monarchy" (p. 327).

The most interesting sections of this book present ten case studies of monarchists who were also Nazi Party members or supporters. With the exception of references to such well-known Nazi monarchists as von Epp, this topic has received little attention from scholars. Indeed, the name of Ludwig Franz Gengler, the Bavarian Nazi monarchist who wrote the first scholarly survey of German monarchism in 1932, does not appear in Geoffrey Pridham's survey of Bavarian National Socialism (*Hitler's Rise to Power* [1973]). Bavarian police reports cited by Garnett note that many League members were attracted to the Nazi Party by 1930. Garnett never deals with this issue satisfactorily, but he does present much new information. To argue that Wittelsbach monarchism, not Nazi monarchism, dominated Bavarian restorationism is obvious. He also fails to discuss the League's contacts with the Bavarian branch of the Deutsche Adelsgenossenschaft, whose membership included several leaders of the League. Georg H.

Kleine's work on the relationship between the Adelsgenossenschaft and National Socialism is not cited ("Adelsgenossenschaft und Nationalsozialismus," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 26 [January 1978], 100–43). On balance, however, this is a thoroughly competent and valuable survey of Bavarian monarchism during the Weimar republic. The sections on Nazi monarchists will certainly stimulate further research.

JOHN PETER HORST GRILL
Mississippi State University

BURKHARD JELLONNEK. *Homosexuelle unter dem Hakenkreuz: Die Verfolgung von Homosexuellen im Dritten Reich*. (Sammlung Schöningh zur Geschichte und Gegenwart.) Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. 1990. Pp. 354.

National Socialism developed a biological vision of the world as a primary element of its world view. This foundation led to the killing of racial groups defined as inferior: above all Jews, but also gypsies, Slavs, mentally defective individuals, and those considered incurably ill. Biological considerations merged with social and cultural views in designating groups targeted for elimination, with the long run aim being the creation of an utopian racial social order. National Socialism viewed these groups hierarchically; all Jews were targeted for killing, as were most gypsies, while the killing of Poles and Russians was done on a more arbitrary basis. Homosexuals have not been recognized as victims of Nazism, nor have they received any compensation for their persecution.

Burkhard Jellonnek's revised dissertation presents a detailed archival study of Nazi treatment of male homosexuals during the Third Reich (National Socialism showed little concern for lesbianism). The author reviews the problem caused by the appointment of Ernst Röhm, whose homosexuality was well known, as chief of staff of the SA. This problem was solved with the killing of Röhm for political reasons during the "Night of the Long Knives" (June 30, 1934), which in turn led to the rise of Heinrich Himmler and the SS.

To Himmler, whose rigid puritanical character is succinctly sketched (although Jellonnek fails to cite Peter Loewenberg's fundamental study, "The Unsuccessful Adolescence of Heinrich Himmler," *AHR* 76 [June 1971], 612–41), homosexuality was unacceptable. Himmler wished to make homosexuality in the SS punishable by death. After degradation and expulsion from the SS, homosexuals would be tried by the courts, Himmler wrote, and "Upon completion of their sentence they will on my order be sent to a concentration camp where they would be shot while attempting to escape" (p. 30). Yet even within the SS the treatment of homosexuals was in practice more lenient. Jellonnek argues that the fates of Jews and homosexuals were not comparable; in contrast to the

Jews, who could not save themselves by conversion, homosexuals were perceived as re-educable. The means used ranged from punishment to psychotherapy. It included incarceration in concentration camps as well as castrations. Only a fraction even of convicted homosexuals were sent to concentration camps—Jellonnek estimates between five and fifteen thousand. In the camps, they generally occupied the lowest positions and were not accepted by other prisoners.

The focus of this study is not primarily on the experiences of homosexuals, but on the means used to deal with them as revealed by available Gestapo documents. An introductory chapter reviewing the state of archival sources is of particular value. The concluding chapters focus in detail first on a rural region (the Palatinate), then on an urban setting (Würzburg), and finally on a metropolitan city (Düsseldorf). The author provides a concrete picture of Nazi methods and techniques for dealing with homosexuals. This work provides a valuable illumination of one aspect of the Nazi system.

GEORGE M. KREN
Kansas State University

OMER BARTOV. *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 238. \$22.95.

"This is not," Omer Bartov makes clear at the outset, "a comprehensive history of the German army and its relationship with regime and society in the Third Reich" (p. vii). It is, however, an impressively researched and imaginatively presented contribution to the contentious debate about the extent to which the German army supported the Nazi regime, subscribed to its ideology, and embraced its war aims.

For decades after the fall of Hitler's Reich, the myth of Wehrmacht innocence in the crimes of the Nazi era dominated both popular and scholarly perceptions. In recent years, however, the work of Christian Streit, Jürgen Förster, Theo Schulte, and other scholars has made this view untenable. Among these revisionists, Bartov holds a respected place; his first book, *The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare* (1986), provided irrefutable evidence of the Wehrmacht's willing cooperation with the Nazis and its widespread involvement in criminal activities. Now, in the shadow of the *Historikerstreit*, Bartov elaborates the depth and breadth of his indictment by raising fresh questions and by extending his investigation of the German army's behavior in the Soviet Union.

Four chapters, proposing four related theses, develop Bartov's consecutive argument. The Wehrmacht that launched "Barbarossa" in 1941 was not as well supplied with modern weapons and equipment as the success of the blitzkrieg in 1940 had led many to believe. The titanic struggle against the Red Army

caused heavy losses in both men and matériel, thereby quickly “demodernizing” the German army and forcing many of its troops into a form of warfare reminiscent of the western front in World War I (chap. 1).

The enormous casualties resulting from the failure of the blitzkrieg and the demodernization of the front quickly destroyed the “primary group” as the principal source of the German army’s cohesion and fighting power. To compensate, the Wehrmacht intensified the political indoctrination of its soldiers. The more the abstract ties of ideology and race replaced the social bonds of unit solidarity, the more brutally the troops behaved and the more frequently they were employed in officially sanctioned criminal activities against their “subhuman” enemies, military and civilian alike (chap. 2).

Additional cohesion was provided by Draconian discipline, also justified on ideological grounds. But even this “perversion of discipline,” which resulted in the execution of thousands of German soldiers, was only one side of the coin. As a reward for the dreadful conditions they had to endure, the men of the Wehrmacht were permitted to engage in private acts of looting and murder, thereby further heightening the savagery of the war in the east (chap. 3).

The cumulative pressure of harsh discipline and unrelenting indoctrination, of hardships endured and horrors inflicted, not only destroyed the individual soldier’s moral fabric but also distorted his perception of reality. This led him to deify his Führer, demonize his enemy, dehumanize his victims, and deepen his commitment to uncompromising racial struggle. Thus, millions of young Germans, preconditioned by years of education in the Third Reich, were transformed into ruthless and fanatical proponents of the Nazi vision of the war. And thus, in the cauldron of the eastern front, the Wehrmacht was truly transformed into Hitler’s army (chap. 4).

This summary barely hints at the analytical and empirical richness of Bartov’s book. Not everyone will agree with all of his views, but no one will be able to ignore his argument, which is solidly based on primary sources (military records, letters, diaries) and skillfully informed by the latest published scholarship. This book is an impressive achievement.

GEORGE H. STEIN
State University of New York,
Binghamton

OLAF GROEHLER. *Bombenkrieg gegen Deutschland*. Berlin: Akademie. 1990. Pp. 456. DM 68.

This massive history of the bombing of Germany during World War II comes very close to the designation of “definitive study.” Even World War II “buffs” who do not read German will find impressive the X-ray diagrams of the bombers, the lists of the raids and their consequences, the charts of the routes

followed by the bombers, and the many illustrations of the results of the bombing.

Olaf Groehler begins with the admission that area bombing was begun by the Germans—they “sowed the wind” and, as a consequence, “reaped the whirlwind” (pp. 15 and following). The author’s main thesis, however, is that area bombing could not and did not win the war and that the Western allies, especially the British, carried it on long after its effectiveness had been disproved. Although he shows that German popular morale sank to a low level after 1943, he indicates that the major contributions of air power to victory came with the attacks late in the war on the production of fuel, planes, and railroads.

In spite of his detailed analysis of the air war, Groehler omits some significant aspects of the story. Until late in the war British bomber command had only two choices: to cease bombing or to bomb at night, with uncertain means of finding their assigned targets and confronting fearsome fighter opposition and dangerous antiaircraft fire. A major part of this bombing took place while the Germans were involved in the titanic struggle with the Soviet Union, with even the British public becoming enthusiastic supporters of Soviet military prowess. Although British forces could confront German forces in Africa, that field of action proved slow and costly. A return to the Continent was far off. War in the Far East moved at a snail’s pace. Under these circumstances the British bombers provided a sense of excitement, of movement toward victory. After the bombing of London, Coventry, and other British cities, there was little British sympathy for German civilians. And Britain was, apparently, providing a kind of assistance for the beleaguered Russians.

Groehler also fails to understand British and American public psychology during the war. Present-day Americans and Britons have lost some of the sense of outrage that undergirded military action in the war. The violent ravaging of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, and much of the Soviet Union had destroyed British and American concern for “innocent” German civilians. If these civilians had to suffer to convince their leaders that the war was lost, then that was an unfortunate aspect of “total war.” What the British and Americans could not comprehend was that the German and later Japanese military and political leaders did not care what happened to civilians so long as there was some chance for victory. Even after the Hamburg catastrophe, the firestorms in other German cities, and the destruction of hundreds of thousands of homes, the Nazis fought on until troops actually occupied the country. Japan would have followed a similar course except for the personal intervention of the Japanese emperor.

Fifty years later one looks back with wonder at the figures presented by Groehler: 1,350,321 tons of bombs dropped on Germany; 507,736 homes destroyed; 420,000 persons (approximately 390,000 Germans) who lost their lives, and yet industrial

production was not materially damaged until late in the war and postwar Germany could emerge from this destruction with a rapidity that justified the term "miracle." Bombers and their bombs have grown "smarter" since World War II but evidently not smart enough to find the most important targets, the rulers who cause the wars.

EARL R. BECK
Florida State University

JEAN-CLAUDE WAQUET. *Le Grand-duché de Toscane sous les derniers Médicis: Essai sur le système des finances et la stabilité des institutions dans les anciens états italiens*. (Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, number 277.) Rome: Ecole française de Rome. 1990. Pp. 657.

This ample study of the financial administration of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under the last Medici dukes Cosimo III (1670–23) and Giangastone (1723–37) will be of interest both to those concerned with the details of Florentine and Tuscan history and with the development of the early modern state in Europe generally. At the more general level it is a critique of the linear view of state development in which some periods are seen as moments of heroic progressive development and others of stasis or temporary decline. Jean-Claude Waquet substitutes a more systemic analysis of how the Tuscan state operated in a specific period. His approach is well supported in recent Italian historiography, surveyed usefully in the first chapter. Eighteenth-century Florentines who shared the more linear view of development typical of the Enlightenment, and also most recent historians, had condemned Cosimo III and Giangastone to the oblivion of stasis or decline. Waquet reexamines the financial administration of Cosimo III from a systemic perspective and finds a structure and policy that aimed prudently, and successfully, at stability. In the crisis of the wars of Louis XIV when the Medici court was obliged to pay tribute to the Habsburg empire—the chief extraordinary financial burden—Cosimo III adopted a prudent policy of further borrowing through the *Monti* of the state debt and he imposed a temporary income tax, the *Colletta universale*. Stability was achieved both through the structure of the finances and the duke's clemency in administration. Of most interest is the analysis of the tax system, and of the *Monti* of the debt.

Despite the fact that church lands were exempt, Waquet concludes that taxation was progressive, weighing on landowners (and particularly on Florentine patricians who paid the land tax and *Colletta*) as well as on artisans, merchants, and consumers who paid indirect taxes, but not burdening peasants. The same wealthy classes were the chief investors in the debt. Florentine nobles were the largest group, with more than a quarter of the value of *Monti* shares, followed by the Florentine clergy with nearly a fifth.

These groups also received the greatest benefit of interest from the debt. Stability was further achieved through ducal clemency, although the author admits that this made it difficult to improve administration or act against fraud. Analysis of the financial administration further emphasizes the symbiotic relationship, noted by others, between the Medici dukes and the Florentine patrician elite, although an underlying tension between dukes and elite arose from the distribution of offices, which were also held mostly by patricians.

Waquet's systemic approach is fresh and insightful, and permits a detailed look at the ducal state in action. His rather apologetic assessment of Cosimo III may not, however, entirely defeat the older linear view. One is aware that much of the stability resulted from the work of earlier periods, and that the duke's clemency might also be read as political weakness, inviting further comparisons with the more aggressive dukes of the sixteenth century. The author's thorough use of documentation in Florence permits some, but not extensive, analysis of relationships between the capital and more peripheral parts of Tuscany, whose potential resources in agriculture and commerce, largely ignored by the last Medici, were promoted more effectively in the late eighteenth century. But still this engaging study sheds new light both on the functioning of the early modern state and on a much neglected period of Tuscan history.

R. BURR LITCHFIELD
Brown University

ANTHONY H. GALT. *Far From the Church Bells: Settlement and Society in an Apulian Town*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 276. \$49.50.

In southern Italy, small landowners usually own relatively widely dispersed fields to which they travel daily from a central village where they live. Exceptions to this pattern of residence are, therefore, interesting and informative and help to determine the possible causes of the usual pattern and of the exceptions. Anthony H. Galt provides a documented exception to the usual pattern of peasant settlement through the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. His book discusses two questions. First, why has there been dispersed settlement (that is, why have small landowners lived in the countryside near their fields rather than in the village) in Locorotondo, Apulia? And second, what effect has this dispersed settlement had on social structure and social values?

Regarding dispersed settlement in Locorotondo, Galt convincingly argues that this pattern developed as a result of the type of land contracts there. Specifically, the emphyteusis contract, a lease in which peasants held land in perpetuity usually with the stipulation that it be improved within a certain period of time, gave peasants a stake in the land they worked. At the same time, such contracts helped to

assure the landowner that the land would be kept productive, thus securing some income over the long term. Galt explicitly recognizes that this adaptive strategy was not a grand social scheme but resulted from a series of individual decisions that together produced a change in society. Peasants were better off, their hard work in the country produced food and inheritable wealth, and their children were always under parents' watchful eyes. Landowners were better off with a steady income.

Regarding the effect of dispersed settlement on social structure and values, Galt clearly demonstrates demographic shifts, social/political concerns arising from the dispersal (such as town officials noting it and trying to reverse it), and different patterns of inheritance among *contadini* and *cittadini*. Regarding family structure and social values, however, Galt's data and interpretations suffer from deficiencies discussed elsewhere (see my book, *Italian Family Structure* [1989]).

Specifically, Galt confuses the legal with the psychological. For example, he, like others, concludes (based on official documents that categorize household structure) that extended families were rare. But household structure may say nothing about family structure. In all parts of Italy a common pattern is, and has been, a multihousehold structure populated by kin. Each apartment has its own kitchen, bath, and so forth, and in official records it is classified as a nuclear household. Official records fail to communicate that the apartment next door, under the same roof, connected by inside doorways, is inhabited by a son and his family. The two official nuclear families interact as one psychological extended unit.

Locorotondo seems no different. Oral information cited by Galt includes brothers or uncles contributing to a girl's dowry (p. 103), relatives sheltering criminals (p. 137), relatives emigrating together to the United States (p. 153), brothers watching out for the virtue of their sisters (p. 182), *trulli* being built with closed door arches that could be used for future expansion "to fit a growing family, or to ease eventual division of the house with the younger son" (p. 183). All of these are descriptive of family interactions in most, if not all, of southern Italy; perhaps all of Italy.

Galt's book provides an excellent, well-documented account of a different system of land contract and its consequences on settlement in southern Italy. For this reason alone, it is worthwhile. The book, however, fails to provide convincing evidence of differences in social structures and values, especially among kin and friends, as a consequence of the different system of land contracts.

NICHOLAS J. ESPOSITO
State University College of New York,
Cortland

ELDA GENTILI ZAPPI. *If Eight Hours Seem Too Few: Mobilization of Women Workers in the Italian Rice Fields.*

(SUNY Series on Women and Work.) Albany: State University of New York Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 396. \$19.95.

If eight hours seem few to you / Try working / And you'll see the difference / Between work and giving orders (p. 159).

Thus did striking weeders taunt their employers in the northern Italian rice fields during their heroic era of labor activism from 1901 until Italy's entry into World War I in 1915. Almost 100,000 weeders toiled for six weeks every summer in the rice districts, site of prewar Italy's most profitable and most capitalistic agricultural enterprise. They frequently worked more than ten hours a day during the hottest part of the year in stagnant water infested with the anopheles mosquitos. From 80 to 95 percent of these workers were adult women. After the turn of the century, increasing numbers of them defied virtually every established institution and social convention of their day to launch a series of labor actions designed to win the eight-hour day and improve their abominable working and living conditions. Elda Gentili Zappi tells their story with a wealth of detail that includes an analysis of the political and economic situation of women workers in liberal Italy and in other nations. Her work is clearly the product of exhaustive research in the archives and the published works, including the labor periodicals, of this era. Her writing is clear but tainted with a style all too familiar to dissertation readers ("I now will focus" [p. 100]). She was ill-served by her copy editors; one need go no further than her introduction to discover the misspelling of "assess" (p. xiv) and the use of "image" for "imagine" (p. xii).

Yet she leaves few stones unturned in her attempt to be both thorough and fair-minded. Her research reveals that the weeders faced hostility, duplicity, and incomprehension from almost every quarter. The employers were the ever-present obstacle, but there were many others, including the leaders of the Catholic church, who were becoming more sensitive to social issues but who seemed more interested in keeping the weeders away from the socialists and in consolidating Catholic power in the national parliament than in improving the weeders' lot. Hostility also came from the national government, which was moving toward universal male suffrage and a more equitable labor policy but which seemed little concerned with the plight of agricultural workers or of agriculture in general. Male family members discouraged organized activity outside the home or the workplace. Medical experts (one of whom was awarded the Nobel Prize) assured the weeders that their work was "light" and safe. Even the Socialist Party, which reluctantly undertook to organize them, seemed more than half convinced that the inevitable revolution of the future would "liberate" women workers by returning them to the home. Neverthe-

less, Zappi concludes that the weeders "achieved rights that transformed their lives" (p. 281).

Did they? What rights? The evidence Zappi presents does not support her triumphant conclusion. In 1915, the eight-hour day was still the exception in labor contracts, wages had scarcely kept pace with inflation, many health and labor laws still did not apply to agricultural workers, and those that did were honored mostly in the breach by the employers. More ominous still was the development of the agriculturalists into a powerful, highly organized enemy of the Italian labor movement. Without diminishing the courage or dedication of the weeders and their supporters, one must conclude that their efforts won only temporary, partial victories that would soon turn to catastrophic defeat in the chaos of postwar Italy.

RICHARD CAMP
California State University,
Northridge

HILLEL LEVINE. *Economic Origins of Antisemitism: Poland and Its Jews in the Early Modern Period*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 271. \$30.00.

Hillel Levine seeks in this book to identify a connection between the failure of modernization in Poland and the rise of anti-Semitism. In the course of a sophisticated treatise, he makes some suggestive points. Because it is grounded neither in archival sources nor in the relevant scholarly literature on the subjects he discusses, however, the book must be seen as a meditation or a series of rather free associations.

A leading authority on Jews in Poland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is Artur Eisenbach. In addition to various articles, a volume of his studies was published in 1983. And his magnum opus, *Emancipacja żydów na ziemiach polskich, 1785–1870* (*The Emancipation of the Jews in Poland, 1785–1870*) appeared in 1988. A series of articles by Krystyna Zienkowska critical of Eisenbach's analysis of bourgeois anti-Semitism appeared in the leading Polish historical journal *Kwartalnik Historyczny* in 1986, 1988, and 1989. Andrzej Wyrobisz is the author of a number of important studies related to urban history, to the attitudes of the nobility to economic problems, and to the situation of Jews in nobility-owned towns. None of this literature in Polish, and the list could be expanded substantially with ease, seems to have come to the attention of Levine. Moreover, the author claims that it is futile to look for traces of Jews in Polish archives; it is an experience of "frustration" (pp. 15–16, 108). This is an absurd and astonishing contention. Every Polish archive fairly teems with documents related to Jews; witness the published work of Zenon Guldón, Jacob Goldberg, Maurycy Horn, and M. J. Rosman, to name just a few scholars who have used such materials.

At a number of specific and rather important

points (there are many, many minor errors), Levine leaves room to doubt his expertise in Polish historiography. For example, there is a particularly confused account of sixteenth-century economic developments that seems to say that Jews controlled almost all of the trade at that time. This is a novel idea; some have said Jews controlled Polish commerce by the early seventeenth century, but even that has been disproved with finality by Zenon Guldón (p. 60). Levine's assertion that figures for the proportion of revenues from sales of alcohol for noble estates and private towns are "unavailable" is incorrect (p. 141). The single important source about Jewish leaseholders cited here is a passage from the autobiography of Solomon Maimon, which Levine takes to be a "credible image" (p. 8). This work, published in German during the author's lifetime, simply cannot be accepted at face value as easily as this. And in any case, in those frustrating archives there are literally thousands of documents pertaining to Jewish leaseholding in all its variety. The Jew as leaseholder is critical to Levine's argument about the role of Jews in the feudal system. In a particularly freewheeling and inventive discussion, Levine associates what he terms the "revival" of the blood libel with, among other things, the failure of feudalism, demographic pressures, marital infidelity, infanticide, and the deflection of peasants from possible political goals (pp. 183–88). As Wiktor Weintraub and Jacob Goldberg have pointed out, at precisely the same time as the increase in the number of blood libel trials, there was an explosion of trials and executions of women for witchcraft. The number of Jewish lives lost because of the blood libel was exceeded by the number of women executed for witchcraft in Poland by a factor of at least ten. One might have expected some comment on this from the author particularly in view of his emphasis on the association of Jews with the demonic realm.

In sum, it is all well and good to be able to cite Mary Douglas and Louis Dumont, Michel Foucault and Theodore Adorno, J. G. A. Pocock and Karl Polanyi, but if the subject is Polish history, it is best to know the subject. By putting its distinguished imprint on this book, Yale University Press has not enhanced its reputation.

GERSHON DAVID HUNDERT
McGill University

VLAD GEORGESCU. *The Romanians: A History*. Translated by ALEXANDRA BLEY-VROMAN. Edited by MATEI CALINESCU. (Romanian Literature and Thought in Translation Series.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 357. \$49.50.

This is a first-rate and remarkable reader's history of Romania. It is first rate because the author, editor, translator, and publisher have combined to produce a quality volume that should satisfy most objective

readers. It is remarkable because the late Vlad Georgescu (1937–88) profited from and transcended his experiences as a young historian trained in, dissenting from, imprisoned by, and eventually exiled from Communist Romania; he then broadened his historical and analytical skills and command of methodologies in the West to bring forth this and other useful studies. It is a reader's history, as opposed to a reference history, because this book is meant to be read, absorbed, and meditated on rather than picked through or used as a compendium of facts about the Romanian past.

The book is a revised version of a Romanian language edition first published in the United States in 1984. Its utility as an interpretive look at the Romanian past was recognized at the outset and confirmed in post-revolutionary Romania itself, where it has been widely used as a replacement for Communist-era textbooks in Romanian higher education. It presents the story of the Romanians in seven concise chapters and an epilogue, beginning with the classical epoch, continuing on through the Middle Ages (from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, when Romanian civilization and political formations emerged), the era of despotism, enlightenment, and nationalism (the eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries), the age of national revival (1831–83), Romania in the mid–1980s, and concluding with the revolution in 1989 and the first months thereafter.

The strengths of the work are the strengths of Georgescu the historian: an excellent analysis of social and cultural history, a nice touch for combining coherent narrative with interpretive presentation and provocative insights, an erudition that is carried lightly. It is strongest on the periods in which Georgescu himself made original contributions, that is, the late-medieval and early modern eras of Romanian history, but his discussion of interwar politics and development and his reflections on the Communist period will also be helpful in the process now underway of reassessing modern Romanian history.

The author's death obviously complicated the completion of the new edition since he had revised only the first five chapters (up to 1948). The decision by the editor, Matei Calinescu, to complete the book with the original version of chapter 6 and two additional chapters (one on the 1980s, written for other purposes by Georgescu, and an epilogue by the editor and Vladimir Tismaneanu) was well taken. The only gap left concerns the specifics of the last few brutal years of Nicolae Ceaușescu's self-proclaimed "Age of Gold" (1987–89), to wit, the insane "systematization" schemes designed to wipe out Romania's peasant and urban heritages and the Draconian measures adopted to eliminate Romania's foreign debt. The epilogue is straightforward and persuasive in its analysis, although it is a little puzzling why it stops in April 1990 instead of with the elections a month later or with the now infamous Miners' Invasion of Bucharest in June

1990, which arguably marked the end of the revolution of 1989.

The only major criticism of this volume concerns the bibliography, which is too eclectic and erratic, and also contains a surprising number of errors (in a book generally clean). The section on the Communist period is particularly inadequate. Overall, however, the new English edition is actually a much better book stylistically and otherwise than the original. The rhetorical edges have been smoothed a bit, some of the interpretations made a little clearer, and a helpful set of notes has been added. In sum, this is a fine book that can be highly recommended to all audiences and is a fitting memorial to its author's memory and work.

PAUL E. MICHELSON
Huntington College

CHARLES JELAVICH. *South Slav Nationalisms: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1990. Pp. xvii, 359. \$45.00.

Historians and others have traced the growth and measured the intensity of national feeling in Eastern Europe with great care, focusing their attention especially on the role of intellectuals and politicians. Occasionally, they have also noted the contributions of schools to the process, but they have had little to say about precisely how these institutions awakened or reinforced patriotic and nationalist sentiments. Implicit in this neglect is the notion that schoolchildren are too lacking in sophistication to count for much in nation-building.

Charles Jelavich has put this assumption to the test, undertaking a pioneering study of textbooks used in Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian elementary and secondary schools before World War I. His aim is twofold: first, to see what students were taught about their own and other South Slav peoples, and, second, to gauge how strongly they were encouraged to think about South Slav unity and, thus, how well prepared they were to accept the Yugoslavia created in 1918. He emphasizes the importance of elementary schools because they represented the limit of formal education achieved by the majority of children.

In search of answers he subjects the contents of history and geography textbooks and readers to an exhaustive analysis. He finds that the Serbian textbooks were the most uncompromising in their promotion of nationalist goals. Almost without exception they asserted the primacy of the Serbs among the South Slavs, laid claim to all the *Stokavian*-speaking lands, including Croatia, on the grounds that they were, in fact, Serbian lands, and deliberately ignored Croatian history. In contrast, Croatian textbooks, while exuding national pride and asserting the leading role of the Croats among the South Slavs of the Habsburg monarchy, nonetheless generally presented Serbian history and culture in a favorable light. Jelavich views all these matters from a broad

historical perspective. He gives particular attention to the development of two competing currents of ideas—burgeoning national consciousness and South Slav unity—and to the creation of ethnically based educational systems subject to all the pressures of complex modern societies.

Jelavich's conclusions, in view of recent events in Eastern Europe, are sobering. He discerns no significant support for the ideal of South Slav unity in Serbian, Croatian, or Slovenian textbooks and education policies. Rather, they promoted avowedly nationalist, separatist goals—for the Serbs, a large Serbian state encompassing most of the lands inhabited by South Slavs; for the Croats, the union of all their co-nationals in a single political entity in the Habsburg monarchy and including in it Serbs living in areas deemed to be historically Croatian; and for the Slovenes, the heightening of national feeling and self-esteem among their young people. The textbooks thus reinforced all the old divisions—linguistic, cultural, religious, and historical—among the three communities. The information and impressions they conveyed to students suggest how fragile the superstructure was for the Yugoslav experiment in the twentieth century.

KEITH HITCHINS
University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign

PÉTER GUNST. *Die bäuerliche Gesellschaft Ungarns in der Zeit zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen*. Translated from Hungarian by JOHANNA TILL. (Studia Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, number 192.) Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 1991. Pp. 246. \$32.00.

In the "motionless" world of the early modern Habsburg monarchy, a peasant was defined as one who "owned" land and more than just a fragment, even if property rights were not recognized in our sense. Of course, definitions change; in this study, Péter Gunst includes the landless in the category of peasantry, but puts an upper limit on the quantity of land owned at 100 *joch* (57.54 hectares). Those who owned more than that, he casually asserts, neither thought of themselves as peasants nor were considered as such by the society in which they lived (p. 18). Had Gunst explored further the implications of this issue of perception, he could have increased our awareness of other ways to look at this heterogeneous segment of society besides defining it in terms of its relationship to the means of production. Because he disregards the role and distribution of ownership of livestock, and because he fails to help us understand the cultural assumptions of his peasants, Gunst is ultimately unable to convince us that much is gained from the creation of this conceptual category as distinct from the notion of an agricultural labor force.

As late as 1930, 4.5 million people, nearly half of the Hungarian population, lived directly from the

land. That statement alone says much about the relative backwardness of East European societies. In England, the share of agriculture in the total labor force fell below that level as early as the middle of the eighteenth century. In America, the comparable figure in 1930 was 21 percent. Yet in Hungary, the absolute numbers of the agricultural labor force continued to increase even in the interwar period.

Another outstanding feature of the society was that the people on the land owned very little of it. Fully 46 percent of the agricultural labor force was landless, and another quarter was effectively so. Hence, poverty was widespread and the material conditions of life were rudimentary. The annual per capita income of agricultural laborers was about 200 *pengös* (\$35), just about half that of unskilled industrial workers. Even if one takes into account the higher prices and rents in the towns, the rural population was at a considerable disadvantage vis-à-vis the rest of society. Gone were the days when the peasantry had longer and healthier lives than the urban population. The peasants were nonetheless glued to the land by the limited opportunities elsewhere, by the closing of the American frontier, and by the love of that sliver of land received in the land reform of 1930. They remained in the villages or in their scattered settlements, which the outside world penetrated only with difficulty.

The peasants lived in premodern conditions characteristic of the American prairies perhaps a century before. Their houses were made of dried clay blocks—not brick or wood—mostly without foundations, running water, electricity, or anything beyond the basics. Some peasant families did not even have an outhouse. Beds counted as a major investment. Only 8 percent of the children had beds of their own. Only half of the houses had their own wells, and the common wells of the villages were often contaminated, a recurrent source of epidemics.

Not surprisingly, only a quarter of the children were considered healthy and judged to be well-developed physically. In towns the proportion of healthy children was twice as high. Poor health was also the outcome of notoriously inadequate nutrition. Bread remained the staple of a monotonous diet supplemented by potatoes and bacon, with pork, perhaps, on Sundays. Dairy products were rare. The better-off peasants ate more meat, but still did not attain a balanced diet.

Gunst sketches these attributes of peasant life in considerable detail, at times still using pre-1989 vocabulary. Geographic variations, as well as variations within the highly stratified peasant society, are always kept in mind. Gunst covers a broad range of other aspects of peasant material culture, including their furnishings, their clothing, and their meals. He is not concerned, however, with their spiritual values, culture, or world view. We learn little about the sensibility that, as much as the quantity of land they owned, unified the peasants into a coherent social group. We

also do not gain a sense of the flavor of village life: Gunst does not examine who drank together in the local taverns or the ways in which shepherds related to cowherds or servants. Hence, we do not come away from this book knowing the peasants in depth.

Yet the dismal picture presented of peasant life, the backwardness and the isolation from the outside world, must be part of the explanation of broader issues of East European political and socioeconomic development, in the interwar period and well beyond. Backwardness had political repercussions. The rigidity of the social structure of interwar Hungary partially explains its authoritarian government and the frailty of its political processes. Its backwardness helps account for the zeal with which the postwar communists viciously attacked the existing social structure, sacrificing the peasantry in the process on the altar of modernization.

JOHN KOMLOS
University of Pittsburgh

BEN-CION PINCHUK. *Shtetl Jews under Soviet Rule: Eastern Poland on the Eve of the Holocaust*. (Jewish Society and Culture.) Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell. 1990. Pp. 186. \$39.95.

Two themes merit serious attention in any assessment of the Jewish experience in that part of eastern Poland occupied by the USSR after September 1939: first, what role did local Jews play in the Soviet takeover; and second, what effect did the occupation have on Jewish life there? Ben-Cion Pinchuk addresses himself to both of these issues in this short but highly informative monograph. As is evident from the title of this work, however, Pinchuk's attention is much more focused on the second theme, the overall impact of Soviet occupation on the approximately 1.5 million Jews of the area, than on the part played by Jews in the sovietization of the region.

Using both oral and written testimonies, Pinchuk concludes that Soviet rule not only hastened but also made irrevocable the secularization and modernization of Jewish life in that area of Poland. Pinchuk especially highlights educational and economic policy as the means used by the Soviets to transform local Jewish life. Students of the Soviet experience already familiar with the Bolshevik treatment of the Jewish community in the USSR during the 1920s will recognize the application of similar approaches in eastern Poland in 1940–41. Outlawing independent Jewish political efforts, denigrating religious and ritual practices, and restricting cultural and national life to prescribed forms, Soviet policies not only forced redefinitions of Jewish identity but they also had the effect of undermining the foundations on which the traditional leadership of the community stood. In fact, the organized community found itself so traumatized that it was incapable of offering any form of

concerted response to the Nazi assault launched against it after June 1941.

In developing his other theme, the relationship between the Jewish community and the occupiers, Pinchuk is much less definitive in both his discussions and his conclusions. In fact, his account reflects many of the ambiguities surrounding this highly complex and emotional topic. Pinchuk indicates that while local Jews did not actively assist the Soviets initially, many of them benefited from the new opportunities for personal development and advancement created by the takeover. For the first time, Jews were offered a wide variety of important public sector positions as the occupiers began the process of restructuring society along Soviet lines. The sudden visibility of Jews in such positions led many Poles, especially those nationalists unalterably opposed to the occupation and its ideology, to conclude that the Jews were either active collaborators or communist sympathizers. These sentiments only reinforced long-standing stereotypes identifying Jews as Bolsheviks. That image was further exploited by the Nazis after the invasion as they sought to galvanize local support for their own war against the Jews.

While noting the possibility for individual advancement, Pinchuk also documents the concurrent processes of Jewish victimization at the hands of Joseph Stalin's functionaries. He emphasizes that while Jews no longer had to fear the pogrom, both those who joined the new system and those who had served in leadership positions in the past now faced the knock on the door in the middle of the night as the NKVD applied the policies of the purge to the newly annexed territory. Given his focus on the transformation of Jewish communal life at the hands of the Soviets and the tenuousness of existence confronting those who served the new rulers, it is not surprising to find that Pinchuk characterizes Jewish experiences in these years in negative terms. He concludes that Jewish victimization in eastern Poland clearly preceded the Nazi invasion.

In the coming days, we will be seeing an increase in the number of studies examining the war years in this part of the world. In the wake of the recent political upheavals in the area and the expected opening of archival collections, scholars will now be able to go beyond the personal and impressionistic recollections available to them from survivors. Thus, these new studies will be able to offer a depth far beyond that which Pinchuk could present here. Given the extent of Jewish destruction suffered at both the hands of the Nazis and the Stalinists, the potential number of Jewish informants available to Pinchuk was limited. In the light of that reality, he is to be commended for his effort, especially for having produced such a careful, nuanced, and, most important of all, sensitive study. In an area where polemic and apologetic very often supplant critical scholarship, Pinchuk provides us with both a good model and a first step in what will

prove to be an important and exciting field for contemporary East European historians.

ALEXANDER ORBACH
University of Pittsburgh

THOMAS W. SIMONS, JR. *Eastern Europe in the Postwar World*. New York: St. Martin's. 1991. Pp. ix, 246. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$16.95.

Trained as a historian, Thomas W. Simons, Jr., has served as an American career diplomat in Warsaw, Moscow, and Bucharest. This history of Eastern Europe from the end of World War II to the collapse of communism is based on an undergraduate course he taught in 1990 while Diplomat-in-Residence at Brown University.

The writing of contemporary history is often inspired by pragmatic considerations. This study is no exception. Simons believes that bringing together the western and eastern part of the European continent is an essential condition for world security and stability in the post-Cold War era. The particularities of East European history, the realms of the desirable and the possible in that region, have to be explained and understood by policy makers.

The analysis concentrates on three historical characteristics of the East European peoples that the author considers the most relevant to their modern development: their peasant character, the legacy of dependence on outside powers, and the history of nationalism. These characteristics continue their influence to the present, despite the significant changes that have occurred in the East European countries since the end of World War II.

The elements of change, however, are important and they enable the author to take a basically optimistic view of the future. Although the area has yet to develop a genuine middle class, its social structures have undergone considerable change; in addition to peasants it now has large groups of workers, intellectuals, and bureaucrats. The modernization of social structures is expected to create better conditions for democracy and economic prosperity than in the interwar period. Equally important, Simons suggests, nationalism has lost its pre-communist impetus as the interwar economic, social, and political circumstances have changed. Ideological nationalism has moved east to the former Soviet Union where conditions are similar to those that prevailed in interwar Eastern Europe.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe is attributed to these elements of change, and in particular to the ability of workers and intellectuals to join forces to topple economically and morally bankrupt regimes. But the ultimate factor in the demise of communism was extraneous, namely Mikhail Gorbachev's readiness to take a gamble with reform policies in Eastern Europe. Having lost this gamble, Gorbachev—to his credit—peacefully accepted de-

feat. Simons's version of events may be correct, but it is not necessarily the only plausible one. One may also assume that the gradual perception in Moscow of Eastern Europe as a liability rather than as an asset led to its premeditated jettisoning to save the Soviet Union itself.

The author integrates well the various perspectives from which he tells his story—economic, political, sociological, and cultural. His writing is compact, clear, and jargon free. Observations based on personal experiences are often interwoven into the story; he dedicates an entire chapter to them. While breaking the narrative, this chapter strengthens the work by adding authenticity.

A brief review can hardly do justice to this well-documented yet readable book. Combining scholarship and first-hand experience, Simons has produced a study of interest not only to students and policy makers but also to the educated public at large.

DOV B. LUNGU
University of Toronto

THOMAS C. OWEN. *The Corporation under Russian Law, 1800–1917: A Study in Tsarist Economic Policy*. (Studies of the Harriman Institute.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xviii, 234. \$49.50.

Thomas C. Owen's book is a pathbreaking contribution to the literature on Russian economic history. This lucid analysis of the interaction between government and business from 1800 to 1917 convincingly challenges the influential hypotheses of Alexander Gerschenkron, which stressed the positive and dynamic contribution of the state to the economic development of imperial Russia. Owen finds instead persistent, overwhelming bureaucratic interference in the tsarist economy and shows that Soviet attitudes were a continuation of this tradition.

Owen looks beyond the official proclamations of the finance ministers to the actual implementation of policy. Not only does he fully and clearly analyze the laws governing business organization in this entire period but he also depicts how the government applied the law and the ways in which business was forced to evade its rigid restrictions. Bureaucratic obstacles seriously impeded the economic development of tsarist Russia, and Owen recounts the frustration of the small but vocal corporate elite in the years just before World War I. He attributes the government's skeptical, if not hostile, attitudes toward private enterprise to the cultural distance between Russia and the West and to the primacy of political considerations in economic policy making.

The book successfully revises our understanding of several important facets of late imperial Russian economic history. Contrary to Gerschenkron, who pointed to the autonomy and vitality of the private sector after the revolution in 1905, Owen finds that government policy in the Duma period was more

actively hostile to capitalist industry than at almost any time since the reign of Nicholas I. As he indicates, Indian entrepreneurs under the British Raj had more leeway than did their Russian counterparts in 1913. He also qualifies the traditional view of strong foreign involvement in Russian industrialization. In my opinion he is correct to stress the unfair limitations on foreign (as well as native Jewish and Polish) business, rather than the fact of its presence in Russia. "Xenophobia triumphed over economic rationality" (p. 119), he writes, even under Minister of Finance Sergei Witte, whose industrialization scheme depended on European capital and expertise. So much for the Leninist view that Russia was a colony of the West.

My only quibble with the author is over nuances in his treatment of certain finance ministers. Owen rightly reminds us that Mikhail Reutern does not deserve the label "liberal," as commonly applied, but he perhaps underestimates the positive economic effects of his attachment to laissez-faire theory (at least before 1866). He might also have gone further to explicate Witte's attitude toward private enterprise, which Boris Anan'ich and others contend was more hostile than is normally assumed. These are only minor criticisms, however, which by no means counter the thrust of his characterizations.

This indispensable work provides a new starting point for the further study of tsarist and Soviet economic history. The extensive notes and bibliography alone constitute valuable research aids. And the book is not only relevant for scholars: lest they repeat the errors of their predecessors, Russian government officials should be required to read it immediately.

STEVEN G. MARKS
Clemson University

ELISE KIMERLING WIRTSCHAFTER. *From Serf to Russian Soldier*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. xix, 214. \$32.50.

During the past decade, our understanding of the military in Imperial Russia has advanced considerably with the appearance of several outstanding studies by Dietrich Beyrau, John Bushnell, William Fuller, John Keep, and Alan Wildman. But none of these works, oddly enough, chose to focus on that most important element of Russia's military machine: the peasant soldier during the era of serfdom. Elise Kimerling Wirschafter's compact and well-researched book thus offers a useful complement to this wide-ranging body of scholarship, being the first Western treatment to examine pre-emancipation Russian soldiers as a social group and, in the author's words, "the first attempt to write a social history of the common soldier" (p. xv).

Looking primarily at the period 1820–50 and using a rich collection of archival material, Wirschafter provides a detailed picture of the lower ranks in

Russia's peacetime military society, the norms by which this society was defined and shaped, and its regulation by and relationship to the autocratic state. She not only succeeds in enhancing our understanding of each of these subjects but also overcomes the often difficult task of linking social and institutional history in a manner that should serve as a model for future researchers. For example, in tracing the peasant soldier's career from conscription through training, Wirschafter demonstrates how difficult it proved for the tsarist government to raise sufficient numbers of troops to stock its huge standing army. Because the state provided exemptions from military service to numerous ethnic groups and classes, its recruitment pool was limited mainly to the Great Russian population. Other exemptions by class, the ability of wealthier citizens to purchase substitutes, and the use of recruitment by serf communities as a means of purging undesirable elements from their ranks meant, in practice, that virtually all recruits were drawn from the poorer and weaker segments of the servile population. Hence, despite the state's efforts to achieve an equitable distribution of the conscription burden, "economic inequalities, administrative corruption, and the prevailing popular attitude toward service combined to make [such a distribution] impossible" (p. 20). The conscription system was further hindered by the large number of recruits who were found unfit for service (an amazing 32 percent in an 1847 levy among state peasants), while training and effectiveness after recruitment suffered as a result of high rates of illness and disease, leaving the army "under the continual threat of physiological collapse" (p. 31). Other factors such as extraneous military duties, providing soldiers as labor on state projects, the necessity for soldiers to become economically self-sufficient by supplementing their meager incomes through outside work, and a system of quartering soldiers in small groups, all contributed to poor training among the troops. Still, Wirschafter argues, the Russian army was no more poorly trained for combat than its European counterparts, its defeat in the Crimean War stemming not from a lack of training but from a broader economic and technical backwardness (pp. 72–73).

In chapters on military justice and soldiers' aspirations and expectations, Wirschafter examines some of the harsher realities faced by recruits. She discusses the types of crimes most frequently committed by Russian soldiers, the severity of punishments imposed for crimes or for infractions of discipline, corruption and abuse of power by those in command, and the soldiers' use of their right to complain against a superior. Disobedience, desertion, and economic crimes were the most common acts for which commanders imposed punishments. Although the state sought to ameliorate the severity of corporal punishment during the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I, it would appear that their decrees proved nearly as ineffective in restricting the behavior of noble officers

as did similar legislation aimed at the behavior of noble serf owners. The author notes that soldiers' complaints against an abusive officer revealed "conflicts between popular and official notions of cruelty," although this issue deserves a more adequate treatment than is provided here. When legislation and complaints failed to bring justice, peasant soldiers might attempt to flee the army; outright revolt, however, was surprisingly rare.

Due perhaps to limitations in the sources, this volume falls somewhat short as a work of social history. We learn far more about the contours and broader functions (or dysfunctions) of military society than about the former serf in uniform. In its treatment of the army's economic workings, for example, the book does not go much beyond the description provided some years ago by Bushnell in his "Peasants in Uniform" (*Journal of Social History* 13 [1980], 565–76). Indeed, the similarities between Wirtschafter's serf army and the post-emancipation system are striking, leading one to wonder how much change was actually brought to the military by the reforms of the 1870s. Wirtschafter also tends to rely on elite stereotypes of the former serf in her treatment of the transition "from serf to soldier." Thus, once again we read that peasants knew little about religion: "no more than children" (p. 59). As for recruits losing their peasant habits in the army, "when fully realized, military training produced a professional soldier with a new appearance and speech, new attitudes and expectations, and a new role in society." Yet the extent to which this ideal was realized in practice remains unclear. The government's unwillingness to assign former soldiers to police duties in their native towns or districts and evidence of soldiers fomenting discontent and rebellion among peasants suggest that the ideal was far from reality. In sum, Wirtschafter has produced a fine study of a large subject, answering some important questions while pointing out significant areas requiring further research.

STEPHEN P. FRANK
*University of California,
Riverside*

GERALD D. SURH. *1905 in St. Petersburg: Labor, Society, and Revolution*. (Studies of the Harriman Institute, Columbia University.) Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1989. Pp. xvii, 456. \$45.00.

In this comfortably hefty volume, Gerald D. Surh undertakes to examine the history of a great city in revolution. Although the revolution in question—that of St. Petersburg in 1905—failed, much can be learned from the year's tumultuous events, so ably chronicled and analyzed by the author. This is all the more the case since hardly more than a decade later a second revolution that began in the same urban milieu succeeded almost beyond anyone's wildest imaginings and thus transformed the history of the

country and the world. The author begins his story with ample and highly informative chapters about the history of the city's topography and demography (with a special focus on the workers); the strike movement in the city from its inception during the mid-1890s until 1904; and the prerevolutionary year 1904, with emphasis on the liberal banquet movement and the development of ties among the workers, the liberal intelligentsia, the visionary and/or police agent Father Gapon, and the revolutionary parties, all of which formed the rather complicated groundwork for what followed.

The author's account of the events of 1905 commences with what is, in my opinion, the best existing description of the immediate background to, carrying out, and aftermath of the Bloody Sunday demonstration and massacre. Of special interest are the workers' attitudes and actions and, most notably, their reactions when they realized that their peaceful and seemingly legitimate requests were to be met with violence (Surh's workers are no passive ciphers). Following briskly are chapters about the strikes that swept the city's factories in response to the Bloody Sunday shootings; the growth of a broad and not entirely united opposition movement during the spring and summer that extended to the revolutionary parties and the liberal intelligentsia; the revolutionary events of October; and the final hapless strike in November that exposed the workers' leaders in the famous Petersburg Soviet to arrest and signaled the end, for the time being, of the workers' will to persist, in effect concluding the revolution in the capital.

The author re-creates a web of interrelationships among workers, intelligentsia, factory owners, and the government, the last of which, with its usual ineptness, attempted to limit the workers' movement by allowing factories to take part in elections to the moribund Shidlovskii Commission and Bulygin Duma. He also devotes some attention to the revolutionary parties, most notably the Social Democrats (Mensheviks and Bolsheviks) and, to a lesser degree, the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs). The author's real theme, however, is the rise of workers' consciousness, which, as he makes clear, had its own largely self-generating dynamic, albeit with involvement of revolutionary activists and programs. In fact, for all the sweep of its analysis, this volume is first and foremost a prolonged meditation on the problem of how workers thought about their lives, work, and problems, and how and why they finally responded as they did; this, I am convinced, was Surh's labor of love, whereas the rest comprises a tapestry, constructed with sophistication and skill, into which he weaves his main story. As the volume winds down in defeat for the workers, one is left with the distinct (unstated) impression that it will only be a matter of time until matters reach a new revolutionary turn: the great problems have not been solved and the workers' militancy, based on their newly achieved consciousness, will not likely dissipate for long.

This volume is eloquently written, tightly constructed, interesting, and offers a deeper understanding of the Russian workers' movement at an important crossroads in its formation. The author has judiciously used a range of sources, including numerous Russian archives and workers' memoirs. Effectively presented tables, appendices, bibliography, and index make the material accessible; specialist, student, and general reader alike will find the book rewarding.

Every book, of course, has shortcomings. I am not sure that it makes much sense to speak of "peasant-workers" overcoming their "rural habits of abject subordination" to the landlord by 1905 in Petersburg's suburbs, when vast peasant revolts had swept the south of Russia beginning already in 1901 and continued through 1907. A more substantive problem concerns the author's scanty treatment of the role of the SRs in the Petersburg workers' movement (the Social Democrats come through much more clearly in the text). Many of the factories discussed at length had considerable and even predominant SR contingents; the Moscow district (*za Moskovskoi zastavoi*) was largely an SR preserve; and an SR worker, Aleksei Buzinov, wrote one of the author's favorite memoirs. Like many recent studies of the Russian workers' movement, this volume carves out a place for the SRs, but does not fill it, a marked improvement over older studies that simply assumed the worker-Social Democratic nexus and left it at that. When publishers are no longer willing to accept the not entirely accurate excuse of lack of sources about the SRs, we will move on to a new level of understanding about the very special nature of the Russian workers' movement. All this aside, I admire this book and warmly recommend it.

MICHAEL MELANCON
Auburn University

ROGER PETHYBRIDGE. *One Step Backwards, Two Steps Forward: Soviet Society and Politics in the New Economic Policy*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 453. \$98.00.

This is a fascinating and a frustrating book. It is fascinating because Roger Pethybridge is a knowledgeable historian who has done a great deal of work on the history of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, and therefore he has many interesting bits of information to tell. He discusses well such diverse topics as the 1921–22 famine, film making in Petrograd (although he is mistaken in believing that Petrograd, rather than Moscow, was the film-making capital), railroads, newspapers, and small-scale, local industry. He is also a learned scholar who draws his references from a great many sources (but he inexplicably confuses Isaiah Berlin's fox and hedgehog).

It is a frustrating and difficult book to read because Pethybridge has no central argument. It would be

hard to say what this book is about. An argument is also an organizing concept because it allows the reader to know where the book is going. In reading this volume, it is hard to avoid the feeling of randomness: in 1922 and then again in 1926 we visit three provinces. Why three? Why in 1922 and 1926 rather than 1923 and 1927? Why these provinces rather than others? Why devote a chapter to Petrograd but not to Moscow? Why not devote a chapter to Kiev or Odessa? Pethybridge discusses movie making in Petrograd, but why not theaters in Moscow? We never know what is going to be in the next chapter, indeed, on the next page.

The mosaic ultimately adds up to very little. This is so not because the author is incapable of generalizing; his refusal to see patterns is a conscious decision. He tells us that he had no intention "to detect the essence of NEP, since there was none" (p. 414). Surely NEP had no essence in a Platonic sense and it is true that NEP evolved and that at different times the Bolshevik leaders themselves changed their minds about the nature and the future of this particular social and political system. Nevertheless, the reader who wades through a 450-page book with this subtitle expects to learn more than the assertion that Soviet reality was too complex to be reduced to simple generalizations. Pethybridge is a historian who is so overwhelmed by the complexity of everyday life that he refuses to search for patterns. Unlike Richard Cobb or Theodore Zeldin, however, Pethybridge is not successful in creating a picture of the life of ordinary citizens at ordinary or extraordinary times. Here and there he does attempt to draw just such a picture, but then he abandons it for the discussion of other matters, such as the working of control mechanisms and the working of bureaucracy.

Let us grant to Pethybridge that Soviet Russia in the 1920s was enormously backward, the distances were vast, and the communication system extraordinarily weak. Let us further grant that historians have paid insufficient attention to the multinational character of the Soviet Union and that not only historians but even contemporary observers and leading politicians had only a vague understanding of the complexities of that vast country and troubled society. But surely these are neither surprising nor novel observations.

PETER KENEZ
University of California,
Santa Cruz

GÁBOR TAMÁS RITTERSPORN. *Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications: Social Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR, 1933–1953*. (Social Orders, number 4.) Philadelphia: Harwood Academic. 1991. Pp. xii, 334. \$34.00.

There are two books residing uncomfortably between the covers of Gábor Tamás Rittersporn's work. The

first is a meticulously researched and highly descriptive study of conflicts within the Soviet bureaucracy from 1933 to 1953. Drawing on an extraordinary range of published sources (including *Izvestia TsK KPSS* through the end of 1989), it is perhaps the ultimate thick description of the Stalin era. The second book is a critique of existing interpretations of Stalinism, whether the "hallowing" work of official Soviet historiography or the "damning" literature associated with such authors as Robert Conquest, Leonard Schapiro, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Historians should be neither hagiographers nor moral crusaders, Rittersporn argues. But it is less the moral tone of history à la Conquest that bothers the author than the preference for oral testimony over written sources and for Kremlin politics over politics in the country.

Taking up a vantage point at the intersection of state and society, Rittersporn offers a revisionist explanation of Stalinism. He argues that the political leadership did have real enemies in the 1930s. They were localism, departmentalism, the incompetence of cadres, the chaos of a shapeless bureaucracy, and the anger of a population reeling from the collectivization and industrialization campaigns. Stalin and his coterie understood the depth of feeling in society and sought to direct it against a recalcitrant bureaucracy. But the bureaucracy fought back, protecting itself by deflecting the popular rage onto scapegoats. Scapegoats begat scapegoats, and soon a targeted campaign to discipline the bureaucracy degenerated into the anarchic terror of the late 1930s.

The image presented, then, is a bureaucracy fighting a two-front war, assailed from below by the masses and from above by a Stalinist clique intent on rationalizing political authority. Who won the war? According to Rittersporn, the bureaucracy. Although individual bureaucrats suffered, bureaucrats as a class succeeded in derevolutionizing Soviet society by neutralizing the masses as a political force and fencing off for themselves the perquisites and powers of office. At the end of this struggle, Stalin may have controlled political discourse but he did not control administration.

Rittersporn's account of the "system" of Stalinism is in some respects a useful supplement to the traditional literature, with its focus on leaders and victims. His concern is not the 1930s as human tragedy but as a critical stage in the development of the Soviet political system. But the central fallacy of much recent revisionism on the 1930s is in evidence here: the attempt to explain Stalinism without Stalin. When Stalin does make the occasional appearance in the analysis, he is half-Weberian, half-Maoist, the modern state-builder who wants to use the masses to keep the state in line.

The significance of Rittersporn's study lies in its description of bureaucratic culture and behavior in the Stalin era rather than its bold reinterpretation of state-society relations. One gains a new appreciation

from this work of the confusion that reigned in government and party administration under Stalin. Rittersporn's vision of Stalinism recalls Carolly Erickson's assessment of feudal government: it "is best seen as an overly rational name given to a desperate and continuing compromise with anarchy."

EUGENE HUSKEY
Stetson University

NEAR EAST

R. STEPHEN HUMPHREYS. *Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry*. Rev. ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 401. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$12.95.

A new generation of Islamic historians has come of age. In this analytic review of how Islamic history has been and could be done, R. Stephen Humphreys breaks out of the traditional Orientalist discourse to examine some of the most productive subjects for inquiry, the types of sources that can be used, and more inventive ways of exploiting them. A major theme is that historians of premodern Islam (his discussion tends to stop at the sixteenth century) need to be aware of other fields of history and to be familiar with the theories, methods, and research of the social sciences.

Part 1 is a survey of reference tools and sources: manuscripts, documents, numismatics, metrology, epigraphy, art, architecture, and technology. Judicious, useful, and convenient as this is, it is not a mere bibliographical survey but addresses issues of method and approach such as what kinds of questions these sources can and cannot answer.

Part 2 reviews ten research problems in a series of historiographical essays that outline the present state of research and use methods developed in other fields of history and the social sciences to suggest how the field of Islamic history could be developed and even transformed. Concerning the issue of asking valid and productive questions, Humphreys suggests that the questions addressed by our sources and the questions we would ask of them should be viewed as complimentary approaches.

The first essay, on early Islamic historical tradition and the first Islamic polity, reviews the debate over the authenticity of the sources and addresses two specific cases: the constitution of Medina and the reign of 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān. The second essay on modern historians and the 'Abbāsīd revolution escapes the usual questions and issues framed by the literature and instead constructs an independent analytic framework of hypothetical questions and new lines of inquiry. The third essay, on narrative in Islamic historical writing, deals with how to read the moral judgments in Bayhaqī and Ibn Taghribirdī and argues for the need to understand the conceptual and literary structures in which their information is imbedded, as well as the need to formulate our own questions of such texts and not simply take what they

give us. The fourth essay, on ideology and propaganda, concerns religion and the state in the early Saljūq period in terms of the political theory of the caliphate, Iranian royal tradition, and Turkish traditions. The fifth essay is on Mamlūk fiscal administration, while the sixth, on the 'ulamā, reviews the volume of data in biographical dictionaries and argues that if we treat the 'ulamā as part of a sociocultural system it will help to understand the society in which they lived and helped to shape. The seventh essay, on Islamic law and Islamic society, is a case study of commerce in early Islamic times, down to about 1100, in which Humphreys suggests that theoretical statements in legal sources should be compared with documents and literary sources, although he is perhaps too cautious about what can be achieved. The eighth essay, on urban topography and urban society, includes a case study on architectural patronage in Damascus under the Ayyūbids and Mamlūks in which Humphreys argues that the small ruling group was the hub of construction activities, not because they did so much themselves but because they attracted the immigrants who did. The ninth essay, on non-Muslims in Islamic society, treats the role and status of dhimmis, Jewish communities according to the documents of the Cairo Geniza, and the issue of conversion, while the tenth essay discusses indirect ways to study the condition of rural populations.

Humphreys's work is refreshing in its independence and rich in ideas. Although it makes no pretense at being exhaustive, the outlook presented here could be applied productively to subjects that are not included, such as Sufism. This work is a welcome and useful introduction for graduate students and a salutary review for more advanced scholars in this field.

MICHAEL G. MORONY
University of California,
Los Angeles

JACOB M. LANDAU. *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1990. Pp. 438.

Jacob M. Landau notes at the outset of this outstanding study that the term "Pan-Islam" was coined by Europeans and came into general use in the 1880s to denote writings, speeches, and ideologies focusing "on the importance of overall Muslim unity," emphasizing its political and economic aspects, and proposing "ways and means to achieve this end" (p. 5). It bore parallels to "Pan-Hellenism" and "Pan-Germanism," terms also current in the latter third of the nineteenth century, but was distinct, Landau claims, because it was the only movement "to base itself strictly on religious commonality" (p. 8). Although some Muslims themselves used equivalent terms as early as 1865 (p. 2), "Pan-Islam" was from the outset an outsider's term coined to define and categorize

ideas and movements with family resemblances that, as a development in part out of a resistance to European encroachment, were often seen as a threat to European interests.

Landau's monograph is the first to deal comprehensively with Pan-Islamic ideologies and the means by which these were disseminated from their first appearance in the 1870s through the present, and he breaks new ground both in comprehensiveness and precision of documentation. This is a work of patient scholarship. Landau has imaginatively combed archival sources in London, Paris, Bonn, The Hague, Washington, Jerusalem, Cairo, Istanbul, and Ankara, using newspapers, pamphlets, diplomatic and intelligence reports, and memoirs in Arabic, Turkish, Russian, and other European languages. No fewer than twenty-one appendices offer a concrete sense of the original documents on which he constructs his narrative.

Pan-Islam first crystallised as an "imperial" ideology during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), a development which Landau traces through contemporary pamphlets, newspaper articles, and diplomatic reports. Notwithstanding incomplete and scattered sources on the movement's organization and financing, Landau makes careful inferences on official, if often clandestine, Ottoman support through subsidies, diplomatic missions and religious emissaries, contacts with religious associations and brotherhoods, intelligence activities, and propaganda.

Support for Pan-Islam declined with the rise of the nationalist Young Turk movement after 1908, but it was revived as a propaganda tool during World War I, with Germans spreading Ottoman propaganda in North Africa and elsewhere (pp. 105–06). Pan-Islam under Russian and Soviet rule is discussed in a separate chapter, as is the rise of the Pan-Islam movement in India in the 1920s, especially following the abolition of the caliphate. Finally, Landau traces the rise of Pan-Islamic congresses and conventions from privately sponsored ones in the interwar years to competing state-sponsored efforts, especially since the 1960s, to foster Islamic solidarity.

In any work of this scope, minor lapses are inevitable. Thus, Morocco's rulers did not "consistently reject" diplomatic relations and other official ties with the Ottoman empire (p. 139); such ties existed from the sixteenth through the eighteenth century. Likewise, with an admirable sense of audience and context, Landau points out that "the politics of Pan-Islam" appealed mostly to a "small élite" of religious intellectuals, "largely drawn from Islamist circles," throughout its various manifestations over the past 120 years, and never achieved a "critical mass" (pp. 308–09). This specificity of audience, together with Landau's careful documentation of the movement's manipulation by states past and present, rests uneasily with his assertion that religion "defines" politics for Muslims and that a "commonality of [Muslim] reli-

gious sentiment" as "the main social and cultural fact of life" can be taken for granted (p. 6). On the same page Landau also says that "relations between Islam as ideology and political relations are complex and multi-varied," a generalization that, unlike the previously cited ones, is borne out in this fascinating and definitive monograph.

DALE F. EICKELMAN
Dartmouth College

MARVIN ZONIS. *Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. x, 350. \$29.95

Audaciously defying the constraints stemming from the paucity of accessible primary sources, Marvin Zonis has attempted to render intelligible the crucial role that the last shah of Iran played in his own downfall in the revolution of 1978–79. Few would doubt that had the shah been politically more astute and endowed with greater wisdom, imagination, foresight, and resolve, the fate of his regime as well as of Iran would have been significantly different.

Zonis explains the shah's failure to broaden the basis of his regime or to act decisively to suppress mounting opposition in terms of his character—a character marked by "grandiosity and contempt" as well as "passivity and tenderness." "The bedrock of the man was a character of diffidence . . . overlaying that narcissistically depleted bedrock were the concomitants of his flying fantasies—a pseudomascuine toughness and bravery, a demeanor which communicated stern, formal, imperious arrogance" (p. 27). According to Zonis, the shah relied on four sources of "psychic support" in order to maintain his capacity to act as shah, namely "the admiration of others, twinships with other persons, divine protection and the unflagging support of the United States" (p. 21).

The heuristic framework of Zonis's book seems problematic: the shah is said to have emerged from his childhood as a man of "poorly integrated contradictions"; his behavior and dispositions are considered to be psychologically determined, and yet Zonis argues that he could have acted significantly differently. It is not clear, however, where psychological determinism ends and calculating "rational" power politics begins. Moreover, Zonis's portrayal of the shah virtually decontextualizes him. There is no adequate account of the nonpsychological constraints within which the shah operated. Nor is there sufficient appreciation of the structural and strategic significance of the institution of monarchy within the Iranian body politic. Why is it that the shah and many of his predecessors, despite their differences of character and circumstances, often behaved in a similar fashion, and to what extent was their behavior determined by the very exigencies and the actual or perceived requirements of their role rather than their traits of character?

Many of the premises and postulates of psychohistorians are often at least as difficult to prove as they are to disprove, and the validity claim of their contentions must ultimately rest on detailed empirical evidence. Identifying and describing the shah's character traits may not be difficult but explaining them primarily in terms of his presumably problematic upbringing and attempting to ascertain the ways in which he actually thought and felt require much greater reliable evidence than has so far been unearthed. Zonis relies heavily on the shah's own official, less-than-introspective writings which, although useful, are predominantly justificatory and often deliberately distortive, while a range of other sources remains unexplored. Furthermore, it is only with full cognizance of the setting within which the shah operated that one would be able meaningfully to ascertain and assess the diverse determinants of his behavior, the range of his possibilities, the circumstances in which he could or could not have acted significantly differently, and the extent to which his actions or inaction were affected by the "logic of the situation." Much of what Zonis finds baffling in the shah's behavior, and in particular the marked contrast between the ways in which he presented himself in private, in public, and to different audiences, can perhaps better be explained in terms of Erving Goffman's theories. Moreover, if the psychologically determined character traits of the shah were to be given precedence over other structural and nonstructural factors that contributed to his downfall, how is it that with the same character traits the shah survived thirty-seven years in power? Could such traits have in any way also worked to his benefit, helping him to retain the throne for so long? And if so, does this not significantly affect their explanatory adequacy?

Zonis does not, however, deny the impact of other factors; his wish is not to simplify, for he does indeed discuss socioeconomic developments and foreign policy issues, and in a long chapter (the conclusions of which are not fully borne out by its historical survey) he attempts to investigate the Iranian political culture. He does not, however, give the impression of intending to convey the complexity and diversity of the Iranian political culture when he identifies its main component as "xenophobia," which he describes as "disastrous" and sweepingly traces to the pre-Islamic era. He is not diffident in resurrecting the defunct "genre" of "national character" studies or giving full vent to his quasi-Freudian assumptions. It was not just the shah, we are told, who was dominated by his father, but all Iranians who are in the grip of this condition. Finding the "Iranian character" to be intrinsically xenophobic, Zonis contends that "the struggle many Iranians have with the foreign is only an extension of the Iranian struggle which begins outside the immediate boundaries of the self" (p. 203). The explanatory value and analytical rigor of such a contention may not be as self-evident to the reader as it is to the author.

One of Zonis's main contentions is that the shah's formative years at the le Rosey school in Switzerland were "miserable" (p. 46). If the account attributed to Husain Fardust, the shah's lifelong companion and classmate at le Rosey, is to be believed, this was not so. Further research on this and other issues is needed, and new sources must be unearthed and existing ones subjected to a more probing investigation. A "typical aspect of the shah's writing and speeches," Zonis contends, was his "predilection for denigrating Islam, and Shi'ism in particular." The two examples he cites in support of this claim, namely, the shah's equation of Ali with St. Paul and his description of Abbas as a "saint," intended to enlighten the foreign reader, do not amount to or entail a denigration of Shi'ism. Zonis's view in this regard would also appear to contradict his own account of the shah's claim to enjoy the backing of the divine or to have "mystical dreams" or a "vision of Ali," which Zonis views not as a "public relations gimmick but a deeply held belief." How, or on what basis, can Zonis meaningfully ascertain this or know with certainty that the shah genuinely believed that he enjoyed divine protection, or that this belief "evaporated" when he learned that he had cancer?

Despite its theoretical and historiographical shortcomings, and although it furnishes little significant new information about the life and times of the shah, Zonis's book does nevertheless advance our appreciation of the complexities and problems involved in trying to make sense of the tangled odyssey of the last shah of Iran. It stimulates new questions, and many of his assertions, even if implausible, are provocative. Some of his conclusions and judgments may command qualified assent, but the way in which he has arrived at them may not prove to be convincing or persuasive.

FAKHREDDIN AZIMI
University of Connecticut,
Storrs

AFRICA

M. W. DALY. *Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934-1956*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 471. \$79.50.

This study completes the history of the colonial Sudan begun in M. W. Daly's *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1934* (1986). The two decades on which the current volume focuses opened with Great Britain's acceptance of the renewal of an Egyptian role, which had been all but nonexistent since the political disorders of 1924, in the administration of Sudan. This decision stemmed more from mutual Anglo-Egyptian concern over the international situation in 1936 than it did from either partner's views about the need to honor the terms of the 1899 agreement that had created the unwieldy condominium structure. Following World War II, in

which the Sudanese people, the government of Sudan, and the Sudan Defense Force all acquitted themselves well, the fatal flaws in the condominium arrangement revealed themselves in a political free-for-all involving the British, the Egyptians, and competing strands of Sudanese sectarianism and secular nationalism in one of the most labyrinthine struggles for independence anywhere in the colonized world.

These same twenty years saw the Sudanese economy soar from the depths of depression in the 1930s to the unprecedented prosperity of the postwar era. Even so, the recurrent political turmoil made economic development planning difficult, and frequently negated those plans that were put forward. Similarly, in the provision of social services and the execution of public works, much less was accomplished than might have been, although the deplorable conditions prevailing in these areas tended to mask inadequacies by endowing any improvement with the appearance of a quantum leap forward.

This book is the most detailed historical record of these crucial years of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. Daly skillfully manipulates a sometimes daunting mass of information, much of it based on primary materials drawn from an impressive array of archives and manuscript collections in Sudan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to produce a narrative that is both comprehensible and, because it examines a broad range of topics in some depth, comprehensive.

This thoroughness is the book's strong suit. Like most previous students of this period, Daly emphasizes the rise of Sudanese nationalism, the competition of the co-domini for Sudanese hearts and minds, and the tortured diplomatic path to independence.

His intricate account of these events offers neither startling revelations nor dramatic new interpretations, but does have the merit of presenting them with a clarity essential for making sense, especially to nonspecialists, of a complex, and occasionally confounding, subject. More importantly, Daly intersperses his account of this political process with solid, fact-filled chapters on contemporaneous economic and social developments that touch on such matters as government finances, development policy, transport and communications, agricultural and animal production, foreign trade, education, and health.

Between 1934 and 1956, no less than at earlier points in the Condominium's history, a few powerful individuals sometimes enjoyed the ability to exert tremendous influence over the course of events in Sudan. Daly's personality sketches of British officials in London, Cairo, Khartoum, and the provinces are almost invariably more detailed than those of Egyptian or Sudanese figures, reflecting, at least to some extent, the nature of the available documentation. But this observation is intended neither to suggest that Egyptians and Sudanese are absent from this history nor that in it British opinion and perspective are taken at face value. Rather, it underscores the

dominance of the British over both their Egyptian partners and their Sudanese charges.

Imperial Sudan and its companion volume, *Empire on the Nile*, constitute the definitive general history of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. It is to be hoped that Sudanese and Western scholars will flesh out the framework that Daly has so painstakingly built by delving further into the sources he has used, and by exploiting new ones, particularly in Arabic, to produce microstudies of the political, social, economic, and cultural history of the still largely neglected Condominium era.

KENNETH J. PERKINS
University of South Carolina

HOWARD TEMPERLEY. *White Dreams, Black Africa: The Antislavery Expedition to the River Niger 1841–1842*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991. Pp. xv, 204. \$35.00.

Howard Temperley provides a familiar account of the British antislavery expedition into the Nigerian hinterland, known more popularly as the Niger expedition of 1841. Although much about this episode has already appeared in books and articles, Temperley's work is probably the only comprehensive and systematic book-length study yet to appear. It is rich in detail and insight and critically examines British antislavery ideology, economic motivation, and attitudes toward Africa. The book is largely based on archival and published primary sources, including the published accounts of the expedition by some of the participants, and, most importantly, the private papers of Thomas Fowell Buxton, who came up with the idea of the Niger expedition.

In characteristic Victorian arrogance, the expedition was advertised as a "civilizing" mission, which meant the introduction of European civilization through "legitimate" commerce and Christianity. Central to the antislavery crusade was the establishment of plantation agriculture (a model farm) on the confluence of the Niger and Benue rivers (Lokoja), which the planners and missionaries believed would benefit the Africans. Thus "civilization" meant "persuading Africans themselves, instead of preying on one another, to develop the agricultural and commercial resources with which Africa was so amply endowed. It would also mean introducing missionaries, schoolmasters, agriculturists and merchants; above all it required Christianity" (p. 4). Temperley describes at length this ambitious project from the perspectives of the Victorians, and hence the title of the first chapter of the book: "So Holy a Cause."

The book has eight chapters and an epilogue. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the politics and the controversies surrounding the expedition. Of particular interest is the campaign for the mobilization of the British public and the selection of ships and personnel for the expedition. Four ships and over 300

members took part. The personnel included Europeans and Africans, the latter, including the Reverend Samuel Adjeyi Crowther, who served as the missionary agent of the Church Missionary Society, being drawn from Sierra Leone. Chapters 4 through 8 deal with the African encounter and the aftermath, with emphasis on the failure of the expedition, dramatized by the abandonment of the model farm and the high death toll of members of the expedition. Although most of the people died of malaria, Temperley notes that insobriety and sheer carelessness also contributed to the misfortune. Overall, fifty-three members of the expedition died, most of them Europeans (pp. 113–16).

Disappointment and frustration over the disaster reverberated through the British public, the press, and the Colonial Office (p. 162). The "unmitigated catastrophe" was particularly "painful" to Buxton (pp. 137–88), as indeed it was also to Dr. M'William, a member of the expedition. "I could not but grieve that . . . an enterprise which had originated in the most noble of human motives, with all appliances that human ingenuity and human foresight could devise . . . was now, alas, doomed to so melancholy a termination" (p. 132).

Temperley points out that, despite its humanitarian trappings, the expedition had imperialistic underpinnings. Thus, in addition to the supposed economic advantages that would accrue to Britain (p. 22), the expedition envisioned the cultural colonization of the Niger basin and beyond, objectives that were ultimately realized from the late 1850s. Temperley also draws attention to the ironies and paradoxes of the antislavery campaign. First, "A great antislavery expedition goes to Africa and establishes—a slave plantation!" Second, up to the 1840s, the Niger basin was the "White man's grave"; before the end of the century, "Life on the Niger, it began to appear, was becoming more hazardous for Africans than for Europeans" because of British punitive military bombardments (p. 175).

Overall, this is an absorbing book whose value is not diminished by the fact that much of its content is largely familiar. Although Temperley's field is not African history per se, he has demonstrated masterly acquaintance with Africanist historiography and scholarship.

FELIX K. EKECHI
Kent State University

KAREN TRANBERG HANSEN. *Distant Companions: Servants and Employers in Zambia, 1900–1985*. (Anthropology of Contemporary Ideas.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1990. Pp. xv, 321. Cloth \$42.50, paper \$14.95.

Perhaps the most problematic arena for colonialism was the master-servant relationship. How could the social distance that sustained colonial power and

privilege exist amid the intimate daily contact that indigenous domestic servants had with their expatriate employers? As its title suggests, Karen Tranberg Hansen's book addresses this problem, detailing the "paradox of conspicuous presence and social invisibility" (p. 7) that characterized domestic service in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia.

Most of the book examines the origins and structure of domestic service in the colonial era. From the start, African males dominated the field, and Hansen rightly centers her analysis on this fact. The preference for male over female servants, she argues, had its main motive in the effort to prevent European men from coercing sexual favors from African women and thereby subverting the terms of difference that regulated the colonial system. Market forces were secondary: even a severe labor shortage in the 1940s did not break the ban against black women in white households. Care of children was the one realm of domestic service open to women, but only to white women and women of mixed race.

Hansen, however, exaggerates the singularity of this situation. She sets Northern Rhodesia/Zambia in contrast to its southern neighbors, suggesting that the Europeans in Zambia were more resistant to female servants because the stereotype of the oversexed black woman held exceptional sway over them. This seems unlikely: European racial attitudes differed little from one side of the Zambezi River to the other. Nor does Hansen's assertion that "black peril" fears were more prevalent in the south provide a satisfactory explanation for whatever shift from male to female domestic labor occurred there: some of Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe's most notorious "black peril" cases took place many decades before any perceptible entry of African women into domestic service. Insofar as the prohibition against the employment of black females in the white household eroded more slowly in Zambia than it did in South Africa and Zimbabwe, this probably had more to do with differing degrees of industrialization and urbanization than it did with differing dynamics of sexual anxiety. Still, Hansen does demonstrate that the racial regulation of sexuality played an important role in structuring the gender requirements of domestic service.

The final third of the book examines domestic service in independent Zambia. Whereas the analysis of the colonial era relies almost entirely on European sources (newspapers, settler memoirs, official records, and so on), offering only a few snatches of African voices, this section draws on an extensive survey that the author conducted in the early 1980s among servants and employers in Lusaka. This survey provides a good deal of useful information, although the conclusions derived from it—that servants' status, wages, and working conditions have deteriorated and their position of inequality has shifted from racial to class categories—are not particularly surprising. The final chapter sets the Zambian case in relation to the American pattern of domestic service, an odd juxta-

position that does little to illuminate either. Uneven though it is, Hansen's book deserves attention for its detailed examination of an unduly neglected sector of employment in the colonial and postcolonial world.

DANE KENNEDY
University of Nebraska,
Lincoln

LUISE WHITE. *The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1990. Pp. xiii, 285. Cloth \$34.95, paper \$14.95.

The culmination of a project spanning more than a decade, Luise White's pioneering book brings new sophistication to our understanding of the political economy of colonial Kenya and, by extension, other parts of the continent. Having conducted oral interviews with seventy women who were prostitutes in colonial Nairobi, White's objective is to explore the profession from the perspective of women who participated in it. Rejecting the language of moralizers who treat female prostitutes as depraved victims, she approaches prostitution as a labor process, a means of capital accumulation consciously chosen by women to reproduce their families and themselves.

Although prostitution was a largely urban phenomenon, White contends that it cannot be studied in isolation from the rural economy or from family and class formation in both the urban and rural areas. In the early twentieth century, loyal daughters from pastoral families prostituted themselves to replenish cattle herds decimated by rinderpest, bovine pleuropneumonia, and other diseases. They reestablished the basis of their fathers' wealth and provided bridewealth cattle for their brothers, thus helping to perpetuate their rural patrilineages. Similarly, in the 1930s, when world coffee prices plummeted, the daughters of Tanganyikan coffee growers sold their sexual services to Nairobi workers, paying off their fathers' debts and saving their families' farms. These women did not invest their profits in the urban areas. Nor did they use them to break free of patriarchal control. Rather, they behaved as subordinate daughters, helping "to reconstruct the rights and responsibilities of [rural] family life and fathers' control over it" (p. 35). Once they had achieved their objectives in Nairobi, these women returned to their rural homes.

Other prostitutes, in contrast, developed a distinctly urban orientation. They acted as independent accumulators, earning money which they themselves controlled. Laying down roots in the urban areas, they invested in Nairobi real estate, becoming wealthy landlords and respected members of the Muslim community. Violating the norms of patriarchal society, they established themselves as heads of households and founders of kin groups, passing their property on to their own children or to young women whom they had designated as their heirs, rather than to their rural-based patrilineages. These women

formed the core of the emerging African petty bourgeoisie in the urban areas.

White distinguishes three forms of prostitution in colonial Nairobi: *watembezi* or streetwalking, in which women solicited men from the streets; *malaya*, in which women waited for men to seek them out inside their own homes; *wazi-wazi*, in which women sat outside their rooms and called out to men. Prostitutes chose a particular form not according to a hierarchy of respectability but according to its suitability to their economic needs. According to White, the ultimate purpose of capital accumulation, whether reinvestment in rural production or investment in urban real estate, largely determined the form of prostitution that was practiced. Women intent on reinvestment in rural production were interested in quick profits, with as little capital outlay and urban-based investment as possible. Those with roots in the urban areas were willing to accumulate more slowly and provided a range of nonsexual domestic services to their male clientele.

Although Nairobi prostitutes operated largely outside state control, they were an integral part of the colonial political economy. Even as they accumulated the capital necessary for their own and their families' survival, prostitutes served the needs of colonial capital and the state. As was the case in so many African colonies, the colonial administration in Kenya found it cheaper and politically less threatening to rely on a migratory male labor force rather than permitting the growth of a large, permanent African population in the urban areas. *Malaya* prostitutes, in particular, reproduced the urban labor force on the cheap, providing not only sexual services but also all the comforts of home: food, warm bath water, tea, and conversation. They "mimicked marriage" (p. 16), but saved the colonizers the cost of family housing and wages.

White's book, recipient of the prestigious Herskovits award of the African Studies Association, takes a unique approach to a largely unexplored aspect of African history. It enhances our understanding of African social history, political economy, and gender studies. It is a book that deserves to be widely read.

ELIZABETH SCHMIDT
Loyola College
Baltimore, Maryland

JONATHAN NEIL GERSTNER. *The Thousand Generation Covenant: Dutch Reformed Covenant Theology and Group Identity in Colonial South Africa, 1652-1814*. (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, number 44.) New York: E. J. Brill. 1991. Pp. xi, 280. \$69.23.

Religion has played a pervasive role in generating South Africa's various political cultures. For many African leaders, particularly those in the African National Congress after its formation in 1912, Christianity was interpreted as a call to build wider human

community. For Afrikaners, however, religion contributed to a political culture of racial discrimination: the politics of ethnic group identity leading to apartheid and eventually a national security state. Jonathan Neil Gerstner's study in historical theology finds the origins of this Afrikaner identity in the Dutch Reformed concept of covenantal holiness as it came to be interpreted on the Cape frontier during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The rise of Afrikaner nationalism is fairly well understood. Reacting against the intrusion of the British and the subsequent freeing of the slaves, a minority of Dutch farmers moved north in the Great Trek of the 1830s. Thereafter their history blended with mythology. The most potent myth was the crowning mercy of Blood River: the Boer victory against the Zulu in 1838 that was later to be interpreted as sealing the covenantal relationship between God and His chosen people in southern Africa. Later, in the early twentieth century, the trauma of defeat in the Boer War and the threat of anglicization generated a cultural resurgence that included the Afrikaners language movement. This was followed by organizational developments. Although the Dutch Reformed church remained central to *volk* identity, in 1913 the Afrikaner National Party was formed. As Afrikaners urbanized in the 1920s and 1930s, economic and cultural institutions were added to alleviate their poverty, while the *Broederbond* (Brotherhood) came to function as a coordinating secret society at the heart of a movement that bridged its growing class divisions by championing race privilege. Having consolidated its support, the Afrikaner National Party captured the state in 1948, ushering in apartheid with the enthusiastic support of the Dutch Reformed church.

Gerstner does not deny the complex range of influences that produced Afrikaner nationalism. Rather, he argues that there has been a missing element, a contributing factor that predated the advent of Britain and the Great Trek. Reformed church theology, his research discloses, had already nurtured a strong sense of exclusive community. Europe's theological debates penetrated to the Cape, generating tensions between those who held to external holiness (resulting from Christian upbringing and social context) as the essential covenantal relationship with God, and those who relied on internal holiness (the assurance of redemption through being born of Christian parents). Believers who emphasized external holiness were somewhat more inclined to evangelize, to baptize "the heathen." Others, particularly frontier farmers at some distance from the Dutch East India Company's administration in Cape Town, were firmly opposed to baptizing slaves or any person of color. Taking the narrow view of covenant, namely internal holiness, their attitudes degenerated into the all-too-convenient belief that grace was a birthright.

Gerstner devotes a good deal of time to the Reformed church controversies of the Netherlands,

showing how these debates of the continuing Reformation reached and disturbed the Cape. Using primary sources, he goes on to trace in convincing detail the resultant hesitations and changing practices of the company as well as the hardening attitudes of the frontier Dutch.

Working his way through archives in the Netherlands and South Africa, Gerstner has filled a gap in our understanding of the ideological roots of Afrikaner nationalism. By the eighteenth century, settlers on the Cape frontier had already come to see themselves and their descendants as inheriting God's covenant with Israel.

PETER WALSHE
University of Notre Dame

BILL NASSON. *Abraham Esau's War: A Black South African War in the Cape, 1899–1902*. (African Studies Series, number 68.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xxvi, 245. \$54.50.

It is by now well accepted that the South African (or Boer) War was as much an internal struggle as a colonial contest. Bill Nasson acknowledges this and places his study of the blacks of the Cape Province squarely in that context. Although his book considers important military aspects of the conflict in some detail, it is much more a social history examining the "vigorously assertive and polarising kind of localism" (p. 190) that the war brought to the Cape.

Readers familiar with Peter Warwick's *Black People and the South African War* (1983) will find a great deal of complementary material here, as Nasson readily acknowledges. But they will also find much new as well, especially in the symbolic focus on the figure of Abraham Esau, a colored leader of resistance to Boer insurgency in Calvinia who was martyred for his cause. Using this important yet local figure as an example, Nasson constructs an intriguing picture of the "mythologizing which has become part of the inherited fibre of lives in the post-war Cape" (p. 139).

In developing his thesis, Nasson is keen to establish how his study fits into a variety of historiographic contexts. He clearly sets the work within the parameters of South African historical study, and less clearly on the margins of structural theories of historical process. But his major efforts put the work in the framework of the increasing corpus of African war and society studies, particularly those that treat a variety of twentieth-century conflicts and their impact on African societies.

Unfortunately, these are exceedingly self-conscious efforts that often seem out of place, appendages on a narrative thread or local analysis that often distract rather than inform the reader. In his conclusion, for example, Nasson briefly equates the experiences of Cape blacks in the South African War to that of "the peoples' war" defined by Basil Davidson in his study *The People's Cause: A History of Guerrillas in Africa*

(1981). Apart from that single paragraph, however, there is little development of the idea, no analytical thread established to give weight to the argument.

Perhaps more disappointing is Nasson's failure to see how his thoughtful study does fit within the context of the history of African peoples and their experiences of modern war. He acknowledges some recent studies of Africans during world wars I and II, but then he argues that for the people of the Cape "it is more the contrasts and discontinuities" between those experiences and the South Africa War "which need to be stressed" (p. 3).

Certainly, the direct experiences of war that Cape blacks felt from 1899 to 1902 did not match their more removed involvement in the world wars. What escapes his notice, however, is that the direct experience of modern war came to other Africans, in German East Africa and surrounding territories for example, during those later wars. The impact of war on those Africans paralleled in many ways—including the martyrdom and mythmaking Nasson places at the forefront of his analysis—the experiences of Esau and his contemporaries.

Much understanding can be gained from this book about the effects of the South African War on people who have sometimes been supposed unaffected by its grand design. But it falls short of placing their experience within the much broader context of the history of African peoples.

MELVIN E. PAGE
East Tennessee State University

ASIA

ANN WALTNER. *Getting an Heir: Adoption and the Construction of Kinship in Late Imperial China*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 226. \$26.00.

This book by Ann Waltner is the first in any Western language to deal in detail with the theory and practice of adoption of children in the Ming and Qing periods (1368–1911). As such, it is both rewarding and frustrating: rewarding because it is compact, clearly written, and full of new information, gathered through creative juxtaposition of a wide variety of sources; frustrating because it never seems quite sure what its argument is.

The central focus of the book is the paradox that adoption outside the agnatic lineage was prohibited by law, but that the prohibition was flouted widely and with virtual impunity (p. 48). The rest of the book is devoted to an attempt to explain the paradox, first using evidence from historical documents and then drawing on material from vernacular fiction of the era.

Waltner presents several explanations. First, there was an unresolved controversy over the roles of heredity and nurture in the formation of adult persons—moral beings who would display the filial behaviors of supporting parents through material help

in old age and through ancestral sacrifices after they died. So it was unclear to legal and ethical thinkers whether an adopted son would actually be able to satisfy living and/or dead parents in lieu of a real son.

Second, there was an unresolved tension in Chinese ideas about kinship. The most "traditional," or perhaps most "elite," formulations insisted that agnation was the basis of all kinship and that continuation of the agnatic descent line would therefore only be accomplished through an actual agnate—if not a son, then a nephew or cousin once-removed. But less-strict notions regarded kinship as in effect cognatic, recognizing the closeness and importance of bonds toward matrilineal and affinal as well as agnatic relatives. According to this formulation, continuation of the line through a cognatic adoption or an uxori-local marriage might in certain circumstances be preferable to, or at least a legitimate alternative to, adoption of a collateral agnate.

The alert reader will notice that the first of these explanations sheds doubt (if not quite equally) on both agnatic and nonagnatic adoption, and thus cannot be used to explain the prohibition of just one type of adoption. A convincing argument must therefore rest on the exploration of the second explanation, and indeed most of the book is devoted to this task, although without any explicit acknowledgment that this is what the author is up to. For example, the problem of nonagnatic succession is posed as much by uxori-local marriage as by a cognatic adoption. And, indeed, Waltner realizes this, devoting ten pages to that sort of marriage. But uxori-local marriage is not adoption, which suggests that the problem is posed wrongly in the first place. The central question is agnation versus bilaterality as organizing principles in Chinese kinship, but the author appears to have thought of this too late to make it the explicit focus of her argument.

All of this is a pity, since Waltner's book possesses so many local virtues. What it needed was a strong-minded editor, to guide the author in organizing her thoughts. Her careful scholarship will assure that the book becomes the standard work on the topic, but her lack of a focused argument will prevent it from becoming a model for writing Chinese family history.

STEVEN HARRELL

University of Washington

VIVIEN W. NG. *Madness in Late Imperial China: From Illness to Deviance*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 204. \$25.00.

This book by Vivien W. Ng examines closely the history of madness in Qing legislation. Ng argues that laws requiring registration and confinement of the insane moved this affliction from the realm of medical disorder to that of criminal stigma. Attentive to social background, she traces this criminalization to the Qing's relentless enforcement of orthodoxy, es-

pecially as challenges to its power arose from the mid-eighteenth century on. A regime that made law, politics, and morality inseparable saw manic violence as a threat to social order.

The first law (1731) jailed registered madmen who could not be confined securely at home. But few were registered. Laws of 1762 and after, confining insane murderers for life, were more effective. Imprisonment was not punishment but segregation. Problems arose when amnesties released sane but not insane murderers, and when families invoked the ancient custom of releasing prisoners to serve aged parents or maintain ancestral offerings. The book perceptively analyzes officials' efforts to balance the classical principles of concessions toward families and lenience toward the insane against the threat of relapsed maniacs to public safety.

This is an intelligent and compassionate study in legal history, revealing connections between law and social attitudes (for example, gender bias). But much of the introductory discussion, such as the details of the Manchu invasion largely abridged from Frederick Wakeman's *The Fall of Imperial China* (1975), is irrelevant. The background chapter on madness in Chinese medicine combines generalities from mediocre histories of medicine with a cursory, poorly integrated survey of material on mental disorders in the Qianlong Encyclopedia (*Gujin tushu jicheng*) without examining its sources.

The claim that madness was criminalized suggests that the social classification of a single entity changed. But the European concepts of madness and insanity had no close counterpart in China. The book uses a number of unrelated Chinese medical disorders as equivalents. It also obscures the difference between what its sources indicate were two largely distinct conceptions, the manic behavioral syndrome usually called *kuang* and the potentially criminal state usually called *feng* in legal writing (see esp. p. 79, where the latter is translated "insanity" without comment on the shift).

The book tends to be uncritical about prior scholarship, careless in transcriptions and references, and offhand in translating both legal and medical documents. It overlooks important sources, such as L. A. Schneider's study of the topos of *kuang* in political thought, *A Madman of Ch'u: The Chinese Myth of Loyalty and Dissent* (1980), M. L. Chiu's "Mind, Body, and Illness in a Chinese Medical Tradition" (Ph.D. diss., 1986), the best study of mental illness as a classical concept, and Hans Ågren and others on the clinical unimportance of diagnostic labels, which goes far to explain why medical reasoning was not useful in judicial determinations.

One example of the perils of secondhand scholarship will suffice. Ng discusses Zhu Zhenheng's (1281–1358) use of emotional catharsis as therapy for "certain kinds of madness" (pp. 40–43). An example that "illustrates the use of Zhu's method" describes chronic depression, not manic *kuang*. The author

argues that the compilers of the Qianlong Encyclopedia put this case under "emotions" rather than "madness" because "the interpretation of emotion-related illnesses was a problematic one for Qing experts." The case record is not by Zhu, but comes from Wu Kun's *I fang kao* (1586, rpt. 1990, vol. 3, p. 224). By not examining this source the author misses two essential points. First, Wu was not using Zhu's method. Zhu merely elaborates, for three related disorders, general principles set out in *pian* 5 of the Basic Questions of the Inner Canon, of which Ng is unaware. Wu explicitly cited the broader Inner Canon doctrine. Second, Wu himself put this case record under "emotions," not "madness." This was not because he considered its interpretation problematic; its lack of connection with mania was clear.

In sum, one wonders why the referees and the publisher did not insist that this useful, innovative, and in many respects well-informed dissertation be transformed into a consistently excellent book.

N. SIVIN

University of Pennsylvania

BEATRICE S. BARTLETT. *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xxi, 417. \$45.00.

Eighteenth-century China has long been noted for the surface political calm that the ruling Manchus imposed on it. Administrative efficiency characterized the very top of the hierarchy of government, where the emperor and his quasi-secret privy council (the so-called "Grand Council") ran China attentively and expertly, heavily shielded from the play of faction, the prevailing types of petty corruption, or formal legal constraints. Some hundreds of thousands of eighteenth-century Grand Council documents have been preserved in Taipei and Beijing. A budding research industry, based on those documents, has emerged in the last ten years or so, and has already resulted in major English-language publications on such varied topics as fiscal relationalization, the Xinjiang exile system, the sorcery panic of 1768, and the foundation of the Imperial Manuscript Library. Beatrice S. Bartlett's study is a fundamental book that focuses on the organization and working methods of the Grand Council, and how it and the Qing monarchs cooperated to produce what she regards as high-quality decisions on a great many of the major and minor issues that appeared on the national decision-making agenda.

This is an excellent book in several respects. Above all, it will be a basic reference and guide to the understanding of sources for anyone investigating the history of the high Qing. The author has spent much effort decoding the whole document system, with a view to discovering the different information channels; who used them and how; and how decisions

were arrived at, based on what kinds of research, review, and discussion beforehand. The author also shows, contrary to earlier belief, that the Grand Council as such came together for the first time only in 1736, at the time of the accession of the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736–99). She gives much attention to the staffing of the Council and the origins and nature of its extraordinary informal and extra-statutory power. There can be no doubt that, at least in terms of meeting the daily requirements of ruling a place like China, the Manchus (and their Chinese colleagues) achieved an impressive level of technical proficiency.

Scholars of the Qing dynasty in its heyday have been giving us well-researched but very different impressions of its rationality as a political system. Bartlett is at pains to demonstrate that ruler and Council gave eighteenth-century China an administration that was knowledgeable in its decision making and highly efficient in handling its business. Far from exercising a personal despotism, the Qianlong emperor was given to laconic endorsements of the wise and well-founded recommendations of his Grand Council. What the author has found in the Grand Council documents shows that François Quesnay (1694–1774) was not wrong in admiring China's as a model system of government.

But is that the whole story? It takes a special effort to remember that it was the astounding personal corruption of Qianlong's favorite Grand Councilor, Hoshen, that occasioned a major parting of the ways between the Qing regime and China's Confucian intelligentsia, as Benjamin Elman has recently shown in his *Classicism, Politics, and Kinship* (1990). It also has to be remembered that Qianlong squandered vast sums on his imperial tours, on many of his so-called "Ten Great Campaigns," and on his grossly mismanaged suppression of the White Lotus rebellion of the 1790s. Somehow it appears that some of the great crises developing in eighteenth-century China are only dimly reflected in the Grand Council's archival treasure-trove. To argue, as Bartlett tends to do, that China was well run because its central executive organs managed its paperwork with skill is a little like saying that if the White House staff is expert and efficient, then crises of maladministration cannot occur in the United States.

JOHN DARDESS

University of Kansas

CHANG JUI-TE. *Chung-kuo chin-tai t'ieh-lu shih-yeh kuan-li te yen-chiu: Cheng-chih ts'eng-mien te fen-hsi, 1876–1937* [Railroads in Modern China: Political Aspects of Railroad Administration, 1876–1937]. (Monograph Series, number 63.) Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. 1991. Pp. 299, xiii. Cloth \$13.00, paper \$11.00.

More than the mere acquisition of a new mode of transportation, railway building had come to symbolize to the Chinese people from the late Qing era on the nation's struggle for modernity. The present work, a carefully researched monograph by Chang Jui-Te (Zhang Ruide), a member of the research staff of the Academia Sinica (Taipei), expresses this belief clearly: "The experiences of modern China's railway administration fully reflect the tortuous, complex process and the difficulties that confronted the modernization of China" (p. 223). Using a large array of primary sources plus a wide range of scholarly studies, Chang has reconstructed the political history of Chinese railway development from its beginnings in the late Qing era to the outbreak of the War of Resistance in 1937. The study focuses on the state railways, which were the major lines.

The contents are divided into two parts. The two chapters of part 1, "The Political Environment," examine the role of foreign interests in Chinese railway-building from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century and the effects of extreme political instability on railway administration through the warlord era into the Nanjing decade. While the story of foreign financial and administrative dominance over the early stages of the Chinese railway enterprise is not new, it is nevertheless an essential factor in our understanding of the history of railways in China, and it is useful to have the overall summary given in chapter 1. Chapter 2 presents in much detail the impact of the civil wars in the Republican period: how the normal economic functions and growth of the railways were set back under the incessant demands of the contending armies. The full significance of this sorry episode, however, could have been enhanced had the quantitative data been projected against the general context of the economic and fiscal state of China as a whole.

The three chapters of part 2, "Internal Administration," discuss the organizational structure and personnel administration of the state railways. Here various problems facing China's railways emerged even as genuine efforts were being made by modern-minded leaders to overcome them. Chang provides revealing details on aspects of railway politics that were a part of China's search for a new political and social form. The formation and the role of the Communications Clique within the Nationalist Party, for example, is a telling instance of the link between the vicissitudes of government power and economic development, and the history of Jiaotong University and other schools points to the importance of technological competence in the age of modern transformation.

As a case study in the nation-building process and in the types of problems—both traditional and new—that could beset a society in transition, this book offers much well-documented information and is a useful addition to the literature in the field. The four appendices, which tabulate the career patterns of

Chinese railway officials and administrators at various levels in 1906–37, throw interesting light on the sociopolitical contours of early twentieth-century China and can serve as the basis for further study.

E-TU ZEN SUN

EMERITA

Pennsylvania State University

ZHANG YONGJIN. *China in the International System, 1918–20: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery*. New York: St. Martin's. 1991. Pp. xi, 262. \$59.95.

Zhang Yongjin argues in this book that the years immediately following World War I saw the entry of China as a virtually full-fledged member into the international society of nations centered on Europe. Moreover, China achieved that membership not so much by conforming to the standards of civilization defined by the West as by an assertive revolt against the treaty system that the West had earlier imposed. China was able to do this by taking advantage both of the breakup of what Zhang calls the "united front" of the great powers against China during and after World War I, and of the disarray into which Russia fell after the Soviet revolution. The popular mood of Wilsonianism that emerged after the war, with its stress on international equality and self-determination, also helped.

The thesis may not sound particularly new, but what is original about Zhang's book is that he examines the story from China's point of view, rather than from that of the Western powers in China, and uses Chinese archives that have recently become at least partly available as well as those from Japan and the West. What emerges is a picture of a nation far more activist than we have heretofore been given. Nor did the activism come simply in response to the development of a mass nationalism. While Zhang does not slight the importance of the May Fourth Movement, many of the chief players in his drama are representatives of the Peking government who, for all the weakness of their regime, were remarkably effective in pressing China's claims to treaty revision and diplomatic equality, and who were ready to seize on all the advantages they found in the postwar world. Zhang examines in some detail, for instance, the debate in the government over whether China should sign the Versailles treaty, with its objectionable clauses on the Shandong question, as well as the process whereby China—sometimes over the objections of the victor nations—achieved diplomatic equality with Germany, Austria, and Russia.

In all this, Zhang's work helps to underscore the thesis, set forth by Mary Wright (*China in Revolution* [1968]), that China's revolutionary beginnings must be sought in the decade prior to the overthrow of the Qing. The nationalism that Wright saw building at all levels in the years from 1900 to 1913 began to reach its fruition during and after World War I; the Wash-

ington Conference, rather than marking the beginning of a new era in which the Western powers invited China to join the rest of the world, became instead an effort made by those powers to catch up to the changes that had already taken place in China and were threatening foreign control.

Although marred by a somewhat wooden style and the occasional grammatical Sinicism, as well as the use of too many brief quotations which interrupt the flow of the author's words, this is an interesting and useful book.

NICHOLAS CLIFFORD
Middlebury College

CHRISTIAN HENRIOT. *Shanghai 1927–1937: Elites locales et modernisation dans la Chine nationaliste*. (Matériaux pour l'étude de l'Asie orientale moderne et contemporaine.) Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. 1991. Pp. 342. 190 fr.

This well-organized and carefully nuanced study provides a wealth of detail about Shanghai local government during the decade-long rule of the Nationalist regime in Nanjing. In addition to information on institutions, activities, personnel, and personal networks in the municipal power structure, Christian Henriot draws useful comparisons with Western cities and municipal administrations. At the same time, he raises large questions about modernization and state-societal relations.

Henriot's major themes are many. First, he argues that municipal institutions originating in local elite initiatives at the end of the Qing dynasty had already been vitiated by militarists and were re-created as appendages of the central state. Second, he suggests that political power in the city nonetheless did not simply flow from the center, but was defined through a complex, three-sided interplay between the militant Shanghai Nationalist Party, the local municipal government, and a small upper segment of Shanghai bourgeois society—all bolstering their local positions with personal connections within the state center at Nanjing. Third, Henriot contends that there was no place for genuine representation of the Shanghai population. Fourth, he finds that, despite unfavorable circumstances and inefficiencies, the Shanghai government made progress toward modernization goals and could deal effectively with emergencies. Fifth, Henriot makes some tentative observations about modernization. He suggests that modernizing projects created new political "playing fields" (p. 249) as well as infrastructures and were accompanied by new, intrusive ambitions to remake society. More ambiguously, these projects emerged within a milieu of Confucian paternalism and traditional relationships between government and social elites. Henriot realizes that he is pushing against limits of the traditional-modern dichotomy, but he does not step outside this framework.

This book addresses a historical debate on the nature of the Nanjing government, taking issue with interpretations of it either as a tool of the big bourgeoisie or as an autonomous authoritarian state pursuing its own power interests. Henriot suggests more careful attention to levels of government, local conditions, and differing sources of power, and his sophisticated analysis is a fine addition to the middle ground of this controversy. His analysis is also relevant to a different debate about state-building and societal activism in twentieth-century China; it provides much information to support the view that the state reasserted control over society after the temporary fragmentation of the warlord period.

Henriot's structural analysis of local government is inherently state-centered, however, and does not encompass the sociopolitical dynamics of an urban public sphere that are the focus of David Strand's *Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s* (1989). He gives, for instance, good biographical material on city employees and on the personal ties linking bureau heads, but the big-bourgeoisie power players are not much described, and the social organizations and elites acting within Shanghai public arenas are even less delineated. As Henriot says in his conclusion, social histories of Shanghai are still to be written. It should then be possible to assess state-societal relations in Shanghai more fully. This thoughtful exposition of governmental structure and activities will make that task much easier.

MARY BACKUS RANKIN
Washington, D.C.

ARIF DIRLIK. *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. x, 326. \$39.95.

Arif Dirlik's book comes as little surprise to many China scholars. For one thing, five of the six substantive chapters are revisions of previously published articles. For another, many of the central arguments were anticipated in Dirlik's *The Origins of Chinese Communism* (1989). Here, as in his earlier work, Dirlik presents anarchism as an important and influential "road not taken" in the Chinese Revolution. He admits that "anarchism from a political perspective was in the long run irrelevant" (p. 40), yet Dirlik argues that anarchist ideas and adherents were nonetheless major contributors to revolutionary discourse in China. The anarchists (despite their internal differences) called consistently for cultural revolution and the abolition of divisions between mental and manual labor—features commonly associated with Chinese Marxism. And of course many of the leaders of China's Communist revolution had been anarchists before they became Marxists.

Despite the sense of déjà vu that those familiar with Dirlik's previous work may experience in reading this book, it is still a significant piece of scholarship. More

than other studies of the subject (Robert Scalapino and George Yu's *The Chinese Anarchist Movement* [1961]; Martin Bernal's *Chinese Socialism to 1907* [1976]; Peter Zarrow's *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture* [1990]), Dirlik's provides a nuanced portrait of disparate ideas and activities within the Chinese anarchist movement: the Paris group, which attacked Confucianism and the institution of the Chinese family in favor of Western practices; the Tokyo group, which prized China's cultural traditions; the Guangzhou group, which organized labor unions; the Guomindang group, which inaugurated a short-lived labor university. Dirlik's informative presentation is enriched by recently (re)published Chinese sources, most notably a two-volume compendium of materials on anarchist thought put out by Beijing University Press in 1984.

The most distinctive aspect of Dirlik's work is neither its comprehensiveness nor its sources, however; it is rather its sympathetic approach to the subject matter. Although Dirlik does not discount the weaknesses of Chinese anarchism, whether as revolutionary program or as postrevolutionary inspiration, he finds in it "a critical perspective on the course the Chinese revolution was to take" (p. 301) and "a vantage point from which to rethink the most fundamental problems of politics—not just Chinese or socialist, but all politics" (p. 304). To Dirlik, the hallmark of anarchist thinking is its rigorous critique of hegemony—a perspective that permits anarchists to "imagine social possibilities beyond the ideological horizons established by political ideology" (pp. 302–03). Dirlik does not offer much guidance about just what those "social possibilities" might be. Nevertheless, his engaged outlook imparts a refreshing immediacy not often found in intellectual histories of the Chinese Revolution.

The book is not without shortcomings, of course. Its frequent reiteration of central arguments, minor points, and even word-for-word quotations becomes tedious. Yet for all this attention to some themes, there is a surprising lack of attention to others. While Dirlik repeatedly stresses anarchism's concern for social—rather than political—revolution, he does not provide us with enough social history to assess the actual importance of this concern. What exactly was the relationship between anarchism and the contemporary Chinese women's movement? Can anarchist ideas be credited with changes in the nature of the Chinese family? These questions are not addressed, whereas overtly political issues—the relationship between anarchism and the Nationalist and Communist parties, for example—are dealt with at length.

Despite its somewhat idiosyncratic presentation, this is an important book not only for students of the Chinese Revolution but also for students of revolution in general. In this day when Communist regimes from Budapest to Bucharest have collapsed, a discussion of alternatives to the Marxist-Leninist state is

especially pressing. Dirlik's is a sensitive and sophisticated contribution to that discussion.

ELIZABETH J. PERRY
University of California,
Berkeley

SAKAMOTO TARŌ. *The Six National Histories of Japan*. Translated by JOHN S. BROWNLEE. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press or University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo. 1991. Pp. xxx, 232. \$65.00.

The late Sakamoto Tarō (1901–87) displayed a legendary mastery of documentary materials. Thus, it is appropriate that John S. Brownlee should translate Sakamoto's classic study of the most important source materials for the study of ancient Japan, the *Six National Histories* (*rikkokushi*).

The *rikkokushi* are Japan's first document-based histories, compiled under Imperial edict by ministers of state and scholars between the seventh and tenth centuries. Titles and dates of publication are: 1) *Nihon Shoki*, or *Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan), 720; 2) *Shoku Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan Continued), 797; 3) *Nihon Kōki* (Later Chronicles of Japan), 840; 4) *Shoku Nihon Kōki* (Later Chronicles of Japan Continued), 869; 5) *Nihon Montoku Tennō Jitsuroku* (Veritable Records of Emperor Montoku of Japan), 879; 6) *Nihon Sandai Jitsuroku* (Veritable Records of Three Reigns of Japan), 901.

Ancient Japan borrowed the Chinese imperial state system to buttress the sacred kingship of the Imperial clan. An official history in the Chinese style was one way to provide an intellectual foundation to Imperial rule. Emperor Temmu ordered Hieda Are to memorize extant records to help prepare a "correct" history. (Completed in 712, this *Kojiki* [Record of Ancient Matters] traced Japanese history from the Age of the Gods to the late seventh century.) But the project was fraught with problems.

Therefore, in 681 Temmu gathered twelve princes and nobles and ordered them to compile a "chronicle of the Emperors and matters of high antiquity." The resulting *Nihon Shoki* differed from *Kojiki*: it was compiled by an appointed team of government scholars and written in Chinese, the official language of administration, signifying the sophistication of the Japanese state. It further provided a strict chronology and commentaries on differing textual versions of events. Later official histories were similarly compiled. But *Nihon Shoki* also differed from the later five histories: since it covers an indistinct prehistory, its early dates are inaccurate, and many emperors are clearly inventions.

Later histories deal with comparatively short and better-documented periods. They are considered authoritative because they "were compiled by a historians' office working under imperial order and using the regular documentary materials of the government" (p. 21). Although they are "official" histories

focusing on the activities of the Emperor, they pay close attention to both central and local administration and are of inestimable value because there are a limited number of other materials for the study of the Nara and early Heian periods.

This translation of Tarō's 1970 work includes the author's original introduction, in which he discusses the classification, format, and authenticity of the *rikkokushi*. Following are chapters devoted to each chronicle. There is an afterword addressing national history compilation after the *rikkokushi*, and a brief conclusion. Brownlee adds a useful introduction, discussing the National Histories in historical perspective and briefly recounting Sakamoto's career.

Although there has been considerable scholarship on the *rikkokushi* since 1970, Sakamoto's work remains definitive. Thus, this volume, well translated by Brownlee, is a most welcome addition to the meager body of English language materials on Japanese historiography.

G. CAMERON HURST, III
University of Kansas

JAMES EDWARD KETELAAR. *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 285. \$35.00.

The title of James Edward Ketelaar's fine book expresses its thesis: that Buddhism, which had enjoyed a privileged position in the religious life of Japan from the sixth century, came under attack in the nineteenth century as a heretical "ancient evil," was forcibly separated from Shinto and bitterly persecuted in the Meiji restoration era, then forced to redefine itself in succeeding decades as a martyr of persecution and a receptacle of Japanese and Asian religious and cultural values. The book is a revealing exploration of the strategies adopted by political leaders and, especially, the Buddhist clergy in the renegotiation of relations between Buddhism, Shinto, and the state in the Meiji period in a process of redefinition into what Ketelaar calls "modern Buddhism."

The opening chapters deal with the construction of Buddhism by its opponents as a heretical "ancient evil" deserving of persecution. After describing the mounting tide of anti-Buddhist rhetoric in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Ketelaar looks at some examples of the ways in which anti-Buddhist rhetoric was embodied in public policy and local action: the actual separation and destruction during the Tokugawa period and early years of the Meiji period in Mito domain, which set the pattern; in Satsuma, which saw the most thoroughgoing separation and destruction with some 4,000 temples closed and thousands of monks and nuns defrocked; and in Mikawa, where efforts by local Honganji priests and farmers to defend Buddhism ended in the martyr-

dom of their leaders. Ketelaar sees the subsequent redefinition of these priests from "heretics" to "martyrs" as symptomatic of the larger transformation of Buddhism as a whole.

Shocked by the intensity of the attack and the violence of the early Meiji separation movement, Buddhist leaders at first cooperated with the state in formulating a new Shinto-centered national teaching—known as the "unity of doctrine and rule"—sustaining the state and the imperial institution. As Buddhist leaders came to realize, however, that the attack on Buddhism did not presage its total eradication, they withdrew their support from the state's ideological agenda and turned instead to demands for freedom of religion and the "separation of religion and rule." The revitalized Buddhism that emerged sought to demonstrate that, far from being useless, backward, alien, other-wordly, and unscientific, it was in fact socially conscious, modern, cosmopolitan, and very Japanese: a fitting repository of the true essence of the emerging national spirit.

In chapter 4, "The Reconvening of Babel," Ketelaar argues persuasively that Japanese Buddhists used the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago to challenge the universality of Christianity and to elevate Buddhism from nihilistic, antisocial idol worship into a world religion worthy of respect on its own terms. This international redefinition of Buddhism was accompanied on the domestic front by efforts to rewrite the history of Buddhism so as to relocate modern Japanese Buddhism at the center of a rich and enduring tradition of "Eastern Buddhism" that would transcend sectarian differences and "dissipate the vision of Buddhism as heresy." Ironically, in seeking to make itself independent of the state by redefining itself as a bastion of Japanese (and thus Asian) culture, Meiji Buddhism laid itself open to renewed cooptation by increasingly nationalist, imperialist, and pan-Asian impulses within the Japanese state.

Ketelaar's book goes far beyond anything in English on the experience of Buddhism in the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji Japan. It is one of the most thoughtful books I have read in English or in Japanese on church-state relations in Japanese history. Its great strength lies in its clear focus on, and deep exploration of, the reactions of Buddhist sectarian leaders to the threat to Buddhism that they felt so sharply.

In spotlighting the changing Buddhist position, however, other areas are inevitably left in shadow. Ketelaar does not explore the issue of whether there was anything resembling a coherent religious policy, or even a shared set of concerns about religion, on the part of the Meiji political elite. What did Ōkubo Tōshimichi, Kido Kōin, Itō Hirobumi, Iwakura Tomomi, and other Restoration leaders think about the role of religion or the place of Buddhism and Shinto in the regime they were building? Were they complicit in the attacks on Buddhism? Did they work

actively to avert or modulate the storm? Buddhist leaders are quoted at length throughout the book. Political leaders are curiously silent. Readers may wonder how the outcome looked from the point of view of the political leadership.

Another muted point of view is that of ordinary Buddhist laypeople. Was there a mass national revolution against Buddhism in early Meiji? The privileges enjoyed by Buddhist clergy and temples under the Tokugawa were resented in many villages. There was popular scorn for clerical corruption. How deep did this go? While it is easy to make the case that anti-Buddhist polemicists regarded Buddhism as "heretical," it is more difficult to establish a case for massive rejection of Buddhism by ordinary Japanese people. Buddhist leaders and politicians may quickly have realized that as severe as it seemed at first, the anti-Buddhist movement did not have deep roots and that the charge of "heresy" would not be sustained at the popular level.

Then there is the question of Christianity in Meiji Japan. It can be argued that Buddhist leaders, Shinto advocates, and politicians were all concerned with the renewed "threat" of Christian missionary activity in Japan and that the various moves by Buddhist leaders and the state in renegotiating the place of Buddhism in Japanese society were influenced by the shadow of Christianity active within Japan. Apart from his discussion of the Chicago World Parliament of Religions, there is little consideration of the lurking presence of Christianity behind almost all Meiji period religious policies and dialogues.

Fuller consideration of the motivations of Meiji political leaders, the feelings of ordinary Japanese people, and the question of Christian intrusion may have modulated Ketelaar's argument, even if they would not have changed his conclusions. Having said that, this book remains a rich and revealing study of religion and the state in the emergence of modern Japan.

MARTIN COLLCUTT
Princeton University

MARK W. MCLEOD. *The Vietnamese Response to French Intervention, 1862–1874*. New York: Praeger. 1991. Pp. xvii, 171. \$39.95.

The period of the French conquest is one of the least-known episodes in the history of modern Vietnam. Although a number of books have recently been published on French Indochina, the conquest itself has attracted relatively little scholarly attention. Moreover, most available works on the period have been written from the French point of view and on the basis of French historical sources. The Vietnamese perspective on the conquest has been essentially ignored.

It is that gap that Mark W. McLeod hopes to fill with this book. Basing his research on Vietnamese

official documents such as court records and imperial correspondence as well as on existing French sources, the author traces the efforts of the Vietnamese court at Hue to counter the French advance into Indochina from the founding of the Nguyen Dynasty in 1802 to the establishment of the first protectorate in 1874. It is McLeod's contention that, contrary to accepted wisdom, Vietnamese policy was essentially consistent throughout the first six decades of the century. Although the founder of the dynasty, Emperor Gia Long, had accepted French assistance in coming to power against rivals in the North, he and his successors did their best to minimize the French presence in Vietnam, allowing only limited commercial contacts while attempting to prohibit Christian missionary activities and long-term diplomatic relations.

This policy of "closed country" changed as a result of the French attack on the southern provinces in 1858. When it became clear that Vietnamese armed forces were incapable of effectively resisting French attacks near Saigon, Emperor Tu Duc adopted a strategy of appeasement, authorizing his representative Phan Thanh Gian to sign a humiliating peace treaty that ceded several provinces in the Mekong Delta to the French.

Despite the doubts of the French, who suspected that the court surreptitiously supported guerrilla resistance activities in the new French colony of Cochin China, Tu Duc stayed with the policy of appeasement throughout the next decade in the hope of avoiding further losses and perhaps even regaining the lost provinces in the south. But Tu Duc's tactics were fruitless, as he would discover in the early 1870s when French Governor Marie-Jules Dupré dispatched the young military adventurer Francis Garnier to Hanoi. Allegedly his purpose was to mediate a dispute between Vietnamese authorities and a French gun merchant over shipping rights in the Red River, but Dupré's real objective was to extend French influence throughout the region. Although Garnier was killed in a skirmish, Tu Duc was once again forced to cede. Within a decade, Vietnamese independence was in tatters.

McLeod's study has its limitations. He provides few insights into Emperor Tu Duc's character, or on the lengthy debate between the war party and advocates of peace at court. Much of his evidence is circumstantial. Lacking definitive source materials, he is forced to concede that Tu Duc might have been secretly conspiring with resistance elements while publicly declaring his peaceful intentions toward the French in Cochin China. But by introducing previously untapped Vietnamese materials into the debate, he has performed a useful service and contributed to our understanding of a murky period in the history of modern Vietnam.

WILLIAM J. DUIKER
Pennsylvania State University

ANAND A. YANG: *The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran District, 1793–1920*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 271. \$37.50.

Anand A. Yang's meticulously researched monograph analyzes in rich detail the mechanisms of social control deployed by the colonial state and the dominant landholding classes in one fascinating district in Bihar, eastern India. In ten chapters organized in four parts, the author explores the meaning and context of social control, the British system of control through local collaborating classes and institutions, the structures and strategies of estate management, and the forms of peasant acquiescence and resistance.

The author is especially skillful in portraying the superimposition of the Sonapur *meet*, an annual gathering of British officials, on the time and space of the Sonapur *mela*, an annual fair and festival long predating colonial rule. This enabled the British to demonstrate their superior authority as well as to forge links with indigenous systems of local control. The *zamindar* or landlord of the large Hathwa estate became the most important local controller in Saran during the nineteenth century.

The appropriateness of Yang's label "the limited Raj" to describe the mechanisms of local control is open to question. It is true that British officials at the district level were few and far between and that the colonial masters relied on networks of rural intermediaries. Yet, as the author himself acknowledges, the Raj "could afford to spread its power thinly across rural areas" because it "enjoyed a monopoly of coercive powers" (p. 111).

His evidence also reveals the extent to which Hathwa was a creature of the British. The Hathwa raj became a powerful estate early in the nineteenth century "under the supportive hand of the British" (p. 119) after a rebellion by the scion, Fateh Sahi, of a rival line of the *zamindar* family of Huseypur had been suppressed by the colonial power. Yang's narrative tells us about the "crucial British role" (p. 143) in putting down—with a small show of force by mounted troops—a peasant rising in 1844, led by Fateh Sahi's grandson against the Hathwa landlord. Again in 1879, during large-scale desertions by recalcitrant peasants, the colonial state chose to ignore the qualms expressed by an Irish district magistrate sympathetic to the plight of the oppressed cultivators and instead stood solidly behind their local collaborator. Colonial power may have been exercised indirectly in the Indian countryside through local intermediaries but, as moments of crisis revealed, it was far from "limited." This might explain why desertion and migration, not outright rebellion, were the more frequently expressed peasant options in contesting the impositions of the state and the landlords.

Yang tends to make a little too much of the adjective "limited" in the title of his book and also overemphasizes the continuities in agrarian social structure

and modes of resistance during colonial rule. Despite these questionable claims, he has produced an excellent book containing a wealth of local research that illuminates the rich tapestry of relations of domination and resistance connecting the state with different levels of rural society.

SUGATA BOSE
Tufts University

GYAN PRAKASH. *Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labor Servitude in Colonial India*. (Cambridge South Asian Studies, number 44.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1990. Pp. xvi, 250. \$44.50.

We have had important Marxian histories of India—the seminal work of Irfan Habib in the 1960s comes immediately to mind—and the Subaltern Collective of historians mounted a major critique of Indian historiography in explicitly Marxian and Gramscian terms in the 1980s. Gyan Prakash has now added a forceful and often compelling Marxian/postmodern critique of the colonial discourse of freedom. The idea of freedom as an inalienable natural right, Prakash would say, was imposed on India as a post-Enlightenment reaction of the British to the unfreedom of slavery and debt bondage they found in that "benighted land."

The author's object, explicit from the outset, is to "interrogate, challenge, and historicize" (p. 9) the discourse of freedom, a pursuit he fulfills relentlessly on virtually every page of this book. The argument is found in a brief preface, in the detailed introduction, in summaries to each of the five chapters, and in a concluding recapitulation. A brief appendix, and the glossary, bibliography, and index together with appropriate maps and tables, make this work completely accessible and reflect the care and thoroughness with which the author addresses his task. The book is obviously based in the rich and revealing archival resources available to the historian of India, at a level of intimacy seldom achieved in the literature, and reinforced by a limited but impressive appeal to the oral traditions of the *kamia* agricultural laborers whom Prakash sees as the central victims of the colonial discourse. The setting is Gaya District in south central Bihar in Gangetic North India. Drawing on Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, Prakash attempts to show that concepts of freedom and the objectification of land and money in the nineteenth-century bourgeois political economy of India had an effect precisely opposite to what the British sought to achieve. Rather than limiting slavery and oppression, they in fact produced and sanctioned debt-bonded labor.

Prakash's formulations are intriguing, but they are conveyed with an almost unreal sense of the total, undivided, and overwhelming dominance of the colonial discourse. We are left, in effect, with a zero-sum game, in which everything else, all other discourses—

cultural, social, and political, Indian or British—are submerged by the ideological and political force of the dominant discourse to determine not only legal abstractions but also social relations and material conditions on the ground. I am suggesting that Prakash unnecessarily overstates the case.

I am also suggesting that his privileging of the colonial discourse as the central fixture in Indian historical experience leads Prakash to misrepresent the condition of *kamia* agricultural laborers in pre-colonial and colonial India from what it really was, to what we think, by our theoretical formulations, it might have been. I refer here to the author's formulation that "from [their] oral traditions and written texts, the *kamias* in the pre-colonial period emerge not as unfree laborers of landlords but as dependent servants of dominant lords" (p. 81), or, that "no longer dependent subjects of superordinate patrons, [the *kamias*] were enveloped in a system of restrictions and prohibitions of rights, and ordered and controlled as unfree laborers whose relations with their employers were founded on money alone" (p. 141). "While the power of things [may have] wrenched the *kamias* free of their moorings in the pre-modern hierarchy," the implication that this older network of dependency was somehow less unfree because it was not governed by the "dazzling power of money" (p. 141) simply is not convincing. Ultimately it was the *malik*, whether as petty raja in pre-colonial India or landlord in colonial India, who oppressed the *kamia*. whatever the force of land and money in defining social relations. When Marx wrote in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in 1844 that "free conscious activity is the species characteristic of man," and that man "relates to himself as to a universal and therefore free being," he was not making distinctions between the pre-colonial and colonial human experience.

Finally, in a book of this intellectual power, written by an Indian historian of India from Bihar, one wonders about the self-consciously awkward descriptions of Bihar itself in the language of the colonial discourse as "a land of feudal backwardness" (p. 225), as "agriculturally relatively backward and stagnant, socially mired in caste oppressions and class exploitation, its political structure eroded by corruption and wracked by landlord and state terror, Bihar today evokes revulsion in other parts of India . . . Even in the colonial period, Bihar was looked upon as a relative backwater. Because of this history of marginality, the region appears to be a place overlooked by the forces of modernity and change, lending credibility to the discourse of freedom's suggestion that the *kamia's* bondage is also a backward legacy of Bihar's pre-modern past" (p. 2). These characterizations provide little explanatory meaning to the social relations and historical experiences they are meant to identify. Generations of social and political reformers in Bihar,

of all cultural and ideological persuasions, might also take exception.

WALTER HAUSER
University of Virginia

RICHARD SISSON and LEO E. ROSE. *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1990. Pp. xiii, 338. \$13.95.

The violent birth of Bangladesh in 1971 split Pakistan, with profound effects for South Asia. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose deal extensively, but almost exclusively, with one aspect of this birth: the decision-making process among the political elites of Pakistan, India, and emergent Bangladesh, as well as the United States, Soviet Union, and China. Social and economic forces, and the people of South Asia generally, stand outside the book's concern.

Since 1947, Pakistan's central political problem has been binding its diverse regions together. East Bengal—with over half of Pakistan's population and its most dissimilar culture, located 1,000 miles from the rest of Pakistan—struggled unsuccessfully for its proportionate share of Pakistan's resources until the 1970 National Assembly elections, won for the first time by an exclusively Eastern-based party. Sisson and Rose carefully reconstruct the subsequent maneuvering for power by military and political elites. They conclude that the outcome was a "theater of the absurd" (p. 176) where virtually all these elites misperceived the situation, leading to results no one wanted, against everyone's interest. They present virtually all political leaders as cynical: "Each of the [West and East Pakistani politicians] felt that he had been manipulated and deprived of the opportunity to control or manipulate the others" (p. 122), and the "line used by the Indian authorities . . . had little basis in fact, which the ruling group in New Delhi clearly understood" (p. 199).

Concentrating on generals and elite politicians, Sisson and Rose rarely mention the people of South Asia. A prime example of the authors' approach concerns the magnitude of the death toll in Bangladesh. Estimates range widely and remain a heated subject: many prominent Bangladeshis and foreign commentators assert that some three million died, while many Pakistanis and others place the figure far lower. Sisson and Rose mention these deaths solely in terms of Indian politicians' efforts at "influencing the public and key political leaders and groups in the West, particularly the United States" (p. 217) by exaggerating the numbers. The authors mention figures only in one endnote about their interview with two Indian officials in which one official indicated 300,000 as the "actual number of deaths," only to be prompted by "a disapproving glance from his colleague" to raise the number to "300,000 to 500,000" (p. 306). Sisson and Rose imply their acceptance of

the lower figure but use this merely to demonstrate deception by "decision makers" rather than to assess the dimensions of the tragedy.

This book synthesizes an impressive number of interviews (from 1978–79) and other sources into a clearly presented analysis of elite political maneuvering in South Asia. Due to the violent deaths of many of the leaders of Bangladesh during the period covered (or in the many coups following independence), Bangladeshis are outnumbered among the sources by Pakistani and Indian generals, officials, and politicians. Frustratingly (but understandably), readers will find that most interviewees are anonymous. Concerning U.S. foreign policy, the authors reject as "simplistic" and "loaded with basic factual errors" assertions that Richard Nixon "tilted" toward Pakistan (p. 317). To follow the narrative, some knowledge of South Asia is helpful (the authors synecdochically use "Islamabad" and "Rawalpindi" interchangeably for the government of Pakistan). In sum, this book stands as a contribution to our understanding of one element in the birth of Bangladesh: elite decision making in South Asia.

MICHAEL H. FISHER
Oberlin College
Western Washington University

ALASTAIR DAVIDSON. *The Invisible State: The Formation of the Australian State 1788–1901*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xviii, 329. \$65.00.

Alistair Davidson's book about Australia's historical underpinnings is a rich tapestry of scholarship and agile decoding. From start to finish, it is also uncompromising in argument, promising to raise controversy.

During its colonial period, Australia was quick in acquiring liberal democratic attributes such as an expanded franchise, the secret ballot, and responsible government. Davidson maintains that by the time of Federation in 1901, however, a sort of dialectic had been at work for many decades. A society had evolved in which the private realm had become subjected to the remorseless encroachments of official authority. Such intrusions were embellished beyond the stage where law and order considerations governed a convict and early settlement society. When "chaotic" social conditions largely dissipated, "order" became much more than ordinary policing. Decisions and regulations invested authority with widespread *in loco parentis* opportunities, extending from social conduct to economic management to public health to education, and with an emphasis on uniformity and conformity. By design or otherwise, authority figures such as doctors and teachers became "agents for hegemony" (p. 205). Australians were in a sense free, but in another sense they had succumbed to an egalitarianism intolerant of difference.

In Davidson's view, the new economic circum-

stances associated with capitalist institutions had to be guided and contained, and federation was the mechanism of choice. Needing to deal with conflict between workers and employers, the new national authority rapidly adopted a system of binding compulsory arbitration that would channel and mitigate contending impulses.

Davidson does not belittle the radicalism of the 1890s, but his analytical framework causes him no surprise that radicalism lost its momentum. He avers that various elites of the time reconciled themselves to, even welcomed, institutionalized but popularly removed management.

Davidson argues that this was in keeping with and indeed inextricably linked to another Australian phenomenon. By the nineteenth century, interpretation of public rules had passed to the courts. By the time a new country had emerged, legalism had triumphed. The Australian judicial system and its style, capping a network of multitiered bureaucracies and multiplying boards and agencies, faced little resistance. By conditioning, by its own consent, the public had forfeited its sovereignty. It had become subjugated. Legislation for change, for meaningful popular reform, was hostage to a positivist-minded legal profession reluctant to look beyond formal law.

Davidson's contention that by the turn of the century Australian political culture had incubated a society of possessive individualists in some ways coincides with conventional assessments: a nonidealistic and parochial people; skeptical of leaders yet looking to government to deliver services and benefits; high on mateship but low on aspirational and risk-taking norms.

His supporting intellectual rationale aside, Davidson's deep regret that Australia fell well short of realizing a "sovereign" and "collective" assertion of popular feelings and ideals conveys a romanticized conception of how political beings should, or can, flourish in a modern and complex national setting. Australians may in 1901 have emerged more conformist, more rule-bound, and in selective ways more acquiescent than people in other polities at their historical turning points. Note Davidson's reference to confident public release and historically grounded "sovereign" status induced in England in 1689, in America in 1776, and in France in 1789.

While this is an engaging book that points in the right general direction, it is a little too deterministic, and its thesis overclaims. Moreover, notwithstanding supposedly inhibiting formal and cultural checks and the absence of a spirited popular mythology, Australia developed a reasonably responsive political system that has accommodated a community of public interests, generally to its own satisfaction, and at times to the praise and selective emulation of outsiders.

HENRY S. ALBINSKI
Pennsylvania State University

UNITED STATES

GLEND A RILEY. *Divorce: An American Tradition*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 262. \$24.95.

In this book, Glenda Riley combines legal and social history to present a welcome overview of an institution that has generated controversy in American life ever since the first documented case in Puritan Massachusetts in 1639. Despite the obvious problems associated with the examination of a multitude of colonial and state laws over a long period, Riley's book is well researched and very readable. Her work disputes myths surrounding the history of divorce and repeatedly sounds the thesis that the "conflict between anti-divorce and pro-divorce factions has prevented the development of effective, beneficial divorce laws, procedures, and policies" (p. viii).

When the Massachusetts General Court sanctioned divorce in cases involving adultery, it did so out of a concern for social harmony and family life. The Massachusetts colonial experience set the pattern for the divorce debate and also revealed the persistent financial and custodial problems associated with marriage dissolution.

Riley sees a link between divorce attitudes and national identity. After the revolution the number of divorces increased. The American ideal of individualism, along with the spirit of the Declaration of Independence and the tendency of Americans to leave unpleasant experiences behind them, made divorce more acceptable. Gradually, states moved procedures from the legislature to the courts, where judges demonstrated flexibility in extending grounds to include drunkenness, desertion, and abuse. New states tended to be more lenient in issuing divorce decrees and in granting financial support and child custody to women.

By the mid-nineteenth century, divorce had become a firmly established institution even though fanatic opponents such as journalist Horace Greeley condemned the practice and railed against the so-called divorce mills in western states. Several celebrated divorce cases accelerated the debate and diverted attention from the social aspects of alimony and custody.

In time, many states added physical and mental cruelty as grounds for divorce. Opponents reacted with a campaign to establish a uniform national divorce law to counter what they saw as the evils of migratory divorce and divorce mills. By 1910 the movement had run its course, derailed by its narrow scope and the failure to include women in the crusade. After World War I the divorce rate continued to climb, and the debate revealed philosophical differences between those who viewed marriage as a life-long commitment and those who saw it as a dissolvable contract.

Riley's analysis demonstrates the necessity of seeing divorce as more than a legal institution. For more

than 300 years the legal system has searched for remedies based on fault, but the most persistent difficulties in divorce have involved the emotions stirred by child custody battles and the reality of financial survival. Riley aptly points out that the opponents of divorce have insisted on seeing a moral issue and often have failed to consider the effects of industrialization, urbanization, and changing gender roles on the rising divorce rate. Riley concludes that the American family will survive despite the spread of divorce. She leaves her readers with suggestions for future divorce policy, calling for a more sensitive and humane approach in the practice of this centuries-old social and legal institution.

CAROL E. JENSON
University of Wisconsin,
La Crosse

MARK E. KANN. *On the Man Question: Gender and Civic Virtue in America*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 364. \$39.95

At the outset it needs to be said that Mark E. Kann's book is not so much a work of history as it is of historically informed political theory. There is much in it of interest to historians, however—especially, perhaps, to intellectual historians concerned with the ideological foundations of the American nation. It needs to be said, too, that the book's title may mislead: although Kann does indeed write ultimately about America, he locates the origins of the American liberal tradition deep in Restoration England. By the time he has concluded a lengthy consideration of Locke, he has consumed considerably more than half the book's length. Clearly "Gender and Civic Virtue in America" takes shape in a transatlantic context. Why not indicate that in the title?

Kann's work challenges earlier readings of American liberalism by scholars such as Louis Hartz, Gordon Wood, John Patrick Diggins, and J. G. A. Pocock, all of whom too uncritically equated Lockean liberalism with unfettered individualism. Such readings fostered a stark and unnecessary bifurcation of American political ideology into two distinct traditions: on the one hand, Lockean liberalism, legitimating "individual rights, economic rationality, and instrumental politics," and on the other hand, classical republicanism, incorporating "civic virtue, commonwealth, and the active political life" (p. 9). The dichotomy is false, Kann asserts, because Locke never championed unbridled individualism. Rather, he viewed selfish passion unchecked by civic virtue as destructive of social order. So construed, liberalism and republicanism become reconciled in a synthesis Kann calls "the other liberal tradition," one in which excessive individualism and self-seeking are checked by mechanisms of social restraint.

Kann's formidably thorough exegesis of English political thought at the time of the Restoration makes

a strong case for his argument that Lockean liberalism was always also republicanism. For historians less inclined to graze in the pastures of political theory, however, it is likely that the third section of the book will prove most rewarding. Here Kann makes skillful use of a wide variety of historical sources to show just how American individualism was yoked in by two other elements of American liberalism—women's self-sacrificial taming of men's passions in "republican motherhood" and the citizen-soldier ideal that called young men, by way of martial patriotism, to their civic duty. Kann's notion of "engendered virtue" is meant to remedy a second flaw in the older interpretation of liberalism as individualism—not just that it oversimplified Lockean theory but that it ignored American reality: "Individualism *does not* describe the historical norms or cultural practices of women and young men" (pp. 3–4). This assertion will not, of course, be news to historians of women; what is new is Kann's enlargement of the concept of liberalism to accord women, as well as men, a central role in American political practice. He thereby joins a number of historians who have worked in recent years to reduce the chasm between "women's sphere" and the public realm.

Somewhat less persuasive is the argument about the role of militarism in shaping the civic virtue of young men. If the republican mothers have done their job, why should further patriotic prodding be necessary? In any case, military experience is the lot of only a minority of young men.

In general, I wish there had been more history in Kann's account, and more of a chronological progression. It is confusing, for example, to find Progressive reformers on pages 231–36 and the women of the revolution on pages 249–50. Yet overall Kann's project is successful: he has enlarged and enriched our understanding of American liberalism.

CYNTHIA RUSSETT
Yale University

DONALD A. RITCHIE. *Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 293. \$29.95.

The disclosure of secret information about sexual harassment allegations that shook the Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings for Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court nomination in 1991 was only one of the more recent and memorable congressional leaks to the press. It is a practice—now predictable and frequent, if the right political conditions converge—that might be considered either an established tradition developed over time to compensate for our divided political system or an aberration or pathology created by it. In any case, one hundred years ago, Donald A. Ritchie argues, it was "common knowledge that each Washington correspondent 'had

his own Senator' who leaked details of secret sessions" (p. 164).

Leaking is one of a half-dozen historical patterns of institutional behavior on Capitol Hill between the duly elected or appointed members and staffers of Congress and the self-appointed members of the press, identified and illuminated by Ritchie in a series of "press gallery portraits" (p. 6). This book is a welcome contribution to the history of congressional-press interaction, a field relatively barren when compared to the much more extensive and visible research in president-press relationships. It is well written and well researched, with thorough notes and an excellent bibliographical essay.

Through the lives and times of twelve members of the press (counting brothers-in-law Joseph Gales, Jr., and William W. Seaton, partners in the period from the Jefferson to the Jackson administrations), Ritchie traces variations of persistent themes and "traditional elements" (p. 219) of Washington reporting and reporters during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These portraits help us understand more fully when and how reporting shifted from overtly partisan to "more objective reporting"; how and why particular patterns affected their reporting; what official and unofficial rules reporters established for themselves; why they developed alliances with public officeholders; how politicians influenced them; and what effect political pressures had in shaping the newspaper accounts that finally reached the public. From these interactions evolved "a Washington press ethic" (pp. 4–5).

In addition to Gales and Seaton, owners and editors of Washington's quasi-official *National Intelligencer*, whose forty or so years of "supremacy lasted as long as did the relatively centralized, Washington-based party system" (p. 8), journalists portrayed include Horace Greeley of the New York *Tribune* and his "aggressive and talented" correspondents (p. 35), who were among the first in Washington. The Chicago *Tribune's* Horace White was an "ardent abolitionist and financial speculator" (p. 59) who, along with "a small army of practicing journalists" (p. 62), drew a second salary as a congressional committee clerk. The influential Ben Perley Poore represented the "well-educated, middle class, hard-drinking, battle-scarred, nose-for-news Bohemian Brigade" (p. 73) of Civil War correspondents who stayed in the capital as political reporters and dominated Washington reporting for more than a generation. The Philadelphia *Inquirer's* Uriah Hunt Painter "learned that the big money came from the railroad lobbying, and he collected his share" (p. 100). His rise and fall as simultaneous correspondent, congressional committee clerk, lobbyist, and business dealer, prodded the Washington journalists to put their own house in order.

The Standing Committee of Correspondence and the Gridiron Club are legacies of the righteous and combative Henry Van Ness Boynton of the Cincinnati

Gazette who ultimately became a peacemaker. "When American newspapers were breaking free from partisan dependency, and when investigatory journalism sorely discomforted politicians," he "worked to rebuild the ties between the press and public men by establishing more formal rules to govern Washington journalism" (p. 113).

James G. Blaine, speaker of the house, U.S. senator, and 1884 Republican presidential nominee who lost the election narrowly to Grover Cleveland, began his career as an editor and reporter. His instinct for news and genius for self-advertisement served him well: "No other politician gathered the power, influence and national reputation that he enjoyed for over thirty years in Washington" (p. 133). "Other leaders were admired, loved, honored, revered, respected," wrote a Senate colleague, "but the sentiment for Blaine was delirium" (p. 131). "I wish he wasn't quite so tricky," wrote Ben Perley Poore (p. 134).

Emily Briggs and the women correspondents of her time were "ambitious and persistent" (p. 151). They had to be. Although women were allowed to enter journalism in the late 1890s, they "faced resistance at every step" and were "ultimately dependent on male editors" (pp. 151, 153). James Rankin Young of the *Philadelphia Evening Star* was fired as Senate Executive Clerk in 1892 after one of the Senate's periodic crusades to stop leakage of information. David S. Barry, chief Washington correspondent of the *Providence Journal*, personified the correspondents of his time whose cozy relationship with members of Congress were fundamentally altered when David Graham Phillips and other magazine writers and muckrakers "put the Washington press corps on the defensive, forcing its members to prove the independence of its judgments" (p. 192).

Richard V. Oulahan, bureau chief of the *New York Times*, "represented the last of the breed of correspondents who had entered journalism during its Bohemian heyday" (p. 195). He died when radio reporters had just joined magazine journalists to successfully challenge the monopoly that newspaper correspondents had enjoyed since 1801; when the newspaper reporters and members of Congress alike approached microphones "with trepidation" (p. 217); and less than a year before Franklin D. Roosevelt, "who understood radio's power of access and turned it to his advantage," was elected president (p. 218).

ROBERT O. BLANCHARD
Trinity University
San Antonio, Texas

MORRIS W. FOSTER. *Being Comanche: A Social History of an American Indian Community*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 230. \$29.95.

Morris W. Foster has written one of the more important studies in ethnohistory published in recent years. He shows that being Comanche is not simply being a

member of a residence band or having the necessary blood quantum. "Instead, it has entailed a more profound willingness to subject one's self to public sanction in gatherings with other Comanches and to accept the conventions and values of that shared community" (p. 169). By concentrating on Comanche-Comanche relations instead of just Anglo-Indian relations, Foster has challenged long-held assumptions and stereotypes.

Through historical analysis, Foster shows the flexible adaptations the Comanche community have made over the centuries in such areas as divisional gatherings of contiguous nomadic residence groups, peyote gatherings, Christian church meetings, and powwow gatherings. His chapters focus on their nomadic existence, 1706–1875; the reservation community, 1875–1901; the post-allotment community, 1901–41; and the postwar community, 1942–90. To Foster, Comanche life was more situational and opportunistic, rather than formal. Scholars such as Ernest Wallace and E. Adamson Hoebel have noted the Comanche's lack of explicit laws or defined positions of authority in a rapidly changing political economy; Foster, however, instead of viewing this as a weakness, implies it was the Comanche's strength since it allowed them to use "their distinctive means of social organization to out-compete a succession of Euro-American regimes on the southern Plains for the better part of two centuries" (p. 74). Drawing on the writings of William T. Hagan, Foster also concludes that Quanah Parker, the best known of the Comanches, was a typical intermediary leader with the Americans, much like earlier Comanches more than a century earlier in dealing with the Spanish. Moreover, to Foster, Comanche adoption of peyote use in the late nineteenth century had connections to early prereservation rituals such as eagle doctoring as well as to traditional symbolism.

Foster's work challenges the writings of Wallace and Hoebel. He rejects their view that the Comanche's shift from older forms of social participation to newer ones during the reservation period was simply the result of acculturative forces at work. Foster is also critical of Wallace's and Hoebel's claims that the battles of Adobe Walls and Palo Duro Canyon were the determining events in Comanche-Anglo relations prior to the reservation period, as well as their assertion that the failure of the Sun Dance revitalization of 1874 led to breaking the spirit of the Comanche community. Foster insists throughout that being Comanche did not necessitate their maintenance or preservation of a specific territory, language, or social structure. The Comanche sense of community was not a formally structured one and was often maintained by lines of communication with one another.

Although at times the author's style is repetitive and too historiographic, his book is well worth a careful reading by ethnohistorians since it has important implications beyond southern Plains Indians.

Foster, through his own interviews and fieldwork, by using the Doris Duke and WPA Indian-Pioneer oral history projects, and by undertaking research in the vast holdings of the Federal Record Center at Fort Worth, has quite effectively countered the derogatory image of Comanche presented in countless western movies of the 1930s through the 1950s.

LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN
State University College of New York,
New Paltz

CARL E. SWANSON. *Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739–1748*. (Studies in Maritime History.) Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xvii, 299. \$29.95.

Carl E. Swanson has written a significant book about the role of privateering in mid-eighteenth-century America. His logical and low-key approach reveals new details and suggests fresh interpretations about a subject dismissed by many historians as peripheral to colonial life.

Because many records necessary to a thorough study of privateering have been lost, the subject has often been examined in an episodic format. Even when well done, the relationship of the specific study to the overall subject remains vague. Swanson uses colonial newspapers to construct a data file on 4,000 prize actions that involved privateers in the War of Jenkins' Ear and King George's War. His examination of this data, supplemented with the papers of merchants in Newport, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston, provides the reader with an extremely valuable overview of privateering.

Swanson views privateering as a commercial activity that lured investors with the promise of windfall profits. The capture of a single vessel of average value could bring the owners of the privateer an annual return of "better than 130 percent" (p. 218). But against this attractive prospect, Swanson finds that almost 40 percent of the privateers never captured more than one vessel during their predatory careers; almost another 50 percent captured two, three, or four prizes apiece; and only the remainder took five or more prizes. He also notes that many privateers cruised in pairs—a practice that meant prizes and profits would be shared. Swanson provides fascinating details on how crews were recruited, where and when privateers went cruising, how long they remained at sea, the length of engagements and the ensuing casualties, and the problems of merchants who invested in privateers.

One of the subjects Swanson examines is enemy privateers. They are included in his data base and their patterns make an interesting contrast to those of the colonial privateers. His observations will be welcomed by maritime historians. Another particularly useful area the author explores is maritime insurance. His discussion of the practice of allowing the

owners of enemy merchant ships to purchase British insurance against capture by British privateers doubtless will be incorporated into many college class lectures. Aside from the small role assigned to letters of marque by the author, my only criticism is that his enthusiasm for privateering occasionally outdistances the evidence. While it certainly influenced the war by disrupting trade and attracting merchant seamen, whether privateering altered the outcome of the conflict is uncertain. That privateering attracted capital must be credited not just to the lure of profits and the appeal of patriotism, as the author believes, but also to the lack of alternative investments.

Swanson's work on privateering will serve as a model for similar studies by other scholars. His methodology is as much of a contribution to maritime history as are his conclusions. This is a book that maritime historians must add to their shelves.

JOSEPH GOLDENBERG
Virginia State University

LAMAR RILEY MURPHY. *Enter the Physician: The Transformation of Domestic Medicine, 1760–1860*. (History of American Science and Technology Series.) Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1991. Pp. xxi, 312.

Before the rise of an organized American medical profession in the late eighteenth century, the afflicted's family and friends along with local healers conducted treatment within a domestic setting. Such domestic practitioners could glean advice from British works such as John Wesley's *Primitive Physick*, which in cookbook fashion listed diseases, remedies, and warnings against the medical profession. The medical profession rose within this context, but, Lamar Riley Murphy argues, it did not seek to displace it. Rather, learned practitioners of the late eighteenth century "not only tolerated home health care but expected it" (p. 10). The American physician Benjamin Rush went so far as to advise doctors to consult with all social ranks in search of helpful cures.

This complementary relationship between physicians and domestic practitioners came under pressure in the early nineteenth century from two sources: self-conscious professionals who, while still widely dependent on folk practitioners, hoped to promote the ascendancy of physicians in spheres formerly dominated by women; and brash defenders of herbal medicine, notably Samuel Thomson, who reacted against this new professional assertiveness by assailing the legal privileges of the profession and by proclaiming that everybody could become their own physician. In this more contentious climate, physicians backed off from their extreme claims to displace domestic practitioners and initiated a compromise: they alone would propose cures, while domestic practitioners would confine themselves to hygiene and prevention. This neat division of labor won support from most

antebellum writers on popular health, including many of Thomson's followers, hydropathists, homeopaths, and female reformers who, like Catharine Beecher, advised mothers on every aspect of domestic "science."

Murphy does a fine job of tracing the subtle adaptations of orthodox medicine to pervasive folk practice and to angry attacks on the profession. Coming to doubt by 1860 their own legacy of heroic treatment, and inclining to define themselves as nonsectarians free of any exclusive system of therapy, orthodox physicians were increasingly willing to accord a wide sphere to hygiene and prevention. In her conclusion Murphy reminds us that calls today for the building of a partnership based on "mutual respect" between professionals and nonprofessionals are "very much like" those envisioned by nineteenth-century health publicists (p. 227). Yet one wonders how deeply the antebellum version of the partnership was grounded on mutual respect, for by 1860 the medical profession, widely derided and legally impotent, was unable to suppress domestic practice, much of which continued to flourish under the guises of hygiene and prevention. As soon as advances in medical science during the late nineteenth century permitted orthodox medicine to renew its offensive against domestic practice, physicians resumed their assault. The compromise that Murphy describes seems as much a shotgun marriage as a meeting of minds.

JOSEPH F. KETT
University of Virginia

JOAN M. JENSEN. *Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 325. \$29.95.

Joan M. Jensen is the pioneer in revealing the army's spying on Americans. Her book *The Price of Vigilance* (1968), on the American Protective League of World War I, introduced her to the topic, and in 1975, after testifying before Sam Ervin's Senate subcommittee investigating army domestic intelligence, she produced her brief *Military Surveillance of Civilians in America*. Unfortunately, the importance of her revelations about this secret and repressive spy machine was entirely neglected by other historians for a decade.

Now, in her latest work, she offers a broad overview. Quickly covering the first century, when the army had no regular intelligence unit, she begins in earnest with the Spanish-American War and the subsequent development of an intelligence program aimed against civilians in Cuba and the Philippines. Those experiences, along with a fear of Mexican radicals and the coming of World War I, created modern Military Intelligence (MI) and gave it a domestic mission to root out and suppress threats of any kind at home. This frightening surveillance program blossomed during World War I and the Red

Scare, faded in the 1920s, made a small resurgence in the Great Depression, strengthened further in World War II, and exploded in the late 1960s.

The primary merit of this work is that it is the only scholarly survey of the entire history of army snooping at home. Well written and solidly based on archival research, it is an important contribution on the issue of the military's role in American life, a matter which has yet to receive the debate it warrants. Given the significance of the topic, it is regrettable that the pioneer in the field failed to update her work with recently available sources. Her chief error in this regard is the lack of any reference to MI's spying on African Americans in World War I, a fascinating story, with the head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People joining MI to monitor "Negro Subversion" and the army engaging in a bizarre flirtation with W. E. B. Du Bois.

Jensen has a fine account of the industrial protection system of World War I, and her portrayal of MI in World War II and the 1960s and of the ultimate end of its domestic operations is the best available. She recounts the famous story of the army spying on Eleanor Roosevelt, but at other times she moves too quickly, omitting important and fascinating abuses. To cite a few examples, there is no mention of the army's first blacklist of early 1919 (which included Jane Addams and Charles Beard), its harassment of Carl Sandburg, its role in the Seattle general strike, or its arrest of Jacob Abrams, which led to Oliver Wendell Holmes's classic defense of First Amendment rights. An embarrassing technical error involves the notes to chapter 2; some are in disarray and four are missing altogether. If her work is hardly definitive, one hopes that its appearance, along with other recent works on MI, will give this important subject the attention it deserves.

ROY TALBERT, JR.
University of South Carolina
Coastal Carolina College

ROY TALBERT, JR. *Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917–1941*. (Twentieth-Century America Series.) Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. 1991. Pp. xiv, 303. \$37.50.

The U.S. Army's excessive and extralegal spying on American civilians first became widely known in the 1970s after an exposé by a former army intelligence officer, Christopher Pyle, and a congressional inquiry led by Senator Sam Ervin. Since then our knowledge of domestic military surveillance has been expanded by a number of historical studies including, most recently, Joan M. Jensen's *Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980* (1991), and Roy Talbert, Jr.'s monograph, which is much more limited in scope and time frame.

The years 1917 to 1941 were formative for domestic military surveillance, and Talbert ably demon-

strates the protean evolution of the army's intelligence apparatus. The topic is not "positive" intelligence, the acquisition of useful information about the enemy, but rather "negative" (counterintelligence) operations. The primary mission was to oppose enemy efforts to use undercover agents, but the number of enemy spies and saboteurs was never large, and as Talbert proves conclusively the Negative Branch of the Military Intelligence Division (M.I.D.) focused mainly on radicals and left-wing reformers suspected by conservative officers of aiding real or potential enemies or of undermining American institutions.

In the World War I era, M.I.D., created in 1917 by Captain (later Major General) Ralph H. Van Deman, conducted a program of surveillance and action against radical unions and political organizations, left-wing reform groups, pacifists, immigrants, and African Americans that initially surpassed even that of the Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation. While striving to be fair to the intelligence officers, Talbert, a former intelligence officer himself, nevertheless admits that the M.I.D. was paranoid about threats and conspiracies on the Left, and he documents the agency's excesses. The army, in alliance with private vigilante groups, conducted illegal raids, made illegal arrests, subjected many citizens to interrogation, developed an elaborate filing system for its dossiers on thousands of American civilians, and helped local authorities crush major strikes and suppress racial disorders.

Some of these abuses are already known, but Talbert provides much fresh detail and documentation and increases our knowledge of the degree to which the army joined with professional patriots and ultra-conservatives in a continuing campaign against domestic radicalism and pacifism in the 1920s and 1930s. In the War Department, M.I.D. developed "Emergency Plan White" for military intervention to suppress radical-led civil disorders and armed insurrection if they occurred in the United States.

With the Great Depression and the increased fear of foreign aggression and radicalism, M.I.D.'s budget and staff grew dramatically. In 1932 the army used a modified form of the White Plan against the "Bonus Army" when an M.I.D. report that the veterans' group was led by communists (a report that Talbert neglects to mention was rejected by the Washington police chief) led President Herbert Hoover to authorize General Douglas MacArthur to employ troops to remove the veterans. Throughout the decade, M.I.D. expanded its domestic operations, spying on communists, unionists, pacifists, civil rights activists, and "radical" college professors, among whom in 1938 Van Deman included John Dewey, Felix Frankfurter, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Rexford Tugwell.

As this valuable book reminds us, the Military Intelligence Division not only participated in widespread, unwarranted violations of civil liberties in the World War I era but also, in the 1930s, squandered its expanded resources by foolishly chasing radical spec-

ters at home and failing in the far more important arena of foreign espionage and intelligence evaluation—a lesson brought home at Pearl Harbor.

JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II
Rutgers University,
New Brunswick

DONALD G. NIEMAN. *Promises to Keep: African-Americans and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present.* (Organization of American Historians Bicentennial Essays on the Bill of Rights.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 275. Cloth \$29.95, paper \$9.95.

This book by Donald G. Nieman tells a morally unambiguous story. The framers of the Constitution compromised the revolutionary principles of liberty and equality that threatened slavery and racial subordination in the United States in 1776 by establishing a constitutional order that recognized slavery and "made freedom a matter of local option" (p. 12). The Constitution was not uniformly proslavery, however, but was a "malleable" and "open-ended document" (pp. viii, 13). After being transformed into a bulwark of slavery and white supremacy in the period from 1830 to 1860, it was transformed during the Civil War and Reconstruction into a new Constitution that promoted equality.

A counterrevolution then occurred in which southern whites imposed a system of racial segregation and black subordination that lasted from 1900 until 1950. During this period black leaders, insisting that the nation fulfill the promise of color-blind equality contained in the Reconstruction amendments, mounted a legal attack on racial segregation and discrimination. Their effort came to fruition in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Supreme Court declared segregation unconstitutional and Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, established the goal of banishing segregation from American life. This goal was achieved by 1968. Then, however, subtle new forms of discrimination emerged requiring race-conscious policies of affirmative action. Moreover, the problem arose of a black underclass trapped in poverty, crime, and drug addiction that was not amenable to resolution by civil rights laws. Failing to understand the rage borne of three centuries of racist oppression that caused the ghetto riots of the late 1960s and justified affirmative action, the white majority decided that crime control was more important than civil rights. It thus supported "flag-waving conservatives who asserted that individual initiative was the best anti-poverty program" and sought to roll back the civil rights gains of the 1960s (p. 188). Representing this point of view, the Reagan administration, a "willing partner of unalloyed racism," succeeded by 1989 in getting the Supreme Court to change course and oppose the quest for equality (p. 217).

Nieman's book illustrates the historicist principle

that denies the possibility of objective truth and assigns value to historical writing as a reflection of subjective influences and contextual factors, including the common opinions of the community to which the historian belongs. The opinion reflected in Nieman's study, to consider only one fundamental question among many, views the Constitution as a malleable, open-ended document.

This opinion presumably means that the ends or purposes of the Constitution are not permanently fixed, but are constantly subject to change in a way that precludes conclusive judgments about the constitutionality of government actions or policies. Nieman writes, however, as though only the views of black leaders and their white allies are consistent with the Constitution's promise of equality. This apparent contradiction might be resolved by saying that with the Fourteenth Amendment the Constitution ceased to be a malleable, open-ended document. If that is the case, however, it is difficult to understand how black leaders' argument for color-blind equality in the period from 1950 to 1959, and their argument for color-conscious special treatment for blacks in the period 1970 to 1989, can both be consistent with the Constitution.

In effect, Nieman resolves this problem by concluding that the Constitution mandates equality, and equality means whatever black civil rights leaders say it means. If this approach to constitutional equality is adopted, it seems safe to assume, as the author predicts, that race will continue to be a major fault line of controversy in American politics for the foreseeable future.

HERMAN BELZ
University of Maryland,
College Park

SYLVIA R. FREY. *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 376. \$29.95.

This is an ambitious book, undertaking three large topics. Sylvia R. Frey describes continuities and relationships that are only hinted at in more conventional studies. After a brief sketch of the colonial South and the evolving society of African Americans therein, Frey launches into a startling and depressing description of certain events during the American Revolution: the disruptions, hardships, and migrations—voluntary and otherwise—affecting thousands of slaves. The result was a diaspora across the hemisphere and even back across the Atlantic. Blacks from the former colonies of the Chesapeake and south Atlantic coast appeared in such remote places as Nova Scotia, England, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and eventually in Sierra Leone on the west coast of Africa. For many these moves compounded hardship and suffering; for more than a few the results included mean-

ingful freedom and new careers, sometimes as Christian missionaries.

Frey's next major subject, developed concurrently with her first, is the ideological and cultural upheaval caused by slaveholders proclaiming egalitarian republicanism. Such slaveholders either had to give up slavery or demote the African from full membership in the human race. Most chose the latter, but they could scarcely conceal their radical doctrines of liberty from their bondservants, and even when they tried to do so many blacks, enslaved or free, passed the new ideas from towns to plantation quarters.

Frey's final and, considering the weight she gives it, most important tale is the creation of a distinctive, enduring, and effective African-American culture in the United States, centered on a community-based religion. Slaves synthesized their religion from enduring African elements of ritual and Christian elements adopted during the Second Great Awakening. When combined with egalitarian political doctrine, this emerging religious culture could produce a Gabriel and a Denmark Vesey. Frey believes that when, after Nat Turner's rebellion and the rise of immediate abolitionism the South turned militantly defensive, Afro-Christianity sustained a now well-defined black community through the darkest days of coercive enslavement.

It would be politically incorrect and downright churlish to argue against this latest historical witness to the bravery, creativity, perseverance, and pervasively African character of those Americans whom our founding fathers, against their own best principles, bought, sold, flogged, and violated. One might quibble about Frey's geography being sometimes askew (for example, "Bermuda was one of the 'jewels' in the curving chain of British Caribbean islands" [p. 188]); and her interest in "white" culture lags far behind her interest in African Americans. She therefore gives but little credit to the considerable number of Puritans, Quakers, and Anglicans who labored to educate and convert blacks in the colonial period, accepting instead the partisan claims that Baptists and Methodists were the first to bring them a really satisfying gospel. In noting the courage and idealism with which some blacks returned to Africa as missionaries, Frey might have said a mitigating word for the Colonization Society, widely condemned by many abolitionists in its own time and by neo-abolitionist historians more recently.

ROBERT MCCOLLEY
University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign

SHANE WHITE. *Somewhat More Independent: The End of Slavery in New York City, 1770–1810*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1991. Pp. xxix, 278. \$35.00.

At first glance this would seem to be a book that did not need to be written. The demise of slavery in New

York has been explained often enough. A marginal institution was jettisoned after the revolution by whites who found it morally unacceptable and economically unsound. What this immensely readable and finely crafted study demonstrates is how flawed that explanation is. Slavery was flourishing in the New York of the 1790s, its death was a protracted business, and its victims did not wait patiently while lawmakers decided their fate.

Slavery, Shane White argues, was an integral part of the social and economic fabric of colonial New York City. After the chaos of the revolution, which afforded some slaves an opportunity to escape, the institution was quickly reestablished. In 1790 the typical slaveowner was an artisan with one or two slaves who lived in his cellar and labored in his workshop.

Between 1790 and 1800 slave ownership increased, even among members of the New York Manumission Society. Slavery was transformed, however, from an economic institution to a badge of elite status. Responding to economic changes, artisans opted for free labor over bound, while merchants and lawyers acquired slaves in larger numbers than ever before to work in their homes. Slaves were increasingly seen not as skilled workers but as domestics.

New Yorkers occasionally manumitted favored slaves but seldom without restrictions. They saw themselves as benevolent slaveowners. They were shocked by tales of cruelty in slaveholding societies elsewhere, but they remained convinced that their own version of human bondage was benign.

Slavery survived the Gradual Abolition Act of 1799. In fact, there was a thriving trade in the indentures of those who were halfway between slavery and a shadowy freedom. At this point, however, the slaves themselves took the initiative, fleeing in unprecedented numbers, setting fires, or negotiating with their owners. Given the increasing assertiveness of their slaves, many owners opted for cash down or emancipation in return for a few years of faithful service.

With the end of slavery in sight, prospects for free blacks seemed fairly bright. True, many eked out a miserable existence, living in filthy cellars and working at menial jobs. But there were others who were pursuing trades learned in slavery, acquiring property, and creating strong families. What happened to frustrate the ambitions of black New Yorkers? White contends that they were the victims of economic forces. Those who had been domestics in slavery had few skills, and those who had been artisans faced a dwindling demand for their skills. Drawn "inexorably into the emerging working class of the city," they were forced to compete, often violently, with working-class whites (p. 206).

White's chapter on the representation of blacks in the print media seems somewhat out of place and might work better as an article. The questions he raises about slaveholding and manumission patterns

among women need answers, but he has asked the questions and one hopes others will take note. Overall, this is a meticulously researched study. Provocative and well argued, it challenges us to rethink the whole nature of northern slavery and the emancipation process.

JULIE WINCH
*University of Massachusetts,
Boston*

DONALD YACOVONE. *Samuel Joseph May and the Dilemmas of the Liberal Persuasion, 1797–1871*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 262. \$44.95.

Donald Yacovone's book on Samuel Joseph May is a welcome addition to an expanding number of recent biographies of immediate abolitionists. Boston born and Harvard educated, May was an early supporter of William Lloyd Garrison's uncompromising indictment of slavery and a life-long Unitarian minister whose advocacy of social reform alienated him from most ministers. What set May apart from Unitarians, such as the influential William Ellery Channing, who preached a morality based on human goodness, was his active effort to practice it. He was a romantic reformer who sought social redemption through moral suasion and Christian love. An early faith in pacifism (including the denial of a right to self-defense for which he condemned the slain abolitionist Owen Lovejoy) is captured in a remarkable anecdote that May related about himself. He slept in the same bed with a deranged man who threatened to murder his own family. During the night, May found the man in the kitchen with a knife. May counseled the would-be killer, and they returned to bed without incident (p. 97). Yet May did not fully accept the Christian anarchism of the Garrisonian New England Non-Resistance Society because it charged that civil government usurped allegiance to divine government. He reasoned practically that governmental action was essential to alleviate the plight of African Americans.

In addition to abolitionism and pacifism, May's Christian ethics embraced total temperance, love-oriented childrearing, educational reform, women's rights, better conditions for industrial workers, and land redistribution for ex-slaves. The account of May's major role as the only "liberal" missionary in orthodox Connecticut and his subsequent, steadfast defense of Prudence Crandall are well told. He never reconciled the moral dilemma of his pacifism with the doctrine of righteous violence, a quandary highlighted by his significant part in the forcible rescue of the alleged fugitive slave, Jerry McHenry, in Syracuse, New York, and further exacerbated by the Civil War. Yacovone effectively uses psychological insights in explaining May's ambivalence toward his father and the revolutionary generation of 1776 and also in analyzing his affinity for fraternal friendship based

on the traumatic childhood death of his brother. Although he was the first minister to publish a tract urging female suffrage, his idealization of women and feminization of Christianity simultaneously confirmed sexual stereotypes.

Yacovone's use of the term "Liberal Persuasion" (a phrase derived from the liberal Christianity of antebellum Unitarianism) is at times too encompassing to explain the reform imperative. "It attacked slavery and racial prejudice" (p. 3), the author states, yet most "liberal" and "conservative" clerics held abolitionists in contempt. Nevertheless, Yacovone has written an engaging biography with important insights about a fascinating figure.

LAWRENCE B. GOODHEART
University of Connecticut,
Hartford

IRA V. BROWN. *Mary Grew: Abolitionist and Feminist (1813–1896)*. Selinsgrove, N.J.: Susquehanna University Press. 1991. Pp. 214. \$35.00.

This old-fashioned biography chronicles the life of Mary Grew from her arrival in Philadelphia in 1834 until her death there sixty-two years later. Born in 1813, the fifth child of Baptist minister Henry Grew but the first of his third wife, she grew up in Hartford. Two years before her birth, her father had been relieved of his pastorate at the city's First Baptist Church but was able to support his family on an independent income he received from his native England and to pay for Mary's education at Catharine Beecher's Female Seminary. After a short stay in Boston, where the father became active as an abolitionist, the family moved to Philadelphia, where Mary joined the Female Anti-Slavery Society almost at once. She shared her father's reform enthusiasms and, despite his ardent opposition to public roles for women, she apparently continued to live in his home until he died in 1862. Made financially independent by the inheritance she shared with two sisters, the children of one of them, and her stepmother, Mary asserted her personal freedom by becoming a Unitarian preacher only five years after Henry Grew's death.

Ira V. Brown, alas, hews to "a conventional biographical method for the most part narrative rather than analytical" (p. 9) and ignores the Jamesian implications of Mary Grew's life. Similarly "avoiding speculation on such intriguing questions as why Mary Grew never married," he waits until near the end of the book to quote her own reference to her "closer union than that of most marriages" with Margaret Jones Burleigh, and he passes rapidly over Grew's concluding observation: "We know there have been other such between two men, & also between two women. And why should there not be? Love is spiritual; only passion is sexual" (p. 165).

Instead of searching the data for meaningful pat-

terns, the author simply reports, year by year, the doings first of the antislavery meetings that Mary Grew attended and wrote about and then those of the Pennsylvania Woman Suffrage Association of which she was president and the American Woman Suffrage Association in which she was active. It seems likely that no remaining annual report or convention proceedings have escaped encapsulation here, as it seems equally unlikely that any extant Grew letter has not been noted. And, because most of these were written to her cousin Ann Terry Greene Phillips, we know more about their inconsequential mutual cousin Charles Greene than about those who played critical roles in her life.

There probably is in these sources, which are the bulk of Brown's data, sufficient material for a significant article, but their use scarcely sustains a book that, despite a fair sprinkling of recent secondary works on abolition and the suffrage movement noted in the bibliography, asks few questions of much concern to contemporary historians. There is as little analysis of Grew's reform ideology and activism as there is about her personal growth and private life. Thus, we learn little about her either as abolitionist or feminist.

JANE H. PEASE
College of Charleston

DAVID R. ROEDIGER. *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*. (The Haymarket Series in North American Politics and Culture.) New York: Verso. 1991. Pp. viii, 191. Cloth \$54.95, paper \$16.95.

In this book, David R. Roediger deftly combines the approaches of Marxism, psychoanalytic theory, and the new labor history to produce a brilliant account of how white workers in antebellum America constructed a social identity fundamentally premised on their "whiteness." Unlike earlier Marxist analysts of the same subject, Roediger is unwilling to reduce racism to a divide-and-rule stratagem of dominant elites. While he examines the more frequently noted utilitarian/economic motives for cultivating a sense of racial exclusiveness, he delves deeper into the murkier waters of cultural and psychological anxiety, where such intangibles as republican pride and masculine assertiveness could seem even more precious and even more threatened than jobs and wages.

The American Revolution made "independence" a potent political and masculine ideal. During the next eighty years of capitalist economic development, the emergence of hired labor generated an enormous fear of dependency that many workers defended against by drawing the starkest differentiation between wage and slave labor. But whereas the category of "free labor" seemed infinitely preferable to that of bondage, it could not conceal from an imperiled artisan class, jealous of its "manly independence," its

own frightening subordination to a rising class of merchant and manufacturing capitalists. Initially these preindustrial, republican-minded workers decried every sign of inequality and exhibited a growing fear of and disdain for "the slavish," an opprobrium that covered both the hireling and the bondsman. But with the ineluctable spread of capitalism, labor radicals had to work overtime rehabilitating the category of wage labor. Gradually, the once despised status of hireling took on a nobility of productive labor denied the degraded black slave. Thus, alongside growing anxiety about and critique of wage labor, there emerged a compensating celebration of white labor.

Roediger is impressively resourceful—drawing on folklore, song, street language, popular humor, and entertainment—and vivid in dramatizing this emerging polarity in language and popular culture. Antebellum workers repudiated such traditional but now toxic terminology as "servant," consigning it to the nether world of "nigger slaves," substituting instead such sanitized expressions as "help" and "hired man." Jacksonian craftsmen anathematized the once unexceptionable "master," replacing it with the Dutch originated "boss," a euphemism that neatly avoided the social confrontation pregnant in a word that had come to imply the mastery of men rather than a handicraft. Antebellum workers were subject to a nearly unbearable tension, sensing the obvious comparison between their own new condition of dependency to that of the slave, yet finding it intolerable to acknowledge that kinship. Republicanism, which once articulated a militant hatred of slavery, degenerated into a hatred of slaves and free blacks too, on the grounds that their slavish nature made them potential pawns of designing aristocrats. Terms such as "work like a nigger" and "white slavery" suggested no incipient solidarity with black chattel but on the contrary criticized particularly the treatment of women and children under the new factory regime so as to draw an unmistakable demarcation between what a white worker as opposed to a black one was entitled to. Increasingly, "white slavery" (which only much later would become a narrower signifier of prostitution) took the place of "wage slavery" as the symbolic object of working-class wrath.

Roediger is especially insightful when he examines the relationship of "whiteness" to the new work culture of industrializing America. The new work discipline and abstemious leisure activities demanded away from work generated great anxiety, setting in motion a process of psychological splitting in which all those now-repudiated yet still-lamented preindustrial habits and desires were imputed to blacks. Black-face festivals and minstrel shows became a staple form of white working-class entertainment, complex psychocultural events that gave workers a chance to "act black" and thereby momentarily mock middle-class fetishes about orderliness, wealth, and respectability, and at the same time reject those rebellious impulses. Minstrelsy expressed this ambivalent attrac-

tion to a forbidden, preindustrial "blackness" and the self-hatred that "morally improving" workers now felt for being attracted to such loose behavior. Minstrel shows, Roediger argues, rechanneled deeply felt resentments about the new industrial morality away from any open defense of customary habits and from open attacks on bourgeois moralizing elites.

Roediger concludes with a penetrating analysis of the role of racism in the formation of the Irish-American working class. As others have before him, the author notes the striking similarity between popular characterizations of blacks and Irish immigrants, the latter often perceived as a darker race—"Irish niggers"—of bestial, sensual, groveling Celts peculiarly fit for dirty physical labor, domestic service, and slum dwelling. Despite this kinship, however, Irish workers often became virulently racist, deploying their whiteness as an entitlement to civil rights, jobs, and political influence. Roediger convincingly argues that the very trauma of their uprooting from the land and their abrupt transformation into an impoverished, urban proletariat of unskilled laborers and servants vilified by nativists—rather than some more utilitarian competition over jobs—made them willing allies of a white supremacist Democratic Party. Torn from their traditional agrarian life, rudely victimized by the most degraded forms of urban and industrial exploitation, subject to a pervasive familial disorganization, suddenly asked to conform to an alien work discipline and personal morality, Irish-American workers suffered deep longings and even deeper guilt about those desires that they resolved by projecting them onto their black brethren in misery who came to represent "a pornography" of Irish life, past and present. As Roediger's Irish-American case makes clear, "the wages of whiteness" have been dear not only in material terms but also culturally, politically, and psychologically.

STEVE FRASER
Basic Books

JANET DUTSMAN CORNELIUS. *"When I Can Read My Title Clear": Literacy, Slavery, and Religion in the Antebellum South*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 215. \$29.95.

The dust jacket photo of "Aunt Betsy's Cabin in Aiken, South Carolina . . . circa 1856" compels attention. To the left stand two black women dressed very much like slaves, in the right foreground is a circle of small children at play, and behind them stand three older youngsters, one of whom is—reading a book?

Exactly so. About 10 percent of southern slaves could read, Janet Duitsman Cornelius assures us. Despite the panic that the thought of a literate slave underclass brought to the mind of the average slaveholder, despite its being specifically illegal in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, and for periods in Alabama and Louisiana as well, many thousands of slaves

were taught to read, a fact actually heralded by southerners such as South Carolina's prominent Baptist clergyman Richard Fuller, himself the owner of 150 to 200 slaves.

The main impulse behind this usually covert literacy program was provided by the slaves themselves, large numbers of whom yearned for a mysterious skill denied them by most whites. The secondary impulse, one might say, was the Protestant religiosity of many northern philanthropists, many slaveholders themselves, and many southerners in general, who agreed on the absolute necessity of Bible reading for the spiritual and moral well-being of black folk.

Several national reform associations also promoted slave literacy. Perhaps first into the field was the American Colonization Society (1816), which encouraged instruction in reading and writing for those facing expatriation to Liberia, and whose members also had been tasked with Christianizing the natives. Specifically religious agencies active in teaching reading and writing included the American Bible Society (1816), the American Sunday School Union (1817), and the American Tract Society (1825), which sponsored long-lived "Bibles for Slaves" campaigns. These groups managed to offend slaveholders and abolitionists alike. The slave who could read the Bible, southerners argued, could also read *The Liberator*. Antislavery activists, however, viewed the distribution of Bibles as simply a counterproductive diversion from the true endeavor.

Individual southern whites who taught slaves to read included such notables as Moncure Conway, Mary Chesnut, and, most probably, young Thomas ("Stonewall") Jackson in his role as the organizer of a Sunday school for African Americans. Other slaves learned from fellow slaves or from free blacks, especially black preachers, but if learning incurred a master's displeasure the penalty might be severe. Many slaves were flogged to death, hanged, or (more traditionally) suffered the amputation of a forefinger for knowing how to read or for teaching others to read. Thus, many slaves, aided by Noah Webster's famous "blue-back speller" and its step-by-step pedagogical routines, virtually taught themselves to read.

All of this and much more is told in six chapters and an epilogue, clearly and concisely if without much flair. The book provides a thorough discussion of a hitherto neglected aspect of the antebellum black experience. One might have wished for some formal tabulations, and the index sometimes falls short, but this is a very worthy book indeed.

ROBERT R. DYKSTRA
State University of New York,
Albany

HAZEL DICKEN-GARCIA. *To Western Woods: The Breckinridge Family Moves to Kentucky in 1793*. Cranbury, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 1991. Pp. 250. \$39.50.

In recent years historians have focused primarily on Anglo-Americans' mid-nineteenth-century migration into the trans-Mississippi West. In this book, Hazel Dicken-Garcia moves back in place and time to the trans-Appalachian migration of the late eighteenth century. As a specialist in communications history, Dicken-Garcia has a thesis to expound: that the "communications infrastructure" greatly influenced one family's decision to move from Virginia to Kentucky in the 1780s and 1790s.

Dicken-Garcia is inclined, however, to overstate the communications infrastructure's role in conditioning the motives, values, and actions of the Breckinridge family. Late-eighteenth-century forms of communication consisted primarily of infrequent letters carried by friends or strangers and newspaper accounts. The author demonstrates the difficulties and limits of such facilities. Yet when one reads the content of the Breckinridge letters, it becomes apparent that the things that motivated them were conditioned by much more. John Breckinridge's choices are clearly linked to his political and financial fortunes in Kentucky. Above all else the family letters address the issue of land opportunities—without doubt the reason most American families moved West. In focusing her attention on the media, Dicken-Garcia misses this message.

Although Dicken-Garcia's communications thesis is debatable, she does make an enduring point: the crucial role family support systems played in the American story of westward migration. The subtitle refers only to the John and Polly Breckinridge family's move to Kentucky in 1793, but this study encompasses a more complicated story. John's brothers made the first family forays in the early 1780s. John, in fact, was the last to go, following even his widowed mother. This, then, is the story of the Breckinridge family's piecemeal migration beginning in 1780 and ending in 1793. It is an intricate and intriguing account of an extended family's hesitations, concerns, and ultimate decision to cast its fortunes with the West.

The author also notes the difference between the Breckinridge men's and women's reaction to migration. The women opposed the move and emphasized the costs to family that migration and its attendant separations meant. These women carried clout. Dicken-Garcia believes that John's delays in moving stemmed in part from his wife's reluctance to leave her family. And Lettice Breckinridge's (John's mother) letters reveal a woman of power and consequence. In the end, the women capitulated because the pull of family already in Kentucky proved as powerful as the inclination to remain in Virginia.

Historians will find things to quibble about in this book: the acceptance at face value of newspaper accounts about Indian attacks, the absence of any explanation of how Indians perceived their situation, the tendency to glorify the pioneers' "quiet courage, strength and determination" (p. 37). Nevertheless,

Dicken-Garcia provides an interesting (if overstated) assessment of late-eighteenth-century communication and a fascinating view into eighteenth-century family dynamics.

SHERRY L. SMITH
University of Texas,
El Paso

JEANNE BOYDSTON. *Home and Work: Housework, Wages, and the Ideology of Labor in the Early Republic*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1990. Pp. xx, 222. \$29.95.

In this well-crafted study, Jeanne Boydston brings together the concerns of labor history and women's history—not in itself an unusual enterprise. But Boydston's focus on women's unpaid labor in the home within the broad context of changes in the antebellum northern economy sets her work off from a myriad of other books that have emphasized women's waged employment in the same period. Likewise, Boydston distinguishes her research from that of historians of housework by her attempts to understand not just how housework was accomplished and of what it consisted but also how it was conceptualized by both women and men.

Boydston concerns herself with a key question: how, why, and when did women's unpaid labor in the home come to be devalued, indeed not seen as "labor" at all? Beginning her analysis with a brief survey of some scattered colonial evidence, she concludes that, at the outset of English settlement in America, women's labor contributions to the household were recognized as significant. Although early Americanists will probably wince at her too-ready adoption of the "declension" model of colonial society, her pointing to Alexander Hamilton's 1791 "Report on Manufactures" as an important indicator of emerging attitudes is surely correct. Hamilton, she observes, utterly disregarded the possibility that women's domestic labors could be of any economic value to the nation by exclusively stressing the prospects for employing women and children in America's nascent industries.

And so it went. As the United States shifted toward an economy dependent on wages, work that did not earn wages—or that did not seem to earn wages, for women's labors often brought cash into the household—could have its basic character denied. Similarly, as earning wages became emblematic of manliness, women could be seen as inappropriate employees, and men could increasingly call for the institution of a wage sufficient to allow a man to be the sole breadwinner in his household. Scholars have struggled to uncover the sources of antebellum workingmen's antagonism to women's paid employment; Boydston demonstrates that those origins lay in changes in the home as well as in the workplace.

The findings of this fine book are too complex to

summarize in a brief review. But among its important features are a precise description of housework in both middle-class and working-class families, including estimates of its cash value; a demonstration that middle-class women's lives were hardly leisured and that they led quite different work lives than did their colonial foremothers; and a useful discussion of the process through which housework came to be viewed as not really work at all.

Boydston has achieved a goal that many women's historians strive toward: she has demonstrated that only through examining the "women's sphere" in its most classic sense can we understand the shape of American history in the antebellum years. She shows that by studying that evidently most mundane of subjects, housework, historians can probe deeply into the heart of economic development in the United States.

MARY BETH NORTON
Cornell University

ROBERT V. REMINI. *Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union*. New York: W. W. Norton. Pp. xxviii, 818. \$35.00.

This long and leisurely retelling of Henry Clay's life rests squarely in the grand biographic tradition. Robert V. Remini's exhaustive research in manuscript collections and great familiarity with existing scholarship provides the foundation for presenting an enormous range of detail, long on the coverage of events and intrigues, buttressed repeatedly by an eye for a colorful anecdote. If he is somewhat wordy and occasionally repetitive, Remini does straightforwardly cover his topic, capturing the high and low points and the political ins and outs of Clay's career, with discussions of family matters interspersed, moving back and forth from Kentucky to Washington, all laid out clearly in a chronological rather than a topical manner. As a result, policy debates interweave with travels, electoral concerns with personal matters. Here are all of the great events that Clay did so much to shape, from Ghent, Missouri, nullification, and the crisis of 1850 to the political developments that accompanied them, from corrupt bargain, the bank, party growth and conflict, to the American system and Texas as well as the electoral campaigns that repeatedly frustrated Clay but did so much to define and direct his age. Each topic is covered effectively with Clay's role extensively spelled out.

Remini offers no new startling interpretations. There is no particular sustained argument, and, although interpretive comments appear throughout, they are never ridden very hard. He is methodologically cautious; all that he knows is knit together in rationalist, common-sense, eclectic terms. Personality is discussed, rarely analyzed. He does not include much about the larger currents and forces at play during Clay's lifetime, in sharp contrast to the way the republican synthesis played so large a role in his

biography of Andrew Jackson. Remini is aware of them and does mention some, for example, the currently fashionable phrase "market revolution" recurs, but more as signposts than as starting points for a discussion of boundaries, interpretation, and role, the interplay between subject and exterior forces. Remini is not without opinions. In his eyes, Clay changed little over his mature years, his political instincts and approaches remained stable. He was willful, ambitious, adroit, and pragmatic, committed to certain ideas but always ready to meet an opponent halfway, recognizing that pacification, compromise, and conciliation were the bedrock of Union. At the same time, a persistent theme of failure—rooted in Clay's personal defects—runs throughout the book. Remini is sharp about Clay's behavior and moral failings at key moments, the latter's "effrontery" and "impertinence," and is quite critical of someone who "recklessly squandered much of his talent as he pursued pleasure and the illusory goals of a driving ambition" (pp. 572, 339). Finally, while the author lost his heart to Andrew Jackson a long time ago and the Old Hero, obviously and necessarily, is a major presence throughout these pages, Remini seems respectful and dutiful about Clay rather than engaged, understanding rather than committed. One can wish for much more imaginative shaping and some additional fire; one can argue, sometimes quite sharply, with emphases and challenge whatever specific interpretations appear. But such is perhaps not the main point. The author's style is to present the color, retell the good stories, and, brick by brick, build up a portrait—to come to understand through detail. This is a compendium and a particular kind of descriptive summary, at the end a diligent, helpful addition to the massive literature about the Age of Jackson—and Clay.

JOEL H. SILBEY
Cornell University

LARRY GARA. *The Presidency of Franklin Pierce*. (American Presidency Series.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1991. Pp. xiv, 218. \$25.00.

In a book heavily dependent on the earlier writings of Roy F. Nichols and Allan Nevins, Larry Gara attempts a new appraisal of President Franklin Pierce. In most regards, however, it is found wanting. He presents a familiar and harsh assessment of Pierce as person and as president. Gara rightly notes that Pierce was plagued by incredible personal problems: persistent alcoholism, an emotionally unstable wife, and the death of all three children, the last of whom died tragically in a train accident shortly before the beginning of Pierce's administration. Is it any wonder, then, that he was an inept, incompetent chief executive whose indecisiveness and apparent lack of relational skills marred his presidency? Gara appears

to make no effort to rehabilitate Pierce's reputation; perhaps none should have been made.

After a brief introduction, the author offers six informative chapters, two of which are devoted to the elections of 1852 and 1856. The former campaign, concedes Gara, was one of the most boring in presidential history—a point well taken. According to him, William L. Marcy should have been the Democratic candidate but instead it was Pierce, who "looked like a president" (p. 29). Curiously, Gara devotes an entire chapter to the contest of 1856 in which Pierce was not a candidate, having been denied the nomination by his Democratic Party.

In chapters 3, 4, and 5 the author ably sketches such topics as the selection of a Cabinet (a poorly unified group), Pierce's troubled relations with Congress (including Democratic opposition), and the trauma that accompanied and followed passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. It is the latter subject, including Pierce's pro-Southern prejudices, that receives careful attention. The legislation and its aftermath, laments Gara, "came to symbolize the failures of the administration" (p. 126).

Chapter 6 offers a somewhat detailed account of foreign policy in which the author focuses on the Gadsden Purchase and the acquisition of guano islands as success stories. Although expansionism revived in the decade, endeavors to secure Cuba failed; but evidently the Pierce administration merits some credit for trying.

There is no denying that Gara has faced a formidable challenge, for it is an almost thankless task to write about a failed presidency. Yet readers might have developed a greater grasp of the situation had the author dealt with Pierce's annual and veto messages, as well as his various speeches. Moreover, one might more fully appreciate Pierce's extremely difficult chore of governing an unruly party and nation if, for example, Gara had explored the provocative arguments submitted by Michael Holt in *The Political Crisis of the 1850s* (1978).

These suggestions aside, Pierce remains a pathetic figure who seemed totally lacking in the will and power to lead. Perhaps one should embrace Gara's modest claim that Pierce saved the country money and prevented fraud during his administration. Given what we know about other presidencies, Pierce should be lauded for this achievement.

PAUL H. BERGERON
University of Tennessee,
Knoxville

ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN. *Lincoln, the South, and Slavery: The Political Dimension*. (Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures in Southern History.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 128. \$19.95.

It is not surprising that Robert W. Johannsen, the author of the standard, monumental biography,

Stephen A. Douglas (1973), should now turn to the "Little Giant's" rival and beneficiary, Abraham Lincoln. Nor is it surprising that his assessment should begin and end with Douglas, or that Douglas should implicitly set the standard by which Lincoln is ultimately measured. Thirty years ago, in *Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s* (1962), Don E. Fehrenbacher observed that the "appraisal of Lincoln's motives swings back and forth between two extremes . . . Panegyrists . . . stress his lifelong hatred of human bondage and his moral indignation at the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. On the other hand . . . scholars who sympathize more with Douglas than with his anti-Nebraska critics are likely to lay emphasis upon Lincoln's self-interest and opportunism" (p. 21). Fehrenbacher was referring specifically to that part of Lincoln's career that Johannsen considers here, the period between 1854 and 1861, when Lincoln climbed to prominence and then to the presidency. The pendulum may not swing as widely these days—the panegyrists tend to concede Lincoln's ambition and the critics his moral seriousness—but that Fehrenbacher's words remain apt can be seen in Johannsen's lectures, which emphasize "Lincoln's self-interest and opportunism" throughout.

Johannsen develops two broad themes. First, Lincoln's public positions on slavery issues changed dramatically between 1854 and the end of the decade. Johannsen labels Lincoln a compromiser even after the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and he seems to interpret Lincoln's insistence on restoring the Missouri Compromise line and his general defense of the compromise spirit as a willingness to agree to new and unspecified concessions on slavery. But Lincoln's language soon grew more inflammatory and anti-southern, until by 1858 it had become indistinguishable from abolitionism. Second, whatever role principles may have played in forming Lincoln's positions, how and when he expressed them were determined by the exigencies of party politics and his own career.

Pervading Johannsen's portrait is a third theme: Lincoln was not Douglas. Douglas had a deep faith in democratic institutions and processes and a comprehensive grasp of public policy. Lincoln was a reactive, rhetorically devious, ill-informed, and self-advertising politician who was "suspicious of human nature and distrustful of mass democracy" (p. 9). His parochial outlook and stake in a sectional party prevented him from accurately measuring either the South's commitment to slavery or the seriousness of the secession crisis.

Johannsen insists that the "political dimension to Lincoln's antislavery position . . . has not been sufficiently appreciated" (p. xii). He does not elaborate this assertion, explain what sufficient appreciation might be, or identify who has failed to show it. Certainly the claim could not apply to familiar works in this vein, which he cites on other matters, by Donald W. Riddle, Reinhard Luthin, or Richard Hofstadter. Douglas himself called the public's atten-

tion to Lincoln's opportunism on slavery questions. Probably the most frequently quoted commentary on Lincoln's character by a man who knew him is William Herndon's remark that "his ambition was a little engine that knew no rest." If historians and readers of history have not appreciated the message sufficiently, it is hardly because of a lack of outspoken messengers.

GEORGE B. FORGIE
University of Texas,
Austin

WILLIAM MARVEL. *Burnside*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 514. \$29.95.

Since it was published in 1882, the standard study of Ambrose E. Burnside has been Ben Perley Poore's *The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Burnside*; it was a poor biography in most ways. Now, with this controversial book under review, William Marvel attempts—unconvincingly—a full-scale rehabilitation of Burnside, certainly one of the Civil War's most notoriously inept Union army generals. The author's notes, unfortunately, do not cite many of the standard monographs and biographies that would have given the reader a fuller understanding and wider dimension of his subject.

In dealing with Burnside's role in the First Bull Run campaign, Marvel fails to respond to the charge that Burnside was seen riding, hatless, at high speed away from the battlefield. One of the better parts of the book is the author's description and assessment of Burnside in his successful campaign along the North Carolina littoral. The author admits that "Burnside not only judged men generously rather than well, he found it next to impossible to apportion staff labor and digest the resulting information . . . Worst of all, he was a slow thinker" (p. 163).

One of the weakest sections of the study is that dealing with Antietam, where Marvel unrealistically blames George B. McClellan for Burnside's miserable effort on the Union left wing. He asks the reader to believe that "Burnside's performance at Antietam was . . . equal to that of any other corps or wing commander" (p. 150), when actually Burnside's was easily the poorest. Throughout, Marvel persistently impugns the loyalty of officers to the army, their superiors, and the Union cause if they personally felt Burnside was incompetent.

Most historians think derogatorily of Burnside's leadership of the Army of the Potomac in the ill-fated Fredericksburg Campaign of 1862. But, once again, the author tries to explain away Burnside's debacle there by trying—futilely—to blame Henry Halleck, William Franklin, and others. More accurate is the respected historian Carl Russell Fish's evaluation: "There was no . . . intention to sacrifice but, if stupidity be culpability, few generals of ancient or modern

times rank with Burnside in the guilt of manslaughter" (*The American Civil War* [1937], 281).

Marvel's best sections deal with Burnside's ablest action of the Civil War; namely, his successful defense of Knoxville, Tennessee. But the author then fails to prove his contention that, as Ninth Corps commander in the 1864 Overland Campaign in Virginia, Burnside performed well; the opposite is true. Burnside's final fiasco was at Petersburg where, in the disastrous Battle of the Crater, he chose his leading attack unit by drawing straws! Showing his poor judgment of retaining incompetent officers, Burnside permitted two of his top commanders to skulk in the rear in a bunker, one of them drunk, while their assaulting soldiers were being decimated.

In sum, despite some new information and a zealous if opinionated attempt at resurrection, the author no more succeeds in elevating Burnside's reputation as an allegedly able Union commander than do recent authors who try—also unconvincingly—to denigrate the abilities, character, and accomplishments of such generals as McClellan, Douglas MacArthur, and Robert E. Lee.

WARREN W. HASSLER, JR.
Pennsylvania State University

ANDREW ROLLE. *John Charles Frémont: Character as Destiny*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991. Pp. xv, 351. \$29.95.

This book adds new dimensions to the interpretation of John C. Frémont's character while explaining freshly his well-known activities. Andrew Rolle is fair in his treatment of this flawed personality whose deeds, possible through many fortunate opportunities, were ruined by rashness. As psychohistorian, Rolle calls his historical method a "relatively cautious psychiatric approach" (p. xiii). He believes that Frémont's illegitimacy, which Frémont never mentioned, and unusual parental relations caused his strong reactions to authority. Frémont acted on impulse in crises. With the early loss of supportive parents, he attempted to compensate through a life of action and nearly constant motion.

Frémont's positive side is not neglected, especially his real contribution as geographer rather than explorer. His second expedition west became a model for trans-Mississippi exploration. We also see how Frémont developed his antislavery position.

Rolle presents a keen analysis of Jessie Benton Frémont, that remarkable woman from a powerful family who dedicated a half century to promoting, defending, and publishing in her husband's behalf. She ignored his philandering, and in their later years, when Frémont's rashness had lost his, her, and their children's treasure, lived by writings that embroiled his myth.

Frémont was fortunate in his sponsors, Joel R.

Poinsett, Joseph N. Nicollet, Thomas Hart Benton, and several American presidents, and his admirers on the trail and in the army. This charismatic man, like the Roosevelts and Kennedys later, was either greatly admired or hated, with few neutral sentiments expressed. Yet, as a loner who loved the wilderness and excitement, blessed with perfect historic timing during his treks, he was sold on his own greatness, never admitted error, often blamed others for his sometimes fatal mistakes, and was devoid of guilt even for those who lost from his harebrained mining and railroad schemes. He possessed no skills as a businessman. His last two expeditions, in winter, were disastrous and offered little useful data.

Frémont made many enemies, including Charles Wilkes, Stephen W. Kearny, and his one-time friends, the politically powerful Blairs, and yet many men of his expeditions, notably Kit Carson, always offered fulsome praise.

In later life, his "character as destiny" destroyed his opportunities to excel, including his Las Mariposas mining grant activities, his campaign as first Republican presidential candidate (which even Benton would not support), and his territorial governorship of Arizona, in which he spent more time seeking his own gain than the region's. As a "political" general during the Civil War, he freed Missouri's slaves, thus nearly losing the state, and Abraham Lincoln had to remove him twice, although he was hesitant to demote a man politically popular with midwestern German voters. Even at his end, Frémont failed; he had just acquired his army pension when he died in 1890.

The author concludes that sometimes Frémont was more dupe than villain, for his lack of self-control made him reach beyond his capabilities. Trusting few, he seldom accepted sage advice. He was his own worst enemy.

This absorbing volume, which includes important facts and episodes not so fully researched or presented in earlier biographies, corrects previous historians' errors and omissions. There are extensive footnotes and a useful selected bibliography.

JOHN E. BAUR
*California State University,
Northridge*

ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR. *The Civil War in the American West*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1991. Pp. xiv, 448. \$27.50.

When historians of the Civil War write about the "West," they mean primarily the region between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. When historians of the American West write about the "West," they often debate the meaning and the usefulness of the word itself. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., knows where his West is—the region between the

Mississippi River and the Pacific Ocean—and his book contends that neither western historians nor Civil War historians have adequately understood the importance of the Civil War to that vast area.

The war Josephy presents in careful detail comprised campaigns and battles between Federals and Confederates, the war of western whites and the U.S. government against various Indian tribes, and the vicious, irregular—or, charitably labeled, “guerrilla”—conflicts. Compared to the fighting in the major battles between armies of the North and the South, the war in the West involved small numbers with few casualties. But Josephy’s case for the significance of the western war does not rely mainly on the size of the armed groups. Nor does he argue that the trans-Mississippi theater dramatically affected the outcome of the war. Instead, Josephy presents the four years of bitter violence as the exemplar or the charter for the rapid, indiscriminate, no-holds-barred conquest of the West, in all senses of the word “conquest.” The spirit of righteous wrath and sweeping devastation that prevailed in the eastern war not only worked in the West but also remained strong for many years after 1865.

Within a roughly chronological scheme, Josephy arranges his book in five parts that are both regional and topical. Part 1 traces the secession of Texas and the struggle for New Mexico, in which Texans had their eyes on the ore fields of Colorado and points westward; part 2 describes the Sioux uprising in Minnesota and the suppression of it, extending far beyond the Indians originally involved; part 3 narrates Nathaniel P. Banks’s Red River campaign in Louisiana; part 4 is a panoramic survey of the ways in which westerners made the Civil War a war for dispossession of Indians, climaxing in confinement of the Mescaleros and the Navajos at the bleak Bosque Redondo reservation and in a massacre at Sand Creek; part 5 focuses on the war in Missouri and environs. The Missouri story, one of the most gruesome in a gruesome war, ends the book fittingly. It casts a lurid glow back over the preceding chapters, imprinting on the reader’s mind Josephy’s main theme: the fixing of a continent’s future by violence.

Josephy’s book is a work of synthesis, drawing on a large secondary literature and on published primary sources. It brings together, with sophistication and economy, a diverse array of intricate stories. While tracing the warmakers’ actions, Josephy also consistently recalls their visions of western wealth: agricultural expansion, gold and silver and other minerals, the profits of trade and transportation. The fighters were few, the struggle was often squalid, but the stakes were incalculably great. Josephy powerfully argues that the Civil War was the prototypical means for fulfilling grand ambitions.

CHARLES ROYSTER
Louisiana State University

MONROE LEE BILLINGTON. *New Mexico’s Buffalo Soldiers, 1866–1900*. Niwot: University Press of Colorado. 1991. Pp. xvii, 258. \$29.95.

Monroe Lee Billington maintains that black soldiers between 1866 and 1900 made significant contributions to the development of the western frontier generally and specifically to the development of the New Mexico Territory. These contributions (mainly fighting Indians) were made despite a host of obstacles including poor equipment, inferior animals, inadequate housing, and racial prejudice.

It was during the post-Civil War period that black men were included for the first time in the regular army. The post-Civil War army largely engaged in Indian Wars, was less respected compared to the Civil War military, Billington notes, and was comprised of lower-class urban workers, European immigrants, and blacks. In 1866 Congress passed a bill to reorganize the army. The reorganization included the establishment of four black units, the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry and the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry. Despite the fact that these were black units, they were commanded by white officers. Noncommissioned officers for these units were black. White and black soldiers nevertheless often served at posts concurrently. Black soldiers comprised approximately one-tenth of the army’s effective strength and in some western states accounted for one-half of the available military force. Billington notes that black soldiers were stationed in the relatively desolate and remote frontier because they were not welcomed in the more populous areas of the East.

The author provides much detail regarding military life and the battles with Indians in the New Mexico Territory during the years from 1866 to 1900. Some 3,000 black soldiers served at eleven of the sixteen forts in the New Mexico Territory. Their primary objective was to subdue the Indians. This they did, participating in the two major campaigns against Apache Chief Victorio and later his follower Nana. Black soldiers were often cited for bravery and eighteen black soldiers were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism during the Indian Wars; of this number eight served in New Mexico Indian Wars.

According to Billington, the day-to-day life of black soldiers did not differ markedly from their white counterparts. It was often a monotonous and tedious existence. Alcohol abuse was a problem among all troops, but at Fort Bayard it was cited as a particularly serious problem among black troops. The military establishment, however, did not take any responsibility for this development nor design any programs for rehabilitation. Desertion rates among black soldiers were considerably lower than among whites. The author speculates that this was due to a better life for black men inside the military than outside. One unique aspect of military life for the black troops was the establishment of educational programs by chap-

lains assigned to black units. The Army Reorganization Act of 1866 authorized the appointment of chaplains to black regiments. Aside from the religious duties they performed, the chaplains implemented educational programs and schools. Initially, only white chaplains were appointed; one notable exception, however, was Allen Allensworth, an educated black Baptist minister assigned to the Twenty-fourth Infantry at Fort Bayard. Allensworth was successful and his schools contributed to the moral and educational uplift of the black soldier.

While Billington's emphasis is mainly centered on the combat and camp life of black troops, he does mention how black soldiers interacted with the broader society. He cites the success and popularity of the regiment bands: the Twenty-fourth Infantry band played for President Benjamin Harrison and the Ninth Cavalry band played for President Rutherford B. Hayes when they traveled in New Mexico. Billington also shows that black troops, like their white counterparts, were used as strikebreakers and peacekeepers during civilian unrest. Their use in this capacity was not welcomed and often was greeted by protest on racial grounds.

The major strength of this work is Billington's concluding chapter analyzing prejudice and discrimination encountered by the black troops, both inside the military and from the civilian society. They were generally issued inferior equipment, food, and other supplies, and obvious discrimination occurred in the recruitment and promotion of black officers. Black troops were often the targets of attacks by local newspapers, their abilities as soldiers were constantly scrutinized, and yet the black soldiers persevered and achieved despite such obstacles.

Billington is thorough in describing the role and contributions of black soldiers during the Indian Wars in the New Mexico Territory. This work contributes to the recent work that details the successes of and the discrimination faced by blacks in the military during the post-Civil War era. Had Billington relied more on the perspective from the black soldier, his study would have been enhanced. Also, it would have been enlightening to learn of the legacy of the black soldier's early presence in New Mexico.

GERALD W. PATTON

Commission on Institutions of Higher Education
North Central Association of Colleges and Schools
Chicago, Illinois

JOSEPH M. WHITE. *The Diocesan Seminary in the United States: A History from the 1780s to the Present*. (Notre Dame Studies in American Catholicism.) Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1989. Pp. xv, 489. \$29.95.

Joseph M. White provides a study attractive for anyone interested in how the clergy of the Roman

Catholic church in the United States have been, and continue to be, trained. The book offers more than an institutional account of U.S. diocesan seminaries. White combines school histories with an engaging analysis of their various theological bases (or lack of them). In 1563 the Council of Trent mandated institutional arrangements for priestly training, but "not the model of priesthood to inform the content of training" (p. 9). By the 1700s, French clergy developed seminary training that identified priests-to-be with Christ, especially Christ as victim. The earliest U.S. seminaries relied on French sources. In 1791, priests of the Society of St. Sulpice arrived from Paris to set up what became exemplars for later American seminaries. St. Mary's Seminary in Baltimore and St. Charles College near Ellicott City were "freestanding" schools attended only by clerical students. Mount St. Mary's College and Seminary at Emmitsburg combined a program of priestly training with a lay college.

This was not what the Council of Trent intended. Here we find another theme that White explores: the tension between the ministerial experience of the local church and Vatican decrees intended for universal application. Thus, in 1884 the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore proposed its own ideal, a priest "possessing the professional skills appropriate for the tasks of ministry in the United States" (p. 235). Two decades later, Pope Pius X challenged the notion that dedication to serving others measured priestly merit. He insisted on an ardent devotional life. To some this seemed more practical for monks than for secular priests. By now static scholasticism, authoritarian teaching, emphasis on humility and obedience, near military subjection to the local bishop, and disdain for learning as a vain pursuit dominated the training of most U.S. priests. In some of his most interesting pages, White shows how U.S. Catholic intellectual leaders tried to rectify this condition.

Meanwhile, efforts of seminary administrators to conform their institutions to contemporary U.S. educational ideals gradually transformed their schools. Once "conducted solely according to church law," they became "academic and professional institutions subscribing to educational standards outside church control" (p. 388). The Second Vatican Council's recovery of the idea of the diocese as a local church headed by the bishop helped by priests offered a new vision. The priest was no longer "a solitary figure representing Christ" (p. 407); now he was to be viewed as united with his bishop and brother priests in service to the local church. Still, White concludes, the Council of Trent's original omission of a model of the priest has yet to be corrected. Restoration of the permanent diaconate and new ministerial roles for the laity have only complicated the task.

JOHN WHITNEY EVANS
College of St. Scholastica

SUSANNE KLINGENSTEIN. *Jews in the American Academy, 1900–1940: The Dynamics of Intellectual Assimilation*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1991. Pp. xxii, 248. \$35.00.

Susanne Klingenstein's blend of biography with intellectual and cultural history traces the impact of the arrival of selected immigrant Jewish intellectuals in the American academy. She argues persuasively that the interplay between bondage and freedom—following an elegant explication of a talmudic passage, she uses the Hebrew terms *harut* (graven, referring to the tablets of the Law) and *herut* (freedom)—“is the single most important dichotomy in the complex response of Jewish academics” (p. xvii) to their transition from Jewish intellectuality to the elite culture of the American university. She studies the assimilation strategies of eight Jewish philosophers and literary figures. Their varied and even opposing responses to the freedom of America, embodied in its literature and learning, reveals the persistence of Jewish intellectuality in the dichotomizing structure of their thought, or what Klingenstein calls their “intellectual grammar.” By juxtaposing diverse individuals—Morris R. Cohen and Horace Kallen, Ludwig Lewisohn and Lionel Trilling—she suggests a commonality in their intellectual assimilation despite their divergent biographies and opposing commitments within the Jewish world.

Klingenstein chooses her thinkers with care. They are all—except for Trilling—part of a generation born abroad in the 1880s who received a Jewish education that profoundly influenced their modes of thought. “The obligation to recognize and implement distinctions in all areas of life had an enormous impact on the intellect of the Jewish people” (p. xv). Thus, these immigrant intellectuals, responding to American freedom, creatively reinterpreted America—their consent community—and Judaism—their descent culture—because they could not completely escape the intellectual inheritance of the latter. The transformative effect of American culture and English and American literature on Jews appears most vividly among the philosophers and literary figures, those who attended the elite universities (Harvard and Columbia). Although she briefly mentions some of the influential Jewish social scientists, such as Franz Boas and Edward Sapir, Klingenstein focuses on the more dramatic story. Yet her necessary decision to narrow the terms of cultural discourse ultimately raises questions regarding the applicability of her analysis beyond the confines of her representative men.

Klingenstein's strength lies in her interpretive skills, her ability to read insightfully the autobiographies and essays, to present them as a coherent response to what on the surface appears to be chaotic discontinuities. Readers probably will be most impressed by her discussion of those individuals whose thought they know, for then they can appreciate her

choice of texts and originality of interpretation. Her reading of Kallen impressed me; she integrates the analyses of other scholars into an original synthesis. I also appreciated the attention devoted to Lewisohn (despite his brief stay in the academy). An undeservedly neglected figure, Lewisohn had a mercurial career that deserves serious consideration. Discussion of the dynamics of American Jewish intellectual assimilation in the years prior to World War II is incomplete without him.

Klingenstein not only chronicles a series of influential academic journeys but her thoughtful study also heralds the academic arrival of a fine young scholar.

DEBORAH DASH MOORE
Vassar College

HENRY WARNER BOWDEN. *Church History in an Age of Uncertainty: Historiographical Patterns in the United States, 1906–1990*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 279.

This volume is a lucid and perceptive analysis of historiographical patterns in church history in America during the twentieth century. Henry Warner Bowden is particularly well qualified to assess the field, for he is the author of *Church History in the Age of Science* (1971), a survey of nineteenth-century historiography of church history.

It is important to clarify Bowden's approach, for it can be subject to misunderstanding. By church history Bowden means the writing of the history of Christianity. The twenty-five historians he discusses are all scholars who worked in the United States, most of them at theological seminaries or university-based divinity schools. Perhaps because Bowden's own research and writing has focused on American materials, the majority of his sample of scholars are historians of the American church. This is not, however, a volume on the historiography of American religion or a volume on the American historiography of religion in general.

Bowden's story chronicles the shattering of the ideal of church history as a science or as a partner of theology, and its emergence as one form of a larger historical inquiry. Throughout the twentieth century, church historians were influenced by movements in the field of history and to a lesser extent by trends in theology. By the late twentieth century, Bowden makes clear, church history is a subject area explored by a diversity of historical methods, not a particular methodology governed by ecclesiastical interests.

Bowden organizes his discussion into schools of interpretation, focusing on representative historians from each school, and his discussion moves chronologically through the century. Until the 1930s, he argues, church historians largely resisted the challenges to the scientific understanding of history inherited from the nineteenth century. They also con-

tinued to write church history as either an apologetic for theology or as an introduction to constructive statements of Christian belief.

When Carl L. Becker and Charles A. Beard attacked the idea of historical objectivity in the 1920s and 1930s, the ground shifted perceptibly. The most notable attempt to reconstruct church history in theological terms borrowed from Karl Barth and the broad, neo-orthodox movement in theology, but even this school was eventually eclipsed. The era since the 1930s marks what Bowden calls the modern period, in which "scholars acknowledge that every investigation contains some subjective elements" (p. 222). They employ a variety of interpretive frames of reference and diverse methodologies. "In these matters," Bowden writes, "they differ not one bit from other historians who comprise many subsections in the historical profession" (p. 222). Church history in the modern period, according to Bowden, falls into four broad categories: works that explore the cultural significance of Christianity, explorations of the theological significance of the church's role in history, analyses of ecclesiastical influences on cultural values, and histories of the church as the embodiment of central ideas.

Bowden's treatment of individual historians is charitable, even when he clearly considers a particular approach to be misguided. Disappointing, however, is the absence of a broader frame of reference for talking about the relationship between church history, the history of religion, and the larger historical task. For example, when Henry F. May heralded "the recovery of American religious history" (*AHR* 70 [1964], 79–92), he was celebrating work done by both church historians and historians who saw religion as an important element in American history. The same case could be made for the study of Christianity in other cultures as well. The ferment and diversity of methodologies and interpretations are richer and broader than Bowden's categories allowed him to treat. The range of approaches and the astonishing variety of disciplines that are now used to study the history of Christianity make the field far richer but also render church history almost impossible to define with clarity.

Bowden's work is a graceful and insightful survey of this century's and this nation's church historians. It will provide an anchor for historians trying to understand how they have conceived their task.

JOHN M. MULDER

Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary

DAVID B. PARKER. *Alias Bill Arp: Charles Henry Smith and the South's "Goodly Heritage."* Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1991. Pp. xix, 197. \$30.00.

Bill Arp was the pen name of Charles Henry Smith, a Georgia humorist who wrote columns, primarily for the *Atlanta Constitution*, from 1861 until 1903. David

B. Parker's book has the relatively modest goal of analyzing Arp's ideas about several of the main themes in the culture of the postbellum South. Arguing that the few previous scholars who have examined Arp have depicted him as a contented teller of rustic rural stories, Parker sees more complexity in the columnist's work. This book reads as a case study in what C. Vann Woodward has called "the divided mind of the New South."

Parker devotes almost a third of his brief volume to a straightforward biography that shows Smith to have had what was in most ways an unexceptional life. Born in Georgia in 1826, Smith became a lawyer, small slaveowner, Presbyterian churchgoer, local politician, member of the Chamber of Commerce and later a Confederate staff member, Klansman, newspaper editor, devoted gardener, and popular columnist and lecturer. Parker does a good job showing the tremendous popularity of Arp's weekly columns.

The main argument of the book is that "just as [Arp] had one foot planted in the Old South, he had another in the New" (p. 109). Parker's main contribution is to describe the tensions between the support Arp showed for industrial growth, railroads, and scientific agriculture, and the folksy author's fears of the price of economic progress. The South's "goodly heritage" was a broad tradition of honesty, hard work, the personal independence of farm life, small-town friendliness, family morality, small government, paternalistic race relations, and a general contentment. The problems of the New South included idleness, ambition, big government, the impersonality and crime of city life, a rapid decline in personal morality, and a growing gap between the behavior of obedient former slaves and the wild and disrespectful young freed slaves. Parker stresses that Arp, far more than most New South spokespersons, was genuinely troubled by new developments and did not merely glorify the Old South as a way to justify the New. Arp emerges as a cranky old man unhappy with change but unsure what to do about it.

As a case study of cultural tension, the book is a success. But the work has two main weaknesses. One is Parker's tendency to raise intriguing questions that he leaves unresolved. He adeptly shows the tensions in Arp's attitude toward the New South, but he does not show how Arp tried to reconcile them. He sees the need to analyze Arp's relationship to his readers, but he fails to do so. He writes that "by taking on the comic persona, Smith could write more freely saying things that might otherwise have gone unsaid" (p. 75), but he fails to analyze the significance humor had in Arp's work. This constitutes the volume's greatest omission. By trying so hard to take Arp seriously, Parker does not address what may be most important about him. Because Parker does not focus on the humor of his subject, Arp seems awfully bland and his opinions so conventional that one might wonder why so many people read his work. Surely a crucial feature of a satirist who adopted the style of a Georgia

cracker, who intentionally misspelled many of his words, and who used quaint anecdotes and personal and family reminiscences to make his points, was humor. Parker misses a great opportunity to study Arp's relationship to his readers by failing to speculate about why his audience found his work so funny. Arp was his day's Lewis Grizzard, another cranky southern satirist, and both Grizzard and Arp owed their popularity far less to their ideas than to the unique ability of humor to make audiences feel superior and secure.

TED OWNBY
University of Mississippi

STEPHEN CRESSWELL. *Mormons and Cowboys, Moonshiners and Klansmen: Federal Law Enforcement in the South and West, 1870–1893*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1991. Pp. viii, 323. \$35.95.

Stephen Cresswell, although not explicitly addressing the issues of political science state-building theory, deepens American historians' current effort to "bring the state back in." He examines a major agency of the national government, the Department of Justice, and its efforts to enforce federal law in the face of widespread citizen resistance. He reveals the limits of the "center's" ability to extend its authority to the "periphery" as well as the conditions under which national authority was successfully asserted in the late nineteenth century.

Beginning with the Civil War, the number of legally defined federal crimes steadily increased. The Department of Justice's marshals arrested violators, district attorneys prosecuted them, and district judges heard federal criminal cases. Other agencies, particularly the post office, treasury, and army, worked with Justice to track down and punish federal criminals.

There have been studies of episodes and specific agencies of federal law enforcement but no general history of the Department of Justice since Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland's *Federal Justice* (1937). Cresswell's book is not a comprehensive history but is valuable because it focuses on the officials on the front lines of particularly difficult enforcement campaigns and how local citizens responded to their efforts.

Cresswell's case studies examine two southern states and two western territories. He chooses the South and West because citizen resistance to distant central authority was greatest in these peripheral regions. The only clearly successful assertion of national authority was the crackdown on Mormon polygamy in Utah, because it was backed by widespread condemnation among non-Mormons, congressional determination to outlaw the practice, and presidential will to enforce the laws. Battling the Ku Klux Klan in northern Mississippi was a losing war against violence. Prosecuting Tennessee moonshiners looked

successful on paper only because the high number of convictions concealed lenient sentencing. The record of prosecution of outlaw "cowboys" and other violators of federal laws in Arizona was mixed, with some successes but continuing citizen resentment. Generally Cresswell blames unimpressive results on inadequate congressional appropriations for federal law enforcement; attorneys general who rarely assisted the district attorneys with useful legal advice in difficult cases; and federal district judges who reflected local attitudes rather than national standards. The bottom line, though, was the unwillingness, sometimes forced by violence and intimidation, of local citizens to cooperate as witnesses or jurors.

Cresswell reveals how political history, even administrative history, is intimately linked to social history. He demonstrates that authority and law reflect both the conceptions and activities of representatives of the state at the top and the customs and responses of citizens at the bottom. His book will be of interest to historians of state development as well as southern and western specialists.

WILBUR R. MILLER
*State University of New York,
Stony Brook*

JOHN N. INGHAM. *Making Iron and Steel: Independent Mills in Pittsburgh, 1820–1920*. (Historical Perspectives on Business Enterprise Series.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 297. \$45.00.

In this volume John N. Ingham highlights the vitality of small and mid-sized manufacturing firms in the nation's most dynamic industry. Frustrated by the prevailing Chandlerian preoccupation with huge, capital intensive, integrated mass producers, Ingham counters with a close look at the resilient independent iron and steel firms in Pittsburgh between 1820 and 1920. These moderate-sized businesses found product and market niches that allowed them to survive and even multiply in the face of an organizational and technological revolution. Masters of the local economy as early as the 1850s, the iron barons and their mercantile partners became Pittsburgh's elite. A self-conscious upper class, they jealously guarded entry into their social world. Rising with the Republican Party, this elite held the reins of political power; when waves of immigrants flooded the city, they used progressive rhetoric and reforms to maintain and even extend their dominance. In short, the barons "remained lords of all they surveyed" (p. 190).

This book draws on two sets of mid-nineteenth to early twentieth-century data: a listing of all the independent mills, their choice of technique, and volume of output; and a roster of all mill owners, their representation in selected social registers, and an assigned family rank. The roster of mill owners divides the mill families into elite, core, noncore, and marginal categories based on a method devised and

described by Ingham in an earlier book, *The Iron Barons* (1978). Armed with this information, Ingham measures the persistence of firms and, with selected examples, explains how the independent firms survived. After two bruising experiences, independent iron and steel manufacturers avoided head-to-head competition with Carnegie Steel. Because Andrew Carnegie did not benefit from economies of scale in puddling, crucible steelmaking, or the open hearth process, smaller, nonintegrated firms could profitably employ these techniques to supply niche markets with highly specialized wares. These were the typical iron and steel firms of their day, accounting for more of Pittsburgh's employment and productive capacity than the newly formed U.S. Steel.

More than scale separated these iron barons from the Carnegie men. While Carnegie engaged in rabid antiunionism that led to violence, the independents grudgingly accepted Amalgamated unions and enjoyed relatively peaceful labor relations. This entrenched elite shunned Carnegie and his lieutenants, excluding them from Pittsburgh's social and cultural swirl. The Carnegie interests avoided local politics, perhaps because they knew that the entrenched elite would blunt demands for government regulation of business and expenditures for social welfare.

This volume owes much to Philip Scranton's pioneering book *Proprietary Capitalism* (1983). It demonstrates once again that industrialization involved more than the simple progression of scale and technique. To re-create our history we need to study small businesses as well as large ones. But we also need to recognize that the independent iron and steel enterprises were not typical small businesses. With their demands for inanimate power, sizable physical plant, and working capital, iron firms discouraged entry by those who possessed only luck, pluck, and diligence. Escalating costs of entry limited the number of potential entrants to those who had ready access to capital, while retained earnings and intermarriage enabled the pre-Civil War elite families to bequeath their positions to the next generation and beyond.

DIANE LINDSTROM
University of Wisconsin,
Madison

CRANDALL A. SHIFFLETT. *Coal Towns: Life, Work, and Culture in Company Towns of Southern Appalachia, 1880-1960*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1991. Pp. xx, 259.

This book is intended as a revisionist study of Appalachian coal company towns. Instead of being oppressive and exploitive, as previous historians claim, coal mining offered the Appalachians work, and company towns gave them a better life style, Crandall A. Shifflett argues. Harmony, a strong sense of community, and positive feelings about both the town and

the company were the norm. Anticompany feelings and anticompany behavior such as strikes and violence were the aberrations.

Arranged topically rather than chronologically, the study is divided into four parts. Part 1 discusses preindustrial Appalachia that, according to the author, was a worse place to live and work than the company town. Part 2 explores the coming of the coal companies and the making of the company town. Part 3 examines the union. Part 4 looks at coal towns as social and cultural communities and the activities of the miners and their families within them.

The book has some commendable aspects. Shifflett makes extensive use of both oral histories and coal company records for his research. Especially well told and documented are the rise of several southern Appalachian coal companies and the early methods of mining coal.

As a revisionist study, however, the book is weak. There is no effort to reinterpret the dynamics of the coal town or the interaction between company officials and coal miners. Shifflett merely tells what was good about the towns and leaves out the bad: the deadly mine explosions, the unsanitary conditions, the mine guard system and the beating and murders of union organizers, black lists and housing contracts, coal company scrip and monopolistic company store prices, the companies' refusal to put checkweighmen at their mines, and all those other things that produced Bloody Mingo, the Armed March on Logan, the Matewan Massacre, Bloody Harlan, and other events that characterized the Appalachian coal fields until the coming of the union in the 1930s.

In trying to make his revisionist case about life and culture in the coal camps, Shifflett leans heavily on oral histories. "Most striking about former miners and their families are their positive recollections of life and work in [the] company town" (p. 150), he writes, and the "perspectives of former miners on life in the company town sometimes contrast sharply with conventional images of company towns" (p. xiv).

Oral histories give a nostalgia about company towns that belies the actions of their inhabitants: open and expressed opposition and hostility to the system. The contradiction between the nostalgia and the reality is certainly worthy of exploration. Shifflett, however, ignores the miners' protests against the system and dwells instead on their fond memories.

The author decries "generalizations about the 'average' company town" (p. 9), but his book is filled with sweeping generalizations and, too often, he provides no supporting evidence for the broad assertions. "Coal companies prohibited the use of the church for labor agitation," he contends, "but it is doubtful that the miners were troubled by that to any great extent" (p. 197). "There is little evidence that mine work mitigated social prejudice against immigrants and blacks" (p. xv). Abundant evidence exists to the contrary of each assertion and other historians have cited it.

The book generalizes over place and time as it jumps around, ignoring important variables. At one point, it discusses conditions in the Virginia coal fields (which experienced little violence) then moves to Tennessee (which experienced some), then to West Virginia (which experienced great violence).

Without chronological development, the reader is presented with a photograph rather than a video of the evolving, dynamic cultures that did develop in the Appalachian coal field. Shiflett leaps back and forth between the pre-union and post-union eras, and pre-New Deal and post-New Deal periods. The union and the New Deal changed Appalachian coal towns so drastically and so fundamentally that the transformation must be accounted for in discussions of coal field societies. In other words, there were two distinctly different cultures—a pre-union, pre-New Deal culture, and a post-union, post-New Deal culture. The yellow dog contract, the scrip system, the mine guard system, and all those other special ingredients that made up southern Appalachian coal company towns were suddenly gone. Also gone were company housing and the coal companies' right to evict striking miners and their families. This has to be accounted for; otherwise, we are left with the image of coal towns being static societies, which they were not.

The company store may have served as an important social center, both in pre-union and post-union eras, as the author argues. But did the miners' image of the company store change with the coming of the union and the New Deal? Both eliminated the harshest features of the company store system. Did the miners' image change from what they called a "pluck me store" to something more favorable and positive? Did leisure time activities change with the coming of the union and the New Deal? Again, minimal attention is given to the change.

The study will serve as a reference book for the development of the coal industry and coal towns in southern Appalachia. But most readers expecting a reinterpretation of life, work, and culture in the coal towns will probably be disappointed.

DAVID A. CORBIN

U.S. Senate Democratic Policy Committee

PETER R. KNIGHTS. *Yankee Destinies: The Lives of Ordinary Nineteenth-Century Bostonians*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xxv, 281. \$34.95.

This volume, Peter R. Knights modestly begins, "is the second and concluding report on research that began in the fall of 1965," the first part of which appeared as *The Plain People of Boston* (1971). Knights chooses to study the lives of "ordinary people" (p. 2) in mid-nineteenth-century America by selecting two samples of native-born, white-male household heads with native parents who were listed in the federal

manuscript census schedules for Boston in 1860 (10 percent sample) and 1870 (11 percent sample). He then traces the lives of his 2,808 subjects backward to birth and forward to death, gathering information on migration, marriage, occupation, wealth, and health. The book explores these data topically, beginning with his respondents' origins and migration to Boston (only 23 percent were Boston natives). He proceeds to explicate marriage and occupational patterns, accidents and crime reported in news accounts, outmigration and death.

The mid-nineteenth-century Yankee Bostonian males married at an average age of 26.3 years. Their brides averaged 22.9 years old. About 54 percent owned less than \$200 worth of property and thus paid no local tax beyond a \$1.50 poll tax. Still, these Yankees were an elite group since 69 percent of Boston's voters paid no other taxes. Just under a third of these men were skilled workers; another quarter were proprietors. They died at about age 70, twenty-five years on average after the census sample date. Sixty percent died in Boston; 23 percent in Massachusetts but beyond the commuting distance from Boston. The richest third of men assessed taxes (only 15 percent of the sample) died at age 74.

Reading this book is like entering a time warp, in two different ways. First, Knights effectively and precisely describes the determinants of life for Yankee Bostonian men in the mid-nineteenth century while simultaneously sprinkling often hilarious anecdotes and quotes throughout the text to illustrate their world. Second, the methods and aims of social history have changed since Knights began his project in 1972, during the heyday of local community and mobility studies. Then, mainframe computers and IBM punch cards were the technology at hand. Knights embarked on a searching and record-linkage project that most historians considered impractical—if not downright crazy. Seventeen years later, he emerges with his impressive data set and analysis, a bit like Rip van Winkle facing a new world. Knowing how difficult his task would be, Knights quite sensibly decided at the time to limit his samples to people he had the best chance of finding: native-born, white-male household heads of native parents. In the meantime, the history of labor, women, and African Americans has enlarged our definition of "ordinary" Americans. Microcomputers, and public use microdata samples for the censuses of 1880, 1900, 1910, and 1940 to the present, have revolutionized the historian's ability to analyze census data. Serious proposals exist for computerizing all nineteenth-century census schedules with the help of supercomputers and scanning equipment (see Vernon Burton and Terence Finnegan, "Supercomputing and the U.S. Manuscript Census," *Social Science Computer Review* 9 [Spring 1991], 1–12).

Knights's work reminds us of an earlier time. Questions were simpler; the technology was less developed and the field was new. Nevertheless, this is a

useful study, precisely because Knights explains his methods and their strengths and weaknesses. His technical appendices describe linkage methods, estimate census undercounts, and evaluate the variety of records he used. These, along with the data themselves, ensure the success of the book, as social historians continue to ponder the question of writing the history of ordinary Americans.

MARGO ANDERSON
University of Wisconsin,
Milwaukee

RONALD A. PETRIN. *French Canadians in Massachusetts Politics, 1885–1915: Ethnicity and Political Pragmatism*. Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses. 1990. Pp. 234. \$37.50.

Ronald A. Petrin disagrees with the older interpretation that, as a result of clashes with the Irish on economic and religious matters, French Canadians resident in the United States gravitated toward the Republican Party after 1892. He argues that the French Canadians leaned toward the Democratic Party in presidential and gubernatorial elections. The situation was more fluid at the local level, but there too the French Canadians gave more support to Democrats than many scholars have believed.

Much of Petrin's book involves an examination of voting and officeholding patterns in different kinds of French Canadian settlements. More than 40 percent of the French-Canadian population in Massachusetts in 1895 resided in six cities—Fall River, Lowell, Holyoke, Worcester, New Bedford, and Lawrence—where they made up an average of 18 percent of the whole population. In an additional twelve cities, the French Canadians made up an average of 13 percent of the overall population. Finally, numbers of French Canadians, particularly of the second generation, lived in secondary towns, many of which had been established in central Massachusetts before the Civil War and had not shared in the expansion of the postwar years.

Compared with other ethnic groups, French Canadians were slow to naturalize. The proximity of Canada and the requirement that voters know English helped keep down to 35 percent the proportion of French Canadians in Massachusetts who were citizens in 1910. Nevertheless, French Canadians gradually came to accept the idea that becoming American did not inevitably entail a rejection of their heritage. Indeed, French-Canadian spokespersons strongly expressed a pluralist vision of what integration into the United States should mean.

Petrin believes that pragmatism drove the French-Canadian response to American politics. At all times the ethnic group's leaders were eager to guarantee the survival of their Catholic faith, their French language, and their French-Canadian customs. In the early years of immigration, many encouraged the

isolation of the community as the best way to achieve "*la survivance*." With the passage of time, however, the idea of permanent settlement became stronger, and middle-class French Canadians became more engaged in the affairs of the broader community. Participation in politics then became a means of protecting the interests of the group and of gaining recognition for it.

When French Canadians held the balance of power, Republicans could often entice their support by affording them access to local office. Hence, a majority of French-Canadian officeholders at the turn of the century belonged to the G.O.P. The Republicans, however, were reluctant to give the French Canadians their due and alliances between the two groups were fragile. In general, therefore, French-Canadian voters found value in the Democrats' sympathy for immigrants and Catholics and, despite occasional rivalries with them, French Canadians often cooperated with Irish Democrats when common interests were at stake.

The principal shortcoming of Petrin's book lies in his use of quantitative evidence. His conclusion regarding the propensity of the French to vote Democratic is probably correct. Substantiating it by referring to correlations between higher proportions of French Canadians in the population and higher percentages of Democratic voters, however, runs afoul of the ecological fallacy of inferring individual behavior from aggregated data.

THOMAS J. ARCHDEACON
University of Wisconsin,
Madison

STEVEN FRASER. *Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor*. New York: Free Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 688. \$29.95.

Steven Fraser has discovered in the career of Sidney Hillman the perfect vehicle to develop a new synthesis of labor history and political history that is a splendid interpretation of the roles of labor and the state in the history of American liberalism in the first half of the twentieth century. Hillman's emergence as a "labor statesman" in the 1930s and 1940s was the culmination of a career that started as a young Russian Jewish immigrant in the garment trades of Chicago. Intelligent and ambitious, Hillman saw early the particular needs of the American industrial situation for a union structure that was industrial, able to unite workers across ethnic divisions, and capable of using the political process to further labor's goals. He founded the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and molded it into a modern industrial union and was present at the founding of the CIO as the labor formation that would play a major role within the New Deal. He guided labor's progress toward private and public recognition during the defense industry production of World War II and

helped to make the labor movement a mainstay of the Democratic Party's political coalition. He was eulogized at his death in 1946 as "one of the greatest labor statesmen of all time" (p. 573).

Fraser argues that Hillman both understood and became comfortable with an economy shifting from an emphasis on production to consumption, an emphasis crucial for labor to understand; labor's progress in such a world would be measured by the increased standard of living available to workers as consumers rather than the control of production available to them as producers. Fraser convincingly demonstrates that Hillman fashioned a role for labor through the legislation of the New Deal and the formation of the CIO that was based on labor's consuming role as part of a welfare state, a role that helped keep the economy prosperous through broad-based consumption. Labor thus became part of a political mass culture asserting an ever-increasing claim to the material good life rather than an exploited class claiming rights as producers to build a workers' commonwealth. The government where labor sat at the table was not one where labor ruled, nor was it one where labor's influence was immune to shifting patterns of power and influence in the nation at large.

Hillman directed labor closer to the political process, emphasizing the power of voting as just as significant as the power of the strike. In 1944 he created a CIO Political Action Committee devoted to returning Franklin D. Roosevelt to the White House for a fourth term and to keeping labor's voice lively and loud in policy-making circles. At the same time that his political action committee was credited by some with securing Roosevelt's victory, labor's voice within the government and the country was already weakening. When he died, some saw Hillman as a sell-out bureaucrat who had forgotten his roots, others viewed him as a far too powerful representative of labor within national government, and still others regarded him as the labor statesman who had succeeded in gaining a respectable cooperation between labor, progressive businessmen, and a benevolent New Deal. Fraser contends that however far Hillman may have traveled into the bureaucratic maze, he never lost the belief that the labor movement could "rescue society from selfishness, exploitation, and organized violence" (p. 575). He concludes, however, that "Not so very long after his death it would become harder and harder to imagine the labor movement aspiring to that same redemptive role in our national life" (p. 575). It is not the least of the many virtues of this fine book that Fraser shows how Hillman himself contributed to the demise of the vision he cherished.

Meticulously, even massively, researched, this is a wonderful biography of the public life of a twentieth-century labor leader whose importance has until now been underappreciated. This book should be of in-

terest and benefit to all who want to better understand modern America.

JOYCE SHAW PETERSON
Florida International University

ROBERT H. ZIEGER. *John L. Lewis: Labor Leader*. (Twayne's Twentieth-Century American Biography Series, number 8.) Boston: Twayne. 1988. Pp. xviii, 220. \$24.95.

In this volume, Robert H. Zieger has undertaken the difficult task of presenting the extraordinary life of John L. Lewis in approximately 200 pages. Unlike many efforts of this kind, this is no mere culling of previous scholarship. Zieger combines original research with complete command of the secondary literature. The result is that rarest of things: a short biography that combines a discriminating intelligence and daunting scholarship with a fine, readable narrative.

Zieger's Lewis is a quintessential American figure. The young miner from Iowa who became president of the United Mine Workers (UMW), first president and driving force behind the CIO, and one of the towering figures of mid-twentieth-century America was a man who combined ambition with pragmatism and who reveled in the exercise of power. Because of the circumstances of his birth, his stage was to be organized labor, and because of the circumstances of history, that stage was to provide him with a dominant role at the very center of American political and economic life.

This single-minded and pragmatic search for power and influence explains the seeming contradictions that mark Lewis's public record. Always a confirmed capitalist, he led an industrial revolution that brought democracy to the American workplace; a Republican all of his life, his alliance with Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the early New Deal helped to create the modern welfare state; a bitter anticommunist, he hired them to help organize the CIO unions and he struck an isolationist alliance with them when he fell out with FDR.

Zieger is particularly critical of Lewis for his destruction of union democracy. But he also shows how Lewis's centralization of power in the UMW had a logic built on the realities of the changing structure of the coal industry. The results were mixed. Rank-and-file control of the union slipped away as the districts became hollow administrative units in Lewis's hand, but the miners' wages soared and decent health care came to the mine fields.

Lewis's heyday lasted through most of the 1930s. His star began to dim as the Great Depression faded with the coming of war. His quixotic battle against FDR and his support for the Republican presidential candidate in 1940 cost him the leadership of the CIO. His willingness to take his miners out on strike in 1943 in the midst of the war drew the ire of the entire

nation. The postwar years found him scorned by many and largely shorn of power outside of his loyal miners. By the time of his death in 1969, the rapidly declining UMW was in the hands of his handpicked successor, the corrupt Tony Boyle, and Lewis was all but forgotten.

To make the story of Lewis half as fascinating as his life is a challenge worthy of the best of biographers. To meet that challenge in a slim, widely accessible volume is even more remarkable. Zieger has done just that.

RONALD L. FILIPPELLI
Pennsylvania State University

ROGER L. WILLIAMS. *The Origins of Federal Support for Higher Education: George W. Atherton and the Land-Grant College Movement*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 272.

In 1898 George W. Atherton, the president of Pennsylvania State University (1882–1906), delivered the eulogy for U.S. Senator Justin Morrill, the sponsor of the precedent-setting Morrill Act (1862). Morrill's wartime legislation opened the way for federal support for public higher education in America. Less well known has been the work of a distinct cohort of educators, including Atherton, that developed Morrill's work into a nationwide system of public higher education in the United States.

In this well-researched and intelligent book, Roger L. Williams re-creates the educational ideology that linked hitherto disparate institutions and congressional legislation. For twenty-five years Atherton and his strong-minded colleagues worked in behalf of an expansive, liberal education in land-grant colleges and resisted every effort to reduce these public schools to narrowly vocational "agricultural colleges." Atherton himself authored both the Hatch Act of 1886 and the second Morrill Act of 1890, which together must be credited with realizing Morrill's original design. These laws not only supported the instructional expansion of land-grant colleges but they also provided federal support for Agricultural Experiment Stations, the first institutional network supporting empirical science as a professional career in America. Equally important, these laws, unusual in their genuinely national scope in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, created colleges that served both state and federal purposes.

This compelling study argues the importance of a distinction between land-grant colleges—"national schools of science"—and state universities, which were not subject to federal supervision. On this point and elsewhere Williams has reversed the confusions of earlier historians like Allan Nevins; embraced the sophisticated revisionism of Colin Burke, David Potts, and Stanley Guralnik (and I would have added David Allmendinger); and produced the now-definitive statement on land-grant colleges in America. He has

resurrected a powerful generation of schoolmen who often disappear in educational histories that move glibly from the antebellum college to Progressive educational reform.

Not least in the admirable achievement of this study is Williams's analysis of the internal politics of a major but neglected organization, the Association of American Agricultural Colleges and Experimental Stations. Founded in 1887 by Atherton and his closest presidential colleagues, Henry Alvord of the University of Maryland and Henry Goddell of the University of Massachusetts, this association provides a good example of late-nineteenth-century organization building. It would have been well to have contrasted this organization with earlier and potentially competing organizations such as the American Institute of Instruction (founded in 1830), to which Atherton also belonged.

Such comparisons would have interpreted more sharply the features of new, generic organizations and policy making between distinctive generations of educational leaders and would have refined the meaning of ideas such as "useful education," which several nineteenth-century generations shared but which each sought to revise according to their needs. Most of all, comparative interpretation would have taken a study that is in no way parochial and would have engaged it with the broadest scholarly issues of the post-Civil War era: after the unifying force of military victory, why did the United States find federal initiatives in basic policy areas, like public education, so difficult a proposition? In spite of the nineteenth-century nationalism unleashed by the Northern victory, why did states' rights triumph so often in the shaping of U.S. congressional legislation?

PAUL H. MATTINGLY
New York University

ANDREW J. POLSKY. *The Rise of the Therapeutic State*. (The City in the Twenty-first Century Book Series.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1991. Pp. x, 287. \$35.00.

The subject of this book is the growth of the social work profession in the public sector. Proponents of the "therapeutic state" of the title use the coercive power of government to intervene in the lives of the poor to give them "expert help" (p. 3) in acquiring "mainstream values" (p. 4) so they can manage better on their own.

Andrew J. Polsky traces the origins of "public tutelage" (p. 65) to the efforts of nineteenth-century philanthropists to reform the working-class family. He then explores continued attempts of therapeutic activists to rehabilitate the poor in the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and the 1950s and 1960s. The emphasis throughout is on theory, on why the human services have evolved as they have in the United States.

The author, who is a political scientist, argues that therapeutic activists were political entrepreneurs who championed social work within government. Yet they met considerable resistance from local elected officials, who had little interest in therapeutic objectives, and from clients, who resisted therapy or manipulated it to their own advantage. At no time have social workers devised a method that would overcome client resistance and achieve the social work goal of normalizing the poor. Nonetheless, human service personnel continue to exert considerable influence. Policy makers rely on their services and clients still face unwanted interference in their lives.

Polsky's strongest objection to the therapeutic state is that it is undemocratic: it undermines the autonomy of individuals that is the basis of "democratic citizenship" (p. 84). To meet this objection, he proposes active citizen involvement at the neighborhood level to solve the behavioral problems of the poor. Yet he acknowledges that such political activism may never come to pass and hence concludes "with a far more modest set of suggestions" (p. 220). He proposes that social policy debate about how to help the poor include many more groups than just social workers. It should emphasize what is positive about the underclass. In addition, social work clients should have more rights, including the right to turn away a caseworker and to end treatment.

While this is a very provocative study, it has some weaknesses. For example, Polsky cannot ascertain how many clients have been affected by social agencies that emphasized therapy or behavioral change as opposed to social agencies that provided the poor with basic necessities. He also makes no attempt to determine if the human services have been equally important in all sections of the United States. In addition, most of his examples of social services are those delivered through the juvenile court and public assistance programs such as mothers' pensions, both of which went largely to children and women. But what of social services delivered principally to men such as aid to the homeless or the jobless? Have they been just as intrusive, just as ineffectual?

These few objections aside, this is a thoughtful and useful study for historians interested in the development of social policy and the growth of the welfare state in the United States.

PRISCILLA FERGUSON CLEMENT
Pennsylvania State University,
Delaware County

GERALD N. GROB. *From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1991. Pp. xv, 406. \$29.95.

Gerald N. Grob does exactly what he says he is doing in his title: he presents a history of policy toward the mentally ill in the United States from 1940 to 1970. While many aspects of the history of psychiatry and

the history of mental illness and knowledge about mental illness are treated, the author subordinates all to the narrative of policy advocacy and policy decisions. Those looking for a history of clinical and theoretical aspects of mental illness or the social history of madness will find substantial and reliable but only selective accounts. In this book, Grob focuses on policy makers.

This focus is not inappropriate. Recent public concern about health care, the homeless (a substantially large proportion of whom are mentally ill), the overcrowding of prisons (populated to a scandalous extent by mentally ill people), and the nursing home crisis in a way recognizes that what happens—and, as Grob shows, what happened—to the mentally ill and incompetent in American society is an important subject. Numerous historians also now touch on the subjects covered in this book, and they and other intellectuals often refer to dimensions of psychiatric concern: the therapeutic society, for example, and the fact that the treatment of the mentally ill is an index to the way in which many groups that are not mainstream fared over the years. Grob's narrative therefore has extensive application to today's social dilemmas and is a significant general book as well as scholarly monograph.

This is the third volume in a series that Grob has written concerning the history of American psychiatrists, mental hospitals, and the mentally ill in American society. It is masterful, as one might expect, and the extent of the annotations covering an enormous amount of primary source material almost guarantees that the book will remain definitive for the foreseeable future.

Although only a passage or two spell out the conclusion as clearly as some of Grob's recent articles, the moral to the story is clear: Americans at all levels of government made a ghastly and cruel mistake by destroying the classic large mental hospitals that for generations cared for and often treated the severely and chronically mentally ill and others who fell between the cracks in society.

The change in policy began within the main medical specialty involved, when physicians in the new Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, using the successes of psychiatrists in World War II as a model, worked to bring mental health and psychotherapy to the country, on the presumption that taking care of minor and incipient mental illnesses would decrease serious mental disease. This approach combined with the general hierarchical regionalism of American medicine and with a public health approach to mental illness, promoted especially by Robert H. Felix, director of the National Institute of Mental Health from 1949 to 1964. Much of Grob's narrative is about how Felix and his allies helped shift policy making to the national level, particularly through two major acts, one in 1946 and one in 1963.

Felix and a number of other reformers had a vision: mental health efforts located in community

facilities. In fact, local general hospital wards partially replaced state hospital wards. But except for receiving psychotropic drugs (occasionally described even by Grob as therapy when in fact they were merely management tools), the very ill received short shrift, as psychiatrists in community mental health service were distracted by drug abuse and other, often middle-class, minor concerns. Medical doctors drifted to an ever greater extent into private practice, leaving even the community mental health centers in the hands of psychologists and other non-medical personnel. Grob's account of the forces involved in these startling policy changes is complete and incisive—except perhaps letting off too easily the state legislators whose stinginess and irresponsibility ruined the promise of asylums (in the true sense of the word) for the afflicted and frustrated the good intentions of post-World War II environmental reformers.

JOHN C. BURNHAM
Ohio State University,
Columbus

CHARLES MUSSER. *High-Class Moving Pictures: Lyman H. Howe and the Forgotten Era of Traveling Exhibition, 1880–1920*. Assisted by CAROL NELSON. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 372. \$45.00.

Authors of standard college U.S. history textbooks continue to depict early motion picture history as a struggle between middle-class reformers and lower-class ethnic audiences. Charles Musser, aided by Carol Nelson, clearly demonstrates that pre-Hollywood film history is much more complex. The book provides another window into the place of the middle class in American cultural history through an examination of the career of itinerant showman Lyman H. Howe, his competitors, and his use of early motion pictures.

Nelson has produced and codirected a thirty-minute documentary film, *Lyman H. Howe's High Class Moving Pictures* (1983). Building on research and interviews prepared for the film, this monograph describes the place and importance of motion pictures in traveling exhibitions at the turn of the century. As such, it serves as a companion piece to Musser's other recent works on film history, *Before the Nickelodeon: Edwin S. Porter and the Edison Manufacturing Company* (1991) and *The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1907* (1990). In addition, this monograph can serve as a study guide to Nelson's documentary film.

As implied by the title of the monograph, the middle class supported the new motion picture technology. Musser demonstrates that support depended on how films were marketed. Howe became known for his ability to attract middle-class audiences to his shows. Analyzing business records, scrapbooks, newspapers, and interviews, Musser demonstrates that

Howe's activities clarify how motion pictures operated within various middle-class cultural groups.

Howe understood that there were several middle-class audiences. The view that the middle class opposed the early films patronized by urban, immigrant audiences is too simplistic. During his early career, Howe pitched his exhibitions at the church-oriented middle class that controlled small towns. Despite the fact that some churches forbade movie attendance by their members, Howe routinely gained church sponsorship for his exhibitions. He did this by sharing profits from ticket sales with local church sponsors and by designing programs that appealed to the audience.

Design was possible because early traveling exhibitors viewed themselves as the authors or producers of their respective exhibits. Howe routinely included phonograph recordings of local musicians as well as film footage of local citizens and points of interest. It was not unusual for these audiences to see some of the same film footage that was shown in urban settings. In his later career, Howe aimed his exhibitions at other segments of the middle class, audiences who felt more comfortable in opera houses and, finally, in the better urban theaters.

Previously overlooked by earlier histories of motion pictures, Howe was an important and successful traveling exhibitor who brought the technical innovations introduced by the phonograph, sound technology, slides, and motion pictures to the small cities and towns of America. Musser and Nelson's biography of Howe is an important contribution to American cultural history and film practice at the turn of the century.

JOHN S. SCHUCHMAN
Gallaudet University

CHARLES MUSSER. *The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1907*. (History of the American Cinema, number 1.) New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1990. Pp. xvii, 613.

EILEEN BOWSER. *The Transformation of Cinema, 1907–1915*. (History of the American Cinema, number 2.) New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1990. Pp. xii, 337.

RICHARD KOSZARSKI. *An Evening's Entertainment: The Age of the Silent Feature Picture, 1915–1928*. (History of the American Cinema, number 3.) New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1990. Pp. xi, 395.

Occasionally a series lives up to its advanced billing, as with the 1986 World Series between the New York Mets and Boston Red Sox, and now with Scribner's History of the American Cinema series. Produced under the general editorship of Charles Harpole, the projected ten-volume series will chart the history of American cinema from its beginnings to the present. The first three volumes trace the silent era, from 1895 to 1928. Covering virtually every aspect of film

production, these three works should be regarded as the starting point for scholars interested in early film history. Production, distribution, exhibition, aesthetics, and audience reception of silent films are meticulously explored by each author.

Equally important, these volumes are accessible to all historians and not simply cinema specialists. Reading film studies can be a daunting venture, especially for those not well versed in the jargon and theoretical literature of the field. But historians will like these volumes for two reasons: their clear prose, and their strong grounding in historical methods and analysis.

While acknowledging the importance of "research based in semiotics, feminist studies, and a broad spectrum of politically and ideologically rooted disciplines," Harpole has designed the series to offer "a solid knowledge of the [cinema's] past" (Musser, p. xii). Charles Musser, Eileen Bowser, and Richard Koszarski provide readers with a comprehensive synthesis of nearly two decades of historical research in the field. The latest scholarship on the technological, social, economic, and cultural history of film, film audiences, and the film industry can all be found in these volumes. The authors employ a variety of primary sources and secondary works that will prove useful to others working in the field: trade periodicals, early film catalogs, company records, court records, congressional hearings, correspondence, memoirs, biographies, and, of course, the films themselves. The inclusion of hundreds of movie stills and frame enlargements both enlivens the books and obviates one of the key problems of film analysis: that readers generally have to see the images being discussed through the eyes of the writer. In these volumes, readers can often see images for themselves.

Each volume covers a distinct period in the early economic, social, and aesthetic development of the film industry: its origins and early artisan-like development (1895–1907); the mushrooming of production companies, the growth of narrative films, and the rise of new exhibition venues (1907–15); and the creation of a mature industry characterized by a well-financed studio system, elaborate feature films, extensive theater chains and movie palaces, and a regular audience that included all classes, ethnicities, races, and regions (1915–28). While each author covers a wide range of topics, Musser is especially concerned with tracing the rise of film production, Bowser with evolving film forms and styles, and Koszarski with the experience of going to the movies.

Musser analyzes the complex evolution of motion pictures and the arenas in which they were shown. He begins with the "first screen practice—projected images and their audio complement—which dates back to the seventeenth century and includes the magic lantern, a precursor of the modern slide projectors" (p. 1). Musser continues by tracing the development of Edison's kinetoscope in 1894, the creation of "actualities" (short films of actual events) for vaudeville houses and traveling road shows, the rise and fall of

dozens of companies that produced actualities and later narrative films for nickelodeons, and the varied ways in which audiences understood (or failed to understand) these evolving moving images. The titles of its five sections offer a glimpse into the ambitious scope of this volume: Before Cinema; The Novelty of Cinema: 1896–97; The Exhibitor Plays a Creative Role: 1897–1900; The Production Company Assumes Creative Dominance: 1900–05; The Beginnings of the Nickelodeon Era: 1905–07. Readers unfamiliar with early film history or who believe that the movies began with the appearance of nickelodeons will be struck by the vitality, diversity, and excitement that characterized the industry at the turn of the century. More knowledgeable readers will be equally impressed by the ways in which Musser explores the dynamic interaction between "cinema's mode of production (how the cinema is made) and the mode of representation (how a story is told or a subject represented)" (p. 7).

Bowser picks up where Musser leaves off and examines a critical period (1907–15) in which movies and the movie industry changed from "a hand-crafted amusement enterprise and sideshow to a gigantic entertainment industry and the first mass-communication medium" (p. xi). Bowser defends the relatively short span of her study, arguing that "Film forms changed as drastically in the seven years covered by this volume as at any point in motion-picture history" (p. xi). To prove her case, she offers a superb and nuanced analysis of the historical context in which films were made, exhibited, and received. Chapters offer rich descriptions of the growth of nickelodeons, larger movie theaters, and movie palaces; the ways in which producers responded to the demands of audiences and exhibitors by making longer and more easily understood narrative films; the rise of the star system; the increased stabilization of production and distribution; and the vehement attacks against films by reformers, politicians, religious leaders, and censors. Bowser is at her strongest and most enthusiastic in describing the evolution of the era's films. Changing narrative forms, acting styles, camera angles, and editing techniques are analyzed in a highly comprehensible manner.

Koszarski takes us from 1915, when war in Europe allowed American producers to capture the world market, to 1928, when the appearance of sound pictures—the "talkies"—slowly brought the silent era to an end. Koszarski offers the same rich multidimensional approach as Bowser and Musser. But in this volume, the movie-going experience is seen as the key to understanding the era and separating it from what had come before and what would follow: "The very notion of a filmgoing experience was much more complex and extended far beyond that part of the show which came in a can" (p. ix). Koszarski rightly suggests that in order to understand how audiences responded to a particular film or set of films, we must first understand the context in which they were seen.

Watching movies was only one part of the total movie-going experience. The sounds, sights, and smells of theaters and their audiences come to life in this volume. Yet Koszarski never loses sight of the world outside the theater. He explores the corporate organization of the increasingly oligarchic movie industry, the changing processes and new technologies involved in making movies, the filmmakers who translated ideas into screen images, and the stars who caused audiences to suspend their disbelief.

These efforts to describe the historical development of film and the film industry will prove useful to theorists as well as empiricists. I found them especially helpful in illuminating debates over the evolution of mass culture. If these three volumes were made into a movie they might be called *Teleology Busters*. They show there was nothing inevitable about the ways in which film styles or the film industry developed. Early filmmakers were not cultural entrepreneurs embarking on the road to bourgeois-capitalist cultural hegemony. Nor was the "Classical Hollywood Style" the inevitable end point of film narrative. Each volume reveals the complex and uneven development of the film industry and the difficulties men and women faced in creating and popularizing this new medium. We see how producers, distributors, exhibitors, and audiences continually interacted to shape and reshape the movie industry and its products.

These volumes do have a few small problems. Like most film scholars, the authors lament the difficulties of discovering what early audiences thought about the movies. But there are sources that can do this. The working-class men, women, and children who comprised the bulk of early audiences did leave records. Labor and radical periodicals, such as the *New York Call*, *Los Angeles Citizen*, *Chicago New Majority*, and *Seattle Union Record*, provide a wealth of information concerning working-class attitudes toward films, film stars, and the film industry. Similarly, the volumes would have been enriched by exploring challenges to Hollywood's development, not just from independents but also from various liberal, radical, and conservative organizations that used films as vehicles of propaganda. Those interested in this story should consult Kevin Brownlow's *Behind the Mask of Innocence* (1990) and Kay Sloan's *The Loud Silence: Origins of the Social Problem Film* (1988) in conjunction with these volumes. Lastly, I would urge the series editor to include filmographies of surviving movies and their repositories in subsequent volumes.

These are minor criticisms when compared to the stunning accomplishments of Musser, Bowser, and Koszarski. They have produced the most comprehensive study of silent films to date. The three volumes represent a major achievement in film history unlikely to be surpassed for many years.

STEVEN J. ROSS
University of Southern California

MARTHA L. OLNEY. *Buy Now, Pay Later: Advertising, Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xvii, 424. \$45.00.

Historians and other observers have long recognized the significant effects of the increased use of major consumer durable goods, like automobiles, household appliances, and radios, on the life style of middle-class Americans in the 1920s. In this impressive work, economist Martha L. Olney marshals an abundance of statistical evidence to analyze the economic causes of the "Consumer Durable Goods Revolution" of the 1920s—which she defines as "revolutionary" changes that occurred in the spending and savings behavior of large numbers of American households during the decade.

Households, which had allocated just 3.7 percent of their disposable income to the purchase of major durables in the period from 1869 to 1916, spent 7.2 percent in the 1920s. This resulted in part from a reallocation of spending away from minor durable goods, like china and books, and from perishables. The most important change, though, was a nearly one-third decline in the nation's personal savings rate from the decade before to the decade after World War I. The economist, however, would consider the purchase of a consumer durable good as an investment in an asset that produces future services for the household, an automobile to provide transportation, or a washing machine to supply laundry services. Thus, "households did not in fact save *less* in the 1920s than they did previously, but, rather they saved *differently*. In the 1920s households substituted purchases of durable goods for accumulation of other assets in their saving portfolios" (p. 54).

Because major consumer durable goods required an outlay that represented a substantial portion of a household's annual disposable income, a vast expansion of credit went hand-in-hand with the increase of durable goods consumption. A lengthening of debt maturities and a reduction of required down payments after World War I did far more to broaden the market for "big-ticket" items than did rising income levels. Sales finance companies emerged just before World War I as a solution devised by automobile makers to solve the problem of financing seasonally fluctuating retail inventories while still preserving power over their franchised dealers. This new type of financial institution quickly became major suppliers of highly profitable consumer installment credit.

The second important factor in the consumer durable goods revolution of the 1920s was advertising. Although advertisements for durable goods never constituted more than 30 percent of all advertising in the print media, this percentage was substantially larger than the share of household spending allocated to this category of consumption. Surprisingly, installment credit was seldom mentioned in advertisements, although it was a key factor in expanding sales

of consumer durable goods. Olney concludes that while economists may be correct in their assertion that advertising does not affect allocation of disposable income between consumption and saving, it may well have stimulated households to purchase certain services in a new and different form, as, for example, when households purchased cars instead of spending a few dollars each week on trolley tickets.

Olney capably puts all of this together in a clear and cogent manner. Even the excursion into econometric analysis can be readily understood by the noneconomist. The major contribution of the work lies in the documentation that the author's careful statistical analysis gives to the causes of the changes in household spending behavior in the 1920s. The book will take its place on the shelf along with other recent works that deal with the many facets of the evolution toward a "consumer society" in America.

JAMES H. SOLTOW
EMERTUS
Michigan State University

RICHARD GILLESPIE. *Manufacturing Knowledge: A History of the Hawthorne Experiments*. (Studies in Economic History and Policy, The United States in the Twentieth Century.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. x, 282. \$39.50.

Positivism has been a central component of contemporary business management ideas. Those skilled in administrative science have claimed to supply value-free, scientifically confirmed ideas to a corporate market. Experiments at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric subsidiary of AT&T from 1924 to 1933, for instance, supposedly led to the discovery and verification of human relations ideas about paternalistic management.

Drawing on the perspectives of the sociology of scientific knowledge, however, Richard Gillespie argues that the Hawthorne research was more political than positive. Gillespie shows how the researchers tested management ideas, ignored worker perspectives, and imposed meaning on disparate data. His thesis is carefully supported by details from records of the Hawthorne investigators and their sponsors at AT&T and in research foundations.

Gillespie shows how Western Electric in the 1920s used the latest management techniques and had a corporate vision of unity between workers and supervisors. To promote harmony at work the company formed an alliance with social scientists who believed they could enhance managerial control by studying the interrelationship between social setting and productivity. Gillespie reveals, however, how the experimenters introduced multiple variables that rendered any conclusions problematic. Supervisors in the experimental work groups changed in contradictory ways, becoming both more congenial and more con-

trolling. Thus, the researchers could not develop a consistent interpretation of the causes of worker behavior.

A dominant interpretation emerged only when Elton Mayo insisted that productivity rose because friendly supervision had improved motivation by integrating managers and workers in one corporate family. These ideas, Gillespie explains, rested less on empiricism than on a commitment to psychology as a tool for managers. Mayo's psychopathological interpretation of worker behavior had been developed before Hawthorne. It ignored the experimental effects on workers of such structural factors as payment schemes, parts supply, and strict surveillance, and it recommended adjusting workers to bureaucratic jobs.

Gillespie makes his most novel contribution in describing Mayo's influence. Mayo used positivist rhetoric, charisma, control over funding, and prestigious connections in academia, research foundations, and business to create the official interpretation of the Hawthorne research. But the human relations approach became influential mainly because of its compatibility with the goals and needs of business managers and social scientists. After the unionization of mass-production industry, managers sought ways to diffuse discontent and minimize grievances without reorganizing structure and so turned to psychological techniques. Social scientists endorsed human relations because they believed Hawthorne confirmed their usefulness, created a paradigm for organizational research, and showed how to sell advice to business.

Gillespie concludes that the Hawthorne research had been permeated with managerial values. The social scientists saw workers as experimental subjects, measured satisfaction in terms of productivity, and treated workers as factors to be engineered. The researchers studied only informal work culture, ignoring the structural environment, and thus naturalized bureaucratic organization. Finally, the researchers assumed that managers should control the workplace and so only sought ideas that could enhance that control. Gillespie offers a rich, ironic tale of how managerial regimes and professional ethics shaped social science.

STEPHEN WARING
University of Alabama,
Huntsville

STANLEY COBEN. *Rebellion against Victorianism: The Impetus for Cultural Change in 1920s America*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 242. \$21.95.

Stanley Coben has spent most of his career mining the rich cultural life of the 1920s. In numerous articles he has unearthed valuable nuggets of material and refined them with great insight. Now, in this

book, he offers "a new hypothesis" to explain the decade's volatile cultural turbulence. For Coben the common thread running through the intellectual revolt of the 1920s was a strenuous effort to escape the web of constricting—and contradictory—values that he subsumes under the awkward label "Victorianism."

By interweaving biographical profiles of Louisa May Alcott, Catharine Beecher, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Henry Seidel Canby, William Dean Howells, and W. E. B. Du Bois, Coben develops a composite profile of American Victorianism that reveals its strengths as well as its internal strains and contradictions. The keystone in the arch of Victorianism was the pious, middle-class, Anglo-American Protestant home in which children were taught self-control, domesticity, diligence, temperance, moral rectitude, and spiritual intensity. The Victorian ideal of "character," however, was stippled with ethnic and racial prejudices. Native Americans, African Americans, Asians, Jews, Catholics, and Hispanics were all considered "foreign" elements incapable of being integrated into the "Victorian synthesis."

For all of its myopia, this configuration of virtues, Coben argues, "helped create a culture sufficiently integrated and satisfying to hold together a rapidly changing society, though with increasing internal tension" (p. 31). But after the Civil War, the friction of new social and economic conditions and intellectual challenges wore away the veneer of Victorian hegemony. During the 1920s, Coben contends, a confluence of events sharpened the assault on Victorian values. New theories in anthropology and physics helped undermine Victorian racial and religious certainties; meanwhile, the wave of African-American migrants from the South to the North spawned "the sudden release of black speech, jazz, blues, and dances into white American society" (p. 74) that helped break down the color caste system. At the same time, the accelerated entry of women into the work force and intellectual and professional communities posed a direct challenge to the cult of domesticity.

Of course the forces of modernity did not go unchallenged. In the book's most illuminating chapter, Coben describes how the revived Ku Klux Klan "emerged as the most visible and powerful guardian of Victorianism during the 1920s" (p. 136). No longer simply a bastion of southern reaction, the Klan during the 1920s blossomed into a national movement, the majority of whose members were in states outside the old Confederacy. Coben demonstrates that most Klansmen were members of the middle class rather than wage laborers. They were usually married, belonged to civic clubs, were politically active, and attended mainstream rather than fundamentalist churches. Although racism remained a prevalent aspect of Klan activity, their foremost concern was the promotion of 100 Percent Americanism, a theme with

widespread appeal during a decade of profound xenophobia.

Although sprinkled with rich insights and graced by clear, crisp prose, this book lacks cohesion. It reads more like a collection of articles than a seamless narrative, and its overarching interpretive thesis loses credibility as the pages turn. Coben's portrait of "Victorianism" claims a specious unity for nineteenth-century American thought and culture, and as such it makes an inadequate explanation for the diverse movements he discusses. Nevertheless, his splendid treatments of jazz and the Harlem Renaissance, the women's suffrage movement, and the Ku Klux Klan warrant praise and attention.

DAVID E. SHI
Davidson College

BARBARA MELOSH. *Engendering Culture: Manhood and Womanhood in New Deal Public Art and Theater*. (New Directions in American Art Series.) Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 297. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.

At a time when some members of the historical profession increasingly feel alienated from their colleagues in literature, this book reminds us just how rewarding interdisciplinary scholarship can be. Barbara Melosh, a historian who teaches English and American Studies, here ventures as well into art criticism and feminist theory to explore representations of gender in two New Deal programs: the Treasury Section of Fine Arts and the Federal Theatre Project (FT). Rightly insisting on the fruitfulness of textual analysis, she also attempts to ground her discussion of such artifacts as post office murals and "Living Newspapers" in an examination of government files, press notices, and similar documents, especially those pertaining to audience. The result is a thorough, authoritative look at Americans' complex understandings of male and female roles in a period of economic hardship and political reform.

In her introduction, Melosh explicitly asserts one of her central theses: that New Deal artists and playwrights used depictions of manhood and womanhood as "tropes in a political rhetoric directed to issues other than gender" (p. 4). That statement signals Melosh's determination not to let her account dead end in a catalogue of images. Rather, she is consistently concerned with the meaning of gender representations. Especially in the first part of the book, Melosh pursues that aim by examining what she calls the "comradely ideal." For example, she claims that Section art and FT productions portrayed frontiersmen not as aggressive loners but, rather, as partners with women in activities that simultaneously sustained democratic politics and the traditional sexual division of labor. Her chapter on representations of farm families stresses that the ambiguities involved in the "comradely ideal" both bolstered a nostalgic concep-

tion of rural life and, in the case of certain FT dramas, exposed its hardships and inequities.

Melosh then turns to depictions of manly industrial workers. Section administrators, she demonstrates, encouraged such images, in part to woo working-class support for the New Deal (although they suppressed references to racial, ethnic, and class conflict). Here and throughout the book, she notices what is absent as well as what is present in the works she explicates: for instance, the exclusion of white-collar workers and the "pervasive erasure of women's paid work" (p. 93), which suggest longings for vanishing individualism and idealized domesticity. Furthermore, Melosh observes that the "comradely ideal" appeared, alongside critiques of emasculated workers, in FT plays endorsing organized labor. In a chapter on visions of science, she argues that the image of the manly worker permeated representations of experts as agents of progress; in a chapter on antiwar works, she explores the alternative view of technology that cast women as peacemakers.

The book's final thematic chapters treat portrayals of youth—or, again, in the case of Section art, mainly the absence of such portrayals—and representations of consumer culture. Melosh explains that muralists tended to repudiate the world of advertising and the marketplace by suppressing reference to it; playwrights, by contrast, confronted that world and urged audiences to become consumer activists. In a concluding discussion entitled "Women, Art, and Ideology," Melosh tests recent theories of the construction of gender against the historical record, arguing that Section administrators and audiences shared what she calls an "aesthetic of containment" that literally kept female figures in their place. Although Melosh's thematic investigations do not always supply as much evidence about context and response as her introduction leads one to expect, here she makes imaginative use of Section archives to probe female artists' intentions and the constraints under which they worked.

Some historians of the 1930s will disagree with Melosh's assumption that feminism lost ground during the decade. Other scholars will challenge her statement that there is widespread consensus on the marked contrast between the nineteenth and twentieth-century "experience of the market" (p. 183). In addition, Melosh might have made a more concerted effort to untangle the extent to which art created (as opposed to reflected) the "comradely ideal," and to describe more fully the wider cultural sources for such values. I also had the nagging suspicion that there was a significant difference between Section art, which was commissioned, and plays such as Karel Capek's *R.U.R.* or Elmer Rice's *Adding Machine* that almost identically wound up being produced by the FT: are they really both "public art" in the same sense? Nevertheless, the impressive density and range of Melosh's interpretations, which no brief summary

can convey, make this book an unusually strong contribution to cultural history.

JOAN SHELLEY RUBIN
State University College of New York,
Brockport

PAULA RABINOWITZ. *Labor and Desire: Women's Revolutionary Fiction in Depression America*. (Gender and American Culture.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 222. Cloth \$29.95, paper \$12.95.

In the 1929 *New Masses*, editor Mike Gold defined proletarian literature as fiction written out of working-class experiences in "mines, mills and farms" (p. 22). In reclaiming the work of women revolutionary writers, Paula Rabinowitz not only challenges the narrative of literary radicalism constructed by Gold and the other "head boys" of the sectarian cultural wars of the 1930s but also charges previous scholarship with neglecting the submerged choreography of female difference. With its virile workers, effete intellectuals, and feminine capitalists, proletarian literature was gendered, even when authors relegated the stories of working-class women and female intellectuals to secondary plots. Male literary radicals could escape from the paralysis of the word to the class consciousness of the deed through writing that encoded the working class as masculine, whether through the hungry or the laboring body.

Associating modernism with the feminine and homosexuality, Communist Party (CPUSA) critics severed "economic and social *oppression* . . . from cultural and sexual *repression*" (p. 22). During the Popular Front, when antifascism sloganeering subsumed strike propaganda, the partisan mother replaced the revolutionary girl in a metaphoric shift that reflected the CPUSA's appeal to familial values. In the writings of men, sexual abuse symbolized capitalist decadence, but women writers found in the sexual alienation of working-class women's bodies the formulator of subjectivity that led to class consciousness. Women wrote of desire as well as labor; in maternity, they combined both. Collectivity took a maternal form.

After a somewhat turgid discussion of the gendered deconstruction of genre, Rabinowitz provides us with sensitive readings of representative novels of the working-class woman and the middle-class female intellectual. Meridel Le Sueur's *The Girl*, rejected by publishers in 1939 but resurrected as a feminist classic in the 1970s, put "women's (re)production, rather than men's production, at the center of [its] narrative of female class consciousness" (p. 123). Approving of "historicizing female desire" (p. 135), still Rabinowitz criticizes the essentialism that marks Le Sueur and other women writers in a decade without a recognizable socialist feminism. Their works actually replicated the dichotomized hierarchies of proletarian fiction as a whole. In Tess Sles-

inger's *The Unpossessed* (1934), Rabinowitz finds a dystopian critique of literary radicalism in which the female intellectual, "unmarked by labor and unscarred by maternity" (p. 170), suffers linguistic alienation. Such a woman entered history not through the body, as did male and female workers, but through her position as an outside recorder of their lives.

In shifting our attention from the criticism of men to the fictions of women, Rabinowitz shows how radical women's writings decentered the genre of the proletarian—and also the domestic—novel. In doing so, she contributes to the feminist project of gendering class and classifying gender. Her larger claim—that "women's revolutionary novels of the 1930s stand as emblems for many of the concerns of post-modern materialist-feminist critical theory" (p. 182)—suffers from the linguistic excesses of her own critical genre where parenthetical marks and dichotomous pairings (labor and desire, history and fiction, hunger and love, production and reproduction, male and female) overwhelm the patience of even the sympathetic reader.

EILEEN BORIS
Howard University

GEOFFREY PERRET. *There's a War to Be Won: The United States Army in World War II*. New York: Random House. 1991. Pp. xxviii, 623. \$30.00.

Mark Twain once said, "When your work speaks for itself, don't interrupt." Geoffrey Perret, a popular historian who has written two other accounts of America at war, should have followed that advice. The U.S. Army was a formidable fighting force that performed extremely well in dozens of campaigns all over the world between 1941 and 1945. The story of those campaigns is a proud and honorable one, but in order to praise that army, Perret goes too far, belittling the contributions of the other services, especially the navy and the Allies.

The U.S. Army that entered World War II was well trained, well armed, and well led. It had learned from the errors of the Great War, transitioning to the more flexible "triangular division," rewriting its tactical doctrine to place greater emphasis on maneuver, grooming energetic and bright young leaders, and replacing its combat equipment with sparkling technology like the Sherman tank and the famed M-1 rifle. Perret tells this story with verve and interest. He then follows that new army through its global campaigns in a fast-paced and readable account.

Believing that an institution like the army is a reflection of its leaders, he dwells heavily on personalities. His preferred generals are George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and Robert Eichelberger, while Douglas MacArthur ("lacked moral courage"), Mark Clark ("acted like minor royalty"), and Walter Krueger ("stubborn and weak") come in for rough handling. Although these characterizations

may be overly facile, the real weaknesses of this book lie in its parochial attempts to glorify and exaggerate the army's accomplishments. Perret argues that the army did most of the fighting—that more than 108,000 men died fighting in the army air forces, navy, and marines calls that assertion into question—and that it lost only one battle, Kasserine Pass, while suffering only one other major check, the Rapido River crossing. Other setbacks, such as those in the Philippines, on the beaches at Anzio, or at the bridges of Arnhem, Perret blames on the poor quality of Filipino troops, lack of support from the other services, or mismanagement by Allied commanders. The British are especially singled out for criticism, being described variously as plodding, inefficient, and insufficiently aggressive while their leaders are charged with being more interested in the empire and personal fame than in defeating the enemy. This approach is as unnecessary as it is offensive. The U.S. Army of World War II was a splendid military instrument; its luster is not enhanced by denigrating all around it.

The sources used are mostly secondary works by American authors, but a smattering of interviews and archival material is added to provide a veneer of authoritativeness. Overall, although the chapters on the prewar army are excellent, as are those dealing with medical care, the disposition of combat casualties, and the plight of prisoners of war, it is difficult to take this book too seriously. It is, however, an enjoyable piece for the recreational reader.

PHILLIP S. MEILINGER
School of Advanced Airpower Studies

CARLO D'ESTE. *Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome*. New York: HarperCollins. 1991. Pp. ix, 566. \$35.00.

During the 1980s, retired U.S. Army Colonel Carlo d'Este emerged as one of America's foremost World War II historians. This, his latest effort, further enhances his reputation.

As in his earlier *Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign* (1991) and *Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943* (1988), d'Este takes a vast array of primary sources and secondary works and fashions them into a fast-paced narrative that features descriptive and interpretive passages as well as telling anecdotes. The result is a book on the Anzio landings of 1944 that will stimulate general readers and historians alike. Particularly impressive are his clear discussion of the tactics involved on both the Allied and the German sides and his description of the Italian landscape in which the battles took place. D'Este also devotes a chapter to little-known facets of the operation, including the Allies' logistical efforts, their civilian intelligence activities, their field hospitals, and even their desertion rates. He amply proves his point that enemy artillery fire and bomb-

ing made the Anzio beachhead into a place where the usual distinction between front-line and rear-area support troops simply did not exist. In his view, the Allies' fatal decision was not so much in undertaking Anzio as in not planning it on a sufficient scale (committing only two divisions initially) to assure that it would break the stalemate south of Rome. In fact, the Allies' successful offensive to liberate Rome in May 1944 was designed in part to relieve the pressure on the beachhead rather than the other way around.

D'Este is always rightly concerned about the leadership factor in military operations. In this case, American commanders generals Ernest Harmon and Lucian Truscott, British division commander General Sir Gerald Templar, and German theater head Field Marshal Albert Kesselring are given especially high marks. The author further provides a convincing defense of VI Corps leader and scapegoat General John Lucas, who was relieved of his post when the Anzio assault did not turn out as well as had been hoped. Yet d'Este has little good to say about the competent but unassertive Allied land commander General Sir Harold Alexander, the British Eighth Army head General Sir Oliver Leese, or the U.S. Fifth Army commander General Mark Clark. He is particularly scathing in his remarks about the vain Clark and his obsession to take Rome, which the author sees as leading to many wrong decisions.

D'Este's work does have some troubling aspects, however, at least for the historian. Most important is that his account is excessively judgmental. For example, he constantly berates Allied military leaders and planners for undertaking Anzio at all, and then, once it was decided on, for doing it improperly. But he fails to deal adequately with the question: what if the Allies had done nothing? What type of criticism would they have been subjected to had they not attempted an amphibious end run to relieve the stalemate? Some of d'Este's considered opinions are also open to question. Churchill, for instance, is correctly seen as the main instigator in bringing Anzio about and is criticized for meddling with it even during its execution, but the implication that he actually directed the operation in any way is certainly debatable. Of lesser importance, some errors of fact inevitably slip into a book of this nature. Alam Halfa is not near the Libyan-Egyptian border, General Alfred Jodl of the German Armed Forces High Command did not make or carry out most of Germany's important military decisions, and German Army Group C was reconstituted, not newly created, in November 1943. In addition, the author falls into a trap that has caught many others: he attributes a number of strategic and tactical decisions surrounding Anzio and the Italian campaign to Hitler because German generals retrospectively blamed him instead of backing up the contention by locating the actual orders themselves. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, this book makes for enjoyable, thoughtful

reading and establishes d'Este as a major writer of military history.

ALAN F. WILT
Iowa State University

KARAL ANN MARLING and JOHN WETENHALL. *Iwo Jima: Monuments, Memories, and the American Hero*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. 300. \$24.95.

This book tells the story of how a major battle of World War II was remembered and reinterpreted in American society during and after the war itself. Carnage and bloodshed were widespread on the Japanese island that was invaded by American troops in February 1945. Nearly one-third of all U.S. Marines killed in the entire war died in the struggle to take Iwo Jima, the small speck in the Pacific Ocean that served American planes on bombing runs to the Japanese mainland. But the public memory of the battle became one focused on themes of heroism and valor rather than on death.

Karal Ann Marling and John Wetenhall trace the invention of the Iwo Jima memory through its key stages. During the actual battle, Marine officials sent two details of soldiers to the top of Mount Suribachi to raise an American flag, a move calculated to raise the spirits of men who were still fighting to take the island. Photographers were present at both flag raisings, but the second one proved more dramatic for publicity and patriotic purposes and came to serve the interests of both the Marines and the American public. The Japanese hold on the mountain was essentially broken by the time the flags were carried to the top, and neither group of flag raisers had to fight their way to the summit, a point that was largely forgotten in the years that followed. Complex reality was conflated in the subsequent retelling of the event, and the images of the second flag raising came to serve as symbols of American heroism and unity.

Marling and Wetenhall examine the cultural life of the Iwo Jima symbol in a number of chapters that explain the drive to build the massive Marine Corps War Memorial in Washington, D.C., which was dedicated in 1954, the use of soldiers from the second flag raising to sell war bonds in 1945, the manipulation of the event's symbolism by Hollywood with the production of the film *The Sands of Iwo Jima* (1950), and a more truthful retelling of the episode in a television production in 1959 that noted the reality of the two flag raisings and caused a brief controversy in the nation's press.

The most poignant part of the book centers on the personal reaction of the three survivors of the second flag raising who returned to the United States to help sell war bonds. John Bradley from Wisconsin, Rene Gagnon from New Hampshire, and Ira Hayes, a Pima Indian from Arizona, all experienced misgivings about touring the nation while their comrades

still did battle. They were equally uncomfortable with their newfound status as celebrities and patriots, and Hayes was eventually dropped from the tour for heavy drinking. Public uses of their deed contrasted sharply with their own private perceptions.

The public commemoration of Iwo Jima was a product of diverse origins. Marling and Wetenhall focus more on telling their story than analyzing its theoretical implications, but they clearly explain the role that the Marine Corps played in attempting to extract as much favorable public opinion from the episode as possible. In fact, the corps' drive to construct a memorial in Washington was prompted partially by the need to convince military planners of its value during the Cold War with its emphasis on technologically sophisticated weapons. Less investigated but certainly suggested is the role the public played in investing Iwo Jima imagery with meaning. News of high casualties on Iwo Jima created a receptive mood for the publication of the "second" photograph with its overtones of victory. And the popular appeal of *The Sands of Iwo Jima* was real enough. But what was it that sustained the appeal of heroism and patriotism? Was it the power of the purveyors of such ideals—the military, the government, the film industry—that accounted for their support? Was it tied to the order of gender relations in American society at the time and the need to celebrate masculinity? Was there anything in the attitudes of ordinary people toward war that made them receptive or even uneasy about these ideals? Expressions of concern on the part of citizens over the degree patriotism may have masked the brutal realities of war are not abundant here.

Toward the end of the book, the authors make good comparisons between the Iwo Jima memorial in Washington and the one that commemorated the struggle in Vietnam. The former saw war as patriotic sacrifice; the latter saw it as death. Anonymous individuals raised the flag in the 1954 memorial; names of individual fallen soldiers predominate in the one dedicated in 1982. But we still need to know more than is told here about the politics and culture of both eras that explain their contrasting visions of war. And who in the America of the 1940s and 1950s preserved the memories that were largely forgotten in the public reconstructions of the time? This highly absorbing account moves scholarship closer to answering such questions, but many similar investigations remain to be undertaken.

JOHN BODNAR
Indiana University,
Bloomington

KENNETH LIPARTITO and JOSEPH PRATT. *Baker and Botts in the Development of Modern Houston*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 253. \$24.95.

Houston-based Baker and Botts was once among the nation's ten largest law firms, and despite a more cautious approach to growth than some of its competitors and the economic problems that have beset its hometown during the past decade, it still ranks well up in the top forty. Kenneth Lipartito and Joseph Pratt have written a history of this legal giant. Although commissioned by Baker and Botts, the book was published not by the firm but by a major university press. In addition, the authors were granted full editorial control over its contents. Their independence shows, for although generally favorable to Baker and Botts, they are sometimes critical of their subject.

Besides a surprising degree of objectivity, Lipartito and Pratt bring somewhat unusual backgrounds to their task. Neither is a legal historian. Lipartito's specialty is economic history, and Pratt's is business history. Their lack of background in the law sometimes leads them, when discussing legal matters, to misuse words whose ordinary definitions differ somewhat from their meanings as professional terms of art. Lipartito and Pratt also fail to cite appellate court decisions properly, often making it impossible to determine either when these rulings were handed down or by what court.

Despite the minor problems caused by their lack of legal expertise, they were excellent choices to write this book. Because of their backgrounds, Lipartito and Pratt have managed to place the evolution of Baker and Botts within the broad context of economic and business history, and thereby they give their book considerably greater significance than a more narrowly focused institutional history would have had. They correctly represent this as "a history of a major Houston law firm—and more" (p. vii). Lipartito and Pratt focus on the complex interrelationship between the economic and business development of Houston and the growth of Baker and Botts from a two-man partnership, founded just after the Civil War, into a major national law firm. Because members of the firm assumed leadership roles in the civic, business, and cultural affairs of their community, these authors often range far beyond its offices. The result is a book that accomplishes considerably more than the authors' stated objective of filling a void in the history of modern corporate law practice. Present and former members of Baker and Botts, whose primary interest is in anecdotes about themselves and their colleagues, may find what these authors have written somewhat disappointing. Serious students of legal history—and of economic, business, and urban history as well—should find it fascinating.

Lipartito and Pratt have drawn on the scholarly literature from all of those fields. In addition, they have exploited not only the archives of Baker and Botts itself but a number of other manuscript collections as well. Their account also draws on published

judicial opinions, unpublished masters theses, and oral history interviews. From these sources they have fashioned a book that, but for the minor mistakes resulting from their lack of legal expertise, is a model of what a law firm history ought to be. Well written, interesting, and insightful, it sets a standard against which future scholarship in this genre should be measured.

MICHAEL R. BELKNAP
California Western School of Law

ARNOLDO DE LEON. *Ethnicity in the Sunbelt: A History of Mexican Americans in Houston*. (Mexican American Studies Monograph Series, number 7.) Houston: Mexican American Studies Program, University of Houston. 1989. Pp. xix, 255. \$30.00.

After the publication of Albert Camarillo's *Chicanos in a Changing Society* (1979), there followed a number of solid works on the history of Mexican Americans in the major urban centers. Richard Griswold del Castillo, Ricardo Romo, Oscar Martinez, Rodolfo Acuña, and others have written books that represent, as a group, a stunning indictment of a system that repeatedly marginalized and ghettoized Mexican-American communities in the United States. Arnolde De Leon offers an interpretation that breaks with the "traditional" historiography of the Mexican-American urban experience.

In this fascinating study De Leon examines closely the changing cultural profile of an enduring Mexican ethos: *lo mexicano*. In the twentieth century this ethos was reinforced by the proximity of the Mexican border, continued immigration, the presence of Spanish language newspapers, radio stations, theaters, and the general revival of Mexican nationalism under Lázaro Cárdenas. But beginning with the "Mexican American Generation of the 1930s," De Leon charts the evolution of an identity that increasingly aligned itself with the social, political, and economic assumptions of mainstream America.

Although De Leon is quick to acknowledge the limitations of this generation, its effect on the history of Mexican Americans in Houston is unique. Most cities with a large Mexican-American population faced a constituency that was predominantly of Mexican birth. The majority of Mexican Americans who lived in Houston were native born. Out of this cohort there emerged a cadre of influential professionals who championed the cause of assimilation. Many had taken President Cárdenas's counsel advising Mexicans in the United States to become full-fledged citizens. Among the more representative of assimilationist organizations was the League of United Latin American Citizens, or LULAC. Although LULAC was maligned by Chicano scholars in the 1960s and 1970s for its assimilationist policies, De Leon offers a contextual argument maintaining that within the po-

litical environment of Texas between 1930 and 1960, LULAC was the most progressive of the Mexican-American organizations. Perhaps the most assimilationist experiment came from the Latin American Club (LAC), a short-lived offshoot of LULAC. LAC was unabashedly assimilationist. Central to its platform was acquiring U.S. citizenship, voting, and participating in local and state affairs. Unlike other Tejano clubs, LAC adopted English as its official language and began meetings with the Pledge of Allegiance. Eventually LAC rejoined the Houston LULAC Council #60, but not before it had left a legacy of assimilationist policies.

De Leon deftly moves in two directions at once. He shows how the ethos of *lo mexicano* was sustained as a cultural symbol, while at the same time showing a conscious movement toward the incorporation of the American dream, especially in terms of its economic and political potential. We see a profound sensitivity when De Leon notes that the "cohorts of the era did not incur the label of 'silent generation' arbitrarily. Protest and dissent attracted social criticism, literary rebellion was virtually nonexistent, and even labor organizers made little headway in an atmosphere of redbaiting. It would have been ahistoric for the Mexican American Generation to have behaved otherwise" (p. 229).

The success and daring of Houston's LULAC was more than the result of demographic coincidence. De Leon persuasively argues that the leadership of LULAC Council #60 was extraordinary. From the 1930s to the late 1950s it was led and influenced by Alonzo Perales, J. T. Canales, James Tafolia, George I. Sanchez, Carlos E. Castañeda, Gus C. Garcia, Hector P. Garcia, Felix Tijerina, and John Herrera. About them De Leon writes: "No other Tejano generation has produced such a venerable crop of activists" (p. 130).

While Chicano historians have tended to locate LULAC and the other assimilationist Mexican-American organizations outside of the more radical vision of the Chicano movement, De Leon establishes a historical continuity between the two. The irony, of course, is that the very radicalness of the Chicano movement, that is, its rejection of mainstream society, American values, rebellion against the politics of previous generations, its anti-Vietnam War sentiments, and so on, could all be seen as assimilationist since they mirrored the antiestablishmentarian impulses of white middle-class youth. Besides a bounty of new interpretations, De Leon has mined deeply in the archives and the result is a richness and mastery of sources that is compelling. This book further establishes De Leon's position in the forefront of Chicano historians, and certainly at the top of Chicano historians of Tejanos.

MAURICIO MAZON
University of Southern California

IGNACIO M. GARCIA. *United We Win: The Rise and Fall of La Raza Unida Party*. Tucson: MASRC, University of Arizona. 1989. Pp. xvi, 284. \$18.50.

By the 1960s, Chicanos were the nation's second largest minority. As prosperity became evident for others, the Chicano community remained on its fringes. This adverse condition heightened the national consciousness of activists. In addition, the civil rights movement focused attention primarily on the issues of minorities and the disenfranchised. Within this ferment of social struggle and change, there occurred a variegated burst of activity, loosely identified as the Chicano movement. Although "Chicanismo" was often an ill-defined and nebulous concept, it did translate as a radicalization of political, civil, and educational struggle. Chicano activism emerged as a clear challenge to the assumptions, ideology, and principles of the established dominant order.

One of the most dramatic manifestations of the Chicano movement was the creation of an alternative third political party, which became known as La Raza Unida. In its early phase, La Raza Unida challenged the Democratic Party by winning significant local elections in south Texas. The Democratic Party had consistently received the Chicano vote. But, according to Raza Unida founders, it had failed to deliver or even address important community issues.

This book by Ignacio M. Garcia is the first comprehensive overview of the origins, process, and ultimate demise of the party, although certain specialized scholarship on aspects, personalities, and periods of La Raza Unida have appeared previously. Based on extensive primary sources and secondary works, interviews with major participants, and Garcia's personal insights, this impressive study combines a narrative style with strong analysis. Garcia effectively explains the factors that led to La Raza Unida Party's victories as well as those that marked its downfall.

Garcia recounts the political maturing of a Chicano generation, the rise of Chicano nationalism, and a successful attempt at Chicano empowerment. Equally impressive are his explanations of the major shortcomings and mistakes of the party, such as the political inexperience of its leadership, the sectarian views of certain party officials, the ideological divisions of the party, and the lack of a solid community base of support. In addition, Garcia offers extensive evidence of the harsh responses of the established political machineries of the Republican and Democratic parties toward La Raza Unida.

An ambitious study such as this is bound to have limitations. Two of the more salient flaws are the lack of attention devoted to both the organizational importance of women in La Raza Unida and to the party's relationship with other Chicano and Latino organizations. Yet these are small points compared to

the substantial contributions this book makes to Chicano and American political and social history.

DAVID R. MACIEL

University of New Mexico

STEPHEN P. WARING. *Taylorism Transformed: Scientific Management Theory since 1945*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 288. \$34.95.

Stephen P. Waring has revised his Ph.D. dissertation into a provocative and well-written book that analyzes business management theory since the end of World War II. The author examines the major business writers as if they were political philosophers and he were writing a history of ideas. In his opening sentence, Waring states that "The modern business corporation is a polity, managers are its princes, academicians working in business schools are its philosophers, and managerial techniques are its constitution" (p. 1). Not everyone will accept this approach because most of the management theorists claimed they were writing for the purpose of helping American business corporations improve their efficiency.

The author is uniformly critical of each of the dozen theorists whom he reviews. With the exception of his hostility toward bureaucracy, Waring does not make clear the standards by which he is criticizing the business writers. In the preface, he mentions his Nebraska prairie roots and says this book reflects his "suspicion of centralized power, concern for social responsibility, desire for individual autonomy, and hope for democracy" (p. 1). These are noble sentiments, but the dilemma is how to reconcile these values with the necessities of running a successful business enterprise in a competitive world. Waring ridicules the attempts of management theorists to confront this problem, but he never provides his own solution to the dilemma.

Waring begins his book with a summary of the scientific management ideas of Frederick Taylor (1856–1915). Taylor advocated that managers become scientific, experimenting with the organization of work in terms of time and motion studies to find the "one best way." Taylor predicted that when workers accept the "scientific" leadership of managers and were assigned a "fair day's work" in exchange for a "fair day's wage," the business enterprise will be based on mutually beneficial harmony, not discord.

But because Taylor's system produced more worker alienation than harmony, his theories were challenged by George Elton Mayo (1880–1949). Mayo believed that industrialization had caused the "social disintegration" of workers. Mayo's solution was a more socially intimate style of management that would adjust workers to bureaucratic life by using informal groups designed to induce them to accept the formal goals of managers. A successful application of Mayo's system would convince workers that

managers were their friends and that bureaucracies were communities, thus giving labor social, as well as monetary, incentives to cooperate.

Following World War II, according to Waring, manager theorists split into two contending schools: the post-Taylorist bureaucrats and the post-Mayoist corporatists. Post-Taylorist theorists like Herbert Simon believed in the rationality and legitimacy of centralized power and specialized tasks, but they argued that scientific management had to be supplemented with new mathematical techniques. Post-Mayoist corporatists, such as Peter Drucker and Kurt Lewin, advocated that bureaucratic forms of managerial capitalism had to be reformed with "democratic styles of leadership" to overcome the dysfunctions of bureaucracy and bring about profitable harmony. Although the proponents of these two schools conducted vigorous debates against one another, they were, in Waring's eyes, "opposite sides of the same Taylorist coin" (p. 187). Both bureaucratic and corporate theorists accepted capitalism and the governing idea that managers should select goals and monitor the performance of workers.

The author follows the same format in chapters two through seven. In these chapters, Waring summarizes the prescriptive theories of the writer or writers who have promoted such techniques as operations research, management by objectives, sensitivity training, or quality circles, and then he subjects the theory to critical analysis. None of the work of these management theorists is shown to have any merit because, in Waring's view, none of them break fundamentally with Taylor's managerial theory of value.

Waring is overly harsh toward managerial theorists. He uses negatively loaded terms like "mandarins" and "gurus" to describe all of them, which is especially unfair to a Nobel Prize winner like Herbert Simon. Waring claims that they are not seekers of the scientific truth but commercial merchants of bourgeois ideology selling their goods to corporate leaders. Waring's net of criticism is cast too wide and fails to distinguish some excellent research from the "touchy, feely" pseudoscience that has been offered to business enterprises. Finally, this good book could have been improved had the author been more sympathetic to the central problem that management theorists were grappling with: the dilemma of reconciling the interests of individuals with the goals of large corporations.

JOHN W. SLOAN
University of Houston

JOHN W. SLOAN. *Eisenhower and the Management of Prosperity*. (Studies in Government and Public Policy.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1991. Pp. viii, 191. \$25.00.

Rediscovery of the significance of public policy making can reshape our historical understanding of mod-

ern American political economy. Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower revisionists have created wholesale cottage industries based on newly opened records and interdisciplinary interpretations. John W. Sloan presents in this work a revisionist account of Eisenhower administration macroeconomic policies that employs recent secondary accounts with extensive primary research at the Eisenhower Library.

Sloan's balanced but favorable retrospective accounting modifies political scientist Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics model. Like Allison, Sloan assumes policies stem from the complicated interactions among key actors in the national government, but Sloan argues that Eisenhower as president actively managed prosperity. Through special assistants Gabriel Hauge and Donald Paarlberg, Ike coordinated the advice of key policy actors such as Treasury secretaries George M. Humphrey and Robert B. Anderson; Bureau of the Budget directors Joseph Dodge, Rowland Hughes, Percival Brundage, and Maurice Stans; Council of Economic Advisers chairs Arthur F. Burns and Raymond J. Saulnier; and Federal Reserve Board chair William McChesney Martin. Three case studies of budget, inflation, and recession policies make this account the most comprehensive, fully researched, and clearly written work on the subject. Sloan argues that Eisenhower sought to balance the federal budget via restrained Cold War military expenditures during his first term, to control inflation through Federal Reserve monetary actions, and to respond to the recessions of 1953-54 and 1957-58 through automatic stabilizers and monetary and tax policy rather than turning to Keynesian fiscal policy.

On balance, Sloan assesses the Eisenhower record more positively than liberal Democrats or conservative Republicans did at the time. The administration balanced the budget three out of seven years, reduced the number of federal employees, and lowered the impact of federal expenditures in the post-Korean War period. Yet unlike other revisionists, Sloan argues that more was accomplished in the first than in the second term, when Ike became more conservative and failed to take unemployment and social welfare concerns more fully into his political accounting.

Sloan's use of the bureaucratic politics model overlooks the emerging influence of mixed private/public institutions such as the Committee for Economic Development seen in the works of Robert M. Collins and Kim McQuaid, which are not cited. Sloan might have raised more directly the larger interpretive issue of continuity and change across presidential administrations. He implies that implementation of the Employment Act of 1946 laid the foundation for the economic policies of modern Republicanism. In concluding, Sloan notes "the bitter irony for Eisenhower . . . [whose policy successes] . . . bequeathed to his

Democratic opponents a healthy economy that would finance a number of the policies he opposed" (p. 162).

This finely tuned study of sometimes arcane Eisenhower economic policy choices further enhances the emerging view of moderate Eisenhower revisionists, fully establishes its case for the post-World War II president's role as "manager of prosperity," and suggests that public policy history may be entering mainstream scholarship. Sloan's work provides a superb model for future histories of economic policy making under the John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon administrations.

PATRICK D. REAGAN

Tennessee Technological University

ANTHONY LEWIS. *Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment*. New York: Random House. 1991. Pp. xii, 354. \$25.00.

In the 1960s, violent acts committed by white racists helped rally national backing for the civil rights movement. Anthony Lewis's splendid analysis of the landmark Supreme Court ruling in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* demonstrates that the behavior of white segregationists also advanced the cause of civil liberties. In 1960, an Alabama jury awarded L. B. Sullivan, city commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, \$500,000 in libel damages for factual misstatements in a *New York Times* advertisement supporting civil rights; by 1964, when the case reached the Supreme Court, local and state officials were seeking \$5.6 million in damages from the newspaper. When "Southern officials, juries and judges distorted libel law for a political end, to suppress criticism of the regime of racial segregation" (p. 153), Lewis asserts, the Supreme Court was led to revolutionize the law of libel and afford new protection to freedom of speech.

Lewis has an important and an absorbing story to tell, and he tells it superbly. He examines the origins of the case, the legal strategies adopted by the lawyers for both sides, and the arguments before the Supreme Court. He notes that Columbia University law professor Herbert Wechsler, who represented the *New York Times*, "faced one daunting historical obstacle: the fact that libel had always been treated as outside the rules of the First Amendment" (p. 114). To show how that obstacle was overcome, Lewis draws on the personal papers of Justice William Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion. Placing the case in the broad context of the development of free speech doctrine in the twentieth century, Lewis traces the evolution of the majority opinion over the course of eight drafts and describes the complex negotiations between Brennan and his fellow justices.

The Court's decision prohibited a "public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless

disregard of whether it was false or not." The Court did not provide what Justice Hugo Black wanted: "an absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their public duty" (p. 151). Later Court decisions, however, applied the new rule, or a variant of it, not only to public officials but also to public figures and even to private persons attacked on matters of public concern. One of the most intriguing aspects of this impressive book is Lewis's examination of the resulting problem of balancing freedom of expression with a sensitivity to reputation.

Lewis also demonstrates how the best-intentioned of decisions can have unintended, and harmful, consequences. As a result of the 1964 ruling, libel suits became "a flourishing American industry" (p. 205), "the cost of defending against libel suits increased" (p. 201), and the fear of facing such suits sometimes led to self-censorship. Acknowledging these and other problems that resulted from the ruling, Lewis nevertheless concludes, on the basis of recent Supreme Court decisions, that "for the foreseeable future, the constitutional law of libel would rest on *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*" (p. 233).

RICHARD POLENBERG
Cornell University

SUZANNE STAGGENBORG. *The Pro-Choice Movement: Organization and Activism in the Abortion Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 229. \$27.50.

At a time when the Supreme Court seems poised to limit further, if not overturn, the abortion rights conferred in its historic 1973 decision in *Roe v. Wade*, a sophisticated, informative history of the pro-choice movement would indeed be a welcome addition to the literature on this conflicted policy issue. Suzanne Staggenborg seeks, not altogether successfully, to provide that addition. Relying on historical records of major national organizations and local groups in Chicago as well as oral interviews with pro-choice activists, she recounts the development of the movement from its inception in the 1960s through the 1989 *Webster* ruling.

Initially formed as a loose coalition of activists and organizations whose original allegiance was to feminism, family planning, and zero population growth, the movement, according to Staggenborg, also included physicians, lawyers, and clergy eager to secure the repeal of restrictive state statutes. Its strength, she argues, lay in the ability of different constituencies to employ different tactics. Lobbying and litigation were designed to legalize abortion; direct action and education were intended to legitimate it as an option. Paradoxically, victory came before the movement achieved its greatest strength.

In the immediate aftermath of *Roe*, the movement as a whole briefly languished. Goals shifted to implementation of the Court's ruling and procurement of

freestanding clinics that could provide safe, low-cost abortions. Organizations such as the National Abortion Rights Action League remained organized and active, according to Staggenborg, developing more formalized organizational structures, acquiring more professional leadership, and moving toward status as political insiders. These developments would serve the movement well for, beginning in the mid-1970s, opponents made impressive gains. The Hyde amendment banning use of Medicaid funds for abortions for poor women, the Supreme Court's affirmation of that policy in *Harris v. Mac Rae*, the resurgence of restrictions on abortion at the state level, congressional hearings on a Human Life bill, and a proposed Constitutional amendment overturning *Roe*—all served to galvanize supporters of choice.

The result, Staggenborg argues, was not only to reinvigorate the movement but also to tighten the linkage between pro-choice and pro-life movements, forcing pro-choice activists to engage in reactive single-issue politics at the expense of a broader reproductive rights agenda favored by many feminists. The extent to which opponents' strategy and tactics dictated those of pro-choice activists was demonstrated again in the mid-1980s. Unable to gain a majority in either Congress and or the Supreme Court, opponent activists mounted new grass-roots initiatives such as Operation Rescue. The pro-choice organizations whose institutional tactics and insider status had functioned so well in Washington now had to mobilize new direct action initiatives at the local level, even as the Reagan and Bush administrations sought to restructure the Supreme Court. That the pro-choice movement did so successfully while simultaneously entering electoral politics at the state level was a measure of the movement's resourcefulness. It is evidence also, Staggenborg insists, of the limitations of social movement theory, which relies on models that are in essence simplistic.

The extent to which Staggenborg, a sociologist, not only uses movement theory but also uses the history of the pro-choice movement to test and effectively critique that theory is the great strength of her work. It is also a limitation. Historians, while appreciating the attention to theory, will wish for a less mechanical, not to say bloodless, approach to what is after all a social drama involving real people. We still await a study with the narrative power to capture both the rich symbolic meaning and the authentic human struggle of what is surely one of the most dramatic and controversial movements of our time.

JANE S. DE HART
University of California,
Santa Barbara

DONALD A. YERXA. *Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898–1945*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1991. Pp. vii, 202. \$34.95.

After the Spanish-American War, Donald A. Yerxa notes, American military and naval planners regarded the Caribbean as a uniquely vital strategic area. Any European power that wished to attack the United States, they thought, must first secure a staging area there. Furthermore, the Caribbean led to the Panama Canal, soon defined as the key to naval defense of both east and west coasts. An intense debate over the proper basing and deployment of naval forces in the region was never entirely resolved. At the same time, the navy was called on to provide ships and marines for frequent interventions and shows of force about the Caribbean. Naval officers not only carried out orders from the State Department but also often played a significant role themselves in shaping their country's response to the region's political crises.

The Caribbean did not exist in a vacuum, however. Great Britain had colonies, large economic interests, and naval forces in the region at the beginning of the century. But the British chose not to challenge American hegemony and in 1906 consolidated most of their naval forces nearer home. Germany, however, rapidly emerged as a perceived threat, and in 1897 the Kaiser initiated a planning exercise aimed at seizure of a Caribbean base and subsequent war with the United States. While such planning was largely abandoned by 1906, it had planted a permanent suspicion in American minds. Far Eastern rivalries with Japan produced a potential foe in the Pacific as well. In 1913, the first version of War Plan Black presumed a German invasion in the Caribbean, and in the following year War Plan Orange theorized a possible Japanese raid on the Panama Canal.

After the United States entered World War I, the navy feared a German U-boat campaign in the Caribbean, but the threat never materialized and the Caribbean was gradually downgraded as a priority area during the war. In the interwar period gunboat diplomacy declined in importance, especially in the 1930s. The navy's battleships moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast in the early 1920s, while planning focused on a war with Japan. The onset of war in Europe, however, brought renewed interest in the Caribbean and fear of an Axis onslaught there. For the first time there seemed a real possibility of fighting enemies in both oceans at once, making the Panama Canal more vital than ever.

Germany's conquest of France in 1940 raised concern in Washington over the fate of the French West Indies. This increased when a French squadron loyal to the Vichy regime sought refuge in Martinique, while 100 fighter planes just delivered from the United States rested on the airstrip there. Fearing that these assets might fall under German control, the navy planned an invasion of the island, but ultimately it neutralized the French force through diplomacy backed by the threat of force. A new crisis appeared in January 1942, when a devastating U-boat attack virtually shut off tanker traffic in the Caribbean. But

the North African invasion of November 1942 brought a German redeployment out of the region, and the U-boat losses never again reached a really serious level there.

These are only some of the developments described in Yerxa's thorough study of the navy's Caribbean strategy. The book begins with a capable overview of the strategic situation and follows the details of service debates over plans, basing, deployment, and other subjects through the years. While sketching the navy's role in interventions and gun-boat diplomacy, Yerxa omits detailed accounts of individual interventions and concentrates on the larger picture. The study is solidly researched, clearly and economically written, and intelligently conceived: it is a useful synthesis filling a gap in the existing literature.

DAVID HEALY
University of Wisconsin,
Milwaukee

SERGE RICARD. *Théodore Roosevelt: Principes et pratique d'une politique étrangère*. Aix-en-Provence: Université de Provence. 1991. Pp. xii, 487.

Serge Ricard has written more about Theodore Roosevelt than any other French scholar, and this work reveals his expertise. He places Roosevelt in the setting of the United States as an "imperialistic republic," demonstrating his mastery of American history in general and of the era of imperialism in particular. He next looks at Roosevelt's life, examining how various situations and events affected TR's foreign policies, but without pushing "psychobiography" beyond the evidence.

The most interesting parts of the work are the 160 pages on Roosevelt's diplomacy, including all major and some minor episodes. Here Ricard cites historians' views, reexamines the evidence, and states his own conclusions. In general, this is nuanced revision, adhering to the national interest school of thought, and with but a few suggestions of a French point of view.

Historians of American diplomacy will find nothing new here in terms of historiography or evidence, but they will discover Ricard's nuances, as in Roosevelt's role in the first Moroccan crisis. Fundamentally, Ricard approves of Roosevelt, although he sees in him something of a "Jekyll and Hyde," as in TR's different treatment of great powers and small states. Ricard praises Roosevelt's attempts to educate Americans about the changing international scene, his concentration of foreign policy decision making in the White House, and, finally, his being a "virtuoso of the *fait accompli*" (p. 411).

Ricard bases his story and judgments on American, French, and German primary sources and on nearly every significant secondary work. One can forgive

two or three oversights. He also provides some useful appendices, plus maps and appropriate illustrations.

The chief pleasure in reading this book, other than finding cogent summaries of Roosevelt's life and deeds, is the prose. Ricard writes quite elegantly but without being in the least orotund. His style is direct, contains engaging metaphors, and has also a delightful wry humor, occasionally at the expense of Americans, their ways, and their foibles. For example, "One thinks of the good Samaritan . . . furnished with a sword" (p. 4).

ROBERT W. SELLEN
Georgia State University

LLOYD E. AMBROSIOUS. *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I*. (America in the Modern World.) Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources. 1991. Pp. xviii, 170. Cloth \$35.00, paper \$13.95.

In this book, Lloyd E. Ambrosius seeks to revive the classic realist criticism of Wilsonian liberal internationalism first advanced by earlier realists such as George F. Kennan, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr. For Ambrosius, realism involves an understanding that American diplomacy must "accommodate the paradoxical reality of interdependence and pluralism in the modern world" (p. ix), and it must perforce eschew utopian visions of an American-led liberal world order based on collective security. America should seek the realistic goal of preserving the balance of power in a pluralistic world and abandon the diplomatic style of liberal internationalism with its paradoxical fusions of isolationism with internationalism, unilateralism with universalism, and desires both to avoid and to redeem the Old World. Moreover, Ambrosius sees himself as correcting the tendency of historians such as Arthur S. Link and Ernest R. May who have, in Ambrosius's view, mistakenly "identified Wilson's practicality with realism, confusing his success in handling immediate problems with effective long-term leadership in world affairs" (p. xii).

At the heart of this neorealist criticism of Wilsonian diplomacy lies Ambrosius's conviction that Wilson should have chosen to reject a vision of American-inspired collective security transcending European power politics in favor of a realistic effort to defend that very European power balance, and America's security, against the challenge of Imperial Germany. But were the two goals of collective security and containing Germany in fact as contradictory as Ambrosius argues they were? For instance, Ambrosius develops the Progressive roots of Wilsonian internationalism in such figures as Franklin H. Giddings and Herbert Croly, both of whom called for a League of Nations-type collective security system before Wilson. For Ambrosius, the Progressive roots of Wilson's liberal internationalism help to explain Wilson's re-

grettable, in Ambrosius's opinion, tendencies to project American liberal exceptionalism onto world politics in an antirealist effort to redeem the Old World. But Ambrosius does not sufficiently emphasize the notion that many Progressives envisioned collective security as based on a strategic-moral fusion of Anglo-American power directed against a potential or actual German threat. Ambrosius notwithstanding, Wilson never saw a contradiction between collective security and the containment of a German threat to the European power balance.

Relatedly, Ambrosius faults Wilson for seeking to combine mediation with neutrality, thereby ignoring America's security interest in preventing a German victory. But this criticism ignores Wilson's belief in 1915–16 that the Western Allies were in no immediate danger of defeat, and Wilson's knowledge that crucial support for the Allied war effort was already being provided by the United States in the form of massive arms shipments paid for by loans. Moreover, Wilson's strong defense of American neutral rights in the face of the German submarine challenge also implicitly defended this war trade so vital to the Allies. Then, too, Wilson's "Peace without Victory" speech of January 22, 1917, criticized as unrealistic by Ambrosius because it stressed a postwar League as opposed to concrete peace terms checking German aggression, in fact also conveyed an implicit pro-Allied message. Any peace without victory in early 1917 would have had to mean a return to the status quo antebellum and would have meant German relinquishment of territories seized on both fronts from the Allies early in the war.

Ambrosius goes on to argue that Wilson's wartime and postwar policies were unrealistic, lacked coordination between ends and means, and were proven a failure by the Bolshevik victory in Russia and by the unwillingness of German socialists and liberals to rebel until the end of the war. But I believe it is only by reifying the concept of realism, making "unrealistic" any policy not centered on the sustaining of a European power balance against Germany, that Ambrosius can consistently undervalue the ways in which Wilson fused his own versions of realism with idealism in his Fourteen Points address and in his postwar diplomacy at Paris. Wilson hoped that the League of Nations would not only contain but also reform and eventually reintegrate a liberal Germany into a liberal Europe. He also projected the League as containing Bolshevik Russia until such time as Russia returned to liberal values. Who can say for sure that the League might not have achieved these hopes of Wilson had not Republican leaders such as Henry Cabot Lodge, whose "realism" Ambrosius approves, supported a harsh peace and then worked successfully to keep America out of the League of Nations?

N. GORDON LEVIN, JR.
Amherst College

JAN WILLEM SCHULTE NORDHOLT. *Woodrow Wilson: A Life for World Peace*. Translated by HERBERT H. ROWEN. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. vii. 495. \$34.95.

This is a fine biography. Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, a Dutch scholar, gracefully surveys Wilson's life with emphasis on his diplomacy. The book's subtitle, "A Life for World Peace," captures perfectly the author's belief that Wilson gave himself—sacrificed himself—for a truly noble cause.

The subtitle notwithstanding, this is no hagiography. The book is both critical and sympathetic, as clearheaded as it is complex. Schulte Nordholt frankly views Wilson as a great man, a hero, "not because he succeeded but because he dared" (p. 421). Indulging in occasional melodrama, he calls Wilson's importance "extraordinary" while he describes a "lonely" and "fossilized" man failing "wretchedly" (p. 5).

Schulte Nordholt raises literally hundreds of questions in order to uncover what Wilson did, why he did it, and why he failed. Although he answers some of these questions, he admits he cannot answer them all. Nevertheless, he offers us a rich sense of the mystery of history, of its subjectivity and complexity and paradox. Impatient with simple explanations, he indicts historians such as Arno Mayer and N. Gordon Levin, Jr., whom he claims, have imposed on Wilson a "set pattern" (the revolution/counterrevolution framework) within which "Everything seems to fit in, and what doesn't fit ceases to be important" (p. 300). By the same token, he is also critical of Arthur Link, whom he considers an apologist.

Apologist or not, Link's work, especially his compilation of Wilson's published papers, allows Schulte Nordholt to identify the themes that give shape to his subject's life: Wilson's poetic imagination, which elevated the spiritual over the material; Wilson's idealism, which expressed itself in a theological approach to politics that transformed political principles into a national religion and America into a servant of humanity; Wilson's belief that language ("the word") was a powerful instrument of change; Wilson's commitment to liberal romanticism and its myth of the goodness of peoples and the evil of governments; and Wilson's ignorance of Europe and his tendency to equate righteousness with self-righteousness, strength with stubbornness, honesty with tactlessness.

Combining intellectual history and old-fashioned biography, Schulte Nordholt grapples with the kind of paradox that many earlier biographers have sidestepped. He reconciles Wilson's Puritanism with his optimism, his internationalism with his nationalism, his admiration for parliamentary government with his contempt for Congress. He draws much from other historians, including relatively little-known European historians, while offering plenty of original interpretation. Readers will undoubtedly reject some of his judgments; he views, for instance, Colonel

Edward House as manipulative, self-important, and silly, and William Jennings Bryan as merely silly. He claims that Wilson's desire to mediate the European peace, rather than his defense of neutral rights, primarily led to his declaration of war in 1917. He argues that the president's refusal to compromise on Article 10 was unnecessary and stemmed from a tragic confusion of moral and legal thinking.

Schulte Nordholt's work leaves us not only knowing but also understanding its subject. Moreover, he offers insightful portraits of supporting characters like House, Henry Cabot Lodge, David Lloyd George, and Edith Wilson. He integrates themes of European and American history too often treated separately. His book should remind us that good biography, fashioned even without the newer methodologies, will likely appeal to specialist and lay readers alike for a long, long time.

GARY B. OSTROWER
Alfred University

NEIL V. SALZMAN. *Reform and Revolution: The Life and Times of Raymond Robins*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 472. \$35.00.

Raymond Robins was, as the phrase goes, larger than life. More fascinating and tragic than anyone Hollywood or a penny novelist could have concocted, Robins was the product of a troubled home and morbidly attached to his sister, who was herself a famous actress and an accomplished novelist. He became by turns a roustabout, a miner, a successful corporate attorney, a gold prospector in Alaska, an evangelical minister, a settlement house director, a reform politician, a leader in the Progressive Party, the chief American liaison with the revolutionary Soviet government in 1917–18, a crusader for prohibition and world peace, and an influential advocate of American recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. Driven by ambition, idealism, and certainty, he consistently fought for the rights of the underprivileged in American society, for understanding and common sense in U.S. relations with the Soviet regime, and for a world free of armaments and war. By his death in 1954, little that he believed in had been accomplished, yet his firmness of principle and his energetic devotion to helping others remain as a testament to values of fairness and humanitarianism that represent an important, if currently sublimated, strand of the American tradition.

This biography, based on extensive family papers, deals fully with every aspect of Robins's remarkable career and includes a sensible medical-psychological explanation of Robins's boyhood and adult breakdowns and of his disappearance for several weeks in 1932. Neil V. Salzman also had access to the views and materials of Sherwood Eddy and William Appleman Williams, each of whom had begun work on a biography of Robins. The result is a thorough and fully

documented account that will become the standard work on Robins.

At the same time there are two chief drawbacks to this study. The challenge for a biographer is to empathize yet not to idolize. Salzman, so clearly attuned to Robins's aspirations and personality, succeeds admirably in giving us a sensitive understanding of the man, but he is too admiring and uncritical regarding Robins's faults and failures. For example, the reader is left puzzled at the glaring contradiction between Robins's enthusiastic support of American entry into World War I and his later ardent pacifism. Or, in describing Robins's relations with Trotsky and Lenin, Salzman fully accepts Robins's view of the sincerity of the Bolshevik leaders' proposals without sufficient consideration of the political tactics that motivated these suggestions. The author also overlooks the bombastic, self-absorbed side of Robins and fails to point out that some of the naiveté reflected in Robins's actions in Soviet Russia stemmed from his lack of knowledge and experience in diplomacy, in Russian history, and in European politics. Finally, the author is too tolerant of Robins's later endorsement of Stalinism in the 1930s.

A second weakness is that the book is overwritten: it is too long, stuffed with lengthy quotations, often repetitious, and poorly edited. Nevertheless, the essential fascination of both the man and his career come through, and Salzman rightly emphasizes the tragedy that Robins's sensible recommendation that the United States deal with, not isolate and attack, Soviet Russia was swamped in a tide of anti-Germanism and anti-Bolshevism. Those, like Robins, who, while not socialists, argued that it made more sense to try to understand Leninism and to deal with the reasons for its appeal than to call it evil incarnate and to lash out blindly at it, have had little more success than Robins over the seventy-five years since the Bolshevik Revolution. To appreciate fully the complexity of Robins the man and the significance of what he did, this biography should be read together with the eloquent and judicious appraisal of Robins by George F. Kennan in his *Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920*, volume 2, *The Decision to Intervene* (1958), chapter 10.

JOHN M. THOMPSON
EMERITUS
*Indiana University,
Bloomington*

H. W. BRANDS. *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918–1961*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 337. \$27.95.

With four books to his credit in as many years in addition to many essays, H. W. Brands can safely be anointed as one of the most prolific American diplomatic historians of the younger generation. Two books on Dwight D. Eisenhower's foreign policy and

one on U.S.–Indian relations are now followed by a biography of the prominent American professional diplomat and cold warrior, Loy Henderson. After a number of monographs on George Kennan, and one on Charles “Chip” Bohlen, a study of the lesser-known Henderson was needed, given that Robert Kelley’s group of State Department Russian experts became so influential in setting the United States on its course to Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Henderson’s beginnings were inauspicious. Born in 1892 in the Arkansas Ozarks, he did not attend Ivy League schools like his famous colleagues, now widely admired as “wise men” of U.S. foreign policy. At the end of the Great War he signed up with the American Red Cross and became involved in repatriating Russian POWs. In 1922 he joined the consular service and came under the wings of Kelley, the State Department’s resident Russian expert who tutored Henderson in his fierce anti-Bolshevism. Sent to the Baltics in 1927, the Riga experience further strengthened his mental baggage of anticommunism (what Daniel Yergin has called the “Riga axioms”) and prepared him for his assignment to Moscow in 1933 with Ambassador William Bullitt.

When Bullitt left Moscow in disgust in 1935, Henderson became chief of mission and witnessed the purge trials firsthand. Henderson’s fear of globally subversive communism became an obsession in these years. When he returned to Washington in mid-1938, he had established a firm reputation as a “reactionary” with the Roosevelt White House. Assigned to the State Department’s Eastern European desk, he swam against the current of cooperation with Joseph Stalin when counseling that “it was a grave mistake to forget a quarter-century of Soviet misconduct in the interest of what doubtless would prove a passing alliance” (p. 102). In 1943 Henderson was kicked up the career ladder for the first time and sent into exile as U.S. ambassador to Iraq. In Baghdad he retooled to become a Middle Eastern specialist but remained a Soviet expert at heart.

Recalled to Washington in 1945, Henderson was made director of Near Eastern and African affairs. In this position the already seasoned cold warrior became highly influential. He played a key role in the Greek crisis of early 1947, helping to draft the Truman Doctrine, a role that he considered the high point of his professional life. His painful experience of fighting what he felt was Harry Truman’s unprincipled policy toward the British Palestine Mandate was the low point in a distinguished career and made him highly unpopular with the Zionists.

As a result of his hard-nosed and stubborn “Anglophile” and “Arabist” positions in the Palestine crisis, Henderson was sent into exile again, this time as ambassador to India. He despised Jawaharlal Nehru’s arrogant policy of neutralism between the emerging Cold War blocs. During his next assignment in Tehran, he recommended the overthrow of Iranian

Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, a feat the CIA accomplished in the 1953 coup. John Foster Dulles brought him back to Washington to oversee the reorganization of the State Department.

Based on Henderson’s copious private papers, oral histories, and numerous official State Department files, Brands’s approach is straightforward—the world according to Loy Henderson. This makes it hardly a critical work of one of the architects of the informal “American Empire,” a concept in the book that is left curiously underdeveloped. Henderson’s character and *mentalité* are only touched on in passing, apart from noting his visceral anticommunism, “hard work,” “deep devotion to duty,” and the fact that he “thrived on adversity.” In Brands’s book this diplomat had no social or family life. So Brands’s Henderson emerges a bloodless, sexless, unimaginative, and dull person. Brands leaves unmentioned, for example, that Henderson “carried the personal scars” of the fight with the Zionists “for the rest of his life” (see Michael Cohen, *Truman and Israel* [1990], 225). Brands’s Henderson may be tedious, but his style is lively, although frequently distracting due to neologisms (“bureaucricide”), colloquialisms (Henderson got a “bum rap”), and cute phrases (“if someone had to crack eggs for a Kashmir omelette, better Britain than the United States” [p. 197]).

The major shortcoming, however, is Brands’s failure to place Henderson fully into the context of international history. Henderson’s actions are usually prefaced by introductions that are textbook knowledge while much recent literature is ignored, evidenced in the fact that there is no bibliography of the scantily cited secondary literature (the vast literature on decolonization or on Anglo-American relations in the early Cold War comes to mind, a failure to consult Alan Bullock’s *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary* [1983] being the most glaring case). The British Foreign Office files surely could have provided more information on Henderson and America’s erratic policies of replacing the British empire than the skimpy fifteen documents cited by Brands. In other words, this book is long on Henderson’s views but short on analyzing those views in a critical context of international history.

GÜNTER BISCHOF

University of New Orleans

JEFFERY M. DORWART. *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909–1949*. (Texas A&M University Military History Series, number 21.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 237. \$35.00.

This book is a study of the personalities and politics of national defense policy making. Jeffery M. Dorwart deals with the civilian mobilization for World War II and emphasizes the immediate postwar years in

which defense organization was hammered out on the anvil of ideology and bureaucratic politics.

The analysis centers more specifically on what Dorwart terms the "national security partnership" of two men who met as students at Princeton University and formed an intimate intellectual bond over a forty-year period ending in 1949. They were James V. Forrestal, an investment banker who became secretary of the navy and later the first secretary of Defense, and Ferdinand Eberstadt, also a Wall Street financier who was the most influential conceptual founding father of post-World War II defense organization.

While this study covers the years 1909 to 1949, when Forrestal died, its most comprehensive coverage is of the four-year period after 1945 when the outlines of the U.S. national security state took shape. As the national government attempted to apply the organizational lessons of the war to the postwar structure for defense, a great debate began over proper organization. Major participants were the army, navy, and air power interests, and their civilian supporters. President Harry S. Truman was an early advocate of a highly centralized defense structure, with "unification" of the armed services under a strong secretary of Defense.

The principal opponent of "unification" was the U.S. Navy and its supporters on Capitol Hill. As secretary of the navy, Forrestal, bolstered by Eberstadt's analytical skills, intuition, and knowledge of bureaucratic behavior, fought against the more extreme versions of "unification." The navy won, by forcing a compromised defense structure. The authority of the new defense secretariat was circumscribed by decentralized power within the separate army, navy, and newly created air force.

Dorwart gives us a penetrating insight into the politics of national defense organization. His theme is captured in these words: "the defense reorganization fight revealed that in many ways the divisions over the Truman and Eberstadt unification plans were an extension of the struggles between New Dealers and dollar-a-year corporatists over mobilization forms and policies, wartime production organization, and reconversion timetables" (p. 124).

Dorwart may have oversimplified the situation by categorizing the opponents in the defense organization debate as "corporatists" versus "New Dealers." In reality, members of each category could be found on both sides in the debates. Also, he has underemphasized the impact of technology—especially air power and strategic bombing theory—as a threat to the armed services' traditional roles and missions, particularly sea power.

Nonetheless, this study adds significant new insight into the founding years of the American national security state. It provides clues as to why no president, beginning with Truman, when confronting the military-industrial elite, has been able to effect his preferred defense organization. From this work we

can also better understand why the nation has as yet failed to fully rationalize its defense structure toward a less costly and more effective defense management.

HARRY HOWE RANSOM
Vanderbilt University

BARRY H. STEINER, *Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy*. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1991. Pp. xvi, 367. \$40.00.

Bernard Brodie (1910–78) has long been heralded as the first and foremost strategist of the nuclear age. Brodie's learned and lucid writings on the military, political, and moral implications of nuclear weapons initiated and largely defined a thriving field of intellectual endeavor. After earning his doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago in 1941, Brodie was a naval reserve staff officer in Washington during World War II, taught at Yale University in the late 1940s, and moved on to the newly formed RAND Corporation in 1951. In the mid-1960s he resumed his academic career as a political scientist at UCLA, where he taught until his death.

Brodie's pathbreaking analysis of the impact of the atomic bomb on international political and military affairs appeared in *The Absolute Weapon* (1946). He served as a special adviser to the air force chief of staff on nuclear targeting in 1950–51, published his seminal *Strategy in the Missile Age* in 1959, and crowned his numerous commentaries on strategic issues with an elegant reflective summary, *War and Politics* (1973).

Brodie's life and work have been treated, along with other nuclear strategy intellectuals, in recent works by Lawrence Freedman, Colin Gray, Fred Kaplan, and Gregg Herken, but a full-length assessment of this intriguing and influential thinker has long been needed. Barry H. Steiner, after more than a decade of work on Brodie's papers, has only partially addressed this need.

Steiner's study is not a biography but rather an exhaustive (and exhausting) exegesis of Brodie's published and unpublished writings, informed by painstaking if circumscribed commentary on the environment in which he worked at RAND and in academia. After a useful introduction and overview of Brodie's career, the book is organized topically in rough chronological order, starting with the initial impact of "the absolute weapon" in the 1940s and covering the targeting of nuclear weapons, the implications of the hydrogen bomb, and limited war and escalation in the 1950s and 1960s. The concluding chapter evaluates Brodie's contributions to his chosen field, attempts to systematize his far from systematic analytical approaches to strategic studies, and fences with Brodie critics Jonathan Schell and Colin Gray.

This is clearly a book for specialists. It is far too detailed and unwieldy for classroom use, even for the beginning graduate student. It is not to be read for

pleasure, nor would it provide the novice with a useful introduction to the theory and practice of nuclear strategy. It would have been more readable, and more significant, had Steiner treated Brodie as a real human being, not just an impersonal intellect producing reams of text and letters. For example, he might at least have mentioned (other than in his dedication) Brodie's forty-year marriage to the influential historian-biographer Fawn Brodie and considered her possible influence on his thinking.

The basic problem with this book is that Steiner never defines what he means by "the foundations of American nuclear strategy." Nor does he distinguish between strategy as an academic enterprise and strategy as a governmental activity. As a result, he never provides a larger context. Steiner is unable finally to evaluate his subject or assess precisely what Brodie accomplished, either as a theorist, where he was enormously influential, or as a policy adviser, where he was often a marginal and frustrated figure. Because he fails to address just how, why, and where Brodie was important, Steiner has produced what is in essence a lengthy footnote to the man's writings, not a satisfying assessment of his work. Brodie's own beautifully written books and memorable phrases capture his ideas far better than Steiner's straightforward but pedestrian commentary. Those who wish to know what Brodie thought would be well advised to read him in the original.

DAVID ALAN ROSENBERG
Temple University

LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC. *The United States and the Genocide Convention*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 290. \$39.95.

Lawrence J. LeBlanc describes with keen political insight and careful legal analysis the nearly forty-year struggle over the ratification of the Genocide Convention by the United States. It was a struggle in which the opponents of the Convention were almost constantly on the offensive while proponents of the Convention were on the defensive.

One might assume that virtually everyone would be in favor of a convention that condemns the hideous crime of genocide. Yet the opponents raised a number of concerns. First, they argued that the Convention might be used to charge that discrimination against blacks and Native Americans in the United States was a form of genocide. Article II of the Convention specified as crimes "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." This concern and others were met by the Senate's Resolution of Ratification (drafted by Richard Lugar, Jesse Helms, and Orrin Hatch and known as the Sovereignty Package), which stipulated the United States' understanding that "the term 'intent to destroy' . . . means the specific intent to destroy."

Second, opponents objected to Article IX, which provided that disputes relating to the interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a state for genocide, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This objection came principally from those who saw themselves as defenders of U.S. sovereignty against the "internationalists." To appease this group, the Sovereignty Package included a reservation that, before any dispute to which the United States was a party may be submitted to the ICJ, the specific consent of the United States would be required.

Third, opponents expressed fear that the Convention might be used by North Vietnam, or another country with which the United States might be at war, to try and to execute American prisoners of war, charging them with genocide. Accordingly, the Sovereignty Package included an understanding that "acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent required by Article II are not sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this Convention." Concerns were also expressed about the extradition provisions and the reference to the possible establishment of an international criminal tribunal. These were alleviated by understandings in the Sovereignty Package. In fact, the number and scope of the reservations and understandings submitted by the United States with its ratification tended to make its accession largely symbolic. But even as a symbolic act, it was important.

Although presidents Harry Truman, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter all supported ratification, it was Ronald Reagan's switch to favoring the Convention in 1984 that finally swayed Senate conservatives to go along, albeit with hobbling reservations and understandings.

This is a carefully written, well-reasoned study that, to my knowledge, is the only book devoted exclusively to the United States and the Convention.

SEYMOUR MAXWELL FINGER
Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations
Graduate School and University Center,
City University of New York

CANADA

MICHAEL DOUCET and JOHN WEAVER. *Housing the North American City*. Buffalo, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1991. Pp. xvii, 572. \$55.00.

This book is an ambitious, complex, and—ultimately—creatively frustrating volume. It is ambitious since it attempts nothing less than to comprehensively analyze the way North Americans have built their cities over the past 150 years. Michael Doucet and John Weaver approach this task by focusing on the provision of housing (or shelter) in Hamilton, On-

tario, and by relating this well-studied city's experiences to those elsewhere on the continent. Arguing—as urban historians and geographers often do—from the particular to the general can be frustrating since it is rarely possible to draw clear, unambiguous conclusions. But short of thousands of detailed case studies, this volume can be judged a success. This is not to say that it is always satisfactory; it does not, for example, compel the reader as does the work of Sam Bass Warner, Jr., or Kenneth Jackson. The book nevertheless certainly deserves similar attention.

The volume is complex in terms of organization, sources, and approaches. It begins with an excellent chapter on "City Building and Shelter History" that relates this study to the current state of urban historiography, attempting to resolve discrepancies and contradictions in the literature. The next six chapters take the reader through decisions and actions that conclude with people moving into shelters. The first three chapters consider land development as design and business exercises, dividing the 160 years into three distinct eras: one of individualism (1830–80), the next of corporate involvement (1880–1945), and the last an era of state intervention (1945–80s). Chapter 4 speculates on the sources for the widely based desire for home ownership, while chapters 5 and 6 discuss innovations in house construction in relation to economic cycles and home financing. The following three chapters study homeownership patterns, uniting material and social history, as people are considered both in their homes and their neighborhoods. Topics include rental houses, apartments, landlords, and tenants. The concluding chapter explores a variety of ways to evaluate shelter quality and environments historically.

In crafting this study, the authors have relied on an amazing array of sources, ranging from obscure statistics to memoirs to official reports. The extensive notes are themselves worth serious study, indicating why this project—begun in 1981—took a decade to appear in book form. The authors also employ a number of different approaches, and, as they themselves admit, the transitions in method from chapter to chapter are sometimes jarring. Yet, if the volume is at times difficult to follow, the reader is convinced by the end that the book uses appropriately the skills of the historian (Weaver) and the geographer (Doucet).

The richness of this long volume precludes a detailed discussion of its many conclusions and critical assessments of its complex array of topics. Indeed, scholars will find every chapter full of substance and worthy of detailed analysis. Ultimately, however, the value of this volume almost certainly lies in its profound overview rather than in its thousand details, for it is essentially an analysis of the fundamental challenge that every society faces: the provision of shelter to its people. Even while casting the future of the North American city in a crisis setting as it falters in its delivery of the cultural icon of homeownership, and even while expressing impatience about a process

that confronts problems with tinkering rather than bold initiatives and indignation about the marginalization of the poor, the authors clearly recognize the awesome task of housing society. For more than a century and a half, a diverse variety of people coped with obstinate and evolving challenges in different areas of a critical industry. In this basic analysis of North America in the age of capitalism, the continent emerged scarred, dented, and sometimes wavering, but not defeated. In this context, current housing problems can be better understood.

ALAN F. J. ARTIBISE

University of British Columbia

BRIAN S. OSBORNE and DONALD SWAINSON. *Kingston: Building on the Past*. Westport, Ont.: Butternut. 1988. Pp. xiii, 381.

This history of the city is by two respected academics at Queen's University in Kingston, one a historical geographer, the other a political historian. Brian S. Osborne and Donald Swainson obviously care a great deal about the present and future of their city, as well as about its past.

Kingston, Ontario, was an important place in early Canada. After the failure of its metropolitan aspirations in the nineteenth century, Kingston has made a virtue of smallness, tradition, the security of federal and provincial government institutions, and its academic and literary prestige.

The authors take the notion of "urban biography" seriously. They set out to capture the "personality" of the place, a task they believe is possible in places that have not succumbed to the process of standardization and homogenization so typical of contemporary urban communities. The chief characteristic of Kingston, they maintain, is continuity: of function and of form. In fact, "few cities have changed as little as Kingston" (p. 1) since its founding as a community by refugees from the American Revolution in 1783. According to the authors, the key elements of this continuity have been, first, its military function as a fortress and base; second, its institutional uses, with penitentiaries, hospitals, asylums, and a university; and third, its entrepôt function as a transshipment point between lake and river.

What goes into the making of a place with such a personality? The authors go far beyond the approach of most local historians, for they place Kingston into the context of the most important national and international events, trends of the time, and contemporary urban developments. But they also move beyond those social scientists who concentrate only on faceless processes. Real people dominate the pages of this account: people like the Reverend John Stuart, a powerful Anglican cleric and, not incidentally, a major landowner; or John A. Macdonald, a local lawyer and politician who was to become Canada's first prime minister; or the more recent civic leaders who have

been consistently dedicated to "outdated notions of urban and economic growth" (p. 326).

The result is a thoroughly researched, well-written study of a community. Two flaws, however, tend to detract from the value of their description and analysis of this city's personality. For some reason, they chose not to develop one of the city's major characteristics, that of being Canada's "Limestone City." Perhaps no other facet of Kingston's urban image is as well known and described. While they use extensive visual material that hints at this, they do not deal with the question of the evolution of urban form. They could have greatly strengthened their interpretation in this area by relating the culture (including politics, economy, activities) to the physical fabric. Another flaw, from my viewpoint, is the organization. They concentrate heavily on the early period, perhaps because not much of national interest happened in Kingston after the middle of the nineteenth century. But the chapter organization does not give the reader a clear picture of how the community changes over time. Most chapters are excellent, discrete essays on particular themes, such as the capital city question, the role as port, the place of the military, and the attempt at industrialization. But all of these factors operate simultaneously at any period in a community's history, and an attempt to understand this interplay is what distinguishes the most successful community studies.

GILBERT STELTER
University of Guelph

JACK VERNEY. *The Good Regiment: The Carignan-Salières Regiment in Canada, 1665–1668*. Buffalo, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 222. \$34.95.

The history of the Carignan-Salières Regiment has been neglected since the studies of Benjamin Sulte in 1922 and Régis Roy and Gérard Malchelosse in 1925. Now, retired soldier and educator Jack Verney has published a book entitled *The Good Regiment*, the phrase used by Jean-Baptiste Colbert to describe the Carignan-Salières. Unfortunately, appendices listing weights and measures of the *ancien régime*, equipment of the armed forces, and regimental rolls limit the space available for treating the subject to only one hundred pages. The author has also decided not to compile a bibliography, thereby depriving us of an overall view of the sources used.

Contrary to the romanticized accounts of the École de Groulx and of those who depicted the regiment's voyage to Canada as a kind of spiritual crusade or colonial regeneration, this book presents a realistic vision of events. Verney describes the poor conduct of the troops before embarkation at La Rochelle, the ridiculous expedition of Rémy de Courcelle in 1666, the Phyrriic victory of Prouville de Tracy against the Agniers, the questionable behavior of the regiment's

officers while in the colony, and, finally, the negligible contribution of the regiment to populating the region.

Not everything in this study is new; much of what Verney presents can be found in older works: Sulte, Roy, and Malchelosse also stressed the same condemnable aspects of the regiment's activities, even if in actuality they contributed to establishing "the golden haze of glorious legend." Verney has not discovered any new sources: the notes of Léo Leymarie, which he uses in large measure, have been in the Canadian Public Archives, where Sulte and Roy both worked, for some time. Regarding the rolls of the regiment, which various historians have tried to reproduce faithfully, Verney is content to establish them by relying on the notes of Leymarie, the *Dictionnaire Généalogique* of Cyprien Tanquay, a study by François Audet, and the *Dictionnaire biographique du Canada*. If progress is to be made in this area, scholars should conduct research in the records of the civilian government and the notaries public, which previous studies have ignored.

In addition, Verney does not appear to be aware of the critical edition of *Vers burlesques* of 1666, which appeared in 1987 in *Les textes poétiques du Canada français, 1606–1867*, nor Marcel Trudel's article on the expedition of Courcelle in *Cahier 19* of the *Société historique de Longueuil* (1989).

Verney interprets certain documents badly. He writes that the *Journal* of the Jesuits did not stress the expedition of Courcelle "for fear of depicting the affair in an unfavorable light and thereby arousing official displeasure" (p. 45): he forgets or ignores that this *Journal* of the Supérieur was not destined for publication. Verney also claims that the commander of the fort at Sainte-Anne was "forced to consider allocating the defense of one of the fort's bastions to Dollier and his patients" (p. 89): the author does not understand that the commander was simply engaging in idle banter when he spoke of entrusting the defense of one of the strongholds to Dollier de Casson (who, as a priest, was not permitted to engage in acts of war) and the wounded men who were in his care.

These weaknesses do not prevent Verney's book from having the advantage of showing us the Carignan-Salières as it actually was, even if it has not advanced knowledge of the subject greatly. He thus helps to dissipate the "golden haze of glorious legend" in which the regiment's past had been enveloped by nationalist historians.

MICHELLE D'ALLAIRE
Université d'Ottawa

LATIN AMERICA

JEAN-YVES MOLLIER. *Le scandale de Panama*. Paris: Fayard. 1991. Pp. 564. 150 fr.

The death of the Jewish financier Jacques de Reinach in 1892 precipitated the single most corrosive parlia-

mentary scandal in the history of Third Republic France. Hundreds of thousands of modest French investors had lost their fortunes in the *Compagnie du canal de Panama*. The *chéquards*, recipients of bribes in Parliament and in the press, had conspired to hide the fact that the company was an inherently unsound investment. The resultant scandal incited the latent forces of anti-parliamentarianism, anti-Semitism, and nationalism.

Although the scandal has been the subject of previous studies, Jean-Yves Mollier's work, based on a comprehensive study of public and business archives, is by far the most comprehensive. Indeed, *Le scandale de Panama* is a larger study than the title suggests. The traditional culprits are all here: Jacques Reinach, Cornélius Herz, Ferdinand de Lesseps, Jules Grévy, and Daniel Wilson. But so are a host of lesser figures in the world of politics, business, and finance. Mollier uses the case of the Panama company as a prism for exploring a far wider network of economic and political forces in the early Third Republic. A new breed of bankers joined forces with a dynamic generation of entrepreneurs energetically exploiting the potential of new technology in engineering, electricity, and explosives. Business and politics inevitably met, the more so since the Republic was dominated by an equally new kind of politician who entered politics with limited means but was determined not to depart in the same condition. The real title of the book should probably be *La curée de la belle époque*.

The breadth of Mollier's study is at once a strength and a weakness. His documentation is both exhaustive and, at times, exhausting. His endless digressions will weary all but the most attentive readers; those not already familiar with the Panama scandal will probably find the venerable 1934 account by Adrien Dansette to be more useful. But as a portrait of the world of French business and political elites in the late nineteenth century, the book is superb.

This study also corrects some of the traditional interpretations of the Panama scandal. There was nothing very unusual, Mollier insists, about the way the Panama company was financed; nor did its notorious payments to politicians and the press depart significantly from standard practices of the times. At worst, men like Herz simply applied to France the lessons they had learned in the rough and tumble American world of "lobbyisme." One of his conclusions is that it was precisely the furor caused by the Panama scandal that rescued French politics from the wholesale financial corruption so characteristic of American public affairs. Still, the later history of Third Republic France was hardly free of scandals involving money and politics; one thinks of the Stavisky affair. Without a systematic comparison of the role of business and politics in the two countries, the case remains unproven. For all that, this book remains an important contribution to the still imper-

fectly understood history of late-nineteenth-century France.

WILLIAM D. IRVINE
York University

D. S. CHANDLER. *Social Assistance and Bureaucratic Politics: The Montepíos of Colonial Mexico, 1767–1821*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1991. Pp. viii, 239. \$40.00.

For about a half century at the end of the colonial period, the Spanish government extended pensions to the widows and orphans of many colonial officials. D. S. Chandler's book examines the arguments for founding these institutions (*montepíos*), their functioning in the important colony of Mexico, and the major difficulties they faced over this period. Regrettably, the author has defined the scope of his study narrowly, deciding not to use his findings to comment on the Bourbon reforms, of which the new pension systems were part, or on the character of the late-colonial Mexican society and economy, subjects that have benefited from considerable quality scholarship over the past twenty years. This constricted focus is reflected by the lack of any bibliography—at the author's request—and by the few references to secondary works in the notes. The documentation is drawn predominantly from the "Montepío" papers in the Mexican National Archives and the section on Mexico in Spain's primary colonial archive.

The book is organized logically into six chapters, which consider first the establishment of the system and internal government disputes about its operation, then aspects of the social and economic impact of the pension fund as revealed by internal documentation, and finally the collapse of the system because of chronic underfunding and the impact of the wars of independence.

Spain established a pension agency for survivors of senior military officers in 1761 and for those of civil officials two years later. A comparable agency for high-ranking colonial officials (*ministros*) was founded in 1770 and its counterpart for colonial functionaries (*empleados*) emerged in 1784. The two agencies squabbled incessantly about membership and funding sources.

From their beginning, the colonial pension systems were plagued by inadequate resources. The amounts deducted from salaries were grossly insufficient to bear the costs of maintaining the widows and daughters of deceased employees for extended periods. Payments were pledged until the women either married or entered a religious order. Predictably, some royal advisors argued that survivors avoided taking such steps in order to receive their meager though dependable pensions. More to the point, however, was that most of these women were too poor to afford the costs associated with either option.

The government also found itself caught up in

judging the validity of certain marriages and other personal relationships in order to determine whether self-termed survivors were truly eligible for pensions. As was so often the case in the colonial world, this often brought the issue of race to the fore. The pension agencies only recognized widows from marriages authorized by their husbands' superiors. The government eventually sought even to restrict marriages between elderly officials and young women.

The *montepíos* became lenders of some scale in Mexico's economy, although they never rivaled the colony's religious institutions in this capacity. Chandler relates the operation and impact of these loans. They served as a vital source of funds for the municipality of Mexico City.

This useful but circumscribed case study fleshes out our knowledge of late-colonial developments in Mexico. But while Chandler's treatment is reliable, readers will have to assess for themselves the importance of his findings and how they fit into what we already know about that era.

JOHN E. KICZA
Washington State University

THOMAS WHIGHAM. *The Politics of River Trade: Tradition and Development in the Upper Plata, 1780–1870*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1991. Pp. xviii, 274. \$50.00.

Thomas Whigham has enriched the field of Latin American history with this slender volume, and he does so without recourse to jargon and obfuscation. He treats the subregion of Paraguay and the Argentine province of Corrientes from the period of the Bourbon reforms (which greatly stimulated commerce) to the end of the ghastly Paraguayan War, and, unlike some, he finds little "autonomous" economic or social development. Instead, he shows that isolationism and a lack of wealth concentrated in few hands were results of political turmoil to the south and west (the wars of independence, pretensions of Buenos Aires, *caudillismo* and civil upheaval, Juan Manuel de Rosas, the *Guerra dos Farrapos*, and so on) rather than the conscious policies of populist leaders who sought to avoid dependency. In fact, he cogently notes that José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia ruled not as a maverick innovator but "like an efficient colonial governor" (p. 27), while his successor Carlos Antonio López, rather than being a developmentalist modernizer, was quite content to maintain "the old mercantilist system" (p. 73) and "was unique only in that he placed military preparedness ahead of overall economic growth" (p. 72). Instead of encountering heroes, Whigham finds people conscientiously working to cope with regional reality and foreign threat.

The book is cogently organized into two parts: "Commerce and Regional Politics" (a chronological history), and "Export Commodities and Development

in the Upper Plata" (with chapters on yerba maté, tobacco, cattle, and timber and associated industries). The material is well integrated, with surprisingly few redundancies, the writing style is lucid and fluent, and Whigham's detailed description of the life of a yerba harvester is genuinely harrowing.

The book is painstakingly researched and includes fourteen pages of good illustrations, relevant tables, an excellent glossary (the regional dialect, laced with Guaraní words, necessitates this), maps, and a full-size bibliography.

I have some quibbles, among them Whigham's acceptance of the common (and mistaken) estimate that at the end of the Paraguayan War only 28,000 males survived in Paraguay (p. 89). Also, his brief mention of the Brazilian south, an area and a people similar to those of the Upper Plata, cries out for amplification. A final problem is the date of Francisco Solano López's trip to Europe, which appears correctly as 1853–54 (p. 80) and incorrectly as 1854–55 (p. 130) and 1853 (p. 149).

This book is not a polemical attack on the historiography of dependency theory. Rather, it is a careful, judicious treatment of the economic history of a subregion. It merits attention.

JOHN HOYT WILLIAMS
Indiana State University

RONALD M. SCHNEIDER. *"Order and Progress": A Political History of Brazil*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1991. Pp. xvi, 486. \$55.00.

Avowedly presentist in aim, this volume by Ronald M. Schneider seeks "lessons of the past" that are relevant to "what Brazil has recently experienced or is going through at present" (p. 21). The book covers the period from 1822 to 1989 and tries to identify the origins of and precedents for the military regime of 1964–85. Unfortunately, this teleological focus leads to dozens of flimsy analogies of dubious relevance and debatable significance in his treatment of the Empire and First Republic (see, for example, pp. 60, 63–64, 70–73, 79, 80, 82, 85, 87–89, 97).

Although claiming to place "political processes and problems where they belong, center stage," Schneider's book is flawed by an anachronistically narrow definition of politics that is devoid of socioeconomic or class factors. He is especially critical of the "influential and fashionable" contemporary tendency to overestimate the importance of popular mobilization and the opposition in recent Brazilian political life (pp. 13, 301, 345).

Schneider criticizes scholars and journalists whose interpretations, he charges, are shaped by their political engagements (pp. xiv, xiii, 460). Yet Schneider's book is distinguished by his own highly partisan opinions inimical to the Left and favorable to the Right and much of the military. Indeed, the book's

greatest strength and originality lies in its right-of-center perspective that not only has its own coherence and legitimacy but that also, being none-too-common among academics, may spark useful controversy.

Thus, the first post-World War II president, Eurico Gaspar Dutra, a notoriously authoritarian military man, is presented as virtually "a Brazilian version of Dwight D. Eisenhower" whose presidency was "characterized by freedom and stability" (pp. 160, 164). In contrast, Schneider sees the era's populist politicians—such as "Jânio Quadros (the irresponsible quitter)," "Leonel Brizola (the equally irresponsible incendiary)," and the notoriously radical and undisciplined Jango Goulart—as largely responsible for the military coup of 1964 (pp. 291, 207, 231).

Yet it is the weakness of Schneider's analysis of the military regime that will be the greatest surprise to those who know his pioneering monograph, *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970* (1971). While incorporating sections of the earlier work into his new book without attribution, Schneider is now also far less critical of the military regime. Although he dissented in 1971 from the then-dominant military "hard line," his current, far more sanguine views of even the repressive post-1968 period reflects the eventual triumph, after 1974, of the "moderate" factions of the military with which he sympathizes.

Minimizing undemocratic actions by "moderate" military rulers, Schneider portrays the later evolution of the regime as pitting sophisticated and cosmopolitan "champions of the military-as-arbiter role" against military hard-liners and the too-often intransigent and ungrateful opposition (pp. 287, 279, 290–91, 243, 252, 267–68, 271). Given these views, it is not surprising that Schneider offers a relatively bleak assessment of the new democratic era after 1985 that has minimized, at least for now, the military's role in Brazilian politics (pp. 314, 316, 320, 328).

Scholars will find the book most useful for its compilation of empirical detail and its admirably comprehensive bibliographical citations. Although it serves as a useful check on left-leaning wishful thinking, this book is not a substitute for Peter Flynn's earlier one-volume English-language history of Brazil (*Brazil: A Political Analysis* [1978]) or Thomas Skidmore's superb *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85* (1988).

JOHN D. FRENCH
Florida International University

MARION K. PINSORF. *German-Speaking Entrepreneurs: Builders of Business in Brazil*. (American University Studies, sixteenth series: Economics, number 6.) New York: Peter Lang. 1990. Pp. iv, 403. \$77.95.

There is an extensive literature in German and Portuguese on the role of German-speaking immigrants

in Brazilian history, but relatively few books and articles have been published in English. This study by Marion K. Pinsdorf is a modest addition to that body of work.

In concept the book is filiopietistic. Its thesis—that German immigrants contributed mightily to the economic development of Brazil—is commonplace. Its focus is entrepreneurial history from 1890 to 1975.

The contents of the first six chapters summarize causes of German emigration and subsequent patterns of settlement in Brazil, especially the forested regions (*Urwald*) of the southernmost Brazilian states (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná), plus São Paulo and Espírito Santo. These chapters provide the setting for understanding the history of the Pinsdorf family, which is treated in chapters seven to eleven. The founder of this family in Brazil, Wilhelm Pinsdorf, receives the lion's share of attention as an exemplar of the German immigrant-entrepreneur in southwestern Mato Grosso, a huge and then primitive territory in the tropical Brazilian interior drained by the Paraná River system. (Pinsdorf is apparently a distant relative.) In the concluding two chapters, the author returns to the larger theme of German immigrant contributions to Brazilian economic history.

The section treating the personal history of Wilhelm Pinsdorf is the most interesting and useful. Unlike other parts of the book, it is based on primary sources. Pinsdorf emigrated from Meissen, Germany, in 1892 to Buenos Aires, where he worked in the leather industry. His entrepreneurial instincts, however, led him up the Paraná River to Corumbá and other nearby settlements in Mato Grosso, near the point where the borders of Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay are joined. Here Pinsdorf pursued various opportunities: he gathered egret feathers, ran a supply goods store, slaughtered cattle, and traded in dried beef, hides, and tallow. After 1914, when Corumbá was linked by rail to the Brazilian coast, Pinsdorf's business and family connections with São Paulo increased. He died there in 1935.

Unfortunately the weaknesses of this book outweigh its strengths. It does not, as its title suggests, provide a structured or systematic study of German-speaking entrepreneurs as a group in Brazilian business history. It is essentially descriptive and its ventures in analysis are superficial. It is not well written: sweeping, unexamined generalizations abound and it suffers from an excess of quotations, usually from secondary works. Even the material based on Pinsdorf's letters offers no coherent narrative; instead the author offers disjointed year-by-year summaries. Apparently the publisher provided no professional copy editing services.

FREDERICK C. LUEBKE
University of Nebraska,
Lincoln

THOMAS E. SKIDMORE. *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. xi. 420. \$29.95.

Brazil is struggling. Six years after Thomas E. Skidmore completed his excellent political history of Brazil under military rule, and five years after he wrote his postscript, this continental nation, which ranks eighth in the size of its economy, experienced negative growth in 1990 and barely grew at all in 1991. The lines forming daily at foreign consulates signify a drastically changed scenario from the "miracle years" of 1968–73, when the economy grew 11 percent a year and Brazil, at the highpoint of authoritarian rule, seemed on the threshold of great power status. An accelerating crime rate, the withering effects of AIDS, falling living standards and poverty, and rampant environmental destruction are further signs of things gone wrong. The origins and reasons for this disappointment are abundant in Skidmore's book.

All the same, and paradoxically, Brazil could become the stable capitalist democracy that General Humberto Castelo Branco and his military-civilian group had wanted after expelling the inept, ad hoc leadership of President João Goulart in 1964. Brazil was the first country to enter and the last to leave the cycle of Latin American military dictatorships. What emerged from the two decades of military rule was a transformed economy that opened new roles and opportunities for perhaps two-thirds of the nation, a much strengthened civil society in response to torture and repression, and broad agreement on the need for rules and representative democracy. These aspects of the legacy, too, are amply covered in the book.

The play of personalities, groups, and incidents is splendidly revealed, giving a faithful rendering of that particular *sabor do Brasil* (Brazilian flavor) in politics with which everyone interested in Brazil eventually must deal. The historical roots of Brazil's weak party structure are well handled. But why weak parties persist in this nation of talented capitalists and a strong private sector is still something of a puzzle. That the military prized rapid economic growth even at the cost of a larger state sector is clear. Business bridled as it was crowded out, and thus it championed democracy. But the enveloping nature of the state is proving hard to loosen in the post-military era as privatization falters.

Another important theme is the constraining effect of credit shortfalls on Brazilian economic growth. Skidmore shows convincingly how the long-term upward trend of postwar economic growth has been whiplashed by balance of payments problems and inflation, all related complexly to the supply of credit. As a capital-importing nation in rapid industrialization, Brazil diversified its economy but at the cost of greater vulnerability to changes in the world economy. Thus, the OPEC oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 hit Brazil hard, but growth was maintained by accelerated borrowing until 1982, when credit dried up after the Mexican default and Brazil began to export capital back to its creditors on much less favorable terms. Under these unpromising conditions the transition to democracy nonetheless took place, but the credit crunch persisted for a decade, something new and unexpected for Brazil, which had chosen the American model of development.

The military and labor are especially well treated. Torn between two models, that of professionalism and that of active intervention in the service of a security-driven, developmental state, the military ultimately lost the stomach for direct rule and became frightened of the corrupting effects of the prerequisites and directorships open to retired officers. The chapter on President Garrastazu Médici, the high point of authoritarian rule, is noteworthy on the workings of military politics and the role of legalism during the worst of the tortures. Economic growth created more space for labor, which began to break away from the corporatist constraints established long ago by Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s. Labor became a major actor in the emerging civil society while testing the limits of the still-active security forces (which continue today), and developing the first worker-based political party in Lula's Partido Trabalhista (PT).

And so we have the elements to understand this compelling, if frustrating, Brazilian mix of success and failure, revealed in all the drama and spirited analysis of a first-rate contemporary history. Even the footnotes make good reading. Skidmore draws his own balance sheet and provides the information for us to do the same.

JOHN D. WIRTH
Stanford University

Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the AHR office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

ELLIS SANDOZ, editor. *Eric Voegelin's Significance for the Modern Mind*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 218. \$25.00.

ELLIS SANDOZ, Introduction. KENNETH W. THOMPSON, Voegelin and Politics. STEPHEN A. MCKNIGHT, Voegelin's New Science of History. LEWIS P. SIMPSON, Voegelin and the Story of the Clerks. PAUL GRIMLEY KUNTZ, Voegelin's Experiences of Disorder Out of Order and Vision of Order Out of Disorder: A Philosophic Meditation on His Theory of Order-Disorder. PAUL CARINGELLA, Voegelin: Philosopher of Divine Presence.

MARY ELLEN WAITHE, editor. *A History of Women Philosophers*. Volume 3, *Modern Women Philosophers, 1600-1900*. Boston: Kluwer Academic. 1991. Pp. xl, 302. \$99.00.

LONDA SCHIEBINGER, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle. SUSANNA ÅKERMÄN, Kristina Wasa, Queen of Sweden. LOIS FRANKEL, Anne Finch, Viscountess Conway. MARY CHRISTINE MORKOVSKY, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz. LOIS FRANKEL, Damaris Cudworth Masham. KATHLEEN M. SQUADRITO, Mary Astell. MARY ELLEN WAITHE, Catharine Trotter Cockburn. MARY ELLEN WAITHE, Gabrielle Émilie le Tonnelier de Breteuil du Châtelet-Lomont. KATE LINDEMANN, Mary Wollstonecraft. JEFFNER ALLEN, Clarisse Coignet. JULIEN S. MURPHY, Antoinette Brown Blackwell. JEFFNER ALLEN, Julie Velten Favre. MARY ELLEN WAITHE, Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Centuries.

EMIKO OHNUKI-TIERNEY, editor. *Culture through Time: Anthropological Approaches*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1990. Pp. x, 330. Cloth \$42.50, paper \$12.95.

EMIKO OHNUKI-TIERNEY, Introduction: The Historicization of Anthropology. MARSHALL SAHLINS, The Political Economy of Grandeur in Hawaii from 1810 to 1830. SHERRY B. ORTNER, Patterns of History: Cultural Schemas in the Foundings of Sherpa Religious Institutions. JAMES W. FERNANDEZ, Enclosures: Boundary Maintenance and Its Representations over Time in Asturian Mountain Villages (Spain). EMIKO OHNUKI-TIERNEY, The Monkey as Self in

Japanese Culture. VALERIO VALERI, Constitutive History: Genealogy and Narrative in the Legitimation of Hawaiian Kingship. DON HANDELMAN and LEA SHAMGAR-HANDELMAN, Shaping Time: The Choice of the National Emblem of Israel. EDMUND LEACH, Aryan Invasions over Four Millennia. JAMES L. PEACOCK, Form and Meaning in Recent Indonesian History: Some Reflections in Light of H.-G. Gadamer's Philosophy of History. PETER BURKE, Historians, Anthropologists, and Symbols.

RAPHAEL SAMUEL and PAUL THOMPSON, editors. *The Myths We Live By*. (History Workshop Series.) New York: Routledge. 1990. Pp. x, 262. Cloth \$67.50, paper \$22.50.

RAPHAEL SAMUEL and PAUL THOMPSON, Introduction. ELIZABETH TONKIN, History and the Myth of Realism. JEAN PENEFF, Myths in Life Stories. LUISA PASSERINI, Mythbiography in Oral History. ROSANNA BASSO, Myths in Contemporary Oral Transmission: A Children's Strike. ALISTAIR THOMSON, The Anzac Legend: Exploring National Myth and Memory in Australia. MARINELL ASH, William Wallace and Robert the Bruce: The Life and Death of a National Myth. ANNA BRAVO *et al.*, Myth, Impotence, and Survival in the Concentration Camps. BILL NASSON, Abraham Esau's War, 1899-1901: Martyrdom, Myth, and Folk Memory in Calvinia, South Africa. ELLA JOHANSSON, Free Sons of the Forest: Storytelling and the Construction of Identity among Swedish Lumberjacks. ALESSANDRO PORTELLI, Uchronic Dreams: Working-Class Memory and Possible Worlds. ELENA CABEZALI *et al.*, Myth as Suppression: Motherhood and the Historical Consciousness of the Women of Madrid, 1936-39. JULIE CRUIKSHANK, Myth as a Framework for Life Stories: Athapaskan Women Making Sense of Social Change in Northern Canada. RINA BENMAYOR *et al.*, Stories to Live By: Continuity and Change in Three Generations of Puerto Rican Women. ROSALIND THOMAS, Ancient Greek Family Tradition and Democracy: From Oral History to Myth. JOHN BYNG-HALL, The Power of Family Myths. BARBARA HENKES, Changing Images of German Maids during the Inter-War Period in the Netherlands: From Trusted Help to Traitor in the Nest. NATASHA BURCHARDT, Stepchildren's Memories: Myth, Understanding, and Forgiveness.

THOMAS KSELMAN, editor. *Belief in History: Innovative Approaches to European and American Religion*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1991. Pp. x, 309. \$35.95.

THOMAS KSELMAN, Introduction. JOHN VAN ENGEL, Faith as a Concept of Order in Medieval Christendom. CAROLINE

BYNUM, Bodily Miracles and the Resurrection of the Body in the High Middle Ages. THOMAS KSELMAN, Alternative Afterlives in Nineteenth-Century France. ROBERT A. ORSI, "He Keeps Me Going": Women's Devotion to Saint Jude and the Dialectics of Gender in American Catholicism, 1929–1965. DALE K. VAN KLEY, The Religious Origins of the Patriot and Ministerial Parties in Pre-Revolutionary France. R. LAURENCE MOORE, The End of Religious Establishment and the Beginning of Religious Politics: Church and State in the United States. JOHN BOSSY, Unrethinking the Sixteenth-Century Wars of Religion. JON BUTLER, Historiographical Heresy: Catholicism as a Model for American Religious History.

JEREMY COHEN, editor. *Essential Papers on Judaism and Christianity in Conflict: From Late Antiquity to the Reformation*. (Essential Papers on Jewish Studies.) New York: New York University Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 578. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$25.00.

JEREMY COHEN, Introduction. DAVID FLUSSER, The Dead Sea Sect and Pre-Pauline Christianity. WAYNE A. MEEKS, Breaking Away: Three New Testament Pictures of Christianity's Separation from the Jewish Community. S. G. F. BRANDON, History or Theology? The Basic Problems of the Evidence of the Trial of Jesus. MERCEL SIMON, Christian Anti-Semitism. ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, The *Adversus Judaeos* Tradition in the Church Fathers: The Exegesis of Christian Anti-Judaism. B. BLUMENKRANZ, The Roman Church and the Jews. SOLOMON GRAYZEL, The Papal Bull *Sicut Judeis*. H. LIEBESCHÜTZ, The Crusading Movement in Its Bearing on the Christian Attitude toward Jewry. LESTER K. LITTLE, The Jews in Christian Europe. CECIL ROTH, The Medieval Conception of the Jew: A New Interpretation. JEREMY COHEN, Scholarship and Intolerance in the Medieval Academy: The Study and Evolution of Judaism in European Christendom. MARK U. EDWARDS, JR., Against the Jews. SALO W. BARON, John Calvin and the Jews. KENNETH R. STOW, The Burning of the Talmud in 1553, in Light of Sixteenth-Century Catholic Attitudes toward the Talmud. LAWRENCE H. SCHIFFMAN, At the Crossroads: Tannaitic Perspectives on the Jewish-Christian Schism. JACOB KATZ, Social and Religious Segregation. IVAN G. MARCUS, From Politics to Martyrdom: Shifting Paradigms in the Hebrew Narratives of the 1096 Crusade Riots. DAVID BERGER, The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages. DAVID B. RUDERMAN, Champion of Jewish Economic Interests.

MATS LUNDAHL and THOMMY SVENSSON, editors. *Agrarian Society in History: Essays in Honour of Magnus Mörner*. New York: Routledge. 1990. Pp. x, 374. \$82.50.

MATS LUNDAHL and THOMMY SVENSSON, Introduction: Agrarian Society in History. SIDNEY W. MINTZ, The Peasantry as a Sociohistorical Category: Examples from the Caribbean Region. ALEC NOVE, The Return of Chayanov. CHRISTER WINBERG, Another Route to Modern Society: The Advancement of the Swedish Peasantry. HERBERT S. KLEIN, The Distribution of Landed Wealth in Late Nineteenth-Century Bolivia: The Hacendados of the Department of La Paz in 1881–82. ARNOLD J. BAUER, Christian Servitude: Slave Management in Colonial Spanish America. ROLAND ANRUP, Disposition over Land and Labour. MANUEL MORENO FRAG-

INALS, Agricultural Backwardness—Industrial Development: Experiences of Sugar Production in the Caribbean. LUIS MIGUEL GLAVE, Conflict and Social Reproduction: The Andean Peasant Community. SVEN CEDERROTH, Javanese and Sasak Folk Beliefs: The Changing Role of Diviners in Two Indonesian Villages. CHRISTER AHLBERGER, Home Industry and Rural Millenarianism in Early Nineteenth-Century Western Sweden. MATS LUNDAHL and JAN LUNDIUS, Socioeconomic Foundations of a Messianic Cult: Olivorismo in the Dominican Republic. JARLE SIMENSEN, Farmers, Chiefs, and the World Market: The Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-Ups of the 1930s. EVA ÖSTERBERG, Compromise Instead of Conflict? Patterns of Contact between Local Peasant Communities and the Early Modern State: Sweden in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries. THOMMY SVENSSON, Bureaucracies and Agrarian Change: A Southeast Asian Case. HOLGER BERNT HANSEN, The Pride and Decline of a Migrant Community: The Nubians in Uganda and the Military Profession. NIELS STEENSGAARD, Before the World Grew Small: The Quest for Patterns in Early Modern World History.

MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN and NANCY SWEET THOMADSEN, editors. *At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory*. New York: Routledge. 1991. Pp. xvi, 368.

MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, Introduction. KATHLEEN A. LAHEY, Reasonable Women and the Law. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, On Being the Object of Property. LUCIE E. WHITE, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G. JUDITH E. GRBICH, The Body in Legal Theory. CLAUDIA CARD, Intimacy and Responsibility: What Lesbians Do. KRISTIN BUMILLER, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence against Women in Legal Culture. ROBIN L. WEST, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory. RUTH COLKER, Feminism, Sexuality, and Authenticity. ADRIAN HOWE, The Problem of Privatized Injuries: Feminist Strategies for Litigation. BARBARA OMOLADE, The Unbroken Circle: A Historical Study of Black Single Mothers and Their Families. ELIZABETH B. CLARK, Religion and Rights Consciousness in the Antebellum Woman's Rights Movement. SYBIL LIPSCHULTZ, Social Feminism and Legal Discourse, 1908–1923. EILEEN BORIS, Homework and Women's Rights: The Case of the Vermont Knitters, 1980–1985. MARY COOMBS, Abandoned Women. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution of Property at Divorce. MARY JANE MOSSMAN, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It Makes. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, The Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement. DIANA MAJURV, Strategies in Equality.

VIRGINIA YANS-MCLAUGHLIN, editor. *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1990. Pp. viii, 342. \$39.95.

VIRGINIA YANS-MCLAUGHLIN, Introduction. PHILIP D. CURTIN, Migration in the Tropical World. SUCHENG CHAN, European and Asian Immigration into the United States in Comparative Perspective, 1820s to 1920s. CHARLES TILLY, Transplanted Networks. KERBY A. MILLER, Class, Culture, and Immigrant Group Identity in the United States: The

Case of Irish-American Ethnicity. SUZANNE W. MODEL, Work and Family: Blacks and Immigrants from South and East Europe. ALEJANDRO PORTES, From South of the Border: Hispanic Minorities in the United States. EWA MORAWSKA, The Sociology and Historiography of Immigration. SAMUEL L. BAILY, Cross-Cultural Comparison and the Writing of Migration History: Some Thoughts on How to Study Italians in the New World. VIRGINIA YANS-McLAUGHLIN, Metaphors of Self in History: Subjectivity, Oral Narrative, and Immigration Studies. LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, The Reactions of Black Americans to Immigration. ARTISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, Reforming the Back Door: The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 in Historical Perspective.

KLAUS HILDEBRAND *et al.*, editors. 1939: *An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg; Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges und das internationale System.* (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, number 76.) New York: Walter de Gruyter. 1990. Pp. xvi, 392. DM 38.

RITA SÜSSMUTH, Geleitwort. KLAUS ZERNACK, Vorwort. KLAUS HILDEBRAND, Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges und das internationale System: Probleme und Perspektiven der Forschung. EBERHARD JÄCKEL, Hitlers Kriegspolitik und ihre nationalen Voraussetzungen. GERHARD L. WEINBERG, Hitlers Entschluss zum Krieg. OLAF GROEHLE, Varianten deutscher Kriegspolitik. COLETTE BARBIER, Das französische Ausenministerium und die diplomatische Aktivität vom Münchener Abkommen bis zur Kriegserklärung. MARLIS G. STEINERT, Die Einstellung der deutschen Bevölkerung zum Krieg in den dreissiger Jahren. MASAKI MIYAKE, Der Weg des revisionistischen Japan zu Militarismus und Krieg. ENNIO DI NOLFO, Der zweideutige italienische Revisionismus. JERZY W. BOREJSZA, Die "kleinen Revisionisten" und Ostmitteleuropa am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges. MARIA SCHMIDT, Der ungarische Revisionismus. GERALD STOURZH, Der Weg zur Einverleibung Österreichs. JAROSLAV VALENTA, Die Tschechoslowakei am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges. WACŁAW DŁUGOBORSKI, Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt als "lebendige Vergangenheit." ELISABETH DU RÉAU, Frankreich vor dem Krieg. ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE, Grossbritannien und das Herannahen des Krieges. PAUL W. SCHROEDER, Die Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten bei der Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges. HARRY PAAPE, Die Haltung der Niederlande und ihre Einschätzung der internationalen politischen Entwicklung 1933 bis 1939. JEAN VANWELKENHUYZEN, Belgien am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges. OLAV RISTE, Die Haltung der skandinavischen Länder gegenüber dem Zusammenbruch des internationalen Systems in den dreissiger Jahren. HERMANN GRAML, Das Versagen der internationalen Solidarität. MARIAN WOJCIECHOWSKI, Der Historische Ort der polnischen Politik in der Genesis des Zweiten Weltkrieges. ALEKSANDR ČUBARJAN, Die UdSSR und der Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges. MICHAEL SEMIRAJAGA, Die sowjetisch-deutschen Verträge im System der internationale Beziehungen des Jahres 1939. VJAČESLAV DAŠIČEV, Planungen und Fehlschläge Stalins am Vorabend des Kriegs: Der XVIII. Parteitag der KPdSU(B) und der sowjetisch-deutsch Nichtangriffspakt. ALEXANDER FISCHER, Die Sowjetunion und das Prinzip der kollektiven Sicherheit am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges. WŁODZIMIERZ BORODZIEJ, Die Alternative Warschau. TUOMO POLVINEN, Die Rolle Finlands in der internationalen Politik vor dem Winterkrieg. SEPPÖ MYLLYNIEMI, Die baltischen Staaten am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges. KARL DIET-

RICH BRACHER, Der historische Ort des Zweiten Weltkrieges. JÜRGEN SCHMÄDEKE, Der Weg in den Krieg: Protokoll einer Konferenz.

EMIL BRIX *et al.*, editors. *Geschichte zwischen Freiheit und Ordnung: Gerald Stourzh zum 60. Geburtstag.* Graz: Styria. 1991. Pp. 466. S 700.

RICHARD GEORG PLASCHKA, Gerald Stourzh zum 60. Geburtstag. ALFRED ABLEITINGER, Parlament und Rechnungshof in Cisleithanien. JOHN W. BOYER, Christian Socialism under the Empire: Some Reflections. ERIKA WEINZIERL, Johann Grimeisen (1885–1969). EMIL BRIX, Brechungen der österreichischen Identität im 20. Jahrhundert. JOHN LESLIE, Der Ausgleich in der Bukowina von 1910: Zur österreichischen Nationalitätenpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. FRITZ FELLNER, Denkschriften aus Österreich. MANFRIED WELAN, Betrachtungen zum Österreichischen Staatsoberhaupt. MARGARETE GRANDNER, Kollektivverträge und berufsständische Ordnung. KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER, Anschluss Reconsidered. MICHAEL CULLIS, Austria 1945–1950. SIEGFRIED BEER, Monitoring Helmer. JOSEF LEIDENFROST, Die UNO als Forum für den österreichischen Staatsvertrag? Vom Wiener Appell 1946 bis zur Brasilien-Initiative 1952. OLIVER RATHKOLB, Hans J. Morgenthau und das Österreich-Problem in der letzten Phase der Truman-Administration 1951/52. HANSPETER NEUHOLD, Supermächte und Neutralität. JAMES WILKIE, Schottlands Weg in die britische Union. J. G. A. POCOCK, City and Empire: Rome and Its Fall in Eighteenth-Century Thought. THOMAS FRÖSCHL, Die amerikanischen Auseinandersetzungen mit europäischen Beispielen föderativer Staatlichkeit in den Verfassungsdiskussionen der Vereinigten Staaten im späten 18. Jahrhundert. MICHAEL WEINZIERL, Einschränkungen der Individualrechte im England der 1790er Jahre. WINFRIED SCHULZE, "Non, sire, c'est une révolution!" WILLI PAUL ADAMS, Amerikanischer Nationalismus, ethnische Vielfalt und die Deutschamerikaner. EDITH SAURER, "Le krach de l'intellectuelle?" KARL DIETRICH BRACHER, Die Universität unter den Totalitarismen. WOLFGANG MANTL, Wettbewerb als "Condition of Excellence" der Universität.

IAN WOOD and NIELS LUND, editors. *People and Places in Northern Europe, 500–1600: Essays in Honour of Peter Hayes Sawyer.* Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell. 1991. Pp. xxii, 248. \$90.00.

IAN WOOD, The Franks and Sutton Hoo. RICHARD MORRIS, Baptismal Places: 600–800. PATRICK WORMALD, In Search of King Offa's "Law-Code." JANET L. NELSON, Reconstructing a Royal Family: Reflections on Alfred, from Asser, Chapter 2. SIMON KEYNES, Crime and Punishment in the Reign of King Æthelred the Unready. R. A. HALL, Sources for Pre-Conquest York. ROBERTA FRANK, The Ideal of Men Dying with Their Lord in *The Battle of Malden*: Anachronism or *Nouvelle Vague*. GILLIAN FELLOWS-JENSEN, Of Danes—and Thanes—and Domesday Book. ALEXANDER R. RUMBLE, A Domesday Postscript and the Earliest Surviving Pipe Roll. PER SVEAAS ANDERSEN, Norse Settlement in the Hebrides: What Happened to the Natives and What Happened to the Norse Immigrants? STEEN HVASS, Jelling from Iron Age to Viking Age. NIELS LUND, "Denemærc," "tanmarkar but" and "tanmaurk ala." TINNA DAMGAARD-SØRENSEN, Danes and Wends: A Study of the Danish Attitude towards the Wends. BRITA MALMER, On the Early Coinage of Lund. THORSTEN ANDERS-

- SON, The Origin of the *tuna*-names Reconsidered. ÅKE HYENSTRAND, Iconography and the Rune Stones: The Example of Sparlösa. BIRGIT SAWYER, Women as Bridge-Builders: The Role of Women in Viking-Age Scandinavia. GRETHE AUTHÉN BLOM, Women and Justice in Norway c. 1300–1600. HANS ANDERSSON, Ancient Monuments Act—Exploitation—Medieval Archaeology—Research: Thoughts on Manifest Connections.
- PAUL MAURICE CLOGAN, editor. *Medievalia et humanistica: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Culture*. (New Series, number 17.) Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield. 1991. Pp. vii, 182. \$50.00.
- JOHN R. E. BLIESE, The Just War as Concept and Motive in the Central Middle Ages. JOYCE MONROE SIMMONS, Martial and Seneca: A Renaissance Perspective. DAVID M. SEAMAN, "As thynketh yow": Conflicting Evidence and the Interpretation of *The Franklin's Tale*. KAREN A. WINSTEAD, Piety, Politics, and Social Commitment in Capgrave's *Life of St. Katharine*. A. E. C. CANITZ, From *Aeneid* to *Eneados*: Theory and Practice of Gavin Douglas's Translation. GILES CONSTABLE, Church Reform and Social Structure in Western Europe. DAVID HERLIHY, Habitats and Habitudes. JAMES W. ALEXANDER, Saints, Scholars, and a Royal Councillor. MICHAEL ALTSCHUL, Celtic Fringe or Celtic Center? Rethinking Medieval Welsh and Irish History. JAMES GIVEN, The Nobility of Later Medieval England. ANTHONY MOLHO, Burkhartian Legacies. MICHAEL ALTSCHUL and EDWARD J. OLSZEWSKI, The Florentine Renaissance: Before, During, and After. STEPHEN K. SCHER, Italian Renaissance Medals.
- KLAUS WOLLENBERG, editor. *In Tal und Einsamkeit: 725 Jahre Kloster Fürstfeld; Die Zisterzienser im alten Bayern*. Volume 3, *Kolloquium: "Die Zisterzienser in Bayern, Franken, und den benachbarten Regionen Südostmitteleuropas; Ihre Verbandsbildung sowie soziale und politische Integration,"* 29. 8.–2. 9. 1988. Fürstfeldbruck: Fördervereins 725 Jahre Kloster Fürstfeld. 1990. Pp. 262. Cloth DM 25, paper DM 19.
- KASPAR ELM, Der Zisterzienserorden: Einheit in der Vielfalt; Einführung in das Thema der Tagung. KLAUS WOLLENBERG, Die Zisterzienser in Altbayern, Franken und Schwaben: Ein Überblick. PETER PFISTER, Die altbayerischen Zisterziensergründungen des 12. und 13. Jhs. und ihre Beziehungen zum Haus Wittelsbach. EGON BOSHOFF, Die Anfänge der Zisterze Aldersbach: Untersuchungen zur ostbayerischen Klosterlandschaft im 12. und beginnenden 13. Jahrhundert. GÜNTER DIPPOLD, Die fränkischen Zisterzen und ihr Verhältnis zu den Landesherren. WINFRIED SCHICH, Der frühe zisterziensische Handel und die Stadthöfe der fränkischen Zisterzienserklöster. MARTINA SCHATTKOWSKY, Möglichkeiten der Durchsetzung zisterziensischer Wirtschaftsgrundsätze in der Mark Meissen: Das Beispiel Altzella. HEINRICH GRÜGER, Die Beziehungen der schlesischen Zisterzienser zu den Klöstern ihres Ordens im süddeutschen und donauländischen Raum. KATERINA CHARVÁTOVÁ, Propter laudabilia abbatum merita: The Kings of Bohemia and the Cistercian Order. FRANZ MACHILEK, Stiftergedächtnis und Klosterbau in der Chronik des Heinrich von Saar (Mähren). HEINRICH KOLLER, Die ältesten österreichischen Zisterzen. FERENZ HERVAY, Die Visitationen der Zisterzienserklöster Ungarns im Mittelalter. IVICA TOMLJENOVIC, Der Einfluss der Zisterzienser auf das religiöse und gesellschaftliche Leben im mittelalterlichen Kroatien. MARIJAN ZADNIKAR, Stična (Sittich) in Slowenien: Eine unzisterziensische Zisterzienserkirche. KASPAR ELM, Zusammenfassung und Ausblick. BIRGITTA KLEMENZ, Ausstellungssommer 1988: Gedanken aus der Retrospektive.
- BERNARD S. BACHRACH and DAVID NICHOLAS, editors. *Law, Custom, and the Social Fabric in Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor of Bryce Lyon*. (Studies in Medieval Culture, number 28.) Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University or Medieval Institute Publications. 1990. Pp. xxvi, 304. Cloth \$34.95, paper \$17.95.
- DAVID HERLIHY, Making Sense of Incest: Women and the Marriage Rules of the Late Middle Ages. ADRIAAN VERHULST, The "Agricultural Revolution" of the Middle Ages Reconsidered. BERNARD S. BACHRACH, Fulk Nerra's Exploitation of the *facultates monachorum*, ca. 1000. EDWARD PETERS, The Death of the Subdean: Ecclesiastical Order and Disorder in Eleventh-Century *Francia*. THOMAS RENNA, Bernard of Clairvaux and the Temple of Solomon. R. C. VAN CAENEGEM, Galbert of Bruges on Serfdom, Prosecution of Crime, and Constitutionalism (1127–28). KAREN S. NICHOLAS, The Role of Feudal Relationships in the Consolidation of Power in the Principalities of the Low Countries, 1000–1300. C. WARREN HOLLISTER, The Viceregal Court of Henry I. CHARLES R. YOUNG, Divided Loyalties: The Neville Family and the Barons' War against Henry III, 1264–65. STANLEY CHOJNACKI, Marriage Legislation and Patrician Society in Fifteenth-Century Venice. DONALD E. QUELLER, The Venetian Family and the *Estimo* of 1379. JOHN BELL HENNEMAN, Reassessing the Career of Olivier de Clisson, Constable of France. DAVID NICHOLAS, The Governance of Fourteenth-Century Ghent: The Theory and Practice of Public Administration. WALTER PREVENIER, Violence against Women in a Medieval Metropolis: Paris around 1400. ESTHER COHEN, "To Die a Criminal for the Public Good": The Execution Ritual in Late Medieval Paris.
- TREVOR DEAN and CHRIS WICKHAM, editors. *City and Countryside in Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy: Essays Presented to Philip Jones*. Ronceverte, W.Va.: Hambleton. 1990. Pp. xv, 197.
- CHRIS WICKHAM, Rural Communes and the City of Lucca at the Beginning of the Thirteenth Century. FRANCO CARDINI, Intellectuals and Culture in Twelfth and Thirteenth-Century Italy. JOHN STEPHENS, The Conversion of St. Francis. DANIEL WALEY, A Blood-Feud with a Happy Ending: Siena, 1285–1304. CHARLES M. DE LA RONCIÈRE, A Monastic Clientele? The Abbey of Settimo, Its Neighbours and Its Tenants (Tuscany, 1280–1340). GIORGIO CHITTOLINI, Civic Religion and the Countryside in Late Medieval Italy. GIULIANO PINTO, "Honour" and "Profit": Landed Property and Trade in Medieval Siena. PETER DENLEY, Governments and Schools in Late Medieval Italy. BERNADETTE PATON, "Una Città Fatticosa": Dominican Preaching and the Defence of the Republic in Late Medieval Siena. DAVID ABULAFIA, The Crown and the Economy under Ferrante I of Naples (1485–94). JOHN LARNER, Crossing the Romagnol Apennines in the Renaissance. JOHN EASTON LAW, City, Court and Contado in Camerino, c. 1500. TREVOR DEAN, Commune and Despot: The Commune of Ferrara under Este Rule, 1300–1450.

MARY ELIZABETH PERRY and ANNE J. CRUZ, editors. *Cultural Encounters: The Impact of the Inquisition in Spain and the New World*. (Publications of the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, number 24.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 288. \$34.95.

J. JORGE KLOR DE ALVA, Colonizing Souls: The Failure of the Indian Inquisition and the Rise of Penitential Discipline. ROBERTO MORENO DE LOS ARCOS, New Spain's Inquisition for Indians from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century. NOEMÍ QUEZADA, The Inquisition's Repression of *Curanderos*. MARÍA HELENA SÁNCHEZ ORTEGA, Sorcery and Eroticism in Love Magic. GERALDINE MCKENDRICK and ANGUS MACKAY, Visionaries and Affective Spirituality during the First Half of the Sixteenth Century. RICHARD L. KAGAN, Politics, Prophecy, and the Inquisition in Late Sixteenth-Century Spain. JAIME CONTRERAS, Family and Patronage: The Judeo-Convert Minorities in Spain. STEPHEN HALICZER, The Jew as Witch: Displaced Aggression and the Myth of the Santo Niño de La Guardia. JOSEPH H. SILVERMAN, On Knowing Other People's Lives, Inquisitorially and Artistically. MOSHE LAZAR, Scorched Parchments and Tortured Memories: The "Jewishness" of the Anusim (Crypto-Jews). STANLEY M. HORDS, The Inquisition and the Crypto-Jewish Community in Colonial New Spain and New Mexico. JESÚS M. DE BUJANDA, Recent Historiography of the Spanish Inquisition (1977–1988): Balance and Perspective. RICHARD E. GREENLEAF, Historiography of the Mexican Inquisition: Evolution of Interpretations and Methodologies.

JEAN DUFOURNET *et al.*, editors. *Le pouvoir monarchique et ses supports idéologiques aux XIV^e–XVII^e siècles*. Paris: Sorbonne Nouvelle. 1990. Pp. iii, 282. 120 fr.

CLAUDETTE PERRUS, Visages du roiet du conseiller dans la *Divine comédie* de Dante. JEAN DUFOURNET, Le prince et ses conseillers d'après Philippe de Commines. MARINA MARITTI, Le "principat civil" et son évolution dans l'œuvre de Machiavel. PIERRE CIVIL, Images du pouvoir dans quelques portraits héroïques de Charles Quint. MICHEL PLAISANCE, Côme 1^{er} ou le prince idéal dans les dédicaces et traités de 1548–1552. MARIO POZZI, Mito arcaico-etrusco e potere assoluto a Firenze al tempo di Cosimo I. AUGUSTIN REDONDO, Le monarque dans les versions italiennes de l'*Horloge des Princes*: De la matière guévarienne au quatrième livre apocryphe de 1562. DANIELLE BOILLET, Les images tragico-miques du pouvoir monarchique dans le théâtre S. Oddi. MADELEINE LAZARD, L'image du prince dans les *Mémoires* de Michel de Castelnau: Le prince dans le tourment des passions religieuses (1520–1592). ADELIN-CHARLES FIORATO, L'"Eloge de Néron" par Jérôme Cardan, ou la justification du pouvoir absolu. RICARDO SAEZ, Le prince et le pouvoir monarchique dans le *Monarchia de España* de Pedro Salazar de Mendoza. JOSETTE RIANDIERE LA ROCHE, Quevedo, censeur et propagandiste de la monarchie espagnole au temps de Philippe II: Un procès à revoir. JEAN-CLAUDE AUBAILLY, L'image du prince dans le théâtre de Gringore. MICHEL ROUSSE, Le pouvoir royal et le théâtre des farces. EDELGARD DUBRUCK, Grandes espérances, grandes illusions: Les princes dans la littérature allemande du XV^e siècle. JEAN-MARIE PRIVAT, Rois Mages, images des rois (matériaux pour une recherche). ANNA FONTES-BARETTO, La grande illusion: Les rapports entre le monarque et l'artiste dans la *Vita* de Benvenuto Cellini. ALAIN VIALA, Le monarque obligé: Fig-

ures du monarque et de l'écrivain dans l'encomiastique du XVII^e siècle français. JACQUES MOREL, Société, valeurs et formes: Images du prince dans la création littéraire en France.

DAVID C. STEINMETZ, editor. *The Bible in the Sixteenth Century*. (Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, number 11.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1990. Pp. vi, 263. \$32.50.

H. C. ERIK MIDELFORT, Social History and Biblical Exegesis: Community, Family, and Witchcraft in Sixteenth-Century Germany. GUY BEDOUELLE, The Consultations of the Universities and Scholars Concerning the "Great Matter" of King Henry VIII. SCOTT H. HENDRIX, The Use of Scripture in Establishing Protestantism: The Case of Urbanus Rhegius. KALMAN P. BLAND, Issues in Sixteenth-Century Jewish Exegesis. RICHARD A. MULLER, The Hermeneutic of Promise and Fulfillment in Calvin's Exegesis of the Old Testament Prophecies of the Kingdom. R. GERALD HOBBS, Hebraica Veritas and Traditio Apostolica: Saint Paul and the Interpretation of Psalms in the Sixteenth Century. DAVID C. STEINMETZ, Calvin and the Patristic Exegesis of Paul. JOHN B. PAYNE, Erasmus on Romans 9:6–24. JEAN-CLAUDE MARGOLIN, The Epistle to the Romans (Chapter 11) According to the Versions and/or Commentaries of Valla, Colet, Lefèvre, and Erasmus. IRENA BACKUS, Polemic, Exegetical Tradition, and Ontology: Bucer's Interpretation of John 6:52, 53, and 64 before and after the Wittenberg Concord. KENNETH G. HAGEN, "De Exegetica Methodo": Niels Hemmingsen's *De Methodis* (1555).

PETER HULME and LUDMILLA JORDANOVA, editors. *The Enlightenment and Its Shadows*. New York: Routledge. 1990. Pp. viii, 232. \$55.00.

PETER HULME and LUDMILLA JORDANOVA, Introduction. PETER HULME, The Spontaneous Hand of Nature: Savagery, Colonialism, and the Enlightenment. GORDON BROTHSTON, *Candide* and Native America. JOE ALLARD, Music in the Enlightenment. JAY BERNSTEIN, Difficult Difference: Rousseau's Fictions of Identity. SIMON COLLIER, Mercier's Enlightenment Utopia: Progress and Social Ideals. TED BENTON, Adam Ferguson and the Enterprise Culture. MARGARET IVERSEN, Imagining the Republic: The Sign and Sexual Politics in France. DAVID MUSSELWHITE, Reflections on Burke's *Reflections*, 1790–1990. MICHAEL FREEMAN, Human Rights and the Corruption of Governments, 1789–1989. ONORA O'NEILL, Enlightenment as Autonomy: Kant's Vindication of Reason. LUDMILLA JORDANOVA, The Authoritarian Response.

RICHARD T. BIENVENU and MORDECHAI FEINGOLD, editors. *In the Presence of the Past: Essays in Honor of Frank Manuel*. (International Archives of the History of Ideas, number 118.) Boston: Kluwer Academic. 1991. Pp. vi, 290. \$99.00.

MARTIN PERETZ, Frank Manuel: An Appreciation. MICHAEL T. RYAN, The Diffusion of Science and the Conversion of the Gentiles in the Seventeenth Century. MICHAEL WALZER, Good Aristocrats/Bad Aristocrats: Thomas Hobbes and Early Modern Political Culture. MORDECHAI FEINGOLD, John

Seldon and the Nature of Seventeenth-Century Science. KEITH M. BAKER, Reason and Revolution: Political Consciousness and Ideological Invention at the End of the Old Regime. JONATHAN BEECHER, Victor Considerant: The Making of a Fourierist. RICHARD T. BIENVENU, Utopia and Sharpest Anguish of the Age? SILVAN S. SCHWEBER, Auguste Comte and the Nebular Hypothesis. STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD, The Profits of America: Early Nineteenth-Century British Travel in the United States. JUDITH SHKLAR, Hawthorne in Utopia. SANFORD A. LAKOFF, Human Rights and Democracy. JACQUES KORNBERG, Dilthey's Introduction to the Human Sciences: Liberal Social Thought in the Second Reich. JOHN W. PADBERG, Above and Beyond Party: The Dilemma of *Dossiers de l'Action Populaire* in the 1930s.

FRANCES MALINO and DAVID SORKIN, editors. *From East and West: Jews in a Changing Europe, 1750–1870*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 1990. Pp. ix, 336.

RICHARD MENKIS, Patriarchs and Patricians: The Gradis Family of Eighteenth-Century Bordeaux. ARON RODRIGUE, Abraham de Camondo of Istanbul: The Transformation of Jewish Philanthropy. MICHAEL BURNS, Majority Faith: Dreyfus before the Affair. FRANCES MALINO, The Right to Be Equal: Zalkind Hourwitz and the Revolution of 1789. DAVID SORKIN, Preacher, Teacher, Publicist: Joseph Wolf and the Ideology of Emancipation. ISRAEL BARTAL, Mordechai Aaron Ünzberg: A Lithuanian Faces Modernity. TODD M. ENDELMAN, The Chequered Career of "Jew" King: A Study in Anglo-Jewish Social History. STEVEN M. LOWENSTEIN, Jewish Upper Crust and Berlin Jewish Enlightenment: The Family of Daniel Itzig. DEBORAH HERTZ, Work, Love, and Jewishness in the Life of Fanny Lewald. JACOB KATZ, Towards a Biography of the Hatam Sofer. JODY ELIZABETH MYERS, Zevi Hirsch Kalischer and the Origins of Religious Zionism. EUGENE C. BLACK, The Anglicization of Orthodoxy: The Adlers, Father and Son.

HANS-ULRICH WEHLER, editor. *Europäischer Adel, 1750–1950*. (Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft, number 13.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1990. Pp. 305. DM 68.

HANS-ULRICH WEHLER, Einleitung. OTTO GERHARD OEXLE, Aspekte der Geschichte des Adels im Mittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit. GERHARD DILCHER, Der alteuropäische Adel: Ein verfassungsgeschichtlicher Typus? RUDOLF BRAUN, Konzeptionelle Bemerkungen zum Obenbleiben: Adel im 19. Jahrhundert. KARL MÖCKL, Der deutsche Adel und die fürstlich-monarchischen Höfe 1750–1918. FRANCIS L. CARSTEN, Der preussische Adel und seine Stellung in Staat und Gesellschaft bis 1945. WALTER DEMEL, Der bayerische Adel von 1750 bis 1871. HANNES STEKL, Zwischen Machtverlust und Selbstbehauptung: Österreichs Hocharistokratie vom 18. bis ins 20. Jahrhundert. MANFRED HILDERMEIER, Der russische Adel von 1700 bis 1917. MICHAEL G. MÜLLER, Der polnische Adel von 1750 bis 1863. JENS PETERSEN, Der italienische Adel von 1861 bis 1946. WOLFGANG MAGER, Von der Noblesse zur Notabilité: Die Konstituierung der französischen Notablen im Ancien Régime und die Krise der absoluten Monarchie. HEINZ-GERHARD HAUPT, Der Adel in einer entadelten Gesellschaft: Frankreich seit 1830.

ANNE LAURENCE *et al.*, editors. *John Bunyan and His England, 1628–88*. Ronceverte, W.Va.: Hambledon. 1990. Pp. xxiii, 181. \$40.00

CHRISTOPHER HILL, Bunyan's Contemporary Reputation. ANNE LAURENCE, Bunyan and the Parliamentary Army. ANN HUGHES, The Pulpit Guarded: Confrontations between Orthodox and Radicals in Revolutionary England. BARRIE WHITE, John Bunyan and the Context of Persecution. RICHARD L. GREAVES, Amid the Holy War: Bunyan and the Ethic Suffering. W. R. OWENS, "Antichrist must be Pulled Down": Bunyan and the Millenium. ROGER SHARROCK, Spiritual Autobiography: Bunyan's *Grace Abounding*. ROGER POOLEY, *Grace Abounding* and the New Sense of Self. ELSPETH GRAHAM, Authority, Resistance and Loss: Gendered Difference in the Writings of John Bunyan and Hannah Allen. N. H. KEEBLE, "Here is her Glory, even to be under Him": The Feminine in the Thought and Work of John Bunyan. STUART SIM, "Safe for Those for Whom it is to be Safe": Salvation and Damnation in Bunyan's Fiction. NIGEL SMITH, Bunyan and the Language of the Body in Seventeenth-Century England.

M. VAN OS and G. J. SCHUTTE, editors. *Bunyan in England and Abroad: Papers Delivered at the John Bunyan Tercentenary Symposium, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 1988*. (VU Studies on Protestant History, number 1.) Amsterdam: VU University Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 150.

I. M. GREEN, Bunyan in Context: The Changing Face of Protestantism in Seventeenth-Century England. RICHARD L. GREAVES, John Bunyan: The Present State of Historical Scholarship. ROGER SHARROCK, Bunyan Studies Today: An Evaluation. JAMES F. FORREST, Between Presumption and Timidity: On Editing Bunyan. AILEEN M. ROSS, Paradise Regained: The Development of John Bunyan's Millenarianism. W. R. OWENS, The Reception of *The Pilgrim's Progress* in England. A. TH. VAN DEURSEN, Dutch Reformed Parish Life in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century. JACQUES B. H. ALBIAS, The Reception of *The Pilgrim's Progress* in Holland during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. JENŐ SZIGETI, Eighteenth-Century Hungarian Protestant Pietist Literature and John Bunyan.

TIM HARRIS *et al.*, editors. *The Politics of Religion in Restoration England*. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell. 1990. Pp. xii, 259. \$39.95.

TIM HARRIS, Introduction: Revising the Restoration. JOHN SPURR, "Virtue, Religion and Government": The Anglican Uses of Providence. PAUL SEAWARD, Gilbert Sheldon, the London Vestries, and the Defence of the Church. MARK GOLDIE, Danby, the Bishops and the Whigs. JONATHAN SCOTT, England's Troubles: Exhuming the Popish Plot. GARY S. DE KREY, London Radicals and Revolutionary Politics, 1675–1683. JONATHAN BARRY, The Politics of Religion in Restoration Bristol. NEWTON E. KEY, Comprehension and the Breakdown of Consensus in Restoration Herefordshire. TIM HARRIS, "Lives, Liberties and Estates": Rhetorics of Liberty in the Reign of Charles II.

JEREMY BLACK and JEREMY GREGORY, editors. *Culture, Politics and Society in Britain, 1660–1800*. New York: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's. 1991. Pp. viii, 216.

JEREMY BLACK and JEREMY GREGORY, Introduction. PAUL HAMMOND, The King's Two Bodies: Representations of Charles II. JONATHAN BARRY, The Press and the Politics of Culture in Bristol, 1660–1775. JEREMY GREGORY, Anglicanism and the Arts: Religion, Culture and Politics in the Eighteenth Century. COLIN KIDD, The Ideological Significance of Scottish Jacobite Latinity. SHEARER WEST, Patronage and Power: The Role of the Portrait in Eighteenth-Century England. ROY PORTER, Civilisation and Disease: Medical Ideology in the Enlightenment. JEREMY BLACK, Ideology, History, Xenophobia and the World of Print in Eighteenth-Century England.

F. M. L. THOMPSON, editor. *The University of London and the World of Learning, 1836–1986*. Ronceverte, W.Va.: Hambledon. 1990. Pp. xxviii, 260. \$45.00.

F. M. L. THOMPSON, Introduction. J. MORDAUNT CROOK, The Architectural Image. GILLIAN SUTHERLAND, The Plainest Principles of Justice: The University of London and the Higher Education of Women. F. M. L. THOMPSON, The Humanities. W. L. TWINING, Laws. SIR HERMANN BONDI, The Sciences. L. P. LE QUESNE, Medicine. SYDNEY EVANS, Theology. H. BILLETT, Engineering. BRIAN TROWELL, Music. O. R. MCGREGOR, The Social Sciences. SIR WILLIAM TAYLOR, Education.

S. MARTIN GASKELL, editor. *Slums*. New York: Leicester University Press; distributed by Columbia University Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 251. \$45.00.

S. MARTIN GASKELL, Introduction. DAVID R. GREEN and ALAN G. PARTON, Slums and Slum Life in Victorian England: London and Birmingham at Mid-Century. GORDON MINGAY, The Rural Slum. GRAHAM DAVIS, Beyond the Georgian Facade: The Avon Street District of Bath. JIM YELLING, The Metropolitan Slum: London 1918–51.

TONY KUSHNER and KENNETH LUNN, editors. *The Politics of Marginality: Race, the Radical Right, and Minorities in Twentieth-Century Britain*. London: Frank Cass; distributed by Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, Md. 1990. Pp. 195. \$30.00.

MARTIN DURHAM, Women and the British Union of Fascists, 1932–1940. DAVID MAYALL, Rescued from the Shadows of Exile: Nellie Driver, Autobiography and the British Union of Fascists. JULIE WHEELWRIGHT, "Colonel" Barker: A Case Study in the Contradictions of Fascism. TONY KUSHNER, Politics and Race, Gender and Class: Refugees, Fascists and Domestic Service in Britain, 1933–1940. DAVID CESARANI, An Embattled Minority: The Jews in Britain during the First World War. HENRY SREBRNIK, The British Communist Party's National Jewish Committee and the Fight against Anti-Semitism during the Second World War. STELLA YARROW, The Impact of Hostility on Germans in Britain, 1914–1918. PANIKOS PANAYI, The British Empire Union in the First World War. BRYAN CHEYETTE, Hilaire Belloc and the "Marconi Scandal" 1913–1914: A Reassessment of the Interac-

tionist Model of Racial Hatred. TONY KUSHNER, Beyond the Pale? British Reactions to Nazi Anti-Semitism, 1933–39. KENNETH LUNN, The British State and Immigration, 1945–51: New Light on the Empire Windrush. MARK MITCHELL and DAVE RUSSELL, Race, the New Right and State Policy in Britain.

DAVID G. TROYANSKY *et al.*, editors. *The French Revolution in Culture and Society*. (Contributions to the Study of World History, number 23.) New York: Greenwood. 1991. Pp. xvii, 221. \$45.00.

DAVID G. TROYANSKY, Introduction. EMMET KENNEDY, The King's Two Bodies: Monuments, Mausoleums, and Museums of the French Revolution. JAMES FRIGUGLIETTI, Gilbert Romme and the Making of the French Republican Calendar. DAVID G. TROYANSKY, Generational Discourse in the French Revolution. DAVID H. J. LARMOUR, History Recreated or Malfunctional Desire? The Roman Republic Re-membered in the French Revolution. ROLAND BONNEL, Ecclesiastical Insights at the 1790 National Assembly: An Assessment of the Contribution of Catholic Thought to the French Revolution. MATTHEW RAMSEY, Revolutionary Politics and Revolutionary Culture: Shakespeare in France, 1789–1815. JEAN-YVES GUÉRIN, La Faute à Figaro? SUSAN B. GRAYSON, Gothic Sexuality and Social Decay in Diderot and Sade. RUDOLPH BINION, Romanticism and the Revolution of 1789: A Psychohistorical View. CARL D. WEINER, Gender-rising the Revolution: *La Duchesse de Langeais*. CLAUDE C. STURGILL, The French Army's Budget in the Eighteenth Century: A Retreat from Loyalty. WILLIAM J. OLEJNICZAK, Change, Continuity, and the French Revolution: Elite Discourse on Mendacity, 1750–1815. JULIUS R. RUFF, Ancien Régime Justice and the Revolution: A Local Study. STEVEN G. REINHARDT, Ritualized Violence in Eighteenth-Century Périgord. JEAN-PIERRE BARDET, Political Revolution and Contraceptive Revolution.

ROGER CHARTIER *et al.* *La correspondance: Les usages de la lettre au XIX^e siècle*. Assisted by MICHEL DEMONET *et al.* Paris: Fayard, with the cooperation of the Centre National des Lettres. 1991. Pp. 462. 160 fr.

ROGER CHARTIER, Introduction. CÉCILE DAUPHIN *et al.*, L'enquête postale de 1847. ALAIN BOUREAU, La norme épistolaire, une invention médiévale. ROGER CHARTIER, Des "secrétaires" pour le peuple? Les modèles épistolaires de l'Ancien Régime entre littérature de cour et livre de colportage. CÉCILE DAUPHIN, Les manuels épistolaires au XIX^e siècle. JEAN HÉBRARD, La lettre représentée: Les pratiques épistolaires populaires dans les récits de vie ouvriers et paysans. DANIELÉ POUBLAN, Affaires et passions: Des lettres parisiennes au milieu du XIX^e siècle. ANNE MARTIN-FUGIER, Les lettres célibataires. PIERRETTE LEBRUN-PEZERAT, La lettre au journal: Les employés des Postes comme épistoliers. ROGER CHARTIER and JEAN HÉBRARD, Conclusion: Entre public et privé: La correspondance, une écriture ordinaire.

DAVID BLACKBOURN and RICHARD J. EVANS, editors. *The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century*. New York: Routledge. 1991. Pp. xix, 348. \$74.50.

DAVID BLACKBOURN, The German Bourgeoisie: An Introduction. DOLORES L. AUGUSTINE, Arriving in the Upper

Class: The Wealthy Business Elite of Wilhelmine Germany. KARIN KAUELKA-HANISCH, The Titled Businessman: Prussian Commercial Councillors in the Rhineland and Westphalia during the Nineteenth Century. RICHARD J. EVANS, Family and Class in the Hamburg Grand Bourgeoisie 1815–1914. DICK GEARY, The Industrial Bourgeoisie and Labour Relations in Germany 1871–1933. MICHAEL JOHN, Between Estate and Profession: Lawyers and the Development of the Legal Profession in Nineteenth-Century Germany. PAUL WEINDLING, Bourgeois Values, Doctors, and the State: The Professionalization of Medicine in Germany 1848–1933. CELIA APPLGATE, Localism and the German Bourgeoisie: The “Heimat” Movement in the Rhenish Palatinate before 1914. UTE FREVERT, Bourgeois Honour: Middle-Class Duellists in Germany from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century. GEOFF ELEY, Liberalism, Europe, and the Bourgeoisie 1860–1914. THOMAS CHILDERS, The Middle Classes and National Socialism.

WILLIAM M. CALDER III and ALEXANDER DEMANDT, editors. *Eduard Meyer: Leben und Leistung eines Universalhistorikers*. (Mnemosyne, bibliotheca classica Batava, supplement, number 112.) New York: E. J. Brill. 1990. Pp. viii, 537. f. 205.

E. BADIAN, Eduard Meyer's American Paralipomena. WILLIAM M. CALDER III, “Credo gegen Credo; Arbeit gegen Arbeit; Anschauung gegen Anschauung”: Ulrich von Wilmowitz-Moellendorff contra Eduard Meyer. LUCIANO CANFORA, Eduard Meyer tra Cratippo e Teopompo. MORTIMER CHAMBERS, The “Most Eminent Living Historian, the One Final Authority”: Meyer in America. JÜRGEN DEININGER, Eduard Meyer und Max Weber. ALEXANDER DEMANDT, Eduard Meyer und Oswald Spengler: Lässt sich Geschichte voraussagen? ALBERT HENRICH, Alte und neue Propheten als Stifter von Offenbarungsreligionen: Der Ursprung der Mormonen nach Eduard Meyer. CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN, Die Selbsterziehung des Historikers: Zur intellektuellen Entwicklung des jungen Eduard Meyer (1855–1879). J. MANSFELD, Greek Philosophy in the *Geschichte des Altertums*. BEAT NÄF, Eduard Meyers Geschichtstheorie: Entwicklung und zeitgenössische Reaktionen. WILFRIED NIPPEL, Prolegomena zu Eduard Meyers *Anthropologie*. FAUSTO PARENTE, *Die Entstehung des Judentums*: Persien, die Achämeniden und das Judentum in der Interpretation von Eduard Meyer. ECKHARD PLÜMACHER, Eduard Meyers “Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums”: Verhältnis zu Fachwissenschaft und Zeitgeist. RENATE SCHLESIER, Religion als Gegenbild: Zu einigen geschichtstheoretischen Aspekten von Eduard Meyers Universaltheorie. HELMUTH SCHNEIDER, Die Bücher-Meyer Kontroverse. BERND SÖSEMANN, “Der kühnste Entschluss führt am sichersten zum Ziel”: Eduard Meyer und die Politik. JÜRGEN VON UNGERN-STERMBERG, Politik und Geschichte: Der Althistoriker Eduard Meyer im Ersten Weltkrieg. WOLFHART UNTE, Eduard Meyer und die Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft.

GREGOR SCHÖLLGEN, editor. *Escape into War? The Foreign Policy of Imperial Germany*. (German Historical Perspectives, number 6.) New York: Berg; distributed by St. Martin's. 1990. Pp. xi, 185. \$34.50.

GERHARD A. RITTER *et al.*, Editorial Preface. GREGOR SCHÖLLGEN, Foreword. GREGOR SCHÖLLGEN, Introduction: The

Theme Reflected in Recent German Research. FRITZ FISCHER, The Foreign Policy of Imperial Germany and the Outbreak of the First World War. WILLIBALD GUTSCHE, The Foreign Policy of Imperial Germany and the Outbreak of the War in the Historiography of the GDR. MICHAEL STÜRMER, A Nation State against History and Geography: The German Dilemma. KLAUS HILDEBRAND, Opportunities and Limits of German Foreign Policy in the Bismarckian Era, 1871–1890: “A System of Stoppaps”? REINER POMMERIN, Germany's Reaction to the Globalisation of International Relations, 1890–1898: A Different Course. IMANUEL GEISS, The German Version of Imperialism, 1898–1914: *Weltpolitik*. GREGOR SCHÖLLGEN, Germany's Foreign Policy in the Age of Imperialism: A Vicious Circle? GUSTAV SCHMIDT, Contradictory Postures and Conflicting Objectives: The July Crisis. ANDREAS HILLGRUBER, The Historical Significance of the First World War: A Seminal Catastrophe.

FRANCIS R. NICOSIA and LAWRENCE D. STOKES, editors. *Germans against Nazism: Nonconformity, Opposition and Resistance in the Third Reich; Essays in Honour of Peter Hoffmann*. New York: Berg; distributed by St. Martin's. 1990. Pp. xiv, 435.

FRANCIS R. NICOSIA, Introduction: Resistance to National Socialism in the Work of Peter Hoffmann. ROBERT GELATELY, Surveillance and Disobedience: Aspects of the Political Policing of Nazi Germany. LAWRENCE D. STOKES, Conservative Opposition to Nazism in Eutin, Schleswig-Holstein, 1932–1933. ARNOLD PAUCKER, Self-Defence against Fascism in a Middle-Class Community: The Jews in Weimar Germany and Beyond. KAROL JONCA, Jewish Resistance to Nazi Racial Legislation in Silesia, 1933–1937. JOHN S. CONWAY, Between Pacifism and Patriotism: A Protestant Dilemma; The Case of Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze. ROBERT P. ERICKSEN, A Radical Minority: Resistance in the German Protestant Church. DONALD DIETRICH, Catholic Resistance to Biological and Racist Eugenics in the Third Reich. IAN KERSHAW, Social Unrest and the Response of the Nazi Regime, 1934–1936. ERNST HANISCH, Peasants and Workers in Their Environment: Nonconformity and Opposition to National Socialism in the Austrian Alps. WILLIAM SHERIDAN ALLEN, Social Democratic Resistance against Hitler and the European Tradition of Underground Movements. GER VAN ROON, Dutch Contacts with the Resistance in Germany. LEONIDAS E. HILL, The National-Conservatives and Opposition to the Third Reich before the Second World War. HENRY O. MALONE, Between England and Germany: Adam von Trott's Contacts with the British. RAINER A. BLASIUS, Waiting for Action: The Debate on the “Other Germany” in Great Britain and the Reaction of the Foreign Office to German “Peace-feelers,” 1942. HAROLD C. DEUTSCH, German Soldiers in the 1938 Munich Crisis. HEINRICH WALLE, Individual Loyalty and Resistance in the German Military: The Case of Sub-Lieutenant Oskar Kusch. JILL STEPHENSON, “Resistance” to “No Surrender”: Popular Disobedience in Württemberg in 1945. EVE ROSENHAFT, The Uses of Remembrance: The Legacy of the Communist Resistance in the German Democratic Republic. MICHAEL BALFOUR, Conclusion: How Far Could the German Resistance Have Changed the Course of History?

GERALD STOURZH and BIRGITTA ZAAR, editors. *Österreich, Deutschland und die Mächte: Internationale und österreichische Aspekte des “Anschlusses” vom März 1938*.

(Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Geschichte Österreichs, number 16.) Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. 1990. Pp. x, 552. S 700.

KARL DIETRICH BRACHER, Nationalsozialismus, Faschismus und autoritäre Regime. FRANCIS L. CARSTEN, Grossbritannien und Österreich 1918–1937. KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER, Bemerkungen zur Frage Anschluss-Annexion-Identitätsbewusstsein in der neueren Geschichte Österreichs (zu den Beiträgen von Karl Dietrich Bracher und Francis L. Carsten). GERHARD L. WEINBERG, Die deutsche Aussenpolitik und Österreich 1937–38. GOTTFRIED-KARL KINDERMANN, Der Feindcharakter Österreichs in der Perzeption des Dritten Reiches: Bemerkungen zu dem Beitrag von Gerhard L. Weinberg. ANGELO ARA, Die italienische Österreichpolitik 1936–1938. MÁRIA ORMOS, Ein internationaler Versuch zur Rettung der Unabhängigkeit Österreichs: Der Donaupakt von 1934–1935. GEORGES CASTELLAN, Remarques sur la contribution de Mária Omos. GEORGES CASTELLAN, Ein Vorspiel zum Anschluss (1935–1937), nach der Korrespondenz des französischen Militärattachés in Wien, Oberst Salland. NORBERT SCHAUSBERGER, Deutsche Wirtschaftsinteressen in Österreich vor und nach dem März 1938. FELIX BUTSCHEK, Die kurzfristigen Auswirkungen der deutschen Okkupation auf die österreichische Wirtschaft (Bemerkungen zu dem Beitrag von Norbert Schausberger). GERHARD JAGSCHITZ, Die österreichischen Nationalsozialisten. BRUCE F. PAULEY, Bemerkungen zu dem Beitrag von Gerhard Jagschitz. GORDON BROOK-SHEPHERD, Britain and the Anschluss. ERWIN A. SCHMIDL, Die militärischen Aspekte des Anschlusses. GERALD STOURZH, Die Aussenpolitik der österreichischen Bundesregierung gegenüber der nationalsozialistischen Bedrohung. ALFRED D. LOW, Der Anschluss und die Supermächte. GEORG KREIS, Die Schweiz und der Anschluss Österreichs. HERBERT ROSENKRANZ, Entrechtung, Verfolgung und Selbsthilfe der Juden in Österreich, März bis Oktober 1938. PETER PULZER, Bemerkungen zu dem Beitrag von Herbert Rosenkranz. GERHARD BOTZ, Zwischen Akzeptanz und Distanz: Die österreichische Bevölkerung und das NS-Regime nach dem "Anschluss." HANS MOMMSEN, Bemerkungen zu dem Beitrag von Gerhard Botz. RADOMIR V. LUŽA, Die Strukturen der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft in Österreich. ERNST HANISCH, Fragmentarische Bemerkungen zur Konzeptualisierung der NS-Herrschaft in Österreich (zu dem Beitrag von Radomir V. Luža). HANS-ULRICH THAMER, Führergewalt und Polykratie in Österreich: Bemerkungen zu dem Beitrag von Radomir V. Luža. ERIKA WEINZIERL, Die Anfänge des österreichischen Widerstandes. GERALD STOURZH, Bemerkungen zu dem Beitrag von Erika Wienzierl.

L'Italia alla vigilia della Rivoluzione francese. (Atti del LIV Congresso di storia del risorgimento italiano, 1988.) Rome: Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano. 1990. Pp. 294. L. 50,000.

FRANCO VENTURI, *L'Italia alla vigilia della Rivoluzione francese*: Relazione introduttiva. CLAUDE PETITFRÈRE, *L'Italie vue par deux français des Lumières*: Charles Duclos et Charles Dupaty. JOHN A. DAVIES, England, the Mediterranean and the Italian States. VITTORIO E. GIUNTELLA, La crisi della Chiesa dell'Antico Regime. CARLO CAPRA, Le finanze degli Stati italiani nel secolo XVIII. FURIO DIAZ, Il limite del riformismo dei principi. GIUSEPPE RICUPERATI, Le

riforme scolastiche negli spazi italiani della seconda metà del Settecento tra progetto e realtà. MARIO BATTAGLINI, Spunti per uno studio sulla crisi della giustizia e sul problema della "legge ingiusta," in Italia, alle soglie della Rivoluzione francese. IVAN PETKANOV, La letteratura italiana alla vigilia della Rivoluzione francese.

ERNST BRUCKMÜLLER *et al.*, editors. *Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie*. Vienna: Böhlau. 1990. Pp. 317. S 469.

HANNES STEKL, Einleitung. ERNST BRUCKMÜLLER, Herkunft und Selbstverständnis bürgerlicher Gruppierung in der Habsburgermonarchie: Eine Einführung. VERA BÁCŠKAI, Die Pester Grosskaufleute: Stadtbürger, Unternehmer oder dritter Stand? MIRJANA GROSS, Entstehung und Struktur des Bürgertums in Kroatien in den ersten drei Jahrzehnten nach 1848. PAVLA HORSKÁ, Stadt und Land in der Entstehung und Abgrenzung bürgerlicher Schichten im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert in den böhmischen Ländern. GYÖRGY KÖVÉR, Einkommenssteuer und Verbürgerlichung: Ein Versuch zur Eingrenzung des Pester Grossbürgertums nach dem Ausgleich. SERGIJ VILFAN, Zur Struktur des Triester Bürgertums: Eine familiengeschichtliche Fallstudie. ANDRÁS VÁRI, "Privatbeamte" in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ersatzbürger? ULRIKE DÖCKER, Bürgerlichkeit und Kultur—Bürgerlichkeit als Kultur: Eine Einführung. ZOLTÁN TÓTH, Transformation und Abstieg der alten städtischen Kleinbürger: Ein Beispiel aus Buda gegen Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts. ULRIKE DÖCKER, "Jeder Mensch gilt in dieser Welt nur so viel, als wozu er sich selbst macht": Adolph Freiherr von Knigge und die bürgerliche Höflichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert. ERNST HANISCH, Provinzbürgertum und die Kunst der Moderne. GÁBOR BENEDEK, Die Verbürgerlichung der ungarischen Ministerialbeamten in der Epoche des Dualismus. JIŘÍ POKORNÝ, Die Lektüre von Prager Büchern im 18. Jahrhundert (1700–1784). PETER URBANITSCH, Bürgertum und Politik in der Habsburgermonarchie: Eine Einführung. OTTO HWALETZ, Zur ökonomischen, sozialen und ideologisch-politischen Formierung des industriell-gewerblichen Bürgertums: Das Beispiel der Industrievereine. OTTO URBAN, Zur Frage der Voraussetzungen der politischen Tätigkeit des tschechischen Bürgertums in den Jahren 1848–1849. JIŘÍ KOŘÁLKA, Tschechische bürgerliche Landtagsabgeordnete in Böhmen 1861–1913. JIŘÍ MALÍŘ, Zur Problematik der tschechischen bürgerlichen Vertretung im mährischen Landtag in den Jahren 1861–1913. EDITH MARKO-STÖCKL, Die politische Repräsentation des Bürgertums in der Steiermark 1861–1914. HANNES HAAS, Postmeister, Wirt, Kramer, Brauer, Müller und Wundarzt: Trägerschichten und Organisationsformen des Liberalismus; Das Salzburger Beispiel, vom frühen Konstitutionalismus bis zum Kulturkampf. ROBERT HOFFMAN, Gibt es ein "schönerianisches Milieu"? Versuch einer Kollektivbiographie von Mitglidern des "Vereins der Salzburger Studenten in Wien." HANS HEISS, Bürgertum in Südtirol: Umrisse eines verkannten Phänomens.

GERASIMOS AUGUSTINOS, editor. *Diverse Paths to Modernity in Southeastern Europe: Essays in National Development*. (Contributions to the Study of World History, number 20.) New York: Greenwood. 1991. Pp. 176. \$39.95.

GERASIMOS AUGUSTINOS, Introduction. JOHN BELL, Modernization through Secularization in Bulgaria. JOHN LAMPE,

Belated Modernization in Comparison: Development in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to 1948. ROBIN ALISON REMINGTON, Self-Management and Development Strategies in Socialist Yugoslavia. GERASIMOS AUGUSTINOS, Development through the Market in Greece: The State, Entrepreneurs, and Society. MARY ELLEN FISCHER, Politics, Nationalism, and Development in Romania.

ALAN WOOD, editor. *The History of Siberia: From Russian Conquest to Revolution*. New York: Routledge. 1991. Pp. xiv, 192. \$49.95.

ALAN WOOD, Introduction: Siberia's Role in Russian History. BASIL DMYTRYSHYN, The Administrative Apparatus of the Russian Colony in Siberia and Northern Asia, 1581–1700. DAVID N. COLLINS, Subjugation and Settlement in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Siberia. J. L. BLACK, Opening up Siberia: Russia's "Window on the East." JAMES FORSYTH, The Siberian Native Peoples Before and After the Russian Conquest. JAMES R. GIBSON, Tsarist Russia in Colonial America: Critical Constraints. ALAN WOOD, Russia's "Wild East": Exile, Vagrancy and Crime in Nineteenth-Century Siberia. LEONID M. GORYUSHKIN, Migration, Settlement and the Rural Economy of Siberia, 1861–1914. JOHN CHANNON, Siberia in Revolution and Civil War, 1917–1921. ALAN WOOD, Afterword: Siberia in the Twentieth Century.

ESTHER KINGSTON-MANN and TIMOTHY MIXTER, editors. *Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia, 1800–1921*. Assisted by JEFFREY BURDS. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1991. Pp. xviii, 443. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$12.95.

ESTHER KINGSTON-MANN, Breaking the Silence: An Introduction. ESTHER KINGSTON-MANN, Peasant Communes and Economic Innovation: A Preliminary Inquiry. JEFFREY BURDS, The Social Control of Peasant Labor in Russia: The Response of Village Communities to Labor Migration in the Central Industrial Region, 1861–1905. ELVIRA WILBUR, Peasant Poverty in Theory and Practice: A View from Russia's "Impoverished Center" at the End of the Nineteenth Century. STEPHEN G. WHEATCROFT, Crises and the Condition of the Peasantry in Late Imperial Russia. CHRISTINE D. WOROBEC, Victims or Actors? Russian Peasant Women and Patriarchy. SAMUEL C. RAMER, Traditional Healers and Peasant Culture in Russia, 1861–1917. RODNEY BOHAC, Everyday Forms of Resistance: Serf Opposition to Gentry Exactions, 1800–1861. DAVID CHRISTIAN, The Black and the Gold Seals: Popular Protests against the Liquor Trade on the Eve of Emancipation. TIMOTHY MIXTER, The Hiring Market as Workers' Turf: Migrant Agricultural Laborers and the Mobilization of Collective Action in the Steppe Grainbelt of European Russia, 1853–1913. SCOTT J. SREGENY, Peasants and Politics: Peasant Unions during the 1905 Revolution. ORLANDO FIGES, Peasant Farmers and the Minority Groups of Rural Society: Peasant Egalitarianism and Village Social Relations during the Russian Revolution (1917–1921).

ROBERT A. FERNEA and WM. ROGER LOUIS, editors. *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited*. New York: I. B. Tauris, for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas, Austin;

distributed by St. Martin's. 1991. Pp. xxiv, 232. \$49.50.

ALBERT HOURANI, Foreword. NORMAN DANIEL, Contemporary Perceptions of the Revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958. WM. ROGER LOUIS, The British and the Origins of the Iraqi Revolution. NICHOLAS G. THACHER, Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy towards Iraq in the 1950s. FREDERICK W. AXELGARD, U.S. Support for the British Position in Pre-Revolutionary Iraq. JOE STORK, The Soviet Union, the Great Powers and Iraq. RASHID KHALIDI, The Impact of the Iraqi Revolution on the Arab World. MARION FAROUK-SLUGLETT and PETER SLUGLETT, The Social Classes and the Origins of the Revolution. ROBERT A. FERNEA, State and Tribe in Southern Iraq: The Struggle for Hegemony before the 1958 Revolution. ROGER OWEN, Class and Class Politics in Iraq before 1958: The "Colonial and Post-Colonial State." ABDUL-SALAAM YOUSIF, The Struggle for Cultural Hegemony during the Iraqi Revolution. SAMI ZUBAIDA, Community, Class and Minorities in Iraqi Politics. HANNA BATATU, The Old Social Classes Revisited.

RUBIE S. WATSON and PATRICIA BUCKLEY EBREY, editors. *Marriage and Inequality in Chinese Society*. (Studies on China, number 12.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xvii, 385. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$14.95.

PATRICIA BUCKLEY EBREY, Introduction. MELVIN P. THATCHER, Marriages of the Ruling Elite in the Spring and Autumn Period. JENNIFER HOLMGREN, Imperial Marriage in the Native Chinese and Non-Han State, Han to Ming. PATRICIA BUCKLEY EBREY, Shifts in Marriage Finance from the Sixth to the Thirteenth Century. JOHN W. CHAFFEE, The Marriage of Sung Imperial Clanswomen. EVELYN S. RAWSKI, Ch'ing Imperial Marriage and Problems of Rulership. SUSAN MANN, Grooming a Daughter for Marriage: Brides and Wives in the Mid-Ch'ing Period. RUBIE S. WATSON, Wives, Concubines, and Maids: Servitude and Kinship in the Hong Kong Region, 1900–1940. GAIL HERSHATTER, Prostitution and the Market in Women in Early Twentieth-Century Shanghai. WILLIAM LAVELY, Marriage and Mobility under Rural Collectivism. JONATHAN K. OCKO, Women, Property, and Law in the People's Republic of China. RUBIE S. WATSON, Afterword: Marriage and Gender Inequality.

SUGATA BOSE, editor. *South Asia and World Capitalism*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1990. Pp. xii, 405. \$36.00.

SUGATA BOSE, Introduction: Beyond the General and the Particular. IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, World-Systems Analysis and Historical Particularity: Some Comments. C. A. BAYLY, Beating the Boundaries: South Asian History, c. 1700–1850. DAVID WASHBROOK, South Asia, the World System and World Capitalism. K. N. CHAUDHURI, The Historical Roots of Capitalism in the Indian Ocean: A Comparative Study of South Asia, the Middle East, and China during the Pre-Modern Period. C. A. BAYLY, Indigenous Social Formations and the "World System": North India since c. 1700. STEPHEN FREDERIC DALE, Indo-Russian Trade in the Eighteenth Century. DAVID LUDDEN, World Economy and Village India, 1600–1900: Exploring the Agrarian History of Capitalism. GYAN PRAKASH, Bonded Labour in South Bihar: A Contes-

tatory History. JIM MATSON, Deindustrialization or Peripheralization? The Case of Cotton Textiles in India, 1750–1950. GORDON JOHNSON, Government and Nationalism in India, 1880–1920. RICHARD G. FOX, Gandhian Socialism and Hindu Nationalism: Cultural Domination in the World System. AYESHA JALAL, State-Building in the Post-War World: Britain's Colonial Legacy, American Futures and Pakistan. DIETMAR ROTHERMUND, A Vulnerable Economy: India in the Great Depression, 1929–1939. RUCHIRA CHATTERJI, Costs, Prices and Outputs: The Nature of Cyclical Fluctuations in a Developing Economy. JAYATI GHOSH, The Impact of Integration: India and the World Economy in the 1980s. SUGATA BOSE, The World Economy and Regional Economies in South Asia: Some Comments on Linkages.

ERIC H. MONKKONEN, editor. *Crime and Justice in American History: Historical Articles on the Origins and Evolution of American Criminal Justice; The Colonies and Early Republic*. In two volumes. Westport, Conn.: Meckler. 1991. Pp. 427; 429–912.

J. M. BEATTIE, The Pattern of Crime in England, 1660–1800. SHARON ANN BURNSTON, Babies in the Well: An Underground Insight into Deviant Behavior in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia. A. ROGER EKIRCH, Bound for America: A Profile of British Convicts Transported to the Colonies, 1718–1775. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, Crime and Social Control in Provincial Massachusetts. DAVID H. FLAHERTY, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early America. DAVID KENT FONNER, The Failure of the Farmers and Drovers National Bank of Waynesburg, Pennsylvania. RICHARD GASKINS, Changes in the Criminal Law in Eighteenth-Century Connecticut. DOUGLAS GREENBERG, Crime, Law Enforcement, and Social Control in Colonial America. DOUGLAS GREENBERG, The Effectiveness of Law Enforcement in Eighteenth-Century New York. DOUGLAS HAY, Crime and Justice in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century England. A. H. HOBBS, Criminality in Philadelphia: 1790–1810 Compared with 1937. LINDA KEALEY, Patterns of Punishment: Massachusetts in the Eighteenth Century. DAVID THOMAS KONIG, "Dale's Laws" and the Non-Common Law Origins of Criminal Justice in Virginia. CAROL F. LEE, Discretionary Justice in Early Massachusetts. PAUL LERMACK, Peace Bonds and Criminal Justice in Colonial Philadelphia. WILLIAM E. NELSON, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective. ROBERT F. OAKS, "Things Fearful to Name": Sodomy and Buggery in Seventeenth-Century New England. KATHRYN PREYER, Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview. KATHRYN PREYER, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority; Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic. WALTER F. PRINCE, The First Criminal Code of Virginia. MARCUS REDIKER, "Under the Banner of King Death": The Social World of Anglo-American Pirates, 1716 to 1726. G. S. ROWE, Women's Crime and Criminal Administration in Pennsylvania, 1763–1790. ABBOT EMERSON SMITH, The Transportation of Convicts to the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century. DONNA J. SPINDEL, The Administration of Criminal Justice in North Carolina, 1720–1740. DONNA J. SPINDEL and STUART W. THOMAS, JR., Crime and Society in North Carolina, 1663–1740. EDWARD M. STEEL, Criminality in Jeffersonian America—A Sample. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, The Evolution of an Urban Judicial System: The Philadelphia Story, 1683 to 1968. NEGLEY K. TEETERS, Public Executions in Pennsylvania: 1682–1834. PETER G. YACKEL,

Benefit of Clergy in Colonial Maryland. JULES ZANGER, Crime and Punishment in Early Massachusetts.

DAVID M. GORDIS and YOAV BEN-HORIN, editors. *Jewish Identity in America*. Los Angeles: The Susan and David Wilstein Institute of Jewish Policy Studies, University of Judaism. 1991. Pp. xv, 296. Cloth \$39.50, paper \$19.95.

DAVID GORDIS and YOAV BEN-HORIN, Preface. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, Introduction. BRUCE A. PHILLIPS, Sociological Analysis of Jewish Identity. STEPHEN M. COHEN, Response. PERRY LONDON and ALLISSA HIRSCHFELD, The Psychology of Identity Formation. IRVING WHITE and CHAIM SEIDLER-FELLER, Responses. HENRY FEINGOLD, The American Component of American Jewish Identity. HOWARD I. FRIEDMAN, Response. JONATHAN D. SARNA, Jewish Identity in the Changing World of American Religion. DAVID ELLENSON and STEVEN BAYME, Responses. STEPHEN M. COHEN, Israel in the Jewish Identity of American Jews: A Study in Dualities and Contrasts. HOWARD MILLER, Response. STUART E. EIZENSTAT, American Jews and Israel in the Bush Era. HAROLD M. SCHULWEIS *et al.*, Panel Discussion: The Role of the Synagogue in Jewish Identity. DANIEL STEINMETZ, An Agenda for the Study of Jewish Identity and Denominationalism among Children. HANAN ALEXANDER and WILLIAM CUTTER, Responses. BERNARD D. COOPERMAN, Jewish Studies in the University. ARNOLD J. BAND and STEVEN T. ZIPPERSTEIN, Responses. ARNOLD J. BAND, Popular Fiction and the Shaping of Jewish Identity. ALAN L. BERGER, Job's Children: Post-Holocaust Jewish Identity in Second-Generation Literature. J. ALAN WINTER, Keeping the Cost of Living Jewishly Affordable. DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT and RUSSELL D. ROBERTS, Responses. DAVID ROSENHAN, Jewish Identity and Policy Research. ROY FELDMAN, Response. MARSHALL SKLARE, Reflections on the Establishment of the Wilstein Institute.

ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL and HOWARD DICKMAN, editors. *Liberty, Property, and the Future of Constitutional Development*. (SUNY Series in the Constitution and Economic Rights.) Albany: State University of New York Press. 1990. Pp. vii, 341.

JAMES M. BUCHANAN, The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberalism. MARK TUSHNET, Public Choice Constitutionalism and Economic Rights. WILLIAM H. RIKER, Civil Rights and Property Rights. LINO A. GRAGLIA, Judicial Activism of the Right: A Mistaken and Futile Hope. STEPHEN MACEDO, Economic Liberty and the Future of Constitutional Self-Government. FRANK MICHELMAN, Tutelary Jurisprudence and Constitutional Property. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, Takings: Of Maginot Lines and Constitutional Compromises. R. SHEP MELNICK, The Politics of the New Property: Welfare Rights in Congress and the Courts. THOMAS R. HAGGARD, Work, Government, and the Constitution: Determining the Proper Allocation of Rights and Powers. LEO TROY, The Right to Organize Meets the Market.

WILLIAM JEFFREY WELSH and DAVID CURTIS SKAGGS, editors. *War on the Great Lakes: Essays Commemorating the 175th Anniversary of the Battle of Lake Erie*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1991. Pp. 154. Cloth \$29.00, paper \$17.50.

WILLIAM JEFFREY WELSH and DAVID CURTIS SKAGGS, Introduction. GERARD T. ALTOFF, The Battle of Lake Erie: A

Narrative. FREDERICK C. DRAKE, *Artillery and Its Influence on Naval Tactics: Reflections on the Battle of Lake Erie*. W. A. B. DOUGLAS, *The Honor of the Flag Had Not Suffered: Robert Heriot Barclay and the Battle of Lake Erie*. DENNIS CARTER-EDWARDS, *The Battle of Lake Erie and Its Consequences: Denouement of the British Right Division and Abandonment of the Western District to American Troops, 1813–1815*. R. DAVID EDMUNDS, *Tecumseh's Native Allies: Warriors Who Fought for the Crown*. HAROLD D. LANGLEY, *The Quest for Peace in the War of 1812*. IAN C. B. PEMBERTON, *Historiography of the War of 1812: The Canadian View of the Battle of Lake Erie and Its Aftermath*. CHRISTOPHER MCKEE, *An Ariel View of Put-in-Bay: United States Historians Scrutinize a Campaign*. STUART SUTHERLAND, *Canadian Archival Sources and the War of 1812*. DOUGLAS E. CLANIN, *United States Manuscript Sources for a Study of the War of 1812 in the Northwest*. DOUGLAS E. CLANIN, *A Bibliography of United States Manuscript Sources for a Study of the War of 1812 in the Northwest*.

LOU FERLEGER, editor. *Agriculture and National Development: Views on the Nineteenth Century*. (The Henry A. Wallace Series on Agricultural History and Rural Studies.) Ames: Iowa State University Press. 1990. Pp. xxiii, 363.

LOU FERLEGER, Preface. WAYNE D. RASMUSSEN, Introduction. HAL S. BARRON, *Listening to the Silent Majority: Change and Continuity in the Nineteenth-Century Rural North*. JEREMY ATTACK and FRED BATEMAN, *Yeoman Farming: Antebellum America's Other "Peculiar Institution."* R. DOUGLAS HURT, *Northern Agriculture after the Civil War, 1865–1900*. DONALD L. WINTERS, *The Economics of Midwestern Agriculture, 1865–1900*. DOROTHY SCHWIEDER, *Agricultural Issues in the Middle West, 1865–1900*. DAVID F. WEIMAN, *Staple Crops and Slave Plantations: Alternative Perspectives on Regional Development in the Antebellum Cotton South*. RICHARD H. STECKEL, *Growth and Development in the Antebellum South: Old Debates and New Directions*. JAY R. MANDLE, *The Role of Markets and Institutions in Postbellum Southern Development*. LEE J. ALSTON, *Issues in Postbellum Southern Agriculture*. JOSEPH P. REIDY, *Slavery, Emancipation, and the Capitalist Transformation of Southern Agriculture, 1850–1910*. ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, *Women in Agriculture during the Nineteenth Century*. KATHLEEN NEILS CONZEN, *Immigrants in Nineteenth-Century Agricultural History*.

SANFORD M. JACOBY, editor. *Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 249. \$35.00.

SANFORD M. JACOBY, *Masters to Managers: An Introduction*. JENS CHRISTIANSEN and PETER PHILIPS, *The Transition from Outwork to Factory Production in the Boot and Shoe Industry, 1830–1880*. WALTER LICHT, *Studying Work: Personnel Policies in Philadelphia Firms, 1850–1950*. DANIEL NELSON, *Scientific Management and the Workplace, 1920–1935*. DANIEL M. G. RAFF, *Ford Welfare Capitalism in Its Economic Context*. HOWELL JOHN HARRIS, *Getting It Together: The Metal Manufacturers Association of Philadelphia, c. 1900–1930*. DANIEL R. ERNST, *The Closed Shop, the Proprietary Capitalist, and the Law, 1897–1915*. GERALD FRIEDMAN, *The*

Decline of Paternalism and the Making of the Employer Class: France, 1870–1914. SANFORD M. JACOBY, *American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Importance of Management*.

WILLIAM L. ANDERSON, editor. *Cherokee Removal: Before and After*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 157. \$25.00.

WILLIAM L. ANDERSON, Introduction. DOUGLAS C. WILMS, *Cherokee Land Use in Georgia before Removal*. RONALD N. SATZ, *Rhetoric versus Reality: The Indian Policy of Andrew Jackson*. THEDA PERDUE, *The Conflict Within: Cherokees and Removal*. RUSSELL THORNTON, *The Demography of the Trail of Tears Period: A New Estimate of Cherokee Population Losses*. JOHN R. FINGER, *The Impact of Removal on the North Carolina Cherokees*. RENNARD STRICKLAND and WILLIAM M. STRICKLAND, *Beyond the Trail of Tears: One Hundred Fifty Years of Cherokee Survival*. WILLIAM L. ANDERSON, *Bibliographical Essays*.

MICK GIDLEY and KATE BOWLES, editors. *Locating the Shakers: Cultural Origins and Legacies of an American Religious Movement*. (Exeter Studies in American and Commonwealth Arts, number 3.) Exeter: University of Exeter Press. 1990. Pp. 158. £8.95.

ROSEMARY GOODEN, *The Shakers: A Brief Historical Sketch*. TIM V. HITCHCOCK, *"In True Imitation of Christ": The Tradition of Mystical Communitarianism in Early Eighteenth-Century England*. LOUIS BILLINGTON, *Different Paths to Perfection: The Shakers and Radical Sects in New England, 1780–1850*. LYMAN T. SARGENT, *The American Utopian Context of the Shakers*. KEN PENNEY, *The Economic Context of the Shakers*. PAUL OLIVER, *"Perfect and Plain": Shaker Approaches to Design*. ELIZABETH KOLMER, *"Blessed are the Peacemakers": The Shakers as Pacifists*. MAJORIE PROCTER-SMITH, *"Who Do You Say That I Am?": Mother Ann as Christ*. ALISON M. NEWBY, *Shakers as Feminists? Shakerism as a Vanguard in the Antebellum American Search for Female Autonomy and Independence*. CHRISTOPHER W. GREGORY, *The Hopedale Sewing Circle and Tract Society: Microcosm of the Hopedale Community*. GEOFFREY GALE, *Elder Evans, Mrs. Girling, and the Children of God*. LOUIS J. KERN, *Maternal Paradigms, Erotic Strategies, and Sororal Consciousness: Sexuality and Women's Experiences among the Shakers and in the Kerista Commune*. JOHN FOWLES, *Past and Present Comment: An Afterword*.

ROBERT D. MITCHELL, editor. *Appalachian Frontiers: Settlement, Society, and Development in the Preindustrial Era*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1991. Pp. x, 350. \$43.00.

ROBERT D. MITCHELL, Introduction: *Revisionism and Regionalism*. ALAN V. BRICELAND, *Batts and Fallam Explore the Backbone of the Continent*. THOMAS HATLEY, *Cherokee Women Farmers Hold Their Ground*. SALLY SCHWARTZ, *Religious Pluralism in Colonial Pennsylvania*. KENNETH W. KELLER, *What Is Distinctive about the Scotch-Irish?* ELIZABETH A. KESSEL, *Germans in the Making of Frederick County, Maryland, 1730–1800*. WARREN R. HOFSTRA, *Land Policy and Settlement in the Northern Shenandoah Valley*. RICHARD K. MACMASTER, *The Cattle Trade in Western*

Virginia, 1760–1830. H. TYLER BLETHEN and CURTIS W. WOOD, A Trader on the Western Carolina Frontier. VAN BECK HALL, The Politics of Appalachian Virginia, 1790–1830. ANDREW R. L. CAYTON, Marietta and the Ohio Company. JOHN MORGAN, Log House Construction in Blount County, Tennessee. TYREL G. MOORE, Economic Development in Appalachian Kentucky, 1800–1860. MARY BETH PUDUP, Social Class and Economic Development in Southeastern Kentucky, 1820–1880. PAUL SALSTROM, The Agricultural Origins of Economic Dependency, 1840–1880.

WALTER L. BUENGER and ROBERT A. CALVERT, editors. *Texas through Time: Evolving Interpretations*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1991. Pp. xxxv, 371. Cloth \$35.00, paper \$15.95.

WALTER L. BUENGER and ROBERT A. CALVERT, Introduction: The Shelf Life of Truth in Texas. RONALD L. DAVIS, Modernization and Distinctiveness: Twentieth-Century Cultural Life in Texas. ARNOLDO DE LEÓN, Texas Mexicans: Twentieth-Century Interpretations. ALWYN BARR, African Americans in Texas: From Stereotypes to Diverse Roles. FANE DOWNS, Texas Women: History at the Edges. DONALD E. CHIPMAN, Spanish Texas. PAUL D. LACK, In the Long Shadow of Eugene C. Barker: The Revolution and the Republic. RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, Statehood, Civil War, and Reconstruction, 1846–76. ROBERT A. CALVERT, Agrarian Texas. LARRY D. HILL, Texas Progressivism: A Search for Definition. KENNETH E. HENDRICKSON, JR., Texas Politics since the New Deal. CHAR MILLER, Sunbelt Texas. WALTER L. BUENGER, Flight from Modernity: The Economic History of Texas since 1845.

JOE P. DUNN and HOWARD L. PRESTON, editors. *The Future South: A Historical Perspective for the Twenty-first Century*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1991. Pp. x, 251. Cloth \$34.95, paper \$12.95.

JOE P. DUNN, The Quest for the South's Future: An Overview. DAVID R. GOLDFIELD, The City as Southern History: The Past and the Promise of Tomorrow. ALEXANDER P. LAMIS, The Future of Southern Politics: New Directions for Dixie. ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR., Variations on a Theme by Henry Grady: Technology, Modernization, and Social Change. HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, The Weight of the Past versus the Promise of the Future: Southern Race Relations in Historical Perspective. MARGARET RIPLEY WOLFE, The View from Atlanta: Southern Women and the Future. DORIS BETTS, Many Souths and Broadening Scale: A Changing Southern Literature. HOWARD L. PRESTON, Will Dixie Disappear? Cultural Contours of a Region in Transition. JAMES C. COBB, Tomorrow Seems Like Yesterday: The South's Future in the Nation and the World.

JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR. and CHARLES E. NEU, editors. *The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. Link*. Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson. 1991. Pp. xii, 356. Cloth \$24.95, paper \$18.95.

GEORGE B. TINDALL, The Formative Years. RICHARD W. LEOPOLD, Arthur S. Link at Northwestern: The Maturing of a Scholar. WILLIAM A. LINK, The Social Context of Southern Progressivism, 1880–1930. STEVEN J. ROSS, Cinema and

Class Conflict: Labor, Capital, the State, and American Silent Film. WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, The Limits of Voluntarism: Farmers, County Agents, and the Conservation Movement. RALPH B. LEVERING, Public Culture and Public Opinion: The League of Nations Controversy in New Jersey and North Carolina. JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., Fool's Errand or Finest Hour? Woodrow Wilson's Speaking Tour in September 1919. JOHN M. MULDER, "A Gospel of Order": Woodrow Wilson's Religion and Politics. CHARLES E. NEU, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: The Early Years, 1911–1915. DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: A Preliminary Appraisal. THOMAS J. KNOCK, Kennan versus Wilson. GEORGE KENNAN, Comments on the Paper Entitled "Kennan versus Wilson" by Professor Thomas J. Knock. CAROL BONDHUS FITZGERALD and MANFRED F. BOEMEKE, Bibliography of Works by Arthur S. Link.

ROBERT HIGGS, editor. *Arms, Politics, and the Economy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Foreword by WILLIAM A. NISKANEN. (Independent Studies in Political Economy.) New York: Holmes and Meier. 1990. Pp. xxxii, 295. \$19.95.

WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, Foreword: The Political Economy of U.S. Defense. ROBERT HIGGS, Introduction: Fifty Years of Arms, Politics, and the Economy. JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, Baruch, the New Deal, and the Origins of the Military-Industrial Complex. DWIGHT R. LEE, Public Goods, Politics, and Two Cheers for the Military-Industrial Complex. JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL and DON LAVOIE, National Defense and the Public-Goods Problem. WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, Blue Ribbon Defense Commissions: The Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems. WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Public Regulation of the Weapons Acquisition Process. ILAN PELEG, Models of Arms Transfer in American Foreign Policy: Carter's Restraint and Reagan's Promotion, 1977–1987. FRANK R. LICHTENBERG, Contributions to Federal Election Campaigns by Government Contractors. JAMES M. LINDSAY, Congress and the Defense Budget: Parochialism or Policy? KENNETH R. MAYER, Patterns of Congressional Influence in Defense Contracting. CHARLOTTE TWIGHT, Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases: The Political Economy of Congressional Resistance.

MERLE GREENE ROBERTSON and VIRGINIA M. FIELDS, editors. *Sixth Palenque Round Table, 1986*. (The Palenque Round Table Series, number 8.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991. Pp. xiv, 359. \$65.00.

MERLE GREENE ROBERTSON, Editor's Introduction. ARNULFO HARDY GONZÁLEZ, Historical Notes on the Discovery of the Ruins, the Founding of the Town, and the Origin and Significance of the Name of Palenque. LINDA SCHELE, The Demotion of Chac-Zut': Lineage Compounds and Subsidiary Lords at Palenque. J. KATHRYN JOSSELAND, The Narrative Structure of Hieroglyphic Texts at Palenque. ARLEN F. CHASE, Cycles of Time: Caracol in the Maya Realm. RUTH KROCHOCK, Dedication Ceremonies at Chichén Itzá: The Glyphic Evidence. LINNEA H. WREN, The Great Ball Court Stone from Chichén Itzá. JEFF KARL KOWALSKI and WILLIAM L. FASH, Symbolism of the Maya Ball Game at Copán: Synthesis and New Aspects. WILLIAM L. FASH, Lineage Patrons and Ancestor Worship among the Classic Maya Nobility: The Case of Copán Structure 9N-82. CLAUDE F.

- BAUDEZ, The Cross Pattern at Copán: Forms, Rituals, and Meanings. DIANE Z. CHASE, Lifeline to the Gods: Ritual Bloodletting at Santa Rita Corozal. RUBEN MALDONADO C. and BEATRIZ REPETTO TIO, Tlalocs at Uxmal. CAROLYN TATE, The Period-Ending Stelae of Yaxchilán. RAMÓN CARRASCO V., The Structure 8 Tablet and Development of the Great Plaza at Yaxchilán. S. JEFFREY K. WILKERSON, Damming the Usumacinta: The Archaeological Impact. FREDERICK J. BOVE, The Teotihuacán-Kaminaljuyu-Tikal Connection: A View from the South Coast of Guatemala. ROSEMARY A. JOYCE *et al.*, Olmec Bloodletting: An Iconographic Study. F. KENT REILLY III, Olmec Iconographic Influences on the Symbols of Maya Rulership: An Examination of Possible Sources. VIRGINIA M. FIELDS, The Iconographic Heritage of the Maya Jester God. DAVID A. FREIDEL *et al.*, The Bearer, the Burden, and the Burnt: The Stacking Principle in the Iconography of the Late Preclassic Maya Lowlands. JOANNE M. SPERO, Beyond Rainstorms: The Kawak as an Ancestor, Warrior, and Patron of Witchcraft. ANDREA STONE, Aspects of Impersonation in Classic Maya Art. ANNE-LOUISE SCHAFER, The Maya "Posture of Royal Ease." DORIE REENTS-BUDET, The "Holmul Dancer" Theme in Maya Art. NIKOLAI GRUBE, An Investigation of the Primary Standard Sequence on Classic Maya Ceramics. DIANE WINTERS, A Study of the Fish-in-Hand Glyph, T714: Part 1. TOM JONES, Jaws II: Return of the *Xoc*. NICHOLAS A. HOPKINS, Classic and Modern Relationship Terms and the "Child of Mother" Glyph (T1:606.23). MARTHA J. MACRI, Prepositions and Complementizers in the Classic Period Inscriptions. DIETER DÜTTING, Aspects of Polyvalency in Maya Writing: Affixes T12, T229, and T110. VICTORIA R. BRICKER, Faunal Offerings in the Dresden Codex. BRUCE LOVE, A Text from the Dresden New Year Pages. MERIDETH PAXTON, Codex Dresden: Late Postclassic Ceramic Depictions and the Problems of Provenience and Date of Painting. ANTHONY AVENI, The Real Venus-Kukulcan in the Maya Inscriptions and Alignments. JORGE L. OREJEL OPISSO, Artificial Intelligence Meets Maya Epigraphy.
- ABRAHAM F. LOWENTHAL, editor. *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1991. Pp. x, 422. Cloth \$55.00, paper in two volumes \$12.95 each.
- PAUL W. DRAKE, From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912–1932. LESLIE BETHELL, From the Second World War to the Cold War: 1944–1954. TONY SMITH, The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s. THOMAS CAROTHERS, The Reagan Years: The 1980s. CARLOS ESCUDÉ, Argentina: The Costs of Contradiction. HERALDO MUÑOZ, Chile: The Limits of "Success." JONATHAN HARTLYN, The Dominican Republic: The Legacy of Intermittent Engagement. LORENZO MEYER, Mexico: The Exception and the Rule. JOSEPH S. TULCHIN and KNUT WALTER, Nicaragua: The Limits of Intervention. ELIZABETH A. COBBS, U.S. Business: Self-interest and Neutrality. PAUL G. BUCHANAN, The Impact of U.S. Labor. JOHN SHEAHAN, Economic Forces and U.S. Policies. LAURENCE WHITEHEAD, The Imposition of Democracy. ABRAHAM F. LOWENTHAL, The United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History.

Documents and Bibliographies

Books listed were recently received in the AHR office. Works of these types cannot normally be reviewed by the AHR.

GENERAL

- KALIB, GOLDIE SZACHTER. *The Last Selection: A Child's Journey through the Holocaust*. Assisted by SYLVAN KALIB and KEN WACHSBERGER. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 1991. Pp. xx, 266. \$29.95.
- KIRSCH, GEORGE B., editor. *Sports in North America: A Documentary History*. Volume 3, *The Rise of Modern Sports 1840-1860*. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International. 1992. Pp. xviii, 390. \$72.00.
- RASOR, EUGENE L. *The Battle of Jutland: A Bibliography*. (Bibliographies of Battles and Leaders, number 7.) New York: Greenwood. 1992. Pp. xii, 176. \$45.00.

ANCIENT

- FOSTER, JOHN L., translator. *Echoes of Egyptian Voices: An Anthology of Ancient Egyptian Poetry*. (Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture, number 12.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. xxiii, 134. \$19.95.
- LUCAN. *Civil War*. Translated by S. H. BRAUND. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. lvi, 335. \$95.00.

MEDIEVAL

- DI BERARDINO, ANGELO, editor. *Encyclopedia of the Early Church*. In two volumes. Translated by ADRIAN WALFORD. Foreword by W. H. C. FREND. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xxv, 578; 579-1130. \$175.00.
- GREGORY OF TOURS. *Life of the Fathers*. Translated by EDWARD JAMES. (Translated Texts for Historians, number 1.) 2d ed. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 1991. Pp. xxv, 143. £8.50.
- KER, N. R., and A. J. PIPER, editors. *Medieval Manuscripts in British Libraries*. Volume 4, *Paisley-York*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xl, 826. \$169.00.
- KEYNES, SIMON, editor. *Facsimiles of Anglo-Saxon Charters*. (Anglo-Saxon Charters, supplementary volume 1.) New York: Oxford University Press, for the British Academy, London. 1991. Pp. xii, 44. \$150.00.
- KRAVARI, VASSILIKI, editor. *Actes du Pantocrator: Édition diplomatique*. Volume 1, *Texte*; volume 2, *Album*. (Archives de l'Athos, number 17.) Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, with the cooperation of the Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies and the Académie d'Athènes. 1991. Pp. 232; 40 plates.
- MYNORS, R. A. B., and ALEXANDER DALZELL, translators. *The Correspondence of Erasmus*. Volume 10, *Letters, 1356 to 1534*. Annotated by JAMES M. ESTES. (The Collected Works of Erasmus.) Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1992. Pp. xxi, 515. \$100.00.

- ROBERTS, PHYLLIS B. *Thomas Becket in the Medieval Preaching Tradition: An Inventory of Sermons about St. Thomas Becket c. 1170-c. 1400*. (Instrumenta Patristica, number 25.) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff International. 1992. Pp. 270.
- WULFSTAN OF WORCESTER. *The Life of St. Æthelwold*. Edited and translated by MICHAEL LAPIDGE and MICHAEL WINTERBOTTOM. (Oxford Medieval Texts.) New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. clxxxviii, 105. \$79.00.

BRITAIN AND IRELAND

- CONSTANTINE, STEPHEN, editor. *Dominions Diary: The Letters of E. J. Harding, 1913-1916*. (Ryburn Archive Editions.) Halifax, U.K.: Ryburn. 1992. Pp. 336. £28.00.
- FIRTH, C. H., editor. *The Clarke Papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke*. Foreword by AUSTIN WOOLRYCH. London: Royal Historical Society; distributed by Boydell and Brewer, Rochester, N.Y. 1992. Pp. lxxvi, 442; xxxviii, 303. \$39.00.
- GEORGE, DAVID, editor. *Records of Early English Drama: Lancashire*. (Records of Early English Drama.) Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1991. Pp. cxix, 471. \$125.00.
- KEEBLE, N. H., and GEOFFREY N. NUTTALL, editors. *Calendar of the Correspondence of Richard Baxter*. Volume 2, 1660-1696. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. 387. \$89.00.
- McKENNA, LAMBERT, S. J. *The Social Teachings of James Connolly*. Foreword by THOMAS J. MORRISSEY, S. J. Dublin: Veritas. 1991. Pp. 104. £5.95.
- PRICE, RICHARD. *Political Writings*. Edited by D. O. THOMAS. (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xxxiv, 199. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$16.95.
- SPALDING, JAMES C., editor. *The Reformation of the Ecclesiastical Laws of England, 1552*. (Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies, number 19.) Kirkville, Mo.: Sixteenth Century Journal. 1992. Pp. xviii, 320. \$35.00.
- WEDDERBURN, ROBERT. *The Hortors of Slavery and Other Writings*. Edited by IAIN MCCALMAN. New York: Markus Wiener and Edinburgh University Press. 1992. Pp. ix, 154. Cloth \$34.95, paper \$14.95.

FRANCE

- CHARMASSON, THÉRÈSE, et al., editors. *L'enseignement agricole et vétérinaire de la Révolution à la Libération*. Paris: Sorbonne, for the Institut National de Recherche Pédagogique. 1992. Pp. cxlv, 745. 350 fr.
- NORTHCUTT, WAYNE, editor. *Historical Dictionary of the French Fourth and Fifth Republics, 1946-1991*. (Historical Dictionaries of French History.) New York: Greenwood. 1992. Pp. xv, 527. \$85.00.
- La Rivoluzione francese (1787-1799): Repertorio delle fonti ar-*

chivistiche e delle fonti a stampa conservate in Italia e nella Città del Vaticano. In four volumes. (Pubblicazioni degli archivi di stato. Sussidi. number 4.) Rome: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali. 1991. Pp. x, 1520.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

FELIU, GASPÀ. *Precios y salarios en la Cataluña moderna*. Volume 1, *Alimentos*; volume 2, *Combustibles, productos manufacturados y salarios*. (Estudios de Historia Económica, numbers 21 and 22.) Madrid: Banco de España. 1991. Pp. 165; 150.

GONZÁLEZ ECHEGARAY, MARIA DEL CARMEN *et al.*, editors. *Artistas Cantabros de la Edad Moderna: Su aportación al arte hispánico (diccionario biográfico-artístico)*. Santander, Spain: Universidad de Cantabria. 1991. Pp. 771.

NORTHERN EUROPE

ØVERLAND, ORM, and STEINAR KJÆRHEIM, editors. *Fra Amerika til Norge: Norske utvandrerbrev, 1838–1857* [From America to Norway: Norwegian Emigrant's Letters, 1838–1857]. Oslo, Norway: Solum. 1992. Pp. 496.

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND

MORSEY, RUDOLF, editor. *Das "Ermächtigungsgesetz" vom 24. März 1933: Quellen zur Geschichte und Interpretation des "Gesetzes zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich."* (Dokumente und Texte, number 1.) Düsseldorf: Droste. 1992. Pp. 223. DM 29.80.

ITALY

CAMMETT, JOHN M., editor. *Bibliografia gramsciana, 1922–1988*. (Annali, 1989.) Rome: Riuniti, for the Fondazione Istituto Gramsci. 1991. Pp. xiii, 457. L. 75,000.

CAMPI, EMIDIO, editor. *Protestantesimo nei secoli: Fonti e documenti*. Volume 1, *Cinquecento e Seicento*. Turin: Claudiana. 1991. Pp. iv, 474. L. 48,000.

CECARO, RITA, *et al.*, editors. *I giornali sardi dell'Ottocento: Quotidiani, periodici e riviste della Biblioteca universitaria di Sassari; Catalogo (1795–1899)*. Foreword by FEDERICO FRANCIONI. Sardinia, Italy: Regione Autonoma della Sardegna and Biblioteca Universitaria di Sassari. 1991. Pp. 229.

FELLONI, GIUSEPPE, editor. *Inventario dell'Archivio del Banco di San Giorgio (1407–1805)*. Volume 3, *Banchi e tesoreria*, numbers 2 and 3. (Pubblicazioni degli archivi di stato di Genova.) Rome: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali. 1991. Pp. 378; 380.

FIRPO, LUIGI, *et al.*, editors. *Lorenzo Valerio: Carteggio (1825–1865)*. Turin: Fondazione Luigi Einaudi. 1991. Pp. lxxiv, 573.

MASSARA, KATIA, editor. *Il popolo al confino: La persecuzione fascista in Puglia*. In two volumes. Foreword by MICHELE CIFARELLI. (Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, number 114.) Rome: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali. 1991. Pp. 911.

PESIRI, GIOVANNI, *et al.*, editors. *Archivi di famiglie e di persone: Materiali per una guida*. Volume 1, *Abruzzo–Liguria*. (Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, number 112.) Rome: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali. 1991. Pp. xx, 280.

QUAZZA, GUIDO, and MARISA QUAZZA, editors. *Epistolario di Quintino Sella*. Volume 3, *1870–1871*. (Biblioteca Scientifica, second series; Fonti, number 80.) Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento Italiano. 1991. Pp. viii, 790. L. 100,000.

RICCI, ALDO G., and FRANCESCA ROMANA SCARDACCIONE, editors. *Ministero per le armi e munizioni: Decreti di ausilia-*

rietà. (Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, number 115.) Rome: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali. 1991. Pp. 656.

SQUADRONI, MARIO, editor. *Le istituzioni pubbliche di assistenza e beneficenza dell'Umbria: Profili storici e censimento degli archivi*. (Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato Italiani, Strumenti, number 108.) Rome: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali. 1990. Pp. 629.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

ARMSTRONG, RICHARD N., editor. *Red Armor Combat Orders: Combat Regulations for Tank and Mechanized Forces, 1944*. Translated by JOSEPH G. WELSH. (Cass Series on the Soviet Study of War, number 3.) Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass. 1991. Pp. xxvii, 163. \$37.50.

KRAVCHENKO, V. N., and N. N. IAKOVENKO, editors. *Torhivlia na Ukraini XIV–seredyna XVII stolittia: Volyn i Naddniproshchyna* nds. (Akademiiia Nauk Urainskoi RSR, Arkheografychna Komisiiia.) Kiev: Naukova Dumka; distributed by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, and Ukrainian Academic Press, Englewood, Colo. 1990. Pp. 404. \$11.95.

STOLYPIN, PETR ARKAD'EVICH. *Nam nuzhna velikaia Rossiia . . . : Polnoe sobranie rechei v gosudarstvennoi dume i gosudarstvennom sovete 1906–1911* ["We Need a Great Russia . . .": The Complete Speeches in the State Duma and the State Council, 1906–1911]. Edited by Iu. G. FEL'SHTINSKII. (Zvonitsa, antologiiia russkoi publitsistiki.) Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia. 1991. Pp. 410. 6 r.

WADE, REX A., editor. *Documents of Soviet History*. Volume 1, *The Triumph of Bolshevism, 1917–1919*. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International. 1991. Pp. xvii, 447. \$75.00.

NEAR EAST

BENGIO, OFRA. *Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents*. Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, the Shiloah Institute, Tel Aviv University; distributed by Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N.Y. 1992. Pp. 212. \$14.95.

UNITED STATES

ALPER, BENEDICT S. *Love and Politics in Wartime: Letters to My Wife, 1943–45*. Edited by JOAN WALLACH SCOTT. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1992. Pp. xxii, 220. \$26.50.

BAGNALL, JOSEPH A., editor. *President John Fitzgerald Kennedy's Grand and Global Alliance: World Order for the New Century*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1992. Pp. xvi, 101. Cloth \$37.50, paper \$16.50.

BICKFORD, CHARLENE BANGS, *et al.*, editors. *Debates in the House of Representatives*. Volume 10, *First Session: April–May 1789*. (Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America, 4 March 1789–3 March 1791.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1992. Pp. lxiv, 794. \$49.95.

BICKFORD, CHARLENE BANGS, *et al.*, editors. *Debates in the House of Representatives*. Volume 11, *First Session: June–September 1789*. (Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America, 4 March 1789–3 March 1791.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 795–1548. \$49.95.

BLAUSTEIN, ALBERT P., and ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, editors. *Civil Rights and African Americans: A Documentary History*. Paperback edition. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 1991. Pp. xxii, 671. \$19.95.

BORUS, DANIEL H., editor. *These United States: Portraits of America from the 1920s*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1992. Pp. xii, 418. \$25.00.

- BRUMLEVE, BARBARA, editor. *The Letters of Mother Caroline Friess: School Sisters of Notre Dame*. Winona, Minn.: St. Mary's Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 542. \$8.00.
- CANTOLON, PHILIP L., et al., editors. *The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present*. 2d ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1984. Pp. xviii, 369. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$16.95.
- DAVIS, MARILYN P. *Mexican Voices, American Dreams: An Oral History of Mexican Immigration to the United States*. Paperback edition. New York: Henry Holt. 1991. Pp. xiv, 448. \$14.95.
- DEPARTMENT OF STATE. *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1990*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1991. Pp. liii, 890.
- DEPARTMENT OF STATE. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*. Volume 1, *Vietnam, 1964*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1992. Pp. xxviii, 1108. \$39.00.
- DEPARTMENT OF STATE. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*. Volume 5, *American Republics, Microfiche Supplement*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1991. 28 microfiche. \$6.50.
- DEPARTMENT OF STATE. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*. Volume 7, *Near East Region; Iran; Iraq*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1991. Pp. xxxv, 1097. \$39.00.
- DEPARTMENT OF STATE. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*. Volume 8, *Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1992. Pp. xxx, 928. \$35.00.
- HANSEN, JENNIFER MOULTON, editor. *Letters of Catharine Cottam Romney, Plural Wife*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1992. Pp. xvii, 317. \$32.50.
- KRUZEL, JOSEPH, editor. *American Defense Annual, 1991-1992*. (Mershon Center, Ohio State University.) New York: Lexington. 1992. Pp. xix, 305. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$19.95.
- MACDONALD, JOHN. *Great Battles of the Civil War*. Foreword by JOHN KEEGAN. (A Marshall Edition.) New York: Collier. 1992. Pp. 200. \$22.95.
- MARCUS, ERIC. *Making History: The Struggle for Gay and Lesbian Equal Rights, 1945-1990; An Oral History*. New York: HarperCollins. 1992. Pp. xii, 532. \$25.00.
- MATSON, MOLLY, editor. *An Independent Woman: The Autobiography of Edith Guerrier*. Foreword by POLLY WELTS KAUFMAN. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 1992. Pp. xxxix, 154. \$27.50.
- MCINTIRE, JIM. *Early Days in Texas: A Trip to Hell and Heaven*. Edited and Foreword by ROBERT K. DEARMONT. Reprint. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. 184. \$22.95.
- MILES, NELSON A. *Personal Recollections and Observations of General Nelson A. Miles, Embracing a Brief View of the Civil War: Or, from New England to the Golden Gate and the Story of His Indian Campaigns with Comments on the Exploration, Development, and Progress of Our Great Western Empire*. In two volumes. Assisted by FREDERIC REMINGTON. Foreword by ROBERT WOOSTER. (A Bison Book.) Reprint. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1992. Pp. 319; xxi, 591. \$23.90 the set.
- NELSEN, JANE TAYLOR, editor. *A Prairie Populist: The Memoirs of Luna Kellie*. Foreword by ALBERT E. STONE. (Singular Lives: The Iowa Series in North American Autobiography.) Iowa City: University of Iowa Press. 1992. Pp. xix, 188. Cloth \$22.95, paper \$9.95.
- NUNIS, DOYCE B., JR., editor. *The Bidwell-Bartleson Party: 1841 California Emigrant Adventure; The Documents and Memoirs of the Overland Pioneers*. Santa Cruz, Calif.: Western Tanager. 1991. Pp. x, 294. \$29.95.
- PURCELL, L. EDWARD, and DAVID F. BURG. *The World Almanac of the American Revolution*. Foreword by JOHN A. GARRATY. New York: World Almanac. 1992. Pp. xiii, 386. Cloth \$35.00, paper \$18.95.
- SHAPIRO, HERBERT, and DAVID L. STERLING, editors. *"I Belong to the Working Class": The Unfinished Autobiography of Rose Pastor Stokes*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1992. Pp. xlv, 173. \$30.00.
- SHRADER, CHARLES REGINALD, editor. *Reference Guide to United States Military History, 1607-1815*. New York: Facts on File. 1991. Pp. x, 277.
- SOLOMON, OLIVIA, and JACK SOLOMON. *"Honey in the Rock": The Ruby Pickens Tartt Collection of Religious Folk Songs from Sumter County, Alabama*. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press. 1991. Pp. xxxvi, 176. \$34.95.
- SYMONDS, CRAIG L. *Gettysburg: A Battlefield Atlas*. Assisted by WILLIAM J. CLIPSON. Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation. 1992. Pp. 103. \$19.95.
- WALL, JOSEPH FRAZIER, editor. *The Andrew Carnegie Reader*. (Pittsburgh Series in Social and Labor History.) Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 325. Cloth \$44.95, paper \$19.95.
- YOUNG, DAVID E., editor. *The Origin of the Second Amendment: A Documentary History in Commentaries on Liberty, Free Government, and an Armed Populace during the Formation of the Bill of Rights*. Ontonagon, Mich.: Golden Oak. 1991. Pp. liii, 822. \$50.00.

LATIN AMERICA

- GAERTNER, LOTHAR, editor and translator. *La Conquista de México: Die Entdeckung und Eroberung in zeitgenössischen Berichten*. (DTV zweisprachig; Edition Langewiesche-Brandt.) Munich: Deutsches Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 131. DM 12.80.
- LAS CASAS, BARTOLOMÉ DE. *In Defense of the Indians: The Defense of the Most Reverend Lord, Don Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, of the Order of Preachers, Late Bishop of Chiapa, against the Persecutors and Slanders of the Peoples of the New World Discovered across the Seas*. Translated and edited by STAFFORD POOLE, C.M. Foreword by MARTIN E. MARTY. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 1992. Pp. xxvi, 385. \$18.00.
- LEON-PORTILLA, MIGUEL, editor. *The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico*. Foreword by J. JORGE KLOR DE ALVA. Translated by ANGEL MARIA GARIBAY K. and LYSANDER KEMP. Assisted by ALBERTO BELTRAN. Rev. ed. Boston: Beacon. 1992. Pp. xlix, 196. \$13.00.
- PARISH, HELEN RAND, editor. *Bartolomé de Las Casas: The Only Way*. Translated by FRANCIS PATRICK SULLIVAN, S.J. (Sources of American Spirituality.) New York: Paulist Press. 1992. Pp. vi, 282. \$22.95.
- PRICE, RICHARD, and SALLY PRICE, editors. *Stedman's Surinam: Life in an Eighteenth-Century Slave Society; An Abridged, Modernized Edition of Narrative of a Five Years Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam by John Gabriel Stedman*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1992. Pp. lxxv, 350. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$19.95.

Other Books Received

The following books were recently received in the AHR office. Books listed here do not include works scheduled for review.

GENERAL

- ACHINSTEIN, PETER. *Particles and Waves: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Science*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. 337. \$24.95.
- ALEXANDER, ROBERT J. *International Trotskyism, 1929–1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 1125. \$165.00.
- BLACK, CYRIL E., et al. *Rebirth: A History of Europe since World War II*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1992. Pp. xv, 565. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$24.95.
- BLACK, EDWIN. *Rhetorical Questions: Studies of Public Discourse*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1992. Pp. 209. \$24.95.
- BOHLANDER, RICHARD E., editor. *World Explorers and Discoverers*. New York: Macmillan. 1992. Pp. xi, 531. \$85.00.
- BOLZ, NORBERT. *Chaos und Simulation*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink. 1992. Pp. 142. DM 28.
- BONNEY, RICHARD. *The European Dynastic States, 1494–1660*. (The Short Oxford History of the Modern World.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xxxiv, 658. \$80.00.
- BIGGS, ASA, editor. *A Dictionary of Twentieth Century World Biography*. Rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. vi, 615. \$30.00.
- BROCK, PETER. *Studies in Peace History*. York, England: William Sessions; distributed by Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N.Y. 1991. Pp. vi, 103. \$14.95.
- CHRISTENSEN, STEPHEN TURK, editor. *Violence and the Absolutist State: Studies in European and Ottoman History*. (Center for Research in the Humanities, Copenhagen University.) Copenhagen: Akademisk. 1990. Pp. 138. 105 KR.
- CIMBALA, STEPHEN J. *Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy*. Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass. 1991. Pp. 218.
- COHEN, MICHAEL J. *Bar-Ilan Studies in History*. Volume 3, *Modern History*. (Bar-Ilan Departmental Researches, Department of General History.) Ramat-Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University Press. 1991. Pp. 166.
- CRONE, PATRICIA. *Die vorindustrielle Gesellschaft: Eine Strukturanalyse*. Translated from English by MARIANNE MENZEL. Munich: Deutsches Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 226. DM 22.80.
- DE VORSEY, LOUIS, JR. *Keys to the Encounter: A Library of Congress Resource Guide for the Study of the Age of Discovery*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. 1992. Pp. xvii, 212. \$18.00.
- FELDMAN, REYNOLD, and CYNTHIA VOELKE, editors. *A World Treasury of Folk Wisdom*. New York: HarperSanFrancisco. 1992. Pp. xix, 164. \$16.00.
- FLEXNER, STUART. *The Pessimist's Guide to History*. Assisted by DORIS FLEXNER. New York: Avon. 1992. Pp. x, 387. \$12.00.
- FRIES, SYLVIA DOUGHTY. *NASA Engineers and the Age of Apollo*. (NASA SP, number 4104; The NASA History Series.) Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration Scientific and Technical Information Program. 1992. Pp. xx, 216.
- GOLDEN, STEPHANIE. *The Women Outside: Meanings and Myths of Homelessness*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1992. Pp. x, 319. \$25.00.
- HOYT, EDWIN P. *War in the Pacific*. Volume 5, *Aleutians*. New York: Avon. 1992. Pp. 186. \$4.99.
- INIKORI, JOSEPH E., and STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, editors. *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1992. Pp. vi, 412. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$17.95.
- JOHNSON, PAUL. *The Birth of the Modern: World Society 1815–1830*. Paperback edition. New York: HarperCollins. 1991. Pp. xx, 1095. \$16.00.
- JOLL, JAMES. *The Origins of the First World War*. (Origins of Modern Wars.) 2d ed. New York: Longman. 1992. Pp. xii, 264.
- KEALEY, GREGORY S., and GREG PATMORE, editors. *Canadian and Australian Labour History: Towards a Comparative Perspective*. Sydney: Australian Society for the Study of Labour History and Committee on Canadian Labour History, St. John's, Newfoundland, in association with Australian-Canadian Studies. 1990. Pp. 140. \$A12.50.
- KEMP, MARTIN. *The Science of Art: Optical Themes in Western Art from Brunelleschi to Seurat*. Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1992. Pp. viii, 375; 570 plates. \$35.00.
- KEYLOR, WILLIAM R. *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xii, 542. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$16.95.
- KORNAI, JÁNOS. *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1992. Pp. xxviii, 644. Cloth \$49.50, paper \$14.95.
- LAMBORN, ALAN C. *The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France, and Germany*. (Studies in International Conflict, number 4.) Boston: Unwin Hyman. 1991. Pp. xvi, 373. \$55.00.
- LAPLANCHE, JEAN, and J.-B. PONTALIS. *Urphantasie: Phantasien über den Ursprung, Ursprünge der Phantasie*. Translated from French by MAX LOOSER. (Fischer Wissenschaft.) Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 73. DM 14.80.
- LYDD, S. A. *Ideals as Interests in Hobbes's Leviathan: The Power of Mind over Matter*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 396. \$54.95.
- LOUDA, JIRÍ. *Lines of Succession: Heraldry of the Royal Families of Europe*. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan. 1992. Pp. 308. \$75.00.

- MACNEISH, RICHARD S. *The Origins of Agriculture and Settled Life*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. xix, 433. \$75.00.
- MARTIN, CALVIN LUTHER. *In the Spirit of the Earth: Rethinking History and Time*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1992. Pp. x, 157. \$19.95.
- MERRIMAN, NICK. *Beyond the Glass Case: The Past, the Heritage and the Public in Britain*. (Leicester Museum Studies Series.) New York: Leicester University Press; distributed by Columbia University Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 188.
- MILLER, TIMOTHY, editor. *When Prophets Die: The Postcharismatic Fate of New Religious Movements*. Foreword by J. GORDON MELTON. (SUNY Series in Religious Studies.) Albany: State University of New York Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 241.
- PONTALIS, J.-B. *Die Macht der Anziehung: Psychoanalyse des Traums, der Übertragung und der Wörter*. Translated from French by HANS-DIETER GONDEK. (Fischer Wissenschaft.) Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 92. DM 14.80.
- RAPHAEL, CHAIM. *The Sephardi Story: A Celebration of Jewish History*. Foreword by MOSHE MANI. London: Vallentine Mitchell. 1991. Pp. xiv, 294.
- REINHARZ, SHULAMIT. *Feminist Methods in Social Research*. Assisted by LYNN DAVIDMAN. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. viii, 413. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$19.95.
- REINTJES, J. FRANCIS. *Numerical Control: Making a New Technology*. (Oxford Series on Advanced Manufacturing, number 9.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 223. \$39.95.
- ROTHER, RAINER, editor. *Bilder schreiben Geschichte: Der Historiker im Kino*. Berlin: Klaus Wagenbach. 1991. Pp. 157. DM 17.80.
- SCHECTER, JERROLD L., and PETER S. DERIABIN. *The Spy Who Saved the World: How A Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1992. Pp. xvi, 488. \$25.00.
- SCHWAB, HENRY. *The Echoes That Remain*. Weston, Mass.: Cardinal Spellman Philatelic Museum. 1992. Pp. 185.
- SHERMAN, CLAIRE RICHTER, compiler. *Sponsored Research in the History of Art: Advanced Research Projects in the History of Art, Archeology, and Related Fields Supported by Public and Private Institutions in the United States and Abroad*. Volume 10, 1990-1991. Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, Center for Advanced Study in the Visual Arts. 1991. Pp. xix, 443. \$25.00.
- SHERMAN, CLAIRE RICHTER, compiler. *Sponsored Research in the History of Art: Advanced Research Projects in the History of Art, Archeology, and Related Fields Supported by Public and Private Institutions in the United States and Abroad*. Volume 11, 1991-1992. Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, Center for Advanced Study in the Visual Arts. 1992. Pp. xx, 450. \$25.00.
- SMITH, DENNIS. *The Rise of Historical Sociology*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1991. Pp. x, 231. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$18.95.
- SPANGLER, STANLEY E. *Force and Accommodation in World Politics*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press. 1991. Pp. xxi, 359.
- STRÅTH, BO, et al., editors. *Language and the Construction of Class Identities: The Struggle for Discursive Power in Social Organisation; Scandinavia and Germany after 1800*. (Report from the DISCO II Conference on Continuity and Discontinuity in the Scandinavian Democratisation Process in Kungälv, 1989; ConDis Project, number 3.) Gothenburg: Department of History, Gothenburg University. 1990. Pp. vii, 564.
- THOMPSON, KENNETH W. *Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. (Political Traditions in Foreign Policy Series.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1992. Pp. xii, 353. Cloth \$37.50, paper \$12.95.
- VASEY, DANIEL E. *An Ecological History of Agriculture: 10,000 B.C.-A.D. 10,000*. Ames: Iowa State University Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 363. \$34.95.
- WALKER, WILLIAM O., III, editor. *Drug Control Policy: Essays in Historical and Comparative Perspective*. (Issues in Policy History, number 1.) Paperback edition. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1992. Pp. viii, 176. \$13.95.
- WEBER, EUGEN, editor. *Movements, Currents, Trends: Aspects of European Thought in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. (Sources in European History.) Rev. ed. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1992. Pp. xii, 619.
- WIGHT, MARTIN. *International Theory: The Three Traditions*. Edited by GABRIELE WIGHT and BRIAN PORTER. Foreword by HEDLEY BULL. New York: Holmes and Meier, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. 1992. Pp. xxvii, 286. \$39.95.
- WILSON, ELIZABETH. *The Sphinx in the City: Urban Life, the Control of Disorder, and Women*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. 191. Cloth \$35.00, paper \$14.00.
- WINSEY, VALENTINE ROSSILLI. *Your Self as History: Family History and Its Effects on Your Personality: A Research Guide*. New York: Pace University Press. 1992. Pp. xv, 97. Cloth \$36.00, paper \$13.00.

ANCIENT

- AUDOUZE, FRANÇOISE, and OLIVIER BÜCHSENSCHÜTZ. *Towns, Villages and Countryside of Celtic Europe: From the Beginning of the Second Millennium to the End of the First Century B.C.* Translated by HENRY CLEERE. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1992. Pp. 256. \$49.95.
- BAILKEY, NELS M., editor. *Readings in Ancient History: Thought and Experience from Gilgamesh to St. Augustine*. 4th ed. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath. 1992. Pp. xi, 507.
- CASTLEDEN, RODNEY. *Neolithic Britain: New Stone Age Sites of England, Scotland and Wales*. New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall. 1992. Pp. xiv, 432. \$57.50.
- CLARKE, JOHN R. *The Houses of Roman Italy, 100 B.C.-A.D. 250: Ritual, Space, and Decoration*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xxvii, 411; 24 plates. \$65.00.
- DAWSON, DAVID. *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 341. \$45.00.
- DELORME, JEAN. *La Grèce primitive et archaïque*. (Histoire Ancienne.) 3d ed. Paris: Armand Colin. 1992. Pp. 320. 110 fr.
- GONZÁLEZ BLANCO, ANTONINO, et al., editors. *Arte, sociedad, economía y religión durante el bajo imperio y la Antigüedad Tardía*. (Antigüedad y Cristianismo: Monografías históricas sobre la Antigüedad Tardía, number 8.) Murcia, Spain: Universidad de Murcia, Area de Historia Antigua. 1991. Pp. 582. \$50.00.
- JENKINS, RICHARD, editor. *The Legacy of Rome: A New Appraisal*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 479. \$30.00.

MEDIEVAL

- CARR, A. D. Owen of Wales: *The End of the House of Gwynedd*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. 1991. Pp. 140. \$25.00.
- BLAIR, CLAUDE, et al. *Studies in European Arms and Armor: The C. Otto Von Kienbusch Collection in the Philadelphia Museum of Art*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, for the Philadelphia Museum of Art. 1992. Pp. 207. \$49.95.
- BRUNNER, OTTO. *Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria*. Translated by HOWARD KAMINSKY and JAMES VAN HORN MELTON. (Middle Ages Series.) Phila-

- delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1992. Pp. lxiv, 425. \$46.95.
- MANCHESTER, WILLIAM. *A World Lit Only by Fire: The Medieval Mind and the Renaissance; Portrait of an Age*. Boston: Little, Brown. 1992. Pp. xvii, 318. \$24.95.
- MAYR-HARTING, HENRY. *Ottoman Book Illumination: An Historical Study*. Part 2, *Books*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. 299. \$85.00.
- RICHARD, JEAN. *Saint Louis: Crusader King of France*. Translated by JEAN BIRRELL. Edited by SIMON LLOYD. New York: Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris. 1992. Pp. xxix, 354. \$59.95.
- RICHARDS, EARL JEFFREY. *Reinterpreting Christine de Pizan*. Assisted by JOAN WILLIAMSON et al. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1992. Pp. x, 310. \$40.00.

BRITAIN AND IRELAND

- BARRELL, JOHN. *The Birth of Pandora and the Division of Knowledge*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1992. Pp. xvii, 263. \$38.95.
- BIELIENBERG, ANDY. *Cork's Industrial Revolution, 1780-1880: Development or Decline?* Cork: Cork University Press. 1991. Pp. vii, 171. Cloth IR£19.95, paper IR£9.95.
- BURK, KATHLEEN, and ALEC CAIRNCROSS. "Goodbye Great Britain": *The 1976 IMF Crisis*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1992. Pp. xix, 268. \$30.00.
- DEMOLLEN, RICHARD L. *Richard Mulcaster (c. 1531-1611) and Educational Reform in the Renaissance*. (Biblioteca Humanistica and Reformatoria, number 49.) Nieuwkoop: De Graaf. 1991. Pp. xxix, 222. f. 80.00.
- HARDIN, RICHARD F. *Civil Idolatry: Desacralizing and Monarchy in Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton*. Newark: University of Delaware Press. 1992. Pp. 267. \$39.50.
- HENRICKS, THOMAS S. *Disputed Pleasures: Sport and Society in Preindustrial England*. (Contributions to the Study of World History, number 28.) New York: Greenwood. 1991. Pp. vi, 194. \$45.00.
- HOLLISTER, C. WARREN. *The Making of England, 55 B.C. to 1399*. (A History of England.) 6th ed. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath. 1992. Pp. xiv, 342.
- JANSEN, SHARON J. *Political Protest and Prophecy under Henry VIII*. Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell. 1991. Pp. x, 182. \$50.00.
- LAYBOURN, KEITH. *The Rise of Labour: The British Labour Party 1890-1979*. (Reading History.) London: Edward Arnold; distributed by Routledge. New York. 1988. Pp. viii, 182. \$34.95.
- MARWICK, ARTHUR. *Culture in Britain since 1945*. (Making Contemporary Britain.) Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, for the Institute of Contemporary British History, London. 1991. Pp. xii, 206.
- MEYERS, JEFFREY. *D. H. Lawrence: A Biography*. Paperback edition. New York: Random House. 1992. Pp. 445. \$14.00.
- PALLISER, D. M. *The Age of Elizabeth: England under the Later Tudors, 1547-1603*. (Social and Economic History of England.) 2d ed. New York: Longman. 1992. Pp. xxv, 516.
- RICH, P. J. *Chains of Empire: English Public Schools, Masonic Cabalism, Historical Causality, and Imperial Clubdom*. New York: Regency. 1991. Pp. 266. £9.95.
- WEST, JENNY. *Gunpowder, Government and War in the Mid-Eighteenth Century*. (Royal Historical Society Studies in History, number 63.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell. 1991. Pp. xii, 242. \$70.00.
- WHITEHAND, J. W. R. *The Making of the Urban Landscape*. (The Institute of British Geographers Special Publications Series, number 26.) Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell. 1992. Pp. x, 239.

FRANCE

- AKKERMAN, TJITSKE. *Women's Vices, Public Benefits: Women and Commerce in the French Enlightenment*. Amsterdam: Spin-huis. 1992. Pp. 145.
- ALDRICH, ROBERT, and JOHN CONNELL. *France's Overseas Frontier: Départements et territoires d'outre-mer*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1992. Pp. x, 357. \$69.95.
- BLACKBURN, JULIA. *The Emperor's Last Island: A Journey to St. Helena*. New York: Pantheon. 1992. Pp. 277. \$22.00.
- BLED, JEAN-PAUL. *Les lys en exil ou la seconde mort de l'Ancien Régime*. Paris: Fayard. 1992. Pp. 346. 130 fr.
- CHARTIER, ROGER. *Die unvollendete Vergangenheit: Geschichte und die Macht der Weltauslegung*. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 190. DM 18.80.
- DE LASQUIER, BERNARD. *La Fayette usurpateur du vaisseau "La Victoire"*. Surgères, France: The Author. 1992. Pp. 285.
- LEGENDRE, PIERRE. *Trésor historique de l'état en France: L'Administration classique*. Rev. ed. Paris: Fayard. 1992. Pp. 632. 290 fr.
- LOTH, WILFRIED. *Geschichte Frankreichs im 20. Jahrhundert*. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 297. DM 19.80.
- NETTEBECK, COLIN W. *Forever French: Exile in the United States, 1939-1945*. (French Studies.) New York: Berg; distributed by St. Martin's. 1992. Pp. vii, 204. \$49.50.
- SCHOBEL, MARTIN. *Archiv und Besitz der Abtei St. Viktor in Paris*. (Pariser Historische Studien, number 31.) Bonn: Bouvier, for the Deutschen Historischen Institut, Paris. 1991. Pp. 302.
- TODD, EMMANUEL. *The Making of Modern France: Politics, Ideology, and Culture*. Translated by ANTHONY FORSTER and BETTY FORSTER. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell. 1991. Pp. viii, 224. Cloth \$58.95, paper \$17.95.
- WEBER, EUGEN. *My France: Politics, Culture, Myth*. Paperback edition. New York: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. 412. Cloth \$22.50, paper \$14.95.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

- FELIU, GASPÀR. *Precios y salarios en la Cataluña moderna*. Volume 1, *Alimentos*; volume 2, *Combustibles, productos manufacturados y salarios*. (Estudios de Historia Económica, numbers 21 and 22.) Madrid: Banco de España. 1991. Pp. 165; 150.
- FLEMING, SHANNON E. *Primo de Rivera and Abd-el-Krim: The Struggle in Spanish Morocco, 1923-1927*. (Modern European History, Spain and Portugal.) New York: Garland. 1991. Pp. xix, 437. \$53.00.
- GILMOUR, DAVID. *Cities of Spain*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 1992. Pp. 214. \$22.50.
- POLO SANCHEZ, JULIO J. *Arte barroco en Cantabria: Retablos e imaginaria (1660-1790)*. (Biblioteca básica.) Santander, Spain: Universidad de Cantabria. 1991. Pp. 318.

NORTHERN EUROPE

- MARKKANEN, ERKKI, et al., editors. *Pysy lujana omalla maalla! Erkki Lehtiselle omistettu juhlakirja* [Stand Fast by Your Own Land! Festschrift Dedicated to Erkki Lehtinen]. (Studia Historica Jyväskylänensia, number 40.) Helsinki, Finland: Gummerus Kirjapaino. 1989. Pp. 354.
- ROSEN, WILHELM VON, editor. *Rigsarkivet og hjælpemidlerne til dens benyttelse*. Volume 2, 1848-1990. Parts 1-4 [The Archives of Public Records and Helping Aids for Its Use]. Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads or Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. 1991. Pp. 494; 495-1066; 1067-1548; 1549-2082. 488 KR.

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND

- ARNDT, JOHANNES. *Das niederrheinisch-westfälische Reichsgrafenkollegium und seine Mitglieder (1653-1806)*. (Veröf-

- fentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Abteilung Universalgeschichte, number 133; Beiträge zur Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte des Alten Reiches, number 9.) Mainz: Philipp von Zabern. 1991. Pp. xii, 430. DM 98.
- BELLON, BERNARD P. *Mercedes in Peace and War: German Automobile Workers, 1903–1945*. Paperback edition. New York: Columbia University Press. 1990. Pp. xv, 356. \$16.50.
- BRAUN, UDO. *Paul Strecker (1898–1950): Leben und Werk*. Giessen, F.R.G.: The Author. 1989. Pp. ix, 253.
- CHILDS, DAVID. *Germany in the Twentieth Century*. (Icon Editions.) 3d ed., rev. New York: HarperCollins. 1991. Pp. v, 331. \$30.00.
- GROSSER, ALFRED. *Mit Deutschen streiten: Aufforderungen zur Wachsamkeit*. Paperback edition. Munich: Deutsches Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 312. DM 16.80.
- HARTUNG, SVEN, and STEFAN KADELBACH, editors. *Bürger, Recht, Staat: Handbuch des öffentlichen Lebens in Deutschland*. Foreword by MICHAEL STOLLEIS. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 327. DM 16.80.
- KAES, ANTON. *From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film*. Paperback edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. xiii, 273. Cloth \$25.00, paper \$12.95.
- KELSEN, HANS. *Staat und Naturrecht: Aufsätze zur Ideologiekritik*. Foreword by ERNST TOPITSCH. 2d ed. Munich: Wilhelm Fink. 1989. Pp. 367. DM 48.
- KOSLOWSKI, PETER. *Der Mythos der Moderne: Die dichterische Philosophie Ernst Jüngers*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink. 1991. Pp. 200. DM 28.
- LINDNER, STEPHAN H. *Das Reichskommissariat für die Behandlung feindlichen Vermögens im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Eine Studie zur Verwaltungs-, Rechts- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands*. (Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, Beiheft, number 67.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 1991. Pp. 178. DM 58.
- SCHUBERT, HELGA. *Judasfrauen: Zehn Fallgeschichten weiblicher Denunziation im Dritten Reich*. Paperback edition. Munich: Deutsches Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 153. DM 9.80.
- SCHWAAB, EDLEFF H. *Hitler's Mind: A Plunge into Madness*. Foreword by PETER H. WOLFF. New York: Praeger. 1992. Pp. xxxvii, 202. \$45.00.
- WILLIAMSON, GORDON. *Infantry Aces of the Reich*. London: Arms and Armour. 1991. Pp. 154. \$19.95.
- ITALY
- BARTLETT, KENNETH R., editor. *The Civilization of the Italian Renaissance: A Sourcebook*. (Sources in Modern History.) Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath. 1992. Pp. xiii, 441.
- BUGIANTELLA, NADIA. *Il movimento socialista umbro tra età giolittiana e primo dopoguerra: La Battaglia*. Foreword by ROMANO UGOLINI. (Studi e ricerche dell'Istituto di Storia della Facoltà di Magistero dell'Università di Perugia, number 7.) Naples: Scientifiche Italiane. 1991. Pp. 132. L. 19,000.
- COPPA, FRANK J. *The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence*. (Origins of Modern Wars.) New York: Longman. 1992. Pp. ix, 188.
- LIEUTAUD, JACQUELINE. *La Pouille: Un exemple de programmation industrielle dans le Mezzogiorno italien*. (Collection de l'école française de Rome, number 144.) Rome: École française de Rome. 1991. Pp. 616.
- PATRUCCO, ARMAND. *The Critics of the Italian Parliamentary System, 1860–1915*. (Modern European History, Italy.) New York: Garland. 1992. Pp. xi, 318. \$75.00.
- SCOTT, JOHN BELDON. *Images of Nepotism: The Painted Ceilings of Palazzo Barberini*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1992. Pp. xiii, 243; 174 plates. \$75.00.
- SMITH, DENIS MACK. *Italy and Its Monarchy*. Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 402. Cloth \$40.00, paper \$20.00.
- WAQUET, JEAN-CLAUDE. *Corruption: Ethics and Power in Florence, 1600–1770*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 1992. Pp. vi, 227. \$35.00.
- EASTERN EUROPE
- BARTOSZEWSKI, WLADYSŁAW, and ANTONY POLONSKY, editors. *The Jews in Warsaw: A History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, in association with the Institute for Polish-Jewish Studies, Oxford. 1991. Pp. viii, 392. \$44.95.
- BUTNARU, I. C. *The Silent Holocaust: Romania and Its Jews*. Foreword by ELIE WIESEL. (Contributions to the Study of World History, number 31.) New York: Greenwood. 1992. Pp. xxv, 236. \$55.00.
- DILLON, KENNETH J. *King and Estates in the Bohemian Lands 1526–1564*. (International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions/La Commission Internationale pour l'Histoire des Assemblées d'États, number 57.) Brussels: Librairie Encyclopédique. 1976. Pp. xi, 206.
- DJILAS, MILOVAN. *Jahre der Macht: Im jugoslawischen Kräftespiel; Memoiren 1945–1966*. Foreword by WOLFGANG LEONHARD. Translated from Serbo-Croatian by BRANKO PEJAKOVIĆ. Paperback edition. Munich: Deutsches Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 471. DM 19.80.
- KARPAT, K. H., editor. *The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority*. Istanbul: Isis; distributed by University of Wisconsin Press, Madison. 1990. Pp. 257. \$15.00.
- KITROMILIDES, PASCHALIS M. *The Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century*. (Princeton Modern Greek Studies.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 203. \$39.50.
- COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
- BOFFA, GIUSEPPE. *The Stalin Phenomenon*. Translated by NICHOLAS FERSEN. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, with the cooperation of the Williams College Center for the Humanities and the Social Sciences. 1992. Pp. xii, 205. Cloth \$32.95, paper \$11.95.
- FARNSWORTH, BEATRICE, and LYNNE VIOLA, editors. *Russian Peasant Women*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. 304. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$14.95.
- NICOLAI, GIORGIO MARIA. *Russia bifronte: Da Pietro I a Caterina II attraverso la Corruzione dei costumi in Russia di Ščerbatov e il Viaggio da Pietroburgo a Mosca di Radščev*. (Biblioteca di cultura, number 417.) Rome: Bulzoni. 1990. Pp. 751. L. 45,000.
- REISINGER, WILLIAM M. *Energy and the Soviet Bloc: Alliance Politics after Stalin*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1992. Pp. xiii, 184. \$34.50.
- WEICHARDT, REINER, editor. *The Soviet Economy under Gorbachev/L'économie soviétique sous la conduite de M. Gorbatchev*. (Colloquium, 1991/Colloque, 1991.) Brussels: NATO. 1991. Pp. 263.
- NEAR EAST
- KORN, DAVID A. *Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967–1970*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1992. Pp. xii, 326. \$36.00.
- LAW, DAVID A. *From Samaria to Samarkand: The Ten Lost Tribes of Israel*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1992. Pp. 228. \$38.50.
- LOMBARD, MAURICE. *Blütezeit des Islam: Eine Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte 8.–11. Jahrhundert*. Translated from French by JÜRGEN JACOBI. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch. 1992. Pp. 261. DM 19.80.

- MUSLIH, MUHAMMAD, and AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON. *Political Tides in the Arab World*. (Headline Series, number 296.) Ithaca: Foreign Policy Association. 1991. Pp. 72. \$4.00.
- SAID, EDWARD W. *The Question of Palestine*. Paperback edition. New York: Vintage. 1992. Pp. xlv, 273. \$11.00.
- SILMAN-CHEONG, HELEN. *Wellesley Aron: Rebel With a Cause; A Memoir*. Forewords by SAMUEL W. LEWIS and LORD SIEFF OF BRIMPTON. Portland, Oreg.: Vallentine Mitchell. 1992. Pp. xviii, 206.

AFRICA

- BROADHEAD, SUSAN H. *Historical Dictionary of Angola*. (African Historical Dictionaries, number 52.) 2d ed. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow. 1992. Pp. xlv, 296. \$39.50.
- EL-KENZ, ALI. *Algerian Reflections on Arab Crises*. Translated by ROBERT W. STOOKEY. Foreword by CLEMENT HENRY MOORE. (Middle East Monograph Series, number 9.) Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas. 1991. Pp. xvii, 116. \$8.95.
- GAILEY, HARRY A., JR. *History of Africa*. Volume 2, *From 1800 to 1945*. 2d ed. Malabar, Fla.: Robert E. Krieger. 1989. Pp. xiii, 259. \$15.00.
- GAILEY, HARRY A., JR. *History of Africa*. Volume 3, *From 1945 to Present*. Malabar, Fla.: Robert E. Krieger. 1989. Pp. xii, 322. \$17.50.
- MALLABY, SEBASTIAN. *After Apartheid: The Future of South Africa*. New York: Times Books. 1992. Pp. xi, 275. \$22.00.
- MARTEL, ANDRE. *La Libye 1835-1990: Essai de géopolitique historique*. (Perspectives Internationales.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1991. Pp. 247. 158 fr.
- ROHERTY, JAMES M. *State Security in South Africa: Civil-Military Relations under P. W. Botha*. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. 1992. Pp. xii, 227.

ASIA

- BORTHWICK, MARK. *Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview or Allen and Unwin, Sydney, Australia. 1992. Pp. xv, 590. Cloth \$54.95, paper \$24.95.
- ELDRIDGE, CHARLES C. *Pacific Parallels: Artists and the Landscape in New Zealand*. Assisted by JIM BARR and MARY BARR. Washington, D.C.: New Zealand-United States Arts Foundation; distributed by University of Washington Press, Seattle. 1991. Pp. 175.
- FUCHIDA, MITSUO, and MASATAKE OKUMIYA. *Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan; The Japanese Navy's Story*. Edited by CLARKE H. KAWAKAMI and ROGER PINEAU. (Classics of Naval Literature.) Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1992. Pp. xxiii, 310. \$29.95.
- HANE, MIKISO. *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*. 2d ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1992. Pp. xiii, 473. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$19.95.
- HARRIES, MEIRION, and SUSIE HARRIES. *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army*. New York: Random House. 1992. Pp. xiii, 569. \$30.00.
- HERDAN, INNES. *The Pen and the Sword: Literature and Revolution in Modern China*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed. 1992. Pp. xx, 156. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$17.50.
- HOYT, EDWIN P. *Hirohito: The Emperor and the Man*. New York: Praeger. 1992. Pp. x, 214. \$24.95.
- LEUNG, EDWIN PAK-WAH, editor. *Historical Dictionary of Revolutionary China, 1839-1976*. New York: Greenwood. 1992. Pp. xv, 566. \$85.00.
- LITTLE, DANIEL. *Understanding Peasant China: Case Studies in the Philosophy of Social Science*. Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 322. Cloth \$35.00, paper \$18.00.

- PLUMMER, KATHERINE. *The Shogun's Reluctant Ambassadors: Japanese Sea Drifters in the North Pacific*. (North Pacific Studies, number 17.) 3d ed., rev. Portland: Oregon Historical Society. 1992. Pp. xviii, 287. \$19.95.
- PRADHAN, KUMAR. *The Gorkha Conquests: The Process and Consequences of the Unification of Nepal, with Particular Reference to Eastern Nepal*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xi, 282. \$28.00.
- ROSE, BARBARA. *Tsuda Umeko and Women's Education in Japan*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 208. \$25.00.
- SHAUGHNESSY, EDWARD L. *Sources of Western Zhou History: Inscribed Bronze Vessels*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1991. Pp. xix, 333. \$55.00.

UNITED STATES

- ADAMS, MICHAEL C. C. *Fighting for Defeat: Union Military Failure in the East, 1861-1865*. (A Bison Book.) Reprint. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1992. Pp. x, 256. \$9.95.
- ANDERSON, PHILIP J., and DAG BLANCK, editors. *Swedish-American Life in Chicago: Cultural and Urban Aspects of an Immigrant People, 1850-1930*. (The Ethnic History of Chicago.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1992. Pp. xii, 394. \$42.50.
- ANDERSON, TERRY L., editor. *Property Rights and Indian Economics*. (The Political Economy Forum.) Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 1992. Pp. 256. \$44.00.
- APPLEBY, JOYCE. *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. viii, 351. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$17.95.
- ARONOWITZ, STANLEY. *False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness*. Rev. ed. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1992. Pp. xlv, 470. Cloth \$34.95, paper \$14.95.
- ARRINGTON, LEONARD J., et al. *Building the City of God: Community and Cooperation among the Mormons*. 2d ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1992. Pp. xx, 497. \$16.50.
- ARRINGTON, LEONARD J., and DAVIS BITTON. *The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-day Saints*. 2d ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 414.
- BAILYN, BERNARD. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution: Enlarged Edition*. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 396. \$12.95.
- BARBER, JAMES DAVID. *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*. 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 1992. Pp. xv, 522.
- BARTSCH, WILLIAM H. *Doomed at the Start: American Pursuit Pilots in the Philippines, 1941-1942*. (Texas A&M University Military History Series, number 24.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1992. Pp. xxi, 503. \$24.50.
- BERGMAN, ANDREW. *We're in the Money: Depression America and Its Films*. Paperback edition. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 1992. Pp. xxiii, 200. \$9.95.
- BERNARD, THOMAS J. *The Cycle of Juvenile Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. vii, 195. \$35.00.
- BERRY, WENDELL. *Harlan Hubbard: Life and Work*. Paperback edition. New York: Pantheon. 1992. Pp. x, 108. \$16.00.
- BERTHRONG, DONALD J. *The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal: Reservation and Agency Life in the Indian Territory, 1875-1907*. (The Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 136.) Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. xxii, 402. \$15.95.
- BOURNE, RUSSELL. *Floating West: The Erie and Other American Canals*. New York: W. W. Norton. 1992. Pp. 232. \$24.95.
- BRAND, DANA. *The Spectator and the City in Nineteenth-Century American Literature*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. vii, 242. \$39.95.

- BUNDY, JAMES F. *Fall from Grace: Religion and the Communal Ideal in Two Suburban Villages, 1870-1917*. Foreword by MARTIN E. MARTY. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 2.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xv, 277. \$60.00.
- BUTLER, JONATHAN M. *Softly and Tenderly Jesus Is Calling: Heaven and Hell in American Revivalism, 1870-1920*. Foreword by JERALD C. BRAUER. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 3.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xx, 197. \$50.00.
- CONLEY, PATRICK T., and JOHN P. KAMINSKI, editors. *The Bill of Rights and the States: The Colonial and Revolutionary Origins of American Liberties*. Madison, Wis.: Madison House. 1992. Pp. xxii, 542. \$39.95.
- COOPER, PATRICIA A. *Once a Cigar Maker: Men, Women, and Work Culture in American Cigar Factories, 1900-1919*. (The Working Class in American History.) Paperback edition. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 350. \$15.95.
- COWDREY, ALBERT E. *The Medics' War*. (United States Army in the Korean War, number 4.) Washington, D.C.: United States Army. 1987. Pp. xvii, 391.
- COWDREY, ALBERT E. *War and Healing: Stanhope Bayne-Jones and the Maturing of American Medicine*. (Southern Biography Series.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1992. Pp. xviii, 230. \$35.00.
- CRONON, WILLIAM. *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*. Paperback edition. New York: W. W. Norton. 1992. Pp. xxv, 530. \$15.95.
- DAVIS, JAMES KIRKPATRICK. *Spying on America: The FBI's Domestic Counterintelligence Program*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 1992. Pp. x, 192. \$21.95.
- DEARMONT, ROBERT K. *George Scarborough: The Life and Death of a Lawman on the Closing Frontier*. Foreword by LEON C. METZ. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 322. \$24.95.
- DIETTER, GERALD A. *Grinnell's Glacier: George Bird Grinnell and Glacier National Park*. Foreword by JERRY DE SANTO. Missoula, Mont.: Mountain. 1992. Pp. xv, 128. \$10.00.
- DOEZEMA, MARIANNE. *George Bellows and Urban America*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1992. Pp. viii, 244; 112 plates. \$45.00.
- DORWART, JEFFERY M. *Cape May County, New Jersey: The Making of an American Resort Community*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 355. Cloth \$40.00, paper \$12.95.
- DOUGLAS, GEORGE H. *All Aboard! The Railroad in American Life*. New York: Paragon House. 1992. Pp. xviii, 462. \$22.95.
- DRYER, RAYMOND C. *December 7, 1941, Remembered: 50th Anniversary Commemorative Eye Witness Account*. Medina, Ohio: R and J. 1991. Pp. 95. \$15.95.
- DUBOFSKY, MELVIN, editor. *The New Deal: Conflicting Interpretations and Shifting Perspectives*. New York: Garland. 1992. Pp. xx, 352. \$18.95.
- DUNBAUGH, EDWIN L. *Night Boat to New England, 1815-1900*. (Contributions in Economics and Economic History, number 128.) New York: Greenwood, under the auspices of The Marine Museum at Fall River. 1992. Pp. 370. \$49.95.
- DVORAK, KATHARINE L. *An African-American Exodus: The Segregation of the Southern Churches*. Foreword by JERALD C. BRAUER. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 4.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xviii, 252. \$50.00.
- ECKERT, ALLAN W. *A Sorrow in Our Heart: The Life of Tecumseh*. New York: Bantam. 1992. Pp. xvii, 862. \$27.50.
- EGGER, BRUCE E., and LEE MACMILLAN OTTS. *G Company's War: Two Personal Accounts of the Campaigns in Europe, 1944-1945*. Edited by PAUL ROLEY. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1992. Pp. x, 293. \$29.95.
- ENGERMAN, STANLEY L., and ROBERT E. GALLMAN, editors. *Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth*. (Studies in Income and Wealth, number 51.) Paperback edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 884. \$29.95.
- FINCH, CHRISTOPHER. *Highways to Heaven: The AUTO Biography of America*. New York: HarperCollins. 1992. Pp. 416. \$25.00.
- FLANAGAN, JOHN F. *Vietnam above the Treetops: A Forward Air Controller Reports*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 1992. Pp. xiii, 313. \$24.95.
- FRASCA, RALPH. *The Rise and Fall of the Saturday Globe*. Cranbury, N.J.: Susquehanna University Press. 1992. Pp. 201. \$36.50.
- FREEMAN, JOSHUA, et al. *Who Built America? Working People and the Nation's Economy, Politics, Culture, and Society*. Volume 2, *From the Gilded Age to the Present*. (American Social History Project.) New York: Pantheon. 1992. Pp. xxviii, 723. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$20.00.
- GALLAGHER, GARY W., editor. *The First Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1992. Pp. x, 174. Cloth \$24.00, paper \$14.00.
- GARAY, RONALD. *Gordon McLendon: The Maverick of Radio*. (Contributions to the Study of Mass Media and Communications, number 32.) New York: Greenwood. 1992. Pp. xiv, 248. \$45.00.
- GARRY, PATRICK M. *Liberalism and American Identity*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1992. Pp. 224. \$32.00.
- GLEASON, PHILIP. *Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1992. Pp. xiii, 314. \$40.00.
- GOLDMAN, ROGER, and DAVID GALLEN. *Thurgood Marshall: Justice for All*. New York: Carroll and Graf. 1992. Pp. 509. \$24.95.
- GOLDSTEIN, DONALD M., and KATHERINE V. DILLION. *The Williwaw War: The Arkansas National Guard in the Aleutians in World War II*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. 1992. Pp. xiii, 416. \$25.00.
- GÖRISCH, STEPHAN W. *Information zwischen Werbung und Warnung: Die Rolle der Amerikaliteratur in der Auswanderung des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*. (Quellen und Forschungen zur hessischen Geschichte, number 84.) Darmstadt: Hessischen Historischen Kommission. 1991. Pp. 392.
- GRAHAM, HUGH DAVIS. *Civil Rights and the Presidency: Race and Gender in American Politics, 1960-1972*. Abridged edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. 282. \$35.00.
- GRIFFIN, ALAN, and NICK KARANOVICH, editors. *Overland with Mark Twain: James B. Pond's Photographs and Journal of the North American Lecture Tour of 1895*. (Quarry Farm.) Elmira, N.Y.: Center for Mark Twain Studies at Quarry Farm and Elmira College. 1992. Pp. xii, 94. \$29.00.
- HAFEN, LEROY R., and ANN W. HAFEN. *Handcarts to Zion: The Story of a Unique Western Migration, 1856-1860; With Contemporary Journals, Accounts, Reports; And Rosters of Members of the Ten Handcart Companies*. (A Bison Book.) Reprint. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1992. Pp. 328. \$12.95.
- HALL, PETER DOBKIN. *Inventing the Nonprofit Sector: And Other Essays on Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and Nonprofit Organizations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 349. \$36.95.
- HAMBY, ALONZO L. *Liberalism and Its Challengers: From F.D.R. to Bush*. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 431. Cloth \$38.00, paper \$16.95.
- HARDING, VINCENT. *A Certain Magnificence: Lyman Beecher and the Transformation of American Protestantism, 1775-1863*.

- Foreword by JERALD C. BRAUER. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 6.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xxix, 573. \$75.00.
- HARRISON, BARBARA, and DANIEL TERRIS. *A Twilight Struggle: The Life of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*. New York: Lothrop, Lee and Shepard. 1992. Pp. xii, 159. \$18.00.
- HARRISON, LOWELL H. *Kentucky's Road to Statehood*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1992. Pp. x, 204. \$23.00.
- HECKSHER, MORRISON, and LESLIE GREENE BOWMAN. *American Rococo, 1750-1775: Elegance in Ornament*. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art; distributed by Harry N. Abrams. 1992. Pp. xv, 288. \$60.00.
- HENDRICKSON, PAUL. *Looking for the Light: The Hidden Life and Art of Marion Post Wolcott*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1992. Pp. xxvii, 297. \$35.00.
- HILL, R. CARGILL, editor. *Lightning over Bougainville: The Yamamoto Mission Reconsidered*. (Smithsonian History of Aviation Series.) Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. 1991. Pp. xv, 220.
- HILLIS, BRYAN V. *Can Two Walk Together Unless They Be Agreed? American Religious Schisms in the 1970s*. Foreword by MARTIN E. MARTY. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 8.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xvii, 247. \$50.00.
- HOGAN, DAVID W., JR. *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II*. (Center of Military History.) Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1992. Pp. ix, 158. \$5.00.
- HOLDEN, HENRY M. *The Fabulous Ford Tri-Motors*. (Flying Classics Series.) Blue Ridge Summit, Pa.: Tab. 1992. Pp. xiv, 173. \$17.95.
- HOLTZBERG-CALL, MAGGIE. *The Lost World of the Craft Printer*. (Folklore and Society.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1992. Pp. xviii, 227. \$27.50.
- HORSMAN, REGINALD. *Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812*. Reprint. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. ix, 209. \$10.95.
- HORWITT, SANFORD D. *Let Them Call Me Rebel: Saul Alinsky, His Life and Legacy*. Paperback edition. New York: Vintage. 1992. Pp. xvi, 595. \$15.00.
- HUTTON, PAUL ANDREW, editor. *The Custer Reader*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 585. \$40.00.
- JACKSON, KENNETH T. *The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915-1930*. Paperback edition. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 1992. Pp. xv, 326. \$13.95.
- JEAN, CLINTON M. *Behind the Eurocentric Veils: The Search for African Realities*. Foreword by JAMES JENNINGS. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 1991. Pp. xxi, 113. \$19.95.
- JEFFREYS-JONES, RHODRI, and ANDREW LOWNIE, editors. *North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays*. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1991. Pp. ix, 256. \$40.00.
- JOHNSON, KENT L. *War, Depression, Prohibition, and Racism: The Response of the Sunday School to an Era of Crisis, 1933-1941*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1992. Pp. 271. \$38.50.
- JOHNSON, ROBERT ERWIN. *Bering Sea Escort: Life Aboard a Coast Guard Cutter in World War II*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1992. Pp. ix, 126. \$19.95.
- JUST, MICHAEL, et al. *Auswanderung und Schifffahrtsinteressen; "Little Germanies" in New York; Deutschamerikanische Gesellschaften*. (Von Deutschland nach Amerika, number 5.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 1992. Pp. 241. DM 76.00.
- KASPER, SHIRL. *Annie Oakley*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 288. \$22.95.
- KENNEDY, ROGER G. *Rediscovering America*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1990. Pp. xvii, 398. \$14.95.
- KLOOS, JOHN M., JR. *A Sense of Deity: The Republican Spirituality of Dr. Benjamin Rush*. Foreword by JERALD C. BRAUER. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 10.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xix, 188. \$50.00.
- KNIBB, JOYCE G., and PATRICIA MEHRTENS. *The Elusive Booths of Burrillville: An Investigation of John Wilkes Booth's Alleged Wife and Daughter*. Bowie, Md.: Heritage Books. 1991. Pp. 238.
- KRAUSE, MARTIN. *The Passage: Return of Indiana Painters from Germany, 1880-1905*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1990. Pp. 280. \$39.95.
- KUTLER, STANLEY I. *The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon*. Paperback edition. New York: W. W. Norton. 1992. Pp. xiv, 733. \$15.95.
- LABAREE, DAVID F. *The Making of an American High School: The Credentials Market and the Central High School of Philadelphia, 1838-1939*. Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1988. Pp. xiv, 208. Cloth \$32.50, paper \$15.00.
- LAFOLLETTE, MARCEL C., and JEFFREY K. STINE, editors. *Technology and Choice: Readings from Technology and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. 341. Cloth \$30.95, paper \$16.95.
- LAGEMANN, ELLEN CONDLIFFE. *The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy*. Paperback edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1992. Pp. xv, 347. \$16.95.
- LANCASTER, PAUL. *Gentleman of the Press: The Life and Times of an Early Reporter, Julian Ralph of the Sun*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 307. \$34.95.
- LARSEN, LAWRENCE H., and NANCY J. HULSTON. *The University of Kansas Medical Center: A Pictorial History*. Foreword by D. KAY CLAWSON and GENE A. BUDIG. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, for the University of Kansas Medical Center. 1992. Pp. x, 222. \$35.00.
- LAVENDER, DAVID. *Let Me Be Free: The Nez Perce Tragedy*. New York: HarperCollins. 1992. Pp. xii, 403. \$30.00.
- LEE, R. ALTON. *Harry S. Truman: Where Did the Buck Stop?*. (Recent American History, number 4.) New York: Peter Lang. 1991. Pp. xii, 331.
- LEFFLER, PHYLLIS K., and JOSEPH BRENT, editors. *Public History Readings*. (Public History Series.) Malabar, Fla.: Robert E. Krieger. 1992. Pp. xiv, 535.
- LEMANN, NICHOLAS. *The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America*. Paperback edition. New York: Vintage. 1992. Pp. 408. \$13.00.
- LORENTZ, PARE. *FDR's Moviemaker: Memoirs and Scripts*. Reno: University of Nevada Press. 1992. Pp. 243. \$29.95.
- LOVELL, MARY S. *Cast No Shadow: The Life of the American Spy Who Changed the Course of World War II*. New York: Pantheon. 1992. Pp. xv, 398. \$25.00.
- MALONE, JOHN. *The Civil War Quiz Book*. New York: Quill. 1992. Pp. 218. \$9.00.
- MARKWELL, BERNARD KENT. *The Anglican Left: Radical Social Reformers in the Church of England and the Protestant Episcopal Church, 1846-1954*. Foreword by MARTIN E. MARTY. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 13.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xix, 310. \$60.00.
- MARTER, JOAN M. *Alexander Calder*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 302. \$75.00.
- MAY, ERNEST R. *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine*. (Harvard Historical Studies, number 110.) Paperback edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. xviii, 306. \$14.95.
- McKENNEY, RUTH. *Industrial Valley*. Foreword by DANIEL NELSON. (Literature of American Labor Series.) Paperback edition. Ithaca: ILR Press. 1992. Pp. xx, 379. \$16.95.
- McPHERSON, ROBERT S. *Sacred Land, Sacred View: Navajo Perceptions of the Four Corners Region*. (Charles Redd

- Monographs in Western History, number 19.) Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, distributed by Signature Books, Salt Lake City. 1992. Pp. viii, 152. \$8.95.
- MELSON, CHARLES D., and CURTIS G. ARNOLD. *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The War That Would Not End, 1971-1973*. (Marine Corps Vietnam Series.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps. 1991. Pp. xi, 311.
- MOON, SAMUEL. *Tall Sheep: Harry Goulding, Monument Valley Trader*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. xviii, 250. \$24.95.
- MORRIS, WILLIAM SPARKES. *The Young Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstruction*. Foreword by JERALD C. BRAUER. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 14.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xvi, 688. \$125.00.
- MOWERY, DAVID C., and NATHAN ROSENBERG. *Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth*. Paperback edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. viii, 330. \$14.95.
- O'HARA, SUSAN PRITCHARD, and GREGORY GRAVES. *Saving California's Coast: Army Engineers at Oceanside and Humboldt Bay*. (Western Lands and Waters Series, number 16.) Spokane, Wash.: Arthur H. Clark. 1991. Pp. 277. \$38.50.
- PLUNZ, RICHARD. *A History of Housing in New York City: Duelling Type and Social Change in the American Metropolis*. (Columbia History of Urban Life Series.) Paperback edition. New York: Columbia University Press. 1990. Pp. xxxvii, 422. \$18.95.
- PORTES, JACQUES. *Histoire des États-Unis depuis 1945*. Paris: Éditions La Découverte. 1992. Pp. 122.
- PORTES, JACQUES. *Les États-Unis: De l'indépendance à la première guerre mondiale*. (Histoire.) Paris: Armand Colin. 1991. Pp. 191.
- POWELL, THOMAS. *The Persistence of Racism in America*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1992. Pp. x, 355. Cloth \$47.50, paper \$19.75.
- RAKOVE, JACK N. *James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic*. Edited by OSCAR HANDLIN. (The Library of American Biography.) New York: HarperCollins. 1990. Pp. xii, 201.
- REHNQUIST, WILLIAM H. *Grand Inquests: The Historical Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson*. New York: William Morrow. 1992. Pp. 303. \$23.00.
- REIMERS, DAVID M. *Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America*. 2d ed. New York: Columbia University Press. 1992. Pp. xii, 362. Cloth \$50.00, paper \$14.50.
- REYNOLDS, TERRY S., editor. *The Engineer in America: A Historical Anthology from Technology and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. vi, 437. Cloth \$44.95, paper \$19.95.
- RICARD, SERGE, editor. *L'Éducation aux États-Unis: Mythes et réalités*. (Groupe de Recherche et d'Études Nord-Américaines.) Aix-en-Provence: Université de Provence. 1992. Pp. 214.
- RICARD, SERGE, editor. *Modèles et contre-modèles dans la culture et la société Nord-Américaines: Identité et différences*. (Groupe de Recherche et d'Études Nord-Américaines.) Aix-en-Provence: Université de Provence. 1992. Pp. 180.
- RIDGE, MARTIN, et al. *Writing the History of the American West*. Foreword by JOHN B. HENCH. Assisted by GEORGE MILES. Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society. 1991. Pp. 166. \$12.95.
- RITTER, KURT, and DAVID HENRY. *Ronald Reagan: The Great Communicator*. Foreword by BERNARD K. DUFFY. (Great American Orators, number 13.) New York: Greenwood. 1992. Pp. xix, 226. \$45.00.
- RITTER, LAWRENCE S. *Lost Ballparks: A Celebration of Baseball's Legendary Fields*. New York: Viking. 1992. Pp. xiii, 210. \$25.00.
- ROGERS, DONALD W., editor. *Voting and the Spirit of American Democracy: Essays on the History of Voting and Voting Rights in America*. Assisted by CHRISTINE SCRIBABINE. Reprint. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1992. Pp. ix, 123. Cloth \$17.50, paper \$7.95.
- ROLLE, ANDREW. *Henry Mayo Newhall and His Times: A California Legacy*. San Marino, Calif.: Huntington Library. 1991. Pp. 168. \$29.95.
- ROSEN, HOWARD, and ANN DURKIN KEATING, editors. *Water and the City: The Next Century*. Chicago: Public Works Historical Society. 1991. Pp. xiv, 385. \$25.00.
- ROSENBLATT, EMIL, and RUTH ROSENBLATT. *Hard Marching Every Day: The Civil War Letters of Private Wilbur Fisk, 1861-1865*. Foreword by REID MITCHELL. (Modern War Studies.) Reprint. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1992. Pp. xvi, 383. \$25.00.
- ROSENGARTEN, THEODORE. *Tombee: Portrait of a Cotton Planter; With the Journal of Thomas B. Chaplin (1822-1890)*. Assisted by SUSAN W. WALKER. Paperback edition. New York: William Morrow. 1992. Pp. 750. \$15.00.
- RUTH, GEORGE HERMAN. *Babe Ruth's Own Book of Baseball*. Foreword by JEROME HOLTZMAN. (A Bison Book.) Reprint. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1992. Pp. xxi, 301. Cloth \$35.00, paper \$9.95.
- SAPIENZA, MADELINE. *Modern Chivalry in Early American Law: H. H. Brackenridge's Legal Thought*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1992. Pp. xxvii, 165. Cloth \$39.50, paper \$19.50.
- SCAMEHORN, H. LEE. *Mill and Mine: The CF&I in the Twentieth Century*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1992. Pp. x, 247. \$37.50.
- SCHMIDT, JEAN MILLER. *Souls or the Social Order: The Two-Party System in American Protestantism*. Foreword by MARTIN E. MARTY. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 18.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xxxvii, 294. \$50.00.
- SEALE, WILLIAM. *Sam Houston's Wife: A Biography of Margaret Lea Houston*. Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. xx, 287. \$14.95.
- SHAPIRO, ANDREW L. *We're Number One! Where America Stands—and Falls—in the New World Order*. New York: Vintage. 1992. Pp. xvi, 204. \$10.00.
- SHEPARD, ROBERT S. *God's People in the Ivory Tower: Religion in the Early American University*. Foreword by MARTIN E. MARTY. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 20.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xiv, 174. \$50.00.
- SKLAR, ROBERT. *City Boys: Cagney, Bogart, Garfield*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1992. Pp. xiii, 311. \$27.50.
- SNYDER, STEPHEN H. *Lyman Beecher and His Children: The Transformation of a Religious Tradition*. Foreword by JERALD C. BRAUER. (Chicago Studies in the History of American Religion, number 21.) Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson. 1991. Pp. xviii, 179. \$50.00.
- SOMBART, WERNER. *Pourquoi le socialisme n'existe-t-il pas aux États-Unis?*. Translated from the German by PIERRE WEISS. (Sociologies.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1992. Pp. 166. 118 fr.
- SORAU, FRANK J. *Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1992. Pp. x, 274. \$27.50.
- SPALDING, ALBERT G. *America's National Game: Historic Facts Concerning the Beginning, Evolution, Development, and Popularity of Base Ball; With Personal Reminiscences of Its Vicissitudes, Its Victories, and Its Votaries*. Foreword by BENJAMIN G. RADER. Assisted by HOMER C. DAVENPORT. (A Bison Book.) Reprint. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1992. Pp. xxvii, 550. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$19.95.
- STAFFORD, JEAN. *A Mother in History*. Paperback edition. New York: Pharos. 1992. Pp. 121. \$8.95.
- STEPHANSON, ANDERS. *Kenman and the Art of Foreign Policy*.

- Paperback edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. x, 380. \$15.95.
- STONE, JOSEPH, and TIM YOHN. *Prime Time and Misdemeanors: Investigating the 1950s TV Quiz Scandal—A D.A.'s Account*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1992. Pp. viii, 349. \$22.95.
- SULLIVAN, MAURICE S. *The Travels of Jedediah Smith: A Documentary Outline Including the Journal of the Great American Pathfinder*. (A Bison Book.) Reprint. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1992. Pp. 195. \$9.95.
- TILFORD, EARL H., JR. *Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press. 1991. Pp. xx, 308.
- TRULOCK, ALICE RAINS. *In the Hands of Providence: Joshua L. Chamberlain and the American Civil War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1992. Pp. xxii, 569. \$34.95.
- TRUMBULL, ROBERT. *The Raft*. Foreword by JOHN M. WATERS. Rev. ed. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1992. Pp. xvii, 213. \$14.95.
- UNDERHILL, RUTH. *Life in the Pueblos*. Rev. ed. Sante Fe, N.Mex.: Ancient City Press. 1991. Pp. 154. \$12.95.
- VALENTINE, DOUGLAS. *The Phoenix Program*. Paperback edition. New York: Avon. 1992. Pp. 479. \$12.50.
- VAN ROSSEM, MAARTEN. *Het radicale temperament: De dubbele politieke bekering van een generatie Amerikaanse intellectuelen, 1934–1953* [The Radical Temperament: The "New York Intellectuals," 1934–1953]. Summary in English. (Hes Studia Historica, number 8.) Utrecht: Hes. 1983. Pp. 371.
- WATKINS, DIANNE, editor. *Hello, Janice: The Wartime Letters of Henry Giles*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1992. Pp. xviii, 237. \$25.00.
- WILLIAMS, WILLIAM J. *The Wilson Administration and the Shipbuilding Crisis of 1917: Steel Ships and Wooden Streamers*. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen. 1992. Pp. iii, 220. \$69.95.
- WILLS, BRIAN STEEL. *A Battle from the Start: The Life of Nathan Bedford Forrest*. New York: HarperCollins. 1992. Pp. xix, 457. \$30.00.
- WISE, DAVID. *Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered the CIA*. New York: Random House. 1992. Pp. 325. \$22.00.
- WOIROL, GREGORY R. *In the Floating Army: F. C. Mills on Itinerant Life in California, 1914*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1992. Pp. x, 168. \$24.95.
- WORCESTER, DONALD E. *The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest*. (The Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 149.) Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. xvi, 389. \$14.95.
- YELLIN, JEAN FAGAN. *Women and Sisters: The Antislavery Feminists in American Culture*. Reprint. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1989. Pp. xxi, 226. Cloth \$27.50, paper \$13.00.
- ZINSSER, WILLIAM. *American Places: A Writer's Pilgrimage to Fifteen of This Country's Most Visited and Cherished Sites*. New York: HarperCollins. 1992. Pp. 200. \$20.00.

CANADA

- DANCOCKS, DANIEL G. *Welcome to Flanders Fields: The First Canadian Battle of the Great War, Ypres, 1915*. (A Douglas Gibson Book.) Paperback edition. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. 1988. Pp. 292. \$18.99.
- MILLER, J. R., editor. *Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1991. Pp. xix, 468. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$24.95.
- NEWMAN, PETER C. *Company of Adventurers*. Volume 3, *Merchant Princes*. New York: Viking. 1991. Pp. xvii, 502. \$25.00.

LATIN AMERICA

- BACELLAR, CARLOS DE ALMEIDA PRADO. *Família, herança e poder em São Paulo: 1765–1855*. (Estudos CEDHAL, number 7.) São Paulo: Centro de Estudos de Demografia Histórica da América Latina, Universidade de São Paulo. 1991. Pp. 99.
- DENEVAN, WILLIAM M., editor. *The Native Population of the Americas in 1492*. Foreword by W. GEORGE LOVELL. 2d ed. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1992. Pp. xlv, 353. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$14.95.
- HAMILL, HUGH M., editor. *Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1992. Pp. x, 373. \$24.95.
- KRAUSS, CLIFFORD. *Inside Central America: Its People, Politics, and History*. (A Touchstone Book.) Paperback edition. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1992. Pp. 316. \$11.00.
- LOVELL, W. GEORGE. *Conquest and Survival in Colonial Guatemala: A Historical Geography of the Cuchumatán Highlands, 1500–1821*. Rev. ed. Buffalo, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1992. Pp. xxi, 279. \$19.95.
- REED, ROGER. *The Cultural Revolution in Cuba*. Geneva, Switzerland: Latin American Round Table. 1991. Pp. 272.
- SANDSTROM, ALAN R. *Corn is Our Blood: Culture and Ethnic Identity in a Contemporary Aztec Indian Village*. (The Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 206.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991. Pp. xxvii, 420. Cloth \$39.95, paper \$19.95.
- SAUER, CARL ORTWIN. *The Early Spanish Main*. Foreword by ANTHONY PAGDEN. (A Centennial Book.) Reprint. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1992. Pp. xviii, 306. Cloth \$40.00, paper \$16.00.
- TODOROV, TZVETAN. *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*. Translated by RICHARD HOWARD. Paperback edition. New York: HarperPerennial. 1992. Pp. x, 274. \$10.00.
- ZOGBAUM, HEIDI B. *Traven: A Vision of Mexico*. (Latin American Silhouettes.) Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources. 1992. Pp. xxiii, 255. \$24.95.

Communications

A communication will be considered only if it relates to an article or review published in this journal; publication is solely at the editor's discretion. Letters may not exceed seven hundred words for reviews and one thousand words for articles. They should be submitted in duplicate, typed double-spaced with wide margins, and headed "To the Editor."

ARTICLES

TO THE EDITOR:

I found Kenneth Stein's "Historiographic Review of Literature on the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict" (*AHR*, 97 [December 1991]: 1450-65) enlightening. Unfortunately, it is marred by the author's tendency to display on his sleeve, in no uncertain colors, his personal biases and animosities. His assertions that Avi Shlaim's *Collusion across the Jordan* and my own book *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949* are wholly unoriginal ("their conclusions are not new," "detailed explanations of previous postulations," "neither Shlaim nor Morris amplify an old cause or discover a new one," "Morris and Shlaim benefited from the earlier works of . . .," and so on) are amusing (and sad). The lady doth protest too much, methinks. To judge by the amount of interest and heat that our "unoriginal" books have generated among Israeli, Arab, and Western historians of the Middle East, Stein on this point languishes in rather unsplendid isolation.

One last point. For one who aloofly bemoans the "shortage" of Middle East historians fluent in Hebrew, Stein commits a revealing faux pas when he writes of Ya'akov Shimoni's "*Arave Eretz Yisrael*" instead of '*Arviyei Eretz Yisrael* (admittedly a tricky possessive).

BENNY MORRIS
*Truman Institute,
Hebrew University*

KENNETH W. STEIN REPLIES:

Since my article did not claim that Benny Morris's book deserved a Pulitzer Prize, he assumes that

it must contain only fulsome praise. Readers of English should know that Morris continues to take to task in the Hebrew press as well (*Haaretz*, April 23, 1992) those who fail to agree with him or those who do not state in superlative terms that his work is the best since Moses came down from Mount Sinai.

Just because Morris asserted something does not mean that his assertion is accurate. He cannot invent what is not there. Without an iota of evidence, he outlandishly claimed that I "display on [my] sleeve, in no uncertain colors" (an interesting phrase in its own right) that I have "biases and animosities." What biases and animosities was he talking about? Does he know that I am a Braves fan and do not particularly like either the Dodgers or the Reds? But even these are not animosities. If one participates in the academic world and is a scholar and not a publicist or polemicist, one cannot make blithe assertions without documentation, data, or proof.

As evidence, Morris should have taken better care to quote exactly what was written in the article. He should read it again. It did not say that his work or Shlaim's work was "unoriginal." That was his term. On the contrary, the article said that both works "contribute important additions to earlier research . . . , [they] are the first to present a vivid and detailed description in English of the frequency, methods, and motivations associated with the Arab-Israeli state and inter-Arab relationships" (p. 1462). The fact remains, as the article stated, that he and Shlaim (for some unknown reason, Morris has become his anointed spokesperson) "benefited from earlier works of [other] Israeli historians" (p. 1464). The article stated that his work, and others, "represents the shift from merely recounting causes to providing nuances, from only describing events to analyzing key aspects of the conflict's beginnings and turning points" (p. 1462). Historians benefit and learn from their predecessors. That is not a syllogism.

KENNETH W. STEIN
*The Carter Presidential Center,
Emory University*

TO THE EDITOR:

Michael Kazin's recent article on the U.S. Right in the twentieth century (*AHR*, 97 [February 1992]: 136–55) raises a number of interesting but highly contentious questions about what is fast becoming one of the key growth areas in American history.

In particular, his focus on women on the Right is especially welcome. I found persuasive his suggestion that Rebecca Klatch's distinction in *Women of the New Right* (1987) between libertarianism and social conservatism overstates the importance of libertarianism, although I would go further and argue that to present social conservatives as a group limited to "family issues" obscures the widening of their agenda to encompass such concerns as the Nicaraguan Contras and Star Wars. If women are important on the modern Right, they were even more significant in the 1920s, and Kazin's discussion of Kathleen Blee's *Women of the Klan* (1991) rightly emphasizes not only their numbers but also their opposition to "vice" and female exploitation. I would not be so sure, however, of seeing them, as Kazin does, as "female activists who challenged male domination." Not only, as he notes, were they supervised by males but the growing body of research in the area suggests (as it does for the Nazis or the much smaller group of British fascists) that women's role within the movement was diverse, and what in some localities could be a remarkably independent mobilization in others could be far more "traditionalist" and auxiliary.

Kazin's article poses crucial questions about gender and the Right and also draws attention to the important recomposition and realignment of the American Right in recent years. The mention of Patrick Buchanan's involvement in the unfolding quarrel between "paleo" and neo-conservatives has a particular resonance, but we could also, for instance, note the recent emergence of links between some "traditionalists" and some libertarians around opposition to the Gulf War and to sexual permissiveness, a development that reopens the question of how we are to understand differences on the Right and how its component groups see the role of the state and the meaning of liberty. Kazin's very concern for difference, however, takes me to my main reservation with his argument.

In discussing the Klan of the 1920s and the modern New Right, a number of different terms—conservatism, populism, the Right—are used as if interchangeable. But while "populism" captures important aspects of such movements, and the term "right-wing" emphasizes what they have in common, "conservative" cannot reach so widely. Other writers, for instance Leo Ribuffo in *The Old Christian Right* (1983), have similarly proposed a continuity between the extreme Right of the 1930s and the New Christian Right of more recent years. But just as the objectives, strategy, and even some of the themes raised by the two forms of Christian Right are sharply divergent,

so, too, the mass Klan of the immediate post-World War I years is fundamentally different from the conservative insurgency of the Carter and Reagan years.

Certainly, there is important common ground between the different forms of the Right during this century, not only in the United States but, as Kazin suggests, in Europe, too. But to amalgamate the electoral populism of a Reagan or a Thatcher or the campaigning of a Richard Viguerie or a Jerry Falwell with the paramilitary politics of the extreme Right is as potentially misleading as to collapse together New Dealers and Communists.

MARTIN DURHAM

Wolverhampton Polytechnic

MICHAEL KAZIN REPLIES:

Martin Durham makes some useful distinctions. However, my point was not to equate the 1920s Klan with the New Right of the 1970s and 1980s but simply to recognize the continuity of certain core themes: the defense of "traditional" values rooted in biblical teachings, the deep suspicion toward blacks and recent immigrants, and the condemnation of a culturally modernist elite. By the way, from 1935 to the onset of the Cold War, Communists and New Dealers *did* share many of the same enemies and, at least tacitly, cooperated in building the same liberal coalition. In 1944, the Communist Party of the United States of America put no candidates on the ballot and worked hard to reelect Roosevelt.

MICHAEL KAZIN

American University

TO THE EDITOR:

Russell Jacoby's *AHR Forum* contribution ("A New Intellectual History?" *AHR*, 97 [April 1992]: 405–24) is a lively polemic, akin to some of the recent neo-conservative contributions to the genre. Any essay that groups me with Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra can't be all bad. But because Jacoby makes heavy use of the polemical tactic of selective quotation and tendentious gloss, the piece does not stand up as scholarship.

My *AHR* article of 1989, discussed by Jacoby, draws on technical work in theory of explanation and to a lesser extent in narrative theory (Jacoby only notices the latter, since my use of analytic philosophy did not fit his agenda). It is difficult to show in a few words Jacoby's distortions, and so I shall confine myself to one example. Jacoby claims that I claimed in "Recounting the Past" (vol. 94 [June 1989]: 627–53) that most professional historians believe that "the truly serious task of historiography . . . is the task of explanation, i.e., causal and general laws" (Jacoby, 423 n. 97). Most readers of the *AHR* will recognize that very few historians seek to articulate "causal and general laws." But I did not claim that they do; the reference to "causal and general laws" is Jacoby's "free" interpolation, even though I went out of my way to

emphasize that my view of causation is Collingwoodian, appealing to counterfactual instances, not Humean or Kantian, which appeal to general laws. Furthermore, I argued—very plausibly, in my view—for the contention that professional historians tend to privilege the explanatory task of historiography over its other, more descriptive or interpretive tasks.

If I may move to a more general plane, Jacoby thinks that the so-called new intellectual historians, myself included, “seek to escape from a baneful positivism that erases the specificity of history” (Jacoby, 424). Jacoby mischaracterizes my position. He offers a clue to why he does so in his discussion of the relation of “Recounting the Past” to Carl Hempel’s well-known “Function of General Laws in History” (in Patrick L. Gardiner, ed., *Theories of History* [Glencoe, Ill., 1959], 344–56). Hempel began that article by repeating the distinction, advanced by Wilhelm Windelband in the late nineteenth century, between nomothetic science, which aims at articulating general laws, and idiographic science, which aims at the portrayal of particulars. Diverging from Windelband, Hempel rejected the latter sort of investigation as not “scientific.”

Jacoby thinks that “Recounting the Past” “argues the reverse proposition” to what Hempel argued (423 n. 97). Had Jacoby read my piece more carefully, he would have seen that it does not reverse the dualism but instead proposes alternatives to it. In fact, “Recounting the Past” is part of a larger argument against outworn dualisms more generally; one thinks, for example, of *Naturwissenschaften* versus *Geisteswissenschaften*, “explanation” versus “understanding,” and objective versus subjective or relativistic. It is not that such dualisms are in every instance wrong; it is rather that most of them are overused and unproductive. It is time to find better ways of thinking, better *topoi*, than those. (I try to revise one of the dualisms in the introduction to “Rethinking Objectivity,” *Annals of Scholarship*, vol. 8, nos. 3–4 [1991].) I should note, though, that I find no way around the distinction between the polemical and the scholarly modes. I can only say that I value both of them, when properly done, and that I particularly value the presence of each mode in the other.

One can learn from polemical critiques, in various ways. But they have a tendency, exemplified in Jacoby’s failure to attend to my argument or even to see what it was, to ride roughshod over positions to which they deem themselves opposed. There is a lot of this sort of thing in public discourse these days. I cannot believe that more of it is helpful. When others’ arguments are difficult or unfamiliar, one may well misunderstand them, but the *attempt* to understand them seems indispensable to civil discourse, both public and academic. Jacoby mocks LaCapra for demanding close textual analysis. Confronted by a reader who, in working his way through an only moderately difficult argument, fails to discern the gentle parody of logical positivist style that led to

(AH) \times (CS) = k and fails, too, to discern the underlying heuristics, I can only think that we need ten LaCapras rather than one. I have some empathy for the story of the decline of “public intellectuals” that Jacoby tells in *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe* (1987). But I am suspicious of the sort of intellectual who knows the truth in advance and who thus does not need to read or listen carefully. I would feel more confident about Jacoby’s preferences and prescriptions if he had managed to get my argument right.

ALLAN MEGILL
University of Virginia

RUSSELL JACOBY REPLIES:

I cop to this: Allan Megill’s sense of humor escaped me. I did not catch the “gentle parody” of his formula illuminating narrative—or the paragraph explaining the formula. I also missed the joke in the footnote that indicated his formula is “an expansion of one proposed by Wallace Martin, *Recent Theories of Narrative* . . . which in turn is inspired by a rather different formula in Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method* . . .” I thought he was playing it straight. Sorry.

Now that I know his penchant for parody, however, I see more of it. He is puzzled that I did not follow his argument, especially inasmuch as he “went out of [his] way to emphasize that [his] view of causation is Collingwoodian, appealing to counterfactual instances.” Previously, I would have been troubled by this statement. In his article, Megill never even mentioned Collingwood, much less went “out of his way” to emphasize a “Collingwoodian” causation. What could he mean? Is he referring to another piece? I would have also wondered about yoking together Collingwood and counterfactuals. I would have become annoyed at these superfluous and confusing references. No longer. I now see Megill’s jesting spirit; he is satirizing pedantry by invoking irrelevant names and concepts. If you know his style, Megill’s a funny guy.

Megill says nothing about the main thrust of my argument. I questioned whether the new literary intellectual history has rendered history more literary; it seems to have made it more sterile. Megill responds by huffing and puffing. I must be a pal of neo-conservatives; I cannot follow “an only moderately difficult argument.” I have not even made an “attempt” to understand his essay. I damage public discourse; and my essay is not a work of scholarship, unlike his own, which draws on a “technical work in theory of explanation.”

He offers one and a half examples of my sadly deficient understanding of his moderately difficult essay. Megill never claimed, as I supposed, that most historians seek to articulate causal laws. However, his 1989 essay opened this way: “It is a rather widely held

opinion among professional historians that the truly serious task of historiography, making it a contribution to knowledge and not a triviality, is the task of explanation" (*AHR*, 94 [June 1989]: 627).

What does this mean? "I use the term 'explanation,'" he stated, "not in the broad sense . . . but in the sense customary in philosophical and social science circles, where in most contexts 'to explain' something means to say what caused it" (p. 628). He cites various historians, for instance E. H. Carr and Lee Benson, to demonstrate how widespread this belief is. "The statements by Benson and Carr assume that the essential connections in a historical account are causal. The revealing of causal connections is what I (and they) define as explanation" (p. 630). The problem is larger than Carr and Benson. "The bias for explanation extends well beyond those historians influenced by positivist theory and methodology" (p. 652). Much of Megill's essay shows the background and extent of this belief. He may want to reread it.

His half example turns on a very small point. I had suggested that Megill was reversing the emphasis found in Hempel, which favored general laws and depreciated descriptions of particulars. No, it turns out, Megill was proposing alternatives to "outworn dualisms more generally." This is small potatoes. The brunt of his piece seeks to undo what he calls the "general elevation of explanation over 'description'" (p. 634). Reverse is fair.

Megill proposes nothing else. He plays his favorite game, alluding to venerable authorities, as if dubbing his view of causation "Collingwoodian . . . not Humean or Kantian" illuminates anything. He congratulates himself on his own sophistication and the perspicuity of his work. He is aggrieved that I cannot follow his argument and its "underlying heuristics." He can only assume that I am that "sort of intellectual who knows the truth in advance." What gives? To criticize an essay of Allan Megill means I know "truth in advance"? Perhaps his "moderately difficult" essay with its courageous attack on "outworn dualisms" does not exactly constitute an advance in truth.

RUSSELL JACOBY
University of California,
Los Angeles

TO THE EDITOR:

I was struck by the evident break in Molly Myerowitz Levine's review of Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* [*AHR*, 97 (April 1992): 440–60]. The first half is an attempt to determine the place of Bernal's first volume, *The Fabrication of Ancient Greece*, in Greek historiography. That determination centers on the validity of the book's thesis that classical scholarship used an "Aryan Model," in place of a pre-nineteenth century "Ancient Model," "to deny any fundamental role to Canaanites or Egyptians in the making of Greek civilization" (p. 441). The second half of her review appears when she moves off from her more erudite

discourse on *Black Athena* and Greek historiography to direct her "use and abuse of *Black Athena*" at what she terms "one of Bernal's most receptive audiences"—radical Afrocentrists (p. 453). It is when she makes the break with her classical scholarship to attack the Egyptian scholarship of "radical Afrocentrists" that she falls prey to (in her own words) what began "as a healthy corrective to the chimera of absolute objectivity in scholarship [but] leads to an equally misleading representation of the scholarly enterprise as a cover for racial and ethnic turf wars" (p. 451).

If Levine had pursued the same "linguistic and cultural mix" line of thought for Egypt that she has for Greece, she would have come away with a more enhanced view of Egypt's "black" roots. For example, using J. E. Greenberg's classification of African languages, ancient Egyptian is a daughter language of Afro-Asiatic (one of six families of languages in Africa) and therefore indicates a common font of cultural and linguistic characteristics with other African languages.

Second, the works for both J. E. G. Sutton ("The Aquatic Civilization of Middle Africa," *Journal of African History*, 15 [1974]: 527–46) and Henri Frankfort (*Kingship and the Gods*, 1948) support the fact that the settlement of the Nile Delta was a result of a southern thrust northward from Middle Africa (heavily "Negroid") rather than from the east. In further support of this, Frankfort stated that cultural traits of dynastic Egypt (social, political, and religious) lay up the Nile rather than in the Delta. The cult of the gods Isis, Horus, Osiris, and the Great Procession derive not only from the African tradition of ancestor veneration but their font was in the southern city of Abydos.

In line with the above, if Levine had resorted to the work of Cheikh Anta Diop (*The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality*, 1974), she would have read on page 91 that, "contrary to Moret's affirmation, authentic Egyptian tradition, as old as recorded time and written into the *Texts of the Pyramids* and *The Book of the Dead*, teaches us in unequivocal terms that the Egyptian deities belonged to the Black Race and were born in the south. Furthermore, the myth of Osiris and Isis points to a cultural trait characteristic of Black Africa: the cult of ancestors, the foundation of Negro religious life and of Egyptian religious life as Amelineau reports."

Finally, from a March 1, 1979, *New York Times* article by Boyce Rensberger ("Nubian Monarch Called Oldest"), there is an acknowledgement that the University of Chicago could have evidence for a Nubian monarchy existing "as long ago as 3300 B.C., several generations before the earliest documented Egyptian king." And that "some of the Nubian artifacts bore disconnected symbols resembling those of Egyptian hieroglyphics that were readable . . . They [Nubians] were . . . probably quite close to [accom-

plishing what in fact became a base for Egyptian success with writing]."

A. J. WILLIAMS-MYERS
State University College,
New Paltz, New York

TO THE EDITOR:

I was so angered by Molly Myerowitz Levine's patronizing review of Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* (AHR, 97 [April 1992]: 440–60) that I first considered organizing some "radical Afrocentrists" to act out some "black racism." I figured that we would descend on her white neighborhood and burn a cross, pass laws to require that her children attend inferior schools and live in substandard housing, get her fired from Howard University for being "white," and take away some of the privileges that she has just for being *white*.

While the above is about as ridiculous an idea as one can imagine, Levine's review essentially implies that Bernal's *Black Athena* is fueling the fires of black racism and separatism—which will result in the logical opposite of white racism. African Americans will make unprovoked attacks on whites and use the political system to take away "white rights." Thus, like the old slaveholders and white southerners of the early twentieth century, she is assuming that African Americans will not act (positively or negatively) unless some "outside agitator" (Bernal) provokes them. In fact, her review seems to be less concerned about the scholarship in Bernal's book than about attacking "radical Afrocentrists" for their crazy idea that the Egyptians were black.

The most patronizing point in her review is that "radical Afrocentrists" did not have any legitimacy until Bernal gave them some semblance of legitimacy in *Black Athena*. Levine's review follows the pattern of most of the five-year response to Bernal from mainstream scholars: he must be attacked because he is a "white man" adopting the view of African and African-American scholars. Indeed, Levine, Mary Lefkowitz, and others make it clear that Bernal is probably the only scholar worthy of scholarly consideration precisely because he is white. If he was an African American, his work would have been ignored!

I make the latter point because "radical Afrocentrists" have asserted that the Egyptians were Africans ("people of color") for well over 150 years! (See J. C. Pennington, *A Textbook of the Origin and History, etc. of the Colored People*, 1841; David Walker, *Appeal to the Colored Citizens*, 1829; Martin R. Delany, *The Origin of Races and Color*, 1879; W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Negro*, 1915; and many others too numerous to list here.) Have all of the African-American scholars been so deluded, misled, and desperate that they would make the assumption that the Egyptians were Africans just to massage their egos and build their self-esteem? According to Levine, they were and are. In fact, according to Levine, now the "radical Afrocentrists"

are engaged in a Bernal-like conspiracy to distort history, foster separatism, and take credit from the Greeks.

Another patronizing point in her review was how she used poor Frank Snowden to justify her position that "radical Afrocentrists" are completely off base and a threat to legitimate scholarship on Egypt. She cites the fact that Snowden has tried to prove that the only "real blacks" in Egypt were those who came from the south—the "Ethiopians." What she fails to note is that Snowden's definition of "Ethiopians" eliminates all people of color from Egypt from having a possible African heritage except those who have "big thick lips, wide noses and woolly hair." Moreover, according to his definition, Snowden, who is black, would not be considered of African descent in antiquity *or* today because he does not have the required "thick lips, woolly hair and wide nose"! Her use of Snowden and other so-called racial classifications points out the trouble that some white scholars have with race: they want it both ways. Any person today with "one drop" of "Negro blood" has to be black; but, in the ancient world, any person with "one drop" of "white blood" has to be white—or anything other than of African descent.

As you have probably discerned from this letter, I was very disappointed in Levine's review of Bernal's *Black Athena*. The focus of her review was to attack "radical Afrocentrists" and "black racism." This is somewhat ironic because as she even stated, the viewpoint that the Egyptians were "black" is not something that will overwhelm academia. She also attributes too much influence to the book for fueling "black racism." I can assure her that African Americans already have enough grievances to motivate us to act on our own behalf. We do not need a *book* to encourage us to foster "separatism" or to enhance our self-esteem. There have been enough *deeds* that we have seen, experienced (and encounter every day) to let us know that we are not the ones fostering separatism, supporting racist practices, and claiming (and enjoying) special privileges because of our race.

W. MARVIN DULANEY
University of Texas,
Arlington

MOLLY LEVINE REPLIES:

My attitude on race as a conceptual category was flatly stated in the very beginning of my essay: "Surely, of all possible approaches to the question of origins, race has proven historically to be the most fruitless, divisive, and destructive . . ." Clearly, I failed to get this point across to my critics, and I deeply regret it.

W. Marvin Dulaney's letter is a good example of the phenomenon my article described. In the intimidating scenario of his first paragraph, he assumed my color, socioeconomic status, etc., and generally pegged me as a "white racist," on the basis of my scholarly and political opinions. Yes, I disagree with

many of the historical claims made by radical Afrocentrists. Ergo, deduces Dulaney, I am a white racist.

In his second paragraph, in a scenario nowhere stated in, but, according to Dulaney, implied by my article, he compares me to an antebellum southerner, fearful of outside agitation that would threaten "white rights." One of the points I made in my essay is that, while radical Afrocentrism barks, largely ignored, at the passing caravan of the so-called "white establishment," it hurts African Americans, for whom it escalates a legitimate and positive momentum for historical recovery and cultural pride into history seen through a distorted lens of separatism, paranoia, and hatred. If Dulaney were to ask and be ready to listen, I would tell him that my concern for this issue was inspired by my students, who at Howard University, happen to be young African-American intellectuals. As Arthur Schlesinger put it, "If some Kleeagle of the Ku Klux Klan wanted to devise an educational curriculum for the specific purpose of handicapping and disabling black Americans, he would not be likely to come up with anything more diabolically effective than Afrocentrism" (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America* [1991], 52).

As for "poor" Frank Snowden (is he patronizingly described as "poor" because I misused him or "poor" because he does not support the historical claims of the radical Afrocentrists?) or any of the other "expert opinions" I invoked in my survey of the scholarly opinions regarding the "race" of the ancient Egyptians (454–56), I believe that within my limited space I represented the spectrum of opinions with scrupulous accuracy. A. J. Williams-Myers is right to emphasize the Nubian and sub-Saharan origins (biological and cultural) of the predynastic Egyptian population (compare 455–56 of my essay), but this does not mean that by historic times Egypt had anything other than its own independent cultural identity and biologically mixed population. The main point of my essay was that descriptions of ethnic identity vary according to the degree of importance accorded "origins" versus "accomplishments." How much importance should we accord to origins in the definition of a historically "grown-up" culture, i.e., should "who you are" be determined by "who you were born" or by "what you do and become"?

Surprisingly, I find myself in agreement with Dulaney on several points. While both scholarly credentials and the general academic climate help, I think it is true that the academic establishment listens to Martin Bernal in a way that it did not listen to his many African-American predecessors, in no small part, as Bernal himself points out, because they were black. (That these "theft of wisdom" claims are themselves part of a long tradition of Hellenistic universal history is another story waiting to be written.) This fact alone, however, does not mean that either Bernal or his many predecessors were historically sound on all counts.

I also agree with Dulaney—and have pointed out in

print more than once, as has Bernal—the bitter irony of the fact that the scholarly controversy over the "race" of the Egyptians occurs in a twentieth-century American context in which "few Egyptians could have bought a cup of coffee in America's Deep South in 1954." In the *AHR* essay, my response to this quote from Bernal was, "True enough" (p. 458).

I would like to add that Afrocentrism has not been without its blessings: it encourages us to think about race and to come to understand the uselessness of "race" as a concept, as illustrated by the difficulties of applying racial definitions to Egyptians, or to any population that changes over time. It further sensitizes us to scholarly racism, the necessity of distinguishing race from culture, and the need to investigate the mechanics of cultural interaction.

MOLLY M. LEVINE
Howard University

TO THE EDITOR:

Robert L. Pounder's critique of Martin Bernal's archaeology has merit [*AHR*, 97 (April 1992): 461–64]. However, he fails to acknowledge that migrants can be "absorbed" with little trace or that culture can "change hands" with no memory (or acknowledged memory or acceptance of origins). As Irving Rouse in *Migrations in Prehistory* (1986) points out, there are many degrees of cultural interaction.

Pounder insists that "all important historical analysis incorporates, to the extent it can, concrete, 'hard' evidence, of various sorts" (p. 461). This can be little argued with; noted Egyptologist Jean Vercoutter made remarks at the 1974 UNESCO symposium that are especially relevant to the issue of "race," Egypt, and 'hard evidence': "Whilst acknowledging that the ancient Egyptian population was 'mixed,' a fact confirmed by all the anthropological analyses, writers nevertheless speak of an Egyptian 'race,' linking it to a well defined human type, the white, 'Hamitic' branch, also called 'Caucasoid,' 'Mediterranean,' 'Europid' or 'Eurafricanid.' There is a contradiction here: all the anthropologists agree in stressing the sizable proportion of the Negroid element—almost a third and sometimes more—in the ethnic [meaning biological] mixture of the ancient Egyptian 'population,' but nobody has yet defined what is meant by the term 'Negroid,' nor has any explanation been proffered as to how this Negroid element by mingling with a 'Mediterranean' component often present in smaller proportions, could be assimilated into a purely caucasoid race." The answer is it can't be. A population that consists of individuals who have ancestry from multiple biologically defined groups is a hybrid population and should not be labeled by either group's designation. Whether such biological (racial?) definitions are valid is another issue. The role of "the blacks" in the Nile Valley is nothing less than having been a part of the original Nile Valley population. There is no one authentic African phenotype. From

an adaptive evolutionary perspective, the early southern Egyptian human biological traits are explicable as Saharo-tropical variants. The 'hard' evidence exists, even if a racial (versus a modern evolutionary) paradigm is used. Creighton Gabel, Jean Hiernaux, Edith Sanders, and Wyatt MacGaffey have exposed 'Hamitic' and 'Mediterranean,' which have indeed been used to create "racist . . . counterfeited evidence (p. 464)," as any serious student of Africa will tell you.

Pounder implies that ancient Egypt cannot be viewed as African. Rouse's threefold criteria (language, archaeology, physical anthropology) can be used to "check" Egyptian primary origins to see if they are extra-African. Ancient Egyptian linguistically is a full member of Afro-Asiatic, a group with only one member outside of Africa (Semitic); proto-Afro-Asiatic originated in either tropical East Africa or the Sahara. Some claim that Chadic (spoken in Nigeria and Camerouns) retains the earliest forms of Afro-Asiatic. The cultures that most clearly lead to dynastic Egypt are found in southern Egypt and have primary roots in the Sahara near the Sudan and perhaps the Sudan itself, in addition to southern Egypt. This whole area forms a unit that is no more "Near Eastern" than the Nile. (The presence of certain animals or cultigens makes Egypt no more Near Eastern than it does Bulgaria or Germany.) Physical anthropological studies of the last fifty years easily demonstrate Vercoutter's point. Earlier workers noted a primary resemblance of early Egyptians to Beja, Somali, and Berabra, and not to Greeks or Phoenicians. Earlier workers also usually found ethnographic analogies to explain Egyptian culture in inner East Africa, not coastal Tunisia, Morocco, or Mesopotamia. Perhaps there is a "Nilotic" perspective that represents a shared pattern of cultural adaptation to Nile ecosystems. These facts or ideas are little remembered in current discussions. Contrast Egypt with Carthage, whose core gods, symbols, and language were a Levantine implant. Ancient Egypt's culture clearly reflects a Saharo-Nilotic base, and this African foundation never changed. Is there some *special definition* of African rooted in certain scholarly traditions?

We must indeed "not cast aside the real for the likely, [or] the known for the hoped-for" (p. 464). We must employ modern microevolutionary principles, the skeletal record, the linguistic map (and detailed analyses of languages), the broad archaeological-cultural data and parsimony to avoid the ghosts of those who encoded bias into their descriptors. We must not excuse anyone for being a product of his or her time.

S. O. Y. KEITA
Howard University

ROBERT L. POUNDER REPLIES:

S. O. Y. Keita's comments have little direct relevance for what I actually wrote, but their indirect bearing on my view of *Black Athena 2* prompts a response.

His initial assertion regarding the absorption of migrants into other cultures is beside the point in this context. It may be possible that "culture can 'change hands,'" but how can we apply such a concept to early Greek civilization without a scintilla of evidence to back it up? *Nihil ex nihilo* is not very helpful.

The passage attributed to Jean Vercoutter is derived from the detailed summary of a 1974 symposium sponsored by UNESCO on "The Peopling of Ancient Egypt and the Deciphering of the Meroitic Script" (*General History of Africa 2: Ancient Civilizations of Africa*, G. Mokhtar, ed. [Berkeley, Calif., 1981], 59–83). Keita fails to include all of the points made by Vercoutter on that occasion (as summarized on p. 75): "Professor Vercoutter did not dispute that there might have been black elements in Egypt throughout history, and he himself adduced a number of further examples of their being represented graphically. He took issue with the facts as presented, however, on two counts: they had been drawn indiscriminately from the whole Pharaonic period, without clear references, and the selection had been made to support a theory."

Further: "Professor Vercoutter conceded that there were representations of black people in Egyptian sculpture during the Old Kingdom, and he gave supporting examples. But he did not consider that they were representative of the Egyptian population as a whole, which was, in any case, also represented by contemporary sculptures showing quite different features."

Professor Vercoutter wondered why the Egyptians, if they did regard themselves as black, rarely, if ever, used carbon black in their representations of themselves but used a red colour instead."

Within the context of the present questions, the arguments revolving around human types (Caucasoid, Hamitic, Mediterranean, Europid, Eurafrikanid, and so on) lead ultimately to a dead end. For many years, Egyptologists and anthropologists have agreed that there were mixed black-white people within the Egyptian population. What is clear, however, from all the evidence at our disposal, whether iconographical, literary, archaeological, anthropological, or (for want of a better term) forensic, is that the population of ancient Egypt was not predominantly black. Two decades ago, it was pointed out by A. D. O'Connor, "Ancient Egypt and Black Africa—Early Contacts," *Expedition*, 14 (1971): 2, that "thousands of sculpted and painted representations from Egypt and hundreds of well preserved bodies from its cemeteries show that the typical physical type was neither Negroid nor Negro."

Frank M. Snowden, Jr., in a distinguished series of books, articles, reviews, and lectures, has dealt incisively with issues of race and color in the ancient Mediterranean, including, specifically, black-white elements in Egypt (see *Before Color Prejudice* [Cambridge, 1983], 40–41). He shows that the Greeks and Romans were well aware of the physical nature of

African blacks ("Bernal's 'Blacks,' Herodotus, and Other Classical Evidence," *Arethusa*, special issue [Fall 1989]: 91–92). He cites Flavius Philostratus (*Vita Apollonii* 6.2), who reported on the region of the Egyptian-Ethiopian border, where the population, not completely black, was composed of half-breeds, "some not as black as Ethiopians but others darker than Egyptians."

Snowden's expert analysis of evidence, including close interpretative study of Herodotus, brings him to the conclusion that blacks were not the predominant physical type in Lower Egypt and could not have defined the course of Egyptian civilization, much less an early Greek civilization spawned by Egyptians, as Bernal would have it. This does not mean that there is an attempt to deny the presence of blacks in Egypt or the importance of black cultures. What does appear to be the case, though, is that blacks lived in large numbers in Upper Egypt, as they do to this day. John H. Taylor, in *Egypt and Nubia* (Cambridge, 1991), 7, states: "The modern Nubians are probably the direct descendants of the ancient inhabitants, since the physical characteristics of the people appear to have changed little over the millennia. The varying environmental conditions along the enormously long inhabited strip of the Nile valley are accurately reflected in the gradual if superficial change in the physical characteristics of the population from north to south, skin becoming darker in colour, facial features flatter, hair more tightly curled and skeletons increasingly slender. The ancient Egyptians observed these differences and faithfully reproduced them in painting and sculpture, distinguishing the brown-skinned inhabitants of Lower Nubia from the black people living further to the south."

Taylor also addresses the point raised by Keita concerning the linguistic classification of "Egyptian," concluding that the Nubians spoke a language of the Nilo-Saharan group, whereas the Egyptians to their north spoke an Afro-Asiatic language, as Keita himself states. This serves further to distinguish the two peoples, or groups of peoples. As for the charge that I imply "that ancient Egypt cannot be viewed as African," let me say unequivocally that ancient Egypt was obviously African.

My assessment of Bernal's archaeology, focused as it was on his use of evidence in or affecting Greece, did not touch on most of these issues. Since they have been raised, it is perhaps worth addressing them. They have been raised before, and they will probably be raised again. It would be a splendid discovery—a discovery to transform and invigorate the study of human history—if we could be convinced by the theories of Martin Bernal and those who follow him. One certainly does not "excuse anyone for being a product of his or her time." That is precisely the point. We cannot, moreover, excuse anyone for debasing scholarly standards and method.

ROBERT L. POUNDER
Vassar College

TO THE EDITOR:

First, let me commend the *Review* for the publication in the April 1992 issue of the two *Forums* and the "Review Articles." I find such essays among the most useful in scholarly journals. I do have questions, however, about some of the content of the *Forum* essay by Marcus Raskin, "JFK and the Culture of Violence" [*AHR*, 97 (April 1992): 487–99].

Raskin asserts (p. 491 n. 8) that in February 1992 the head of the Central Intelligence Agency was in the Middle East, "attempting to find ways of deposing and assassinating Saddam Hussein." Since such a mission by the CIA is likely illegal and contrary to repeated policy statements by recent administrations in Washington, can Raskin document this statement?

Raskin also says (p. 497) that President Kennedy did *not* believe in the so-called domino theory re the situation in Vietnam in the early 1960s. This will astonish the millions of television viewers who saw and heard Kennedy state that he did believe in the domino effect. Could we have documentation and, if such documentation exists, an explanation of the contradiction between the television Kennedy and the one who denied his announced position elsewhere?

WILLIAM L. BURTON
Western Illinois University

TO THE EDITOR:

I think the idea of an article on JFK and the Culture of Violence good. I would question on page 495 that Lyndon Johnson was majority leader of the Senate, as he did not get elected to that post until January 1955. He was minority leader of the Senate in 1954, during the Indochina War. What bothers me is that Lee Harvey Oswald had a motive to kill Governor Connally of Texas, as he had changed his discharge from the Marines (see James Reston's book on Governor Connally, *The Lone Star*) as well as the fact that the FBI had infiltrated the Ku Klux Klan, etc., and the murder of the children in September 1963 at the 16th Street Baptist Church was not stopped, as part of the culture of violence.

CHRISTOPHER NIEBUHR
Stockbridge, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR:

As a historian and a member of the Warren Commission staff, I was a firsthand observer of its work. I find that Marcus Raskin, "JFK and the Culture of Violence," is not a credible critic of the Warren Commission report. He is wrong in a number of unsupported assertions, which should not be allowed to stand. I take them up in the order in which they appear.

Raskin writes (p. 487) of "hundreds of thousands of papers collected by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and the Warren Commission but now

under seal." The National Archives has stated that only 2 percent of the commission's records are not open. Many of these records, subject to the Privacy Act, contain private information about individuals; it appears that most of the 2 percent will be opened in the near future.

Raskin states (p. 487) that the Warren Commission did not index its "papers and hearings." In fact, the hearings are fully indexed in volume 15, pp. 753–801. There is a listing of documents related to the hearings at pp. 801–26.

With reference to Raskin's views (p. 489) on the "single bullet" theory, there is no conclusive evidence that the bullet could not have passed through both Kennedy and Connally, improbable as it may seem to Raskin and others. The bullet fragments recovered were analyzed for the House Select Committee by Dr. Vincent P. Guinn, a leading academic specialist in chemical analysis of munitions. He established that the fragments could have come only from two bullets and that his findings therefore supported the Warren Commission's account of the two bullets. No other bullets were found.

As for Oswald doing "extraordinary" things (p. 489), such as firing a rifle from the Texas School Book Depository and covering a great deal of ground in forty-three minutes, these were well within his capacity. It did not require an extraordinary marksman to fire three shots from a rifle with a telescopic sight at distances ranging from 177 to 266 feet at a slowly moving target. It may well be that Oswald fired better and faster than his record would lead us to suppose. There is no concrete evidence that there were any other gunmen firing at Kennedy.

President Kennedy himself knew how presidents might be killed. According to his special assistant, Kenneth O'Donnell, on the morning of November 22, before leaving the hotel in Fort Worth, the president, Mrs. Kennedy, and O'Donnell "talked about the risks inherent in Presidential public appearances . . . The President commented that if anybody wanted to shoot the President of the United States, it was not a difficult job—all one had to do was get a high building someday, and there was nothing anybody could do to defend against such an attempt" (*Report of the Warren Commission*, p. 42).

Raskin omits mention of the taxicab that Oswald took to get him close to his rooming house in Oak Cliff after he gave up on the bus he first took after leaving the depository (p. 489). Here he relies on Mark Lane's *Rush to Judgment*. Reference to the commission's report would have informed Raskin about the taxicab. Reenactment and timing of Oswald's movements from the building to the time he encountered Officer Tippett show clearly that it required no extraordinary actions to cover the ground on foot, by bus, and by cab (*Report of the Warren Commission*, pp. 149–65). Other members of the staff and I covered the different segments of the journey within the indicated time span, and I have no doubt that I felt

less urgency than Oswald must have felt. I suggest that Raskin do likewise—go to Dallas and reenact Oswald's movements.

The statements (p. 490) that the "Warren Commission's bright young staff of lawyers [there were older ones also] were no match for its putative investigative arms, the CIA and FBI" and that "the idea of deeply questioning these organizations did not cross their intellectual radar screen" are mere verbiage. Members of the staff can testify to their doubts and their search for resolution through questioning of the investigative agencies. Moreover, the notion that the staff could not "do so as long as Allen Dulles" was on the commission would strike staff members as absurd. If anything, Dulles had less influence on the report than most if not all the other Warren Commission members. Indeed, Dulles's rewrite of the appendix on presidential protection, which attempted psychological profiles of assassins, was rejected outright by the general counsel and me.

Raskin tells us (p. 491) that "assassination" and "state murders" almost always involve more than one person. In the United States, almost all attempts on presidents, successful and unsuccessful, have been by individuals acting alone. The failed attempts on Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt (ex-president in 1912), Franklin D. Roosevelt, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan involved no conspiracies. Garfield and McKinley were killed by lone gunmen. John Wilkes Booth may have conspired with others, but he acted alone. The two Puerto Ricans who made an attempt on Harry Truman in 1950 may have been part of a conspiratorial group. Oswald clearly fit the pattern of American presidential assassins. A conspiracy of the kind implied by Raskin would have been the historical exception—not an impossibility but an improbability. It is so much easier to allege conspiracy, even if there is no evidence, than it is to prove that none existed.

Finally, Raskin's last words (p. 499) are that "cynicism and alienation in its nastiest political sense will grow even greater." Raskin himself seems to be the best case in point. Raskin's alienation expresses itself in his vision of the pervasive presence of conspiracy in our society and especially in our government. Given this vision of dark and sinister forces manipulating us, it was predictable that he would embrace the notion of a Kennedy assassination conspiracy.

Concerning such a conspiracy, these are the possibilities: First, that there was a conspiracy involving two or more people, involving or not involving Oswald. No evidence to uncover such a conspiracy has ever been found. Second, that there was a conspiracy, and those responsible were so powerful that they were able to have it covered up. The coverup would have involved all, most, or some of the following: the Dallas police, the Secret Service, the CIA, the FBI, the White House, and the attorney general of the United States, Robert F. Kennedy. Third, that there was a coverup of the coverup by the Warren Commission,

suppressing and altering evidence and presenting a political truth that would soothe doubts.

Do those who believe that there was a coverup involving any of the above groups imagine that the secret of a conspiracy could have been kept all these years? The political, psychological, and ethical differences among those involved would have been great enough in themselves to ensure that a coverup could not have occurred or, if it did occur, could not have been kept secret. So, if we wish to cling to belief in a conspiracy, it must be the first mentioned above—a conspiracy of Oswald and unknowns, or unknowns without Oswald, who have never been identified by name. For those who refuse to believe that Oswald was the lone assassin and those who have an ax to grind, such belief, however fantastic and flimsy, has remained a powerful attraction.

ALFRED GOLDBERG
Arlington, Virginia

TO THE EDITOR:

I am retired but continue my membership in the American Historical Association and, of course, receive the *American Historical Review*.

I could not believe the garbage (and that is the only word for it) in the articles written by Marcus Raskin, Michael Rogin, and Robert A. Rosenstone regarding the *JFK* movie. If these three individuals are historians, history is in a bad way.

If they admire Oliver Stone, let them take him to dinner and honor him personally; but don't foist their screwy concepts on the readers of the *American Historical Review*.

Oliver Stone is an entrepreneur. Every movie that he has produced has "dollar signs" written all over it. Truth is the last objective of Oliver Stone. And yet, young people, for the most part because they were not around when President Kennedy was assassinated, are buying these distortions by the car load.

Stone is making money—many, many, many millions—at the expense of naïve Americans. That is his privilege. Some get their money (they don't earn it) by sleight-of-hand methods; some play craps; but at least the latter get to gamble. Stone plays on the gullibility of so-called "educated" individuals.

Even the mention, as one of the reviewers has done, of Mark Lane, is an indication of how shallow this individual is. Using Mark Lane as a reference is somewhat akin to using a victim of the Holocaust to praise Hitler—it is that far from the truth.

Nowhere in these articles or, of course, in Stone's distortion of the assassination is mention made of an in-depth study of the assassination by Dr. John K. Lattimer, a former military surgeon and a retired top urologist at the Columbia University Medical School. Dr. Lattimer, as the author of "Kennedy and Lincoln, Medical and Ballistic Comparisons of Their Assassinations," has no ax to grind. He is a seeker after the

truth. He has testified before congressional committees on this tragedy.

Recently, Dr. Lattimer was invited by NBC to describe and demonstrate on NBC's 6 o'clock news one aspect of President Kennedy's assassination, namely that the bullet that went through Kennedy's head came from the back. Lattimer demolished the argument that the bullet came from the front. He demonstrated once again that a bullet coming from the rear would make the head jump back *toward* the gun. There was another expert marksman on that show using Lattimer's equipment who established the fact that the shots from Oswald's gun could easily have been fired accurately in less than seven seconds.

A second deliberate untruth that Oliver Stone uses is calling the Kennedy neck bullet a "pristine" bullet. This bullet has been deformed by a powerful impact. It is bent on its long axis and markedly flattened on its rear end. It requires great force to deform this sturdy bullet to that extent. It was done by hitting Governor Connally while traveling sideways, after leaving President Kennedy's neck. Dr. Lattimer has demonstrated this over and over.

A third bit of absolute nonsense that Stone forces down his audiences' throats is that the neck bullet "zigzags" in going through the two men. Actually, this bullet goes right straight through the two men just as the Warren Commission reported. Just because Stone repeats it over and over does not make it true.

Why cannot so-called historians believe that one individual, whether deranged or not, could have accomplished the assassination alone and for his own reasons? President Lincoln was assassinated by *one* individual; President Garfield was assassinated by *one* individual; President McKinley was assassinated by *one* individual, and *one* individual attempted the assassination of President Reagan, and all for individual reasons. No conspiracy was involved in these unfortunate happenings. Why do some believe that the Kennedy assassination was different? Evidence, of course, is not part of the approach of the three Rs—Raskin, Rogin, and Rosenstone.

There are many legitimate ways to make money other than via distortions and lies. However, securing excellent actors and actresses, good directors, etc.—as Stone did—to confuse the American public is no substitute for truth.

Sorry to use the word garbage, but the articles on the movie *JFK* by Raskin, Rogin, and Rosenstone truly belong in the garbage. The American Historical Association should make a public apology for using valuable paper for these value-less viewpoints.

JOHN J. COLLINS
Palisades, New York

TO THE EDITOR:

The April 1992 *AHR Forum* on the film *JFK* illustrates both the classic flaws of most work on the assassination and the problems threatening to overwhelm the

historical profession. Confronted with the huge body of evidence generated about the crime, the authors, just like Oliver Stone, make no real effort to distinguish between fact and hypothesis, to take account of what various investigations have been able to establish, or even to present a coherent theory of what happened. The debate over the assassination has been poisoned from the beginning not merely by the Warren Commission, which certainly feared what it might discover even though it did not consciously cover up the truth, but also by the paranoia of most of its critics, which has reached new heights in the crop of astoundingly successful books now taking advantage of Stone's movie. A Gresham's law of conspiracy theories, under which the more bizarre nearly always prevails over the more reasonable, rules the field. Why this should be true among the American people as a whole is perhaps a problem for social psychologists; why the same phenomenon should pop up in the pages of the *AHR* should concern every historian.

Rather than analyze the forum's three contributions in any detail, I would like to illustrate what I mean simply by listing a few facts that all of them ignored and then comment on their significance.

The House Assassinations Committee concluded after a two-year investigation that President Kennedy was probably assassinated by a conspiracy led by organized crime figures and presented acoustical evidence—subsequently called into question—of a second gunman. But, despite these critical differences with the Warren report, it also concluded, after an exhaustive analysis of trajectories and photographs, that the much-maligned, apparently doubtful single-bullet theory was true and that Lee Harvey Oswald had fired the shots that killed Kennedy and, later, Officer Tippitt. Both Marcus Raskin and Michael Rogin ignore this aspect of the committee's work completely and continue—like Stone—to treat the single-bullet theory as the *reductio ad absurdum* of the Warren report.

Neither Oliver Stone nor Raskin, Rogin, or Rosenstone shows any sign of having read the most authoritative account of Jim Garrison's investigation and the trial of Clay Shaw, James Kirkwood's *American Grotesque* (1970). Had they done so, they would have found that Garrison's actual witnesses failed to volunteer their critical evidence during their first interviews, making it impossible for the jury to believe their stories.

Like Oliver Stone, Marcus Raskin includes, more or less as an aside, the theory that organized crime might have been behind the assassination. Like Stone, he fails to mention that David Ferrie, Garrison's suspect whose acquaintance with Oswald is well established, was employed on November 22, 1963, as a pilot and private investigator for Carlos Marcello, the Mob boss of New Orleans; that Marcello on that very day was acquitted on federal charges Robert Kennedy's Department of Justice was trying to use in order to secure, for the second time, his deportation from the

United States; or that Oswald's uncle, Charles Muret, was a bookmaker in the Marcello organization in New Orleans. Impressive circumstantial evidence supporting the Mob theory was developed more than ten years ago by two House Assassinations Committee staffers, G. Robert Blakey and Richard Billings, in their excellent book, *The Plot to Kill the President* (1981), another book the contributors show no signs of having read, and which includes transcripts of revealing Mob conversations.

The ordinary historical rules of evidence would have required Raskin, Rogin, and Rosenstone to judge *JFK* based on the body of facts that have been established to date. These three examples—and I could easily present many more—show that they have utterly failed to do so. That in and of itself makes the *April Forum* a professional disgrace, but one cannot stop even there. The three contributors show a related and equally serious tendency as well: evaluating hypotheses or evidence not according to what they can tell us about the past but according to what prejudices they can be used to sustain.

Marcus Raskin confesses his purposes pretty directly: "Of course," he writes, "a murder caused by organized crime may show the integral connections between crime and politics, but it does not rise to proportions that would cause fear and dread about the political system itself" (p. 492). His meaning becomes even clearer from the rest of his piece: he cares less about the facts of the assassination than about documenting the limitless perfidy of the Cold War national security state. (I myself would feel plenty of fear and dread if it could be proven that the Mob had killed a president and gotten away with it, by the way.) To Michael Rogin, homophobia seems to be the most important element in *JFK*, and the violation of Kennedy's "vulnerable male body" (p. 504), both in his murder and the subsequent autopsy, are apparently more significant than his death, which I venture to suggest was the assassins' real intention. (Rogin reminds me of the Shakespeare critic who recently argued that Brutus, Cassius, and company wanted to reduce Caesar to the status of a bleeding, helpless female, rather than simply to kill him.) And to Robert Rosenstone, because all movies, and all books, are imperfect reconstructions of the past, we should not judge the accuracy of *JFK* too harshly but merely applaud it for "rais[ing] such historical issues so powerfully" (p. 511). The power of his case, apparently, does not depend on the real evidence he can muster.

The truth about the assassination is now most unlikely ever to be established, and few people, alas, will be much interested if it is. Most critics have refused to engage the findings of the House Assassinations Committee because, while finding evidence of a conspiracy, it rejected the CIA-Pentagon-FBI-LBJ conspiracy to which they are so devoted. This is serious enough, but, as a historian, I find it more disturbing that an *AHR Forum* could not find one

contributor willing to address the case on its merits. And this is, I fear, all too typical of the prevailing trend in historical scholarship, with its emphasis on theory and ideology in preference to facts and its often explicit disregard for the very idea of historical truth.

DAVID KAISER
Naval War College

MARCUS RASKIN REPLIES:

Questions have been raised regarding my essay on the film *JFK*. I stated that Oliver Stone's *JFK* is important because it is not a lie. Rather, it is a powerful myth raising profound questions about governance through the prism of President Kennedy's assassination and subsequent events. It is intended to disturb, just as many novels intend to disturb, not because they state with utter accuracy an event or series of events but because they show in blinding illumination the character of a time. I also stated that the purpose of the Warren Commission was the reverse. It sought to calm a frightened nation that had recently lived through the harrowing experience of the Cuban missile crisis. I offered my hypothesis on the assassination and how the assassination should be seen in a larger picture than the murder itself. I also questioned the Warren Commission methodology and therefore its conclusions. Furthermore, I stated that there existed at that time a culture of violence of which American policy makers were part. This could be seen in the way the U.S. government used the CIA and accepted force or the threat of force as a way to conduct national security policy. I also suggested that President Kennedy was sobered by the experience of the Cuban missile crisis and that there is strong evidence to suggest that Kennedy would not have extended the war in Indochina. Finally, I made clear that the central thesis of *JFK*, that there was a cabal at the highest level of the government to kill Kennedy, is not proved, nor do I believe that such a cabal existed, the culture of violence notwithstanding.

William L. Burton wonders about the documentation regarding the question of possible assassination or deposing of Saddam Hussein. The *New York Times* carried a front-page story on February 7, 1992, under the byline of Patrick Tyler, that CIA director Gates had gone to Saudi Arabia and Egypt to have high-level discussions on ways to depose Saddam Hussein either through the staging of a coup or a direct military confrontation and attack. As for Burton's other point, President Kennedy believed in a number of aspects of the domino theory. However, he made clear on several occasions that the United States could not win the war for the South Vietnamese government. Although Chester Bowles, a former undersecretary of state in the Kennedy administration, pressed hard against U.S. involvement, State Department officials and other Kennedy hawks undercut his appeals to the president. However, "before his death,

John Kennedy had told Senator Mansfield that he had been right about withdrawal, 'but I can't do it until 1965—after I'm reelected.'" In mid-November 1963, he told Senator Wayne Morse that Morse's criticism of the administration's Vietnam policy was right and that he was "in the midst of an intensive study which substantiates your position" (Harris Wofford, *Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties* [New York, 1980], 421–22).

Christopher Niebuhr is correct to point out that Lyndon Johnson was the minority leader of the Senate in 1954. The majority leader of the Senate at that time was William Knowland of California, who favored intervention. Johnson carried the day by arguing that before the United States committed troops or ordered direct air strikes in Indochina, other nations would have to join in the action. Dulles scurried for such support, but none was forthcoming.

There is no question that Lee Harvey Oswald was part of the culture of violence. How he fit into it remains a mystery. The idea that he was out to assassinate Governor Connally is predicated on the assumption that he was a lone gunman who carried a grudge against Connally because Connally as the secretary of the navy would not change his discharge category from the navy. I think not. If, as Governor Connally believed so strongly, there was more than one gunman, it would not be likely that Connally was the target. Oswald appeared to have no Texas friends who would have joined him in that action. Connally, who was familiar with rifles and gunshot sounds, has never changed his view that there were three bullets and more than one assassin. After analyzing the frames of the Zapruder film, he concluded that he was shot a third of a second later than Kennedy and between Frames 231 and 234 but that it would have taken one assassin forty-one frames to load and reload.

Alfred Goldberg tells us that only 2 percent of the assassination documents have not been opened, as if this were a very small number of papers. The question to ask is, 2 percent of what? The number becomes clearer when one digs beneath the surface. House Report 102–625 on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, Part One, issued by the House Government Operations Committee, states on page 13: "The CIA houses approximately 300,000 pages of records requested by the Assassination Committee. Of those records, about 11,000 pages have been released. The Committee has not ascertained the extent to which there exist other CIA records relevant to the assassination." The report also states that the House Committee on Assassinations "generated 414,000 pages related to the Kennedy assassination," but they are not available for public perusal, generally speaking until 2029. A number of other files of government agencies have also been kept secret.

Goldberg is pulling our leg. There are twenty-six volumes to the Warren Commission report, not fif-

teen. As Russell Stetler states on page vii of his foreword to the 435-page *Master Index to the J.F.K. Assassinations Investigation*, prepared by Sylvia Meagher and Gary Owens, "The Warren Commission's failure to provide an index to its twenty six volumes . . . if only for the future use of the FBI . . . was inexcusable" (Metuchen, N.J., 1980).

In approaching scientific evidence, it is important to remember that scientific conclusions are matters of judgment. Goldberg relies on Dr. Vincent Guinn for his conclusion that "the bullet fragments recovered . . . established that the fragments could have come only from two bullets and that his findings therefore supported the Warren Commission's account of the two bullets. No other bullets were found." But what is extraordinary is that Dr. Guinn did not examine the same fragments the FBI did in 1964. As Wallace Milam in his paper "The Testimony of Dr. Vincent Guinn: Some Troubling Questions" (Wallace Milam, Dyersburg, Tennessee) has pointed out, "none of the weights matched those of the 1964 test fragments." Further, Dr. Guinn stated that he was thoroughly familiar with the Mannlicher-Carcano bullets and the batches sold in the United States, although he seems to have been unaware of production lots sold here prior to 1954 by the Western Cartridge Company. This means that the bullet could have come from that batch. And, according to Milam, on the basis of Dr. Guinn's own tests, there is great variation within the Mannlicher-Carcano bullet as to its chemical consistency.

My purpose is not to re-argue the positions of those who think that there is more than a doubt about the Warren Commission judgment. It is to say that there is something terribly incomplete in the analysis of historians who are not prepared to lift the curtain regarding the actual operations of the government and the national security state apparatus. Let us examine Goldberg's gravaman against me: "Finally, Raskin's last words are that 'cynicism and alienation in its nastiest political sense will grow even greater.' Raskin himself seems to be the best case in point. Raskin's alienation expresses itself in his vision of the pervasive presence of conspiracy in our society and especially in our government." It does not help Goldberg's argument that Judge Lawrence Walsh, the independent counsel investigating the Iran-Contra affair, has so far brought indictments for conspiracy, coverup, and perjury against a former secretary of defense and a former national security adviser, as well as high-ranking CIA officials. Judge Walsh, as far as I know, is not given to paranoia, just heavy doses of reality. It is doubtful that such a wide-ranging investigation could have occurred prior to the Watergate scandal, which saw a president and vice-president, indeed, an entire government, fall in disgrace. The legislation that established the independent counsel and the Freedom of Information Act has begun to give us a more accurate glimpse at the operations of

the American government and therefore of political reality.

As far as Goldberg's rendition of the Kennedy assassination and the Warren Commission report, my problems remain. Goldberg states that he and "other members of the staff covered the different segments of the journey within the indicated time span." I am not sure if that means each took a different segment or all undertook the various operations that Oswald allegedly performed. I wonder whether Goldberg also fired the Mannlicher-Carcano successfully at a moving target, between 4.6 and 7 seconds from the Texas School Book Depository, or if any other staff member did so, including walk, run, wait for a bus, get a cab, etc., on a day when the wind and conditions were the same. It would have been far more credible if Goldberg had told us that a former marine who, like Oswald, scored just one point over the minimum to qualify as a marksman (although he had done somewhat better a few years before) was put through the same paces using an old Mannlicher-Carcano rifle of the same vintage as the Oswald weapon with defective sights. Finally, it should be noted that the certitude with which Goldberg discusses these events is not present in the Warren Commission report. The commission "could not accept important elements of Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig's testimony namely that he saw a man who he identified as Oswald being picked up by a light colored Rambler station wagon and then drove off" (New York: Bantam, 1964, pp. 147-54).

I stated that the "Warren Commission's bright young staff of lawyers were no match for its putative investigative arms, the CIA and FBI." Goldberg claims that "'the idea of deeply questioning these organizations did not cross their intellectual radar screen' [is] mere verbiage." The hard and stubborn fact is that there was a CIA and Mafia connection. The CIA was engaged with the Mafia in a plot to kill Castro. No one on the staff of the Warren Commission, so far as I can determine, knew about this connection and joint purpose. This point was made painfully clear in U.S. Senate Report No. 94-755, May 26, 1976, page 5, "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," Book V, "Final Report of the Select Committee to study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities." "The Committee has, however, developed evidence which impeaches the process by which the intelligence agencies arrived at their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission. This evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassination was deficient and that facts which might have substantially altered the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI and the CIA, as well as other agencies of government, who were charged with investigating the assassination." (Also referred to in

the House Government Operations Committee cited above.)

In *The Freedom of Information Act and Political Assassinations* (Stevens Point, Wis., 1978-), editor David R. Wrone brings forward an extraordinary document, namely a transcript of a Warren Commission executive session that occurred on January 22, 1964. Beginning at page 226, the record tells the reader how and whether the members of the commission intended to confront the FBI once it appeared that the FBI was more than a casual bystander in relation to Oswald. Waggoner Carr, the attorney-general of Texas, called J. Lee Rankin, the chief counsel of the Warren Commission, who stated that Oswald was acting as an FBI undercover agent for 200 dollars a month and had badge number 179, "paid from September 1962 up through the time of the assassination." Rankin commented to the commission, "It is going to be very difficult for us to be able to establish the fact in it. I am confident that the FBI would never admit it, and I presume their records will never show it, or if their records do show something, I would think their reports would show some kind of a number that could be assigned to a dozen different people according to how they wanted to describe them . . . So that it seemed to me if it truly happened, he (Oswald) did use postal boxes practically every place that he went and that would be an ideal way to get money to anyone that you wanted as an undercover agent, or anybody else that you wanted to do business with."

Rankin pointed out in the same colloquy that his experience with the FBI in the past contrasted with that in the Oswald investigation. The FBI had gone against its own strictures of not evaluating the evidence. He was discomfited by the fact that the FBI had concluded there was no conspiracy before it had "run out all kinds of leads in Mexico or in Russia and so forth." The question the commission members asked was why, and Rankin had an answer. "They would like to have us fold up and quit." Rankin went on to say, "They found the man. There is nothing more to do. The Commission supports the conclusions, and we can go on home and that is the end of it." At this point, the commissioners were aghast at what they were hearing, for now they had to confront the problem of investigating the FBI. This the commission was not prepared to do. The discussion now took another turn. Taking up Hale Boggs' concern about the discussion, Dulles said, "Yes. I think the record ought to be destroyed. Do you think we need a record of this?" The chief justice said to the members of the commission that if they thought it shouldn't be on the record, it should be destroyed. Boggs' final suggestion seems to have been followed, that the discussion would not circulate. In 1963-1964, these men were very busy with other activities. It was not their task to investigate the sources and methods of either the FBI or CIA, even though these may have impinged on the assassination of President Kennedy. The first committee counsel to the House

Select Committee on Assassinations, Richard Sprague, was replaced because of disagreements with congressional members and his attempts to obtain detailed information and cross-examine the various intelligence agencies.

John J. Collins, for his part, overlooks the fact that several people were executed for the assassination of President Lincoln, and it should be noted that in the McKinley assassination, anarchists as a group were blamed. One should also note Elihu Root's charges against William Randolph Hearst for creating an environment for assassination (Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* [New York, 1938], vol. 2, p. 120; see also William Speilman, *William McKinley, Stalwart Republican: A Biographical Study* [New York, 1954], 201).

There is ample disagreement among highly qualified doctors about the Kennedy wounds and the direction from which the bullets came. Most notable is that of the forensic pathologist, Dr. Cyril Wecht of the University of Pittsburgh Medical School. Dr. Lattimer, a urologist, may not be the person best qualified to comment on a bullet wound to the head.

David Kaiser is concerned about the "classic flaws of most work on the assassination and the problems threatening to overwhelm the historical profession." I, too, am concerned but I suspect for very different reasons. First of all, the linkage between crime, politics, and intelligence agencies is not a matter to be taken lightly and I don't. I am sorry that Kaiser neglected to mention the involvement of the CIA in working with the Mafia. It would have helped to fill out the picture more clearly.

Throughout the Cold War, professional historians accepted the idea that the intelligence agencies were off limits. What overwhelmed the historical profession during the Cold War was that much of American policy was conducted through agencies of government that were by organization and inclination secret. The result was heavy doses of deceit and sanitizing of the documents and pronouncements made available to the public. However understandable or inexcusable, this was the government's *modus operandi* for most of the Cold War. Professional historians internalized the notion that they should deal with half the reality deck of what the government did during the Cold War. Now, that war is over. The Soviet Union has collapsed, and the Russians are attempting to make available the KGB files. The same is true for East German files. I would have thought that those who disagreed with me would at least have agreed with the idea that files of the national security state should be opened, namely those of the FBI, CIA, and other national security institutions, including all files with regard to the Kennedy assassination, and that one way of getting at the truth of the Kennedy matter, as well as hundreds of others, would be through public access to undoctored files. Obviously, these, too, would have to be scrutinized carefully for their own truth value. I would have thought that Messrs. Kaiser, Goldberg, and Collins would be com-

mitted to openness and access, especially in times of peace. But there is deafening silence on this point from my antagonists.

The historians now have a choice. They can either serve the cause of democratic society and accuracy by demanding open access to the files of the intelligence agencies, or they can serve the national security state intentionally or unintentionally by accepting as a given its present limitations on information. Is this not the real crisis for American historians who concentrate on the last fifty years of the United States as a world power? Tension and doubt will only get worse and more obvious as the needs of an open, modern, democratic society contradict the demands of the closed aspects of the national security state and its "intelligence community."

MARCUS RASKIN
Institute for Policy Studies

MICHAEL ROGIN REPLIES:

Messrs. Collins and Kaiser indignantly come to the defense of history. Apparently, the historical method they favor does not include the accurate reading of texts. My contribution to the *AHR Forum* deliberately refused to enter the labyrinthine, heated, and ultimately unresolvable debate among Kennedy assassination conspiracy and anti-conspiracy theorists. Either John Collins has confused my essay with Raskin's and Rosenstone's or he is furious because I have not joined the conspiracy debate on his terms. I attended rather to the anxiety producing that debate, which I located in the real power of secret and unaccountable government in the United States and in the widespread, mistaken perception that the American political and cultural coming apart resulted from the killing of the king. Oliver Stone's contribution, I suggested, was to coalesce the challenges to traditional family values and the anxieties about distant power exercised on the body politic into a homosexual conspiracy. (Since David Kaiser has read James Kirkwood's *American Grotesque*, he will know that Jim Garrison himself had already moved in that direction.) *JFK's* homophobia, and the silence about it in all the controversy surrounding the movie, outside the gay press, is the major scandal of Stone's film. If Kaiser actually looked at *JFK*, he would know that the homosexual obsession is in the movie, not the critic. Since Kaiser agrees that a homosexual primal horde did not kill Kennedy, his quarrel is with Oliver Stone, not with me. Don't blame the messenger for bringing the news.

MICHAEL ROGIN
*University of California,
Berkeley*

Robert A. Rosenstone does not wish to respond.

THE EDITOR

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

TO THE EDITOR:

In his February 1992 review of my book, *The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570–1860* [*AHR*, 97 (February 1992): 259–60], Harold G. Marcus makes a frivolous, distorted, inaccurate, and out-of-context attack on my book. A careful reading of the preface itself would have made it clear to Marcus that my book deals only with the history of the Oromo of one particular area—the Gibe region—and it is not the history of all the Oromo within Ethiopia.

The Oromo, who constitute 40 to 50 percent of the population of Ethiopia, are the single largest national group in the Horn of Africa. And yet the Ethiopian historiography ignored them. The reason for this is quite obvious. The former Ethiopian ruling elites, who perceived the danger of the larger Oromo population to their empire, did everything to prevent Oromo study. Up until 1972, it was not even permissible to write, to publish, to preach, or to broadcast in the Oromo language in Ethiopia. Marcus asserts that the Oromo do not have "corporate history" and that "their history is limited." Yes, it is limited, not because of lack of history itself but because of the policy just mentioned.

Marcus also claims that I have based my analysis of early Oromo history on unverified hearsay. Nothing is further from the truth. My conclusion is based on historical data. I questioned the received truth that asserts that the Oromo arrived in the medieval Christian kingdom of Ethiopia only in the sixteenth century. I broke with that tradition and indicated that there were some Oromo groups within the medieval Christian kingdom as early as the fourteenth century. Owing to limited space, I could not discuss this aspect fully in my book.

Marcus accuses me of ignoring "the extent of Oromo cultural assimilation into the northern, Christian power structure during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." This statement only betrays that the reviewer did not read my book. His purpose was to attack my book not for what it discusses but for what exists in his mind. I did not discuss those Oromo who were assimilated into the Christian power structure in northern Ethiopia. That will be the subject of my next book. This one is about the history of the Oromo in the Gibe region in southwestern Ethiopia.

Marcus asserts that "the very strange organization and nature of this book—one chapter on migrations and five on the Gibe states—reveals the limited nature of Oromo history." What is strange is not the organization of the book but the incapacity of the reviewer to read carefully even the table of contents of it. There are two chapters (not one) on migration. There are four chapters (not five) on the Gibe states. My book reveals not the limited nature of Oromo history but the richness, depth, and freshness of

history of the Oromo in the Gibe region, which is only one of the twelve regions over which the Oromo spread within Ethiopia.

I clearly stated in the preface that the two chapters on migration are based on Christian and Muslim literature of more than two centuries, while the last four chapters of my book are based on European travelers' accounts as well as a rich Oromo oral tradition collected during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Marcus claims that I never explained how they were gathered or how I judged them reliable. However, I did precisely that on pages 84–85, as well as in several other places in my book.

MOHAMMED HASSEN
Decatur, Georgia

TO THE EDITOR:

Readers who are not familiar with Ethiopian history and politics must have been misled by the review by Harold G. Marcus of Mohammed Hassen's *Oromo of Ethiopia* [AHR, 97 (February 1992): 259–60]. Ethiopian politics carries over into Ethiopian studies, and dispassionate, scholarly appraisal is rare. Hassen and Marcus are at opposite poles politically and also as historians.

Hassen, an Oromo, is a modern African and a modern historian. As an African, he experiences his nationality, like Chinua Achebe, as part of his identity. As a modern historian, like John Lonsdale, he sees that "moral ethnicity is not given its due in analyses of modern Africa" (Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa* [Athens, Ohio, 1992], 466). As both an African and a historian, he seeks to counter myths that assume that colonizing, literate conquerors were innately superior to those they conquered and therefore justified in their barbarities. My guess is that Hassen would agree with Ernest Gellner that, rather than providing a model of cultural assimilation, the "Amhara empire was a prison house of nations if ever there was one" (Ernest Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism* [Oxford, 1983], 85). Further, like most African refugees, Hassen has worked in hardship, unsupported by travel and research grants.

Marcus, on the other hand, has had a relatively comfortable career as the distinguished hagiologist of Emperor Menelik and as the chronicler of the Shoa chiefdom that became the center of an empire. His enduring commitment has been to the commemoration of Greater Ethiopia, just as other imperial historians have commemorated the expansive dreams of Greater Russia, Greater Serbia, Greater Germany, Greater Japan, Greater Britain, and so on.

To be the diplomatic historian of an empire is fair enough, but it is not fair, I submit, for a senior, established, and tenured scholar to make snide and irrelevant comments on the work of a junior without making his own entrenched position clear.

To make my own position clear, I am a social anthropologist, a sympathizer of the Oromo and other African colonial sufferers, and an admirer of Mohammed Hassen's pioneering work.

P. T. W. BAXTER
University of Manchester

HAROLD G. MARCUS REPLIES:

Mohammed Hassen entitled his book *The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570–1860*. Between its covers, however, I discovered a discussion mostly of the history of Ethiopia's Gibe states, revealing the title to be misleading. When I found in the book's preface an unusual digression neither based on data nor stemming from the putative subject under scrutiny, I pointed it out as a theological issue remote from the book's fancied or real subject. As for the substance of Hassen's book, I wrote that he contributed "an excellent account of the Oromo migration of 1570–1600" and a "well-conceived history of the Oromo Gibe states," evaluations that add up to good scholarly praise.

My few negative comments stemmed from Hassen's book as written. If I claimed that the Oromo had no "corporate" history or that their history was "limited," it was because these conclusions emerged from the author's reconstruction, not from the quirks of my personality. As a serious reviewer, I stay within the context of the scholarship I am asked to assay. In fact, a close reading of the author's rejoinder fully justifies the points I made in my review. Finally, I am happy to learn that Hassen will write a book on the Oromo of northern Ethiopia. I hope that he will select an appropriate title.

As for the commentary by Paul Baxter, I think it fair to state that my task was to review a book, not to assess the author's personal or ethnic background or his professional status. Baxter seeks to deconstruct my prose and my career to assess my motives. I advise my old friend to answer the criticisms in my review, not to explain them away in terms of my "entrenched position."

HAROLD G. MARCUS
Michigan State University

TO THE EDITOR:

The April 1992 review of attorney Alan T. Nolan's *Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History* states Nolan's claim: "Lee the Confederate general wasted southern blood and treasure in an audacious, offensive strategy that precluded any rational chance of victory" (AHR, 97 [April 1992]: 618). This statement is a reiteration of the often expressed criticism that Lee's generalship was especially costly of Confederate manpower. However, the burden of proof on this issue rests with Nolan, who fails in his book to furnish any figures on Lee's casualty rates

compared to other Confederate generals. A related matter is the rates of Confederate losses from disease, which may have been as high as three times Confederate losses caused by battle. Lack of adequate food, sanitation, shelter, clothing, and medical care may have been more debilitating to Confederate military strength than the outcomes of tactics and strategy, and is a matter that Nolan should have investigated but did not.

One recent work that refutes Nolan's claim about the excessive costliness of Lee's generalship is *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, by Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones (1982). In Appendix B of this book, pages 721–32, the authors refute the contention that the defensive was wiser because it was considerably cheaper than the offensive during the Civil War, by pointing out that, in practice, defenders often did not suffer substantially fewer casualties than attackers, because the rigid linear defensive positions both armies used required that penetrations be prevented or closed by reinforcements and counterattacks by the defenders regardless of cost. Thus a Civil War general preferring the defensive over the offensive would not have automatically achieved dramatically fewer casualties.

More significant in relation to Nolan's book, Hattaway and Jones have compared Lee's casualty rates with the average rates of other Confederate generals and assert that Lee achieved an "overall lower record of casualties." The authors conclude that Lee suffered 19.7 percent casualties compared with an average of 21.8 percent casualties for all other Confederate generals, particularly significant in view of Lee's forces being on average 75.6 percent of the size of opposing Union forces, while the average forces of all the other Confederate generals were 80.7 percent the size of the opposition. The average casualties on the attack of all Confederate generals without Lee were 25.8 percent, while Lee when on the attack suffered on average 21.6 percent casualties. Nolan's claim that Lee was especially wasteful of Southern manpower is highly questionable.

JOSEPH FORBES
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

ALAN T. NOLAN REPLIES:

Joseph Forbes criticizes my book in two respects, apparently as a result of Emory M. Thomas's review. In the first place, Forbes faults me for not addressing the issue of "Lee's casualty rates compared to other Confederate generals." I did not address that issue because it is irrelevant to the theses of my book. For the same reason, I did not set forth statistics bearing on that issue. Forbes further complains that I did not investigate Confederate losses from disease, diet, sanitation, shelter, clothing, and medical care. These he claims were debilitating to Confederate military strength. Again, such data have nothing to do with my theses.

My book includes a consideration of that aspect of the Lee myth that asserts he was the master general, a military genius. Lee was an effective and sometimes brilliant field commander, but his towering reputation results from viewing his leadership a campaign or a battle at a time and disregarding the considerations of strategy to win the war. I argue that in *strategic* terms, Lee did not understand the war. This is such an ultimate failure that his frequently brilliant maneuvers and tactics simply do not overcome it.

Because of its relatively limited manpower, the Confederacy was never in a position to defeat the North militarily. Its only chance was to make the war so costly to the North that the North would give it up. To do this, it was essential for Lee to observe a conserving, defensive strategy, the counterpart of Washington's strategy in the War for Independence. Such a strategy would not have required Lee always to defend; occasional reasoned offensive campaigns and tactics could have been undertaken within the framework of the defensive strategy.

Lee's strategic view was set forth in a letter of July 6, 1864, to President Davis: "If we can defeat or drive the armies of the enemy from the field, we shall have peace. All of our efforts and energies should be devoted to that object." This is a statement of offensive strategy. Lee believed that, to win the war, the South had to overpower the North militarily, to decimate its armies and disperse them. As late as 1864, he told General Jubal A. Early that "we must *destroy* this army of Grant's before he gets to the James River" (emphasis mine). His army already reduced by the 1862–1863 offensives, it was simply not possible for Lee to *destroy* Grant's overwhelming force. He could injure it and slow it down, but he could not destroy it. The point is that, even as late as 1864, Lee thought strategically in terms of the military defeat of the Federals.

A reference to 1862–1863 is appropriate. Having taken command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862, for two years Lee vigorously pursued the strategic offensive in an effort to defeat the North militarily: the Peninsula, the Second Bull Run Campaign, the Maryland Campaign, Chancellorsville, and the Pennsylvania Campaign. He either attacked or, in the case of Second Bull Run and the Maryland Campaign, maneuvered offensively so as to precipitate large and costly battles. He did this although he had predicted that a siege in the Richmond defenses would be fatal to his army. In order to avoid being fixed, to avoid a siege, an army must be mobile. And mobility, the capacity to maneuver, requires numbers in some reasonable relationship to the enemy's numbers. In the course of his offensives, Lee took disproportionate, irreplaceable, and unaffordable losses that undermined the viability of his army, deprived it of mobility, and committed it to a siege.

It was in connection with my argument that I did compare Lee's losses to those of the Federals. For example:

	<i>Federals</i>	<i>Confederates</i>
The Seven Days	9,796 10.7%	19,739 20.7%
Second Bull Run	10,096 13.3%	9,108 18.8%
Antietam	11,657 15.5%	11,724 22.6%
Chancellorsville	11,116 11.4%	10,746 18.7%
Gettysburg	17,684 21.2%	22,638 30.2%

Forced to the strategic defensive by 1864, Lee demonstrated the value of the strategic defensive, exacting such a price from the North that it came close to abandoning the war. I contend that had he carried out his leadership in this way during the two costly offensive years, he would have saved a substantial portion of the approximately 100,000 soldiers he lost on the offensive. With these additional numbers,


he could have maintained mobility and avoided a siege. Maneuvers like Early's 1864 movement in the valley could have been undertaken with sufficient numbers to be effective. The Federals, on the offensive, could have suffered for an earlier or longer period those ceaseless Federal losses that began in May of 1864. The Northern people could have politically abandoned their support of the war.

In short, I believe that Lee's strategy was destructive to the South's chances of victory. Major General J. F. C. Fuller, the English military historian, seems to me to have fairly characterized Lee's leadership during the first two years of his command: Lee "rushed forth to find a battlefield, to challenge a contest between himself and the North." In this process, he unilaterally accomplished the attrition of his army that led to its being besieged and ultimately surrendered. His losses ultimately prevented his punishing the North sufficiently to induce it to abandon the war—the only chance the South had to win the struggle.

Fortunately, all is not lost. Joseph Forbes and I can look forward to Emory M. Thomas's forthcoming Lee book. All will be well.

ALAN T. NOLAN
Indianapolis, Indiana

Changing Your Address?



If you are planning to move, please let us know at least six weeks in advance before changing your address. Either attach your label from a recent *AHR* or *Perspectives*, or clearly print your old address in the bottom portion of this page. Tear off the page on the broken line and mail to: Membership Secretary, American Historical Association, 400 A St., SE, Washington, DC 20003.

Either attach *AHR* or *Perspectives* label or clearly print your old address in this space.

Print new address in this space.

Name _____

New Address _____

_____ City _____

State _____ Zip _____

American Historical Association

Founded in 1884. Chartered by Congress in 1889
Office: 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

President: Frederic E. Wakeman, *University of California, Berkeley*
President-elect: Louise A. Tilly, *New School for Social Research, New York*
Executive Director: Samuel R. Gammon
Controller: Randy Norell

MEMBERSHIP: persons interested in historical studies, whether professionally or otherwise, are invited to membership. The present membership and subscription total is approximately 18,000. Members elect the officers by ballot.

MEETINGS: The Association's annual meeting takes place December 27–30. The meeting in 1992 will be held in Washington, D.C. Many professional historical groups meet within or jointly with the Association at this time. The Pacific Coast Branch holds separate meetings on the Pacific Coast and publishes the *Pacific Historical Review*.

PUBLICATIONS AND SERVICES: The *American Historical Review* is published five times a year and sent to all members. It is available by subscription to institutions. The Association also publishes its *Annual Report, Perspectives* (newsletter with classified listings), and a variety of pamphlets on historical subjects. To promote history and assist historians, the Association offers other services, including an Institutional Services Program. It also maintains close relations with international, specialized, state, and local historical societies through conferences and correspondence.

PRIZES: The *Herbert B. Adams Prize* of \$1,000 awarded annually for a first book in the field of European history. The *George Louis Beer Prize* of \$1,000 awarded annually for a book on any phase of European international history since 1895. The *Albert J. Beveridge Award* of \$1,000 given annually for the best book on the history of the United States, Canada, or Latin America. The *Albert B. Corey Prize*, sponsored jointly by the AHA and the Canadian Historical Association, of \$2,000 awarded biennially for the best book on the history of Canadian-American relations or the history of both countries (next award, 1992). The *Paul Birdsall Prize* of \$1,000 for a major work by a U.S. or Canadian historian in European military and strategic history offered biennially (next award, 1992). The *James H. Breasted Prize* of \$1,000 offered annually for the best book in English in any field of history prior to 1000 A.D. The *John H. Dunning Prize* of \$1,000 awarded biennially for a book on any subject relating to American history (next award, 1993). The *John K. Fairbank*

Prize in East Asian History since 1800 of \$1,000 awarded annually. The *Herbert Feis Award* of \$1,000 awarded annually to recognize the recent work of independent scholars and public historians. The *Leo Gershoy Award* of \$1,000 awarded annually for outstanding work in seventeenth or eighteenth-century Western European history. The *Clarence H. Haring Prize* of \$500 awarded every five years to a Latin American for an outstanding book in Latin American history (next award, 1996). The *Joan Kelly Memorial Prize* of \$1,000 awarded annually for the best book in women's history and/or feminist theory. The *Littleton-Griswold Prize* of \$1,000 awarded annually for the best work on history of American law and society. The *Howard R. Marraro Prize* in Italian history awarded annually and carrying a cash award of \$500. The *James Harvey Robinson Prize* for the teaching aid that has made the most outstanding contribution to the teaching of history (next biennial award, 1992). The *J. Franklin Jameson Prize* awarded every five years for outstanding editorial achievement (next award, 1995). The *Waldo G. Leland Prize* awarded every five years for the most outstanding reference tool (next award, 1996). The *Alexis de Tocqueville Prize* offered every five years for the best work in U.S. history published outside the U.S. by a foreign scholar (next award, 1994). The *Premio del Rey Prize* of \$1,000 awarded biennially for Spanish medieval history and culture (500–1516 A.D.) (next award, 1992). The *Morris D. Forkosh Prize* awarded every other year to recognize the best book in the field of British, British Imperial, or British Commonwealth history (next award, 1993).

DUES: For incomes of \$60,000 and above, \$85.00 annually; \$50,000–\$59,999, \$75.00; \$40,000–\$49,999, \$65.00; \$30,000–\$39,999, \$55.00; \$20,000–\$29,999, \$45.00; below \$20,000, students, and joint memberships, \$25.00; associate (nonhistorian) \$35.00; life \$1,200; teachers of K-12 \$70.00, K-12 without *The Review* \$45.00. Non-U.S. members add \$8.00 for postage. Members receive the *American Historical Review, Perspectives*, the program of the annual meeting, and the *Annual Report* on request.

CORRESPONDENCE: Inquiries should be addressed to the Executive Director at 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

American Historical Review

Founded in 1895

The *AHR* is sent to all members of the American Historical Association; information concerning membership will be found on the preceding page. The *AHR* is also available to institutions by subscription. There are two categories of subscription:

CLASS I: *American Historical Review* only, United States \$48.00, foreign \$56.00.

CLASS II: *American Historical Review*, *Perspectives*, the program of the annual meeting of the Association, and the *Annual Report*, United States \$60.00, foreign \$70.00.

Single copies of the current issue and back issues in and subsequent to volume 92 (1987) can be ordered from the Membership Secretary of the Association at \$12.00 per copy. Issues prior to volume 90 (1985) should be ordered from Kraus Reprint Company, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y., 10546.

Notice of nonreceipt of an issue must be sent to the Membership Secretary of the Association within three months of the date of publication of the issue. Changes of address should be sent to the Membership Secretary by the first of the month preceding the month of publication. The Association is not responsible for copies lost because of failure to report a change of address in time for mailing. The Association cannot accommodate changes of address that are effective only for the summer months.

Correspondence regarding contributions and books for review should be sent to the Editor, *American Historical Review*, 914 Atwater, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. For further information on the submission of manuscripts, see page ii at the front of this issue.


Fire from Heaven

Life in an English Town in the Seventeenth Century

David Underdown

This engrossing book recreates a seventeenth-century English town in all its vitality and richness. David Underdown explains why Dorchester was transformed from a provincial backwater into the most fervently religious town in England, places this transformation in the context of national and international events, and describes the lives of the townspeople—both the high minded reformers and the boisterous characters they attempted to reform.

"A gem of a book."—Roy Porter, *The Sunday Times* \$28.50



The Jews of Germany

A Historical Portrait

Ruth Gay

with an introduction by Peter Gay

"Through a lively narrative, enhanced by abundant contemporary documents and illustrations, Ruth Gay lays out a broad and fascinating panorama. This popularly written book presents the reader with a fine introduction to the leading personalities, the significant economic and cultural achievements, and the ultimate tragedy of German Jewry."—Michael A. Meyer

"*The Jews of Germany* is a magnificently illustrated historical synthesis. It will be an essential reference work for a long time to come."—Saul Friedlander 277 b/w + 20 color illus. \$35.00

Yale University Press

92A Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520

New in paperback

Grand Strategies in War and Peace

Edited by Paul M. Kennedy

"Kennedy...has assembled a team of genuine experts...[who] analyze the strategic thinking of the British, the European powers, and the United States in this thoroughly stimulating, provocative collection."—*Virginia Quarterly Review* \$12.00

The Lessons of History

Michael Howard

"Reading *The Lessons of History*,...it becomes all too evident that any study of modern history is inseparable from military history. That is one of the main points emerging from Howard's eloquent book...on the nature of armed conflict....What comfort is there in reading *The Lessons of History*? Nothing less than the pleasures of encountering a challenging mind, supported by a great store of information, delivered in graceful language."—Herbert Mitgang, *The New York Times* \$11.00

Wolfe Tone

Prophet of Irish Independence

Marianne Elliott

"A lucidly searching study of a most complex character who emerged from the Protestant Irish elite to become the mouthpiece of Irish national aspirations and the catalyst of political and military actions in the heady days of the French Revolution....Full of insights, sensitive and fair-minded...written in a crisp style."—John McGurk, *History Today* \$20.00



Winner of the American Conference for Irish Studies' 1991 James S. Donnelly, Sr., Prize for History and the Social Sciences


Oxford

Civil Rights and the Idea of Freedom

RICHARD H. KING,
University of Nottingham

Focusing attention on the political ideas that were influential as well as those that were central to the civil rights movement, this pathbreaking book examines not only written texts but also oral history interviews to establish a rich tradition of freedom that emerged from the movement.

1992 288 pp. \$35.00



The Evolution of Women's Asylums Since 1500

From Refuges for Ex-Prostitutes to Shelters for Battered Women

SHERRILL COHEN

"This book combines a comprehensive history of women's asylums from their origins to the present, with a richly textured analysis of three pioneer foundations in early modern Tuscany. The chapters on those institutions contain poignant accounts of the lives and fortunes of marginal women, and the pressures that impelled them to enter asylums."—Gene Brucker, *University of California, Berkeley*

1992 288 pp. \$39.95

Jews in Christian America

The Pursuit of Religious Equality

NAOMI W. COHEN, *City University of New York*

"Her work is a brilliant and distinctive contribution, valuable not only for those concerned with the history of church-state, religion-government, and interfaith relations in America, but also for those seeking a fuller understanding in depth of many controversial issues now before Supreme, state, and local courts."—Robert T. Handy, *Union Theological Seminary*

1992 320 pp. \$39.95

New in paperback!

The Gestapo and German Society

Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-1945

ROBERT GELLATELY, *University of Western Ontario*

"This excellent and disturbing book demolishes a number of long-accepted myths."—*The Historian*. "A valuable contribution not only to the literature on the Gestapo but also to the study of public accommodation and cooperation in the Third Reich."—*American Historical Review*.

1990 (paper 1992) 320 pp. paper \$24.95 cloth \$45.00

German Resistance Against Hitler

The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938-1945

KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER, *Smith College, Emeritus*

This book traces the many efforts of the German Resistance to forge alliances with Hitler's opponents outside Germany. Von Klemperer shows that many of the principles and strategies of the German Resistance, albeit ignored or overridden by the Allies during wartime, found their place in the concerns of international relations in the post-war period.

1992 512 pp. \$49.95

Marxism and the City

IRA KATZNELSON, *The New School for Social Research*

"An imaginative, exhilarating, and critically argued survey of the contribution of Marxist-influenced writings to our understanding of the development of modern western cities and to the ways they constituted and were constituted by statebuilding and the development of modern capitalism."—Steven Lukes, *European University Institute, Florence*

1992 336 pp. \$39.95

Origins of the Federal Judiciary

Essays on the Judiciary Act of 1789

Edited by MAEVA MARCUS, *Supreme Court of the United States*

The Judiciary Act of 1789 established a federal court system, an experiment that became one of the outstanding features of American democracy. This volume of essays analyzes the Act from political and legal perspectives while enhancing our understanding of the history of the judiciary and its role in the constitutional interpretation.

1992 320 pp. \$39.95


The Rise of Gospel Blues

The Music of Thomas Andrew Dorsey in the Urban Church

MICHAEL W. HARRIS,
University of Iowa

Placed in the broader contexts of African-American religion and the large urban migration of African-Americans after World War I, this book looks at the story of the rise of gospel blues as seen through the career of its founding figure, Thomas Andrew Dorsey.

1992 360 pp. \$29.95




Revolutionary Sparks

Freedom of Expression in Modern America

MARGARET A. BLANCHARD,
*University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill*

A broad-gauged discussion of freedom of expression in America, this book presents a lively discussion of freedom of speech ranging from questions of national security to those of public morality, from loyalty during times of national stress to the right to preach on a public street corner.

1992 592 pp. \$49.95



New in paperback!

Quakers and the American Family

British Settlement in the Delaware Valley

BARRY LEVY, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

"This book represents recent social and intellectual history at its best. Like a finely cut gem, its carefully coordinated facets glitter and shine....[Levy's] analysis is subtle and complex, blending intellectual, social, economic, and demographic sources."—*History: Review of New Books* 1988 (paper 1992) 368 pp. paper \$14.95 cloth \$35.00

New in paperback!

Searching the Heart

Women, Men, and Romantic Love in Nineteenth-Century America

KAREN LYSTRA, *California State University, Fullerton*

"A rich source for understanding the private/public dichotomy at the heart of middle-class Victorian culture....Lystra's engaging study adds to the literature that rejects the old stereotype of Victorian sexual repression and moves beyond it to advance the more provocative and more problematic argument that women gained power, standing and status through romantic love."—*The Nation*

1989 (paper 1992) 352 pp. paper \$14.95 cloth \$30.00

Land and Power

The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948

ANITA SHAPIRA, *Tel-Aviv University*

Shapira traces the road along which the Zionist movement discarded its early mission of peaceful settlement in Palestine, to the incorporation of the use of force as a legitimate tool for realizing the idea of Jewish national sovereignty there.

1992 464 pp. \$59.00

Aristocratic Liberalism

The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burckhardt, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville

ALAN S. KAHAN, *Rice University*

"An overwhelmingly convincing case for linking these three great nineteenth-century figures in a single intellectual and ideological tradition. This kind of group portrait is, in my view, among the most delicate achievements of the intellectual historian, and Kahan demonstrates a complete mastery of the necessary skills. He is an incisive analyst of his three thinkers (whose works he reads in the original), and his control over the scholarly literature is impressive."—Paul Robinson, *Stanford University*

1992 240 pp. \$39.95

Studies in Contemporary Jewry

Volume VIII: A New Jewry?

America Since the Second World War

Edited by PETER Y. MEDDING, *Hebrew University, Jerusalem*

The eighth volume of the acclaimed annual publication of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the contributions here focus on the history and development of American Jewish life since World War II.

1992 448 pp. \$35.00


Soldiers of Christ

Preaching in Late Medieval and Reformation France

LARISSA J. TAYLOR, *Wellesley College and Harvard University*

"Its original insights into the social history of preaching and preachers are often peppered with amusing anecdotes, served up in a vigorous prose style. From doctrine to social criticism, from the Virgin Mary to prostitutes, the sermons represent a treasure chest of social vignettes and a mirror of late medieval French society. In short, I find this to be an outstanding piece of scholarship, written in a style that animates an important topic."—R. Po-chia Hsia, *New York University*

1992 368 pp. \$55.00



Prices are subject to change and apply only in the U.S. To order, send check or money order to: Social Sciences Marketing, Dept. KLH. To order by phone using major credit cards please call 1-800-451-7556.

Oxford University Press ♦ 200 Madison Avenue ♦ New York, NY 10016

AWARD WINNING HISTORY FROM CAMBRIDGE

Winner of the Society of American Historians' 1992 Francis Parkman Prize and Co-winner of the Organization of American Historians' 1992 James A. Rawley Prize

The Middle Ground

Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815

Richard White

37104-X Hardcover \$69.50

42460-7 Paper \$19.95

Winner of the American Historical Association's 1991 Howard A. Marraro Prize

The Cost of Empire

Neapolitan Finance During the Period of Spanish Rule

Antonio Calabria

39176-8 Hardcover \$44.95

Winner of the American Historical Association's 1991 George Louis Beer Prize

Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955

John Gillingham

40059-7 Hardcover \$49.95

Winner of the Forest History Society's Charles A. Weyerhaeuser Award

Americans and Their Forests

A Historical Geography

Michael Williams

42837-8 Paper \$29.95

Winner of the Law and Society Association's 1991 James Willard Hurst Award

Nature Incorporated

Industrialization and the Waters of New England

Theodore Steinberg

39215-2 Hardcover \$34.50

Winner of the Society for History in the Federal Government's Thomas Jefferson Prize

Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867

Series I, Volume 3: The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Lower South

Ira Berlin, Thavolia Glymph, Steven F. Miller, Joseph P. Reidy, Leslie S. Rowland, Julie Saville

41742-2 Hardcover \$54.95

Winner of the American Association for the History of Medicine's William H. Welch Medal

Death by Migration

Europe's Encounter with the Tropical World in the Nineteenth Century

Philip D. Curtin

38922-4 Paper \$13.95

Winner of the American Historical Association's 1991 Robert Livingston Schuyler Prize and the 1991 Herbert Baxter Adams Prize

Class Formation and Urban-Industrial Society

Bradford, 1750-1850

Theodore Koditschek

32771-7 Hardcover \$79.95

Winner of the Bancroft Prize for 1991 and the Philip Taft Labor History Award

Making a New Deal

Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939

Lizabeth Cohen

42838-6 Paper \$15.95

Available in bookstores or from

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211. Call toll free 1-800-872-7423.
MasterCard/VISA accepted. Prices subject to change.

New in American History from Cambridge

Victorian America and the Civil War

Anne C. Rose

This book examines the relationships between American Victorian culture and the Civil War. In examining the biographies of seventy-five Americans who lived in the antebellum and Civil War eras, elements of disequilibrium, passion and intellectual excitement are explored in contrast to the traditional view of Victorian self-control and moral assurance.

41081-9 Hardcover \$29.95

New England's Generation

The Great Migration and the Formation of Society and Culture in the Seventeenth Century

Virginia DeJohn Anderson

Through analyses of the process of migration and settlement and of the symbolic meaning that participants attached to their experiences, the book tells the story of New England's origins as one of dynamism and change.

40506-8 Hardcover \$34.50

The United States as a Developing Country

Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s

Martin J. Sklar

These seven essays are concerned with the U.S. as a developing country in the early twentieth century. Critical linkages are drawn among economic, political, and cultural developments in the 1920s, raising a parallel between Henry Adams in the Progressive Era, the "Young Intellectuals" of the Twenties, and the New Left in the Sixties.

40060-0 Hardcover \$49.95

40922-5 Paper \$14.95

The Strategy and Consistency of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1924-1933

David C. Wheelock

This book examines the policy strategy developed by the Federal Reserve during the 1920s and also the effects on policy of the institutional changes occurring prior to the depression.

Studies in Monetary and Financial History

39155-5 Hardcover \$39.95

The National Integration of Italian Return Migration, 1870-1929

Dino Cinel

This book examines return migration to Italy from the United States from 1870 to 1929. The book documents the flow back to Italy of individuals and remittances and discusses the strategies used by returnees in investing American savings.

40058-9 Hardcover \$49.50

The Devil's Dominion

Magic and Religion in

Early New England

Richard Godbeer

"The Devil's Dominion probes one of Puritanism's most terrifying anomalies: a fascination for supernatural belief... No book better explains how and why so many New Englanders lost their lives to witch prosecutions. *The Devil's Dominion* does not explain away the witchcraft charges, as is traditional, but probes their origins; it is intellectual and social history at its most arresting."

—Jon Butler, *Yale University*

40329-4 Hardcover \$24.95

New in British History

Mr. Bligh's Bad Language

Passion, Power, and Theater
on the *Bounty*

Greg Dening

"Greg Dening has produced a powerful new account of an event that has, over two centuries, helped to define our modern understandings of tyranny and resistance. His tale about Bligh and the mutineers is imaginative and learned, engaging and entertaining, much to be enjoyed by anyone interested in the society and culture of wooden ships and iron men." —*Marcus Rediker, Georgetown University*

38370-6 Hardcover \$34.95

Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform

Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 1860–1880

Eugenio F. Biagini

In a radically innovative synthesis of the history of popular support for the Liberal party during the second half of the nineteenth century, the author shows that liberalism in Britain was a mass movement.

40315-4 Hardcover \$74.95

The Victorian Achievement of Sir Henry Maine

A Centennial Reappraisal

Editor: Alan Diamond

In this book some of the world's leading scholars in the fields of anthropology, sociology, linguistics, jurisprudence, South Asian studies and the history of ideas come together to consider the extraordinary achievement of Sir Henry Maine.

Contributors: *Alan Diamond, George Feaver, John W. Burrow, Raymond Cocks, Krishan Kumar, Stefan Collini, Alan D. J. McFarlane, Edward Shils, John D. Y. Peel, Ray Abrabams, Peter G. Stein, William Twining, Calvin Woodard, David E. Yale, Bernard S. Jackson, John Lyons, Clive Dewey, Gordon Johnson, Christopher A. Bayly.*

40023-6 Hardcover \$79.95

Virtue Transformed

Political Argument in England, 1688–1740

Shelley Burt

In tracing the emergence of a privately oriented conception of civic virtue from the period's public discourse, this book not only challenges the received notions of the fortunes of virtue in the early modern era but provides a promising critical perspective on the question of what sort of politics of virtue is possible or desirable today.

37528-2 Hardcover \$39.95

The Spirit of the Oxford Movement

Tractarian Essays

Owen Chadwick

"...the collection is interesting to read. The author is a great scholar and a superb writer." —*John R. Griffin, The Catholic History Review*

42440-2 Paper \$19.95

Merchant Enterprise in Britain

From the Industrial Revolution to World War I

Stanley Chapman

This survey of the mercantile sector concentrates on the various ways in which British merchants responded to the opportunities of the Industrial Revolution and the growth of the British Empire

35178-2 Hardcover \$69.95

Hailey

A Study in British Imperialism, 1872–1969

John W. Cell

William Malcolm Hailey (1872–1969) was by common consent the most distinguished member of the Indian Civil Service in the twentieth century. This is the first book-length study of Hailey's career. Its larger theme, in which the man himself played a truly amazing number of central roles, is the theme of colonialism-nationalism-decolonization: spanning more than half a century on two continents.

41107-6 Hardcover \$47.95

from Cambridge

The London Hanged

Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century

Peter Linebaugh

"Anyone who has an abiding interest in historical writing—and is willing to make the same demands of it (and of themselves) that they make of serious fiction—will find in Linebaugh's work a great and original feast... He is easily one of the finest, most original historians now writing." —*Michael Merrill, The Nation*

41842-9 Hardcover \$44.95

Philosophy, Science and Religion in England, 1640–1700

Editors: **Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft and Perez Zagorin**

This interdisciplinary collection of essays looks at the distinctively English intellectual, social and political phenomenon of Latitudinarianism.

Contributors: *Richard Kroll, Alison Coudert, Sarah Hutton, Joseph M. Levine, Alan Gabbey, Perez Zagorin, Richard Ashcraft, Margaret Osler, Michael Hunter, John Rogers, John Marshall.*

41095-2 Hardcover \$59.95

The English Rural Community

Image and Analysis

Editor: **Brian Short**

This important and innovative overview of the English rural community, past and present, offers an interdisciplinary perspective on the realities behind the myths and images of rural England.

Contributors: *Brian Short, Joan Thirsk, Malcolm Kitch, Alun Howkins, John Barrell, Stuart Laing, John Lowerso, Peter Ambrose, Susan Wright.*

40537-8 Hardcover \$59.95

40567-X Paper

The Revolution of 1688–89

Changing Perspectives

Editor: **Lois G. Schworer**

The sixteen essays in this book offer novel and interdisciplinary interpretations of the Revolution and of the late Stuart and early Hanoverian world.

Contributors: *Stephen B. Baxter, J. M. Beattie, Karl S. Bottingheimer, Gary S. De Krey, Jack P. Greene, K. H. D. Haley, Bruce P. Lenman, Howard Nenner, J. G. A. Pocock, Lois Potter, John C. Rule, Gordon J. Schochet, Lois G. Schworer, W. A. Speck, Rachel J. Weil, Steven N. Zwickler.*

39321-3 Hardcover \$59.95

Francis Bacon, The State and the Reform of Natural Philosophy

Julian Martin

Bacon's axiom that "Knowledge is Power" takes on far-reaching implications in Martin's challenging argument that the reform of natural philosophy was a central part of an audacious plan to strengthen the powers of the Crown in the State.

38249-1 Hardcover \$49.95

Friends in Life and Death

British and Irish Quakers, 1650–1900

Richard T. Vann and David Eversley

This book looks at patterns of child-bearing, marriage and death among more than 8,000 Quaker families during a period of demographic transition.

Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy and Society in Past Time 17

39201-2 Hardcover \$49.50

William Cobbett and Rural Popular Culture

Ian Dyck

This first book-length study of William Cobbett (1763–1835) uses Cobbett's own writings as well as innovative sources such as popular rural songs to tie Cobbett's radical politics to the countryside.

41394-X Hardcover \$59.95

New in European History

The Racial State

Germany 1933–1945

*Michael Burleigh and
Wolfgang Ipperman*

"In looking at the racial underpinnings of virtually every move made by the Nazi state, this book tries to refute the idea that the Third Reich represented just another form of national modernization. . . . [The authors] argue convincingly that Nazism was on its way to creating a society demarcated by race, not economic class." —*Library Journal*
39114-8 Hardcover \$29.95

Contending with Hitler

Varieties of German Resistance
in the Third Reich

Editor: David Clay Large

This volume consists of twelve original essays that serve as a distillation of recent scholarship on Germany's domestic resistance to the Nazi dictatorship.

Contributors: *David Clay Large, Willy Brandt, Theodore Ellenoff, Fritz Stern, Martin Broszat, Detlev J. K. Peukert, Claudia Koonz, Konrad Kwiet, Michael Krüger-Charlé, Peter Steinbach, Thomas Childers, Peter Hoffman, Klemens von Klemperer, Charles Maier, Hans Mommsen*
Publications of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C.

41459-8 Hardcover \$34.95

A History of the Peoples of Siberia

Russia's North Asian Colony
1581–1990

James Forsyth

This first ethnohistory of Siberia to appear in English presents a vast corpus of previously inaccessible ethnographic and linguistic material.

40311-1 Hardcover \$79.95

Inessa Armand

Revolutionary and Feminist

R. C. Elwood

Professor R. C. Ellwood explores Armand's relatively short life as a Tolstoyan, a lady philanthropist interested in rehabilitating prostitutes, an underground propagandist arrested five times by the tsarist police, an important Bolshevik organizer in Western Europe before the revolution, and a leading Soviet feminist from 1917 to 1920

41486-5 Hardcover \$49.95

The Popular Front and Central Europe

The Dilemmas of French Impotence
1918–1940

Nicole Jordan

This illuminating study investigates the implications of French military, economic, and diplomatic policies in Central Europe from Versailles until the fall of France, establishing the proper context for the policy options of Leon Blum's Popular Front.

41077-0 Hardcover \$59.95

Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922

*Editors: Carole Fink, Axel Frohn,
and Jurgen Heideking*

This book, a unique international collaboration, presents various perspectives on the Genoa Conference: its leadership, goals, and outcome.

Contributors: *Carole Fink, Andrew Williams, Peter Kruger, Sally Marks, Manfred Berg, Stephen A. Schuker, Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstov, A. A. Fursenko, Giorgio Petracchi, Frank Hadler, Magda Adam*

Publications of the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C.

41167-X Hardcover \$44.50

from Cambridge

Pogroms

Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History

Editors: John D. Klier, Shlomo Lambroza

The contributors look at the role of violence in Russian society; the prejudices, stereotypes and psychology of both the educated society and rural masses; the work of the Tsarist regime, especially the police and army as agents of order and control; and the impact of the pogroms on the sense of Jewish identity and security in the Empire.

Contributors: John D. Klier, I. Michael Aronson, Moshe Mishkinsky, Eric Haberer, Michael Orbach, Michael Ochs, Robert Weinberg, Peter Kenz, Hans Rogger, Abraham Greenbaum

1992 413 pp. 15 halftones / 4 maps / 2 figures / 1 table
40532-7 Hardcover List: \$59.95

The French Revolution and British Popular Politics

Editor: Mark Philp

The nine essays in this collection focus on the dynamics of British popular politics in the 1790s and on the impact of the French Revolution and the subsequent war with France.

39123-7 Hardcover \$49.95

Criminal Justice and Crime in Late Renaissance Florence, 1537-1609

John K. Brackett

This book uses as an index of princely power a thorough examination of the major elements of the Florentine system of criminal justice which reveals the extent of their effectiveness in the capital city and the subject territory.

40405-3 Hardcover \$39.95

Available in bookstores or from

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Court of France 1789-1830

Philip Mansel

This attractively illustrated volume describes the succession of courts and monarchies in France from the revolutionary period to the fall of Charles X.

42398-8 Paper \$19.95

Epidemics and Ideas

Essays on the Historical Perception of Pestilence

Editors: Terence Ranger, Paul Slack

The chapters in this book look at the ways in which the great epidemic diseases of the past have shaped not only our views of medicine and disease, but the ways in which people have defined the "health" of society in general terms.

Contributors: Paul Slack, James Longrigg, Peregrine Horden, Lawrence I. Conrad, Brian Pullan, John V. Pickstone, Richard J. Evans, A. W. Crosby, Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, Terence Ranger, Megan Vaughan, Virginia Berridge.

Past and Present Publications

40276-X Hardcover List: \$49.95

Geography, Technology and War

Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649-1571

John H. Pryor

"A delightfully learned, technically informed and tightly argued monograph such as this commands professional admiration. The author is master of his subject, and of the relevant literature..."

—William H. McNeill,

Sixteenth Century Journal

Past and Present Publications

42892-0 Paper \$16.95

40 W. 20th St., NY, NY 10011-4211

Call toll-free 800-872-7423

MasterCard/VISA accepted.

Prices subject to change.

New in paperback

The Cambridge Cultural History of Britain

Boris Ford, Editor

This nine-volume series presents a survey of the art, architecture, literature and music of Britain from prehistoric times through present day. Each volume includes an introductory chapter that offers a cultural and social backdrop to the period followed by illustrated chapters written by specialists. Originally published in hardcover as *The Cambridge Guide to the Arts of Britain*.

Early Britain

Includes: Beowulf, The Dream of the Rood, Stonehenge, Hadrian's Wall, Bath, Roman mosaics, wall paintings and silverware, the Sutton Hoo treasure, illuminated manuscripts, stained glass.

42881-5 \$19.95 Paper

Medieval Britain

Includes: Royal patronage, a dominant Church, Chaucer, the Gawain poet, Wells Cathedral, Medieval Mystery Plays, plainchant, minstrelsy.

42882-3 \$19.95 Paper

16th Century Britain

Includes: The dissolution of the monasteries, the Spanish Armada, Protestant humanism, Erasmus, More, Spenser, Hampton Court, Longleat House, Marlowe, Shakespeare.

42883-1 \$19.95 Paper

17th Century Britain

Includes: The Civil War, the Plague, the Great Fire of London, Milton, Bunyan, the Metaphysical Poets, Newton, Locke, Wren, Inigo Jones, Jacobean tragedy, Restoration comedy.

42884-X \$19.95 Paper

18th Century Britain

Includes: Social Harmony, Rationality, Pope, Dryden, Gainsborough, Reynolds, Addison and Steele's *Spectator*, Swift, Fielding, Hogarth.

42885-8 \$19.95 Paper

The Romantic Age in Britain

Includes: Industrialization, scientific discovery, Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Austen, Turner, Constable, Nash, Academy of Music, Isambard Kingdom Brunel.

42886-6 \$19.95 Paper

Victorian Britain

Includes: the Great Exhibition, William Morris, the pre-Raphaelites, Dickens, George Eliot, Ruskin, Elgar, Delius.

42887-4 \$19.95 Paper

Early 20th Century Britain

Includes: World Wars, the General Strike, Bloomsbury, Lawrence, Joyce, Yeats, Epstein, Lutyens, Vaughan, Williams, Holst, Britten, radio, film.

42888-2 \$19.95 Paper

Modern Britain

Includes: the Cold War, John Osborne, Tom Stoppard, Doris Lessing, the Beatles, Henry Moore, Graham Sutherland, radio, television, film.

42889-0 \$19.95 Paper

Available in bookstores or from

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211

Call toll-free 800-872-7423.

MasterCard/VISA accepted.

Prices subject to change.

Gendered Domains

Rethinking Public and Private in Women's History
Essays from the Seventh Berkshire Conference on the History of Women

EDITED BY DOROTHY O. HELLY
AND SUSAN M. REVERBY

"An excellent collection that reflects some of the most interesting recent scholarship in women's history. Recent critiques of the concept of the split between public and private spheres have not adequately examined the historical foundations of the model, and this volume fills this gap."

—Laura Frader, Northeastern University.

\$42.50 cloth, \$13.95 paper

The Counter-Reformation in the Villages

Religion and Reform in the Bishopric of Speyer, 1560–1720

MARC R. FORSTER

Forster reconstructs and analyzes the history of the Catholic Counter-Reformation in the Bishopric of Speyer from the later sixteenth to the early eighteenth century. \$37.50

The Emperor in the Roman World

With a New Afterword by the Author

FERGUS MILLAR

New in Paper! A work of classic stature first published in 1977, *The Emperor in the Roman World* is available now for the first time in paperback with a new afterword written by the author. "A work of enormous learning addressed to a subject of wide scope." —*Times Literary Supplement*. 21.95

Knowing Words

Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece

LISA RAPHALS

For the Greeks, the craft of Odysseus and the wisdom of Athena were examples of *metis*, an elusive cast of mind that ranged from wisdom and forethought to craft and cunning. Invoking indigenous Chinese debates, Raphals here examines the role and significance of metic intelligence in classical Chinese philosophy, literature, history, and military strategy. *Myth and Poetics*. \$39.95

At bookstores, or call 607-277-2211 (credit card orders only, please)

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

124 Roberts Place, Ithaca NY 14850

The Roots of Rural Capitalism

Western Massachusetts, 1780–1860

CHRISTOPHER CLARK

New in Paper!

Winner of the Organization of American Historians' 1991 Frederick Jackson Turner Award.

"*The Roots of Rural Capitalism* is solid, invariably intelligent, and significant. Its imprint upon studies of the northern countryside, and of rural history generally, will be felt—and appreciated—for a long time."

—*Journal of Social History*. \$14.95

True France

The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900–1945

HERMAN LEBOVICS


Lebovics shows how, among politicians and thinkers on both the right and the left, the glorification of True France masked the cultural project of eliminating diversity.

The Wilder House Series in Politics, History, and Culture. \$29.95

James Hutton and the History of Geology

DENNIS R. DEAN

Dean examines the growth and development of Hutton's thought in the light of his training and experience in medicine, agriculture, and philosophy, locating him within the intellectual milieu of Edinburgh at the height of the Scottish Enlightenment. \$38.50



HISTORY

NEW FROM CALIFORNIA

Mountain Fires

The Red Army's Three-Year War in South China, 1934-1938

GREGOR BENTON

Benton reconstructs the dramatic story of the Chinese Communists in southern and central China. "A milestone marking a new maturity in studies of Chinese Communist history." —John S. Service, editor of *Golden Inches*

\$70.00 cloth

From the Soil

The Foundations of Chinese Society

A Translation of Fei Xiaotong's *Xiangtu Zhongguo*

Translated with Introduction and Epilogue by Gary G. Hamilton and Wang Zheng

"A lucid and fascinating work about Chinese society and values. Fei's account of how China differs from the West is every bit as telling now as it was when this book was first published almost half a century ago."

—Orville Schell

\$35.00 cloth, \$11.00 paper

War and Society in Ancient Mesoamerica

ROSS HASSIG

In this study of warfare in ancient Mesoamerica, Hassig offers new insight into three thousand years of Mesoamerican history, from roughly 1500 BC to the Spanish conquest.

\$40.00 cloth, illustrated



History and Tradition in Melanesian Anthropology

JAMES G. CARRIER, ed.

Melanesian societies are frequently portrayed as existing in a timeless, traditional present. These original essays offer an alternative view, one showing that historical evidence can and must inform our understanding of contemporary cultures.

Studies in Melanesian Anthropology

\$38.00 cloth

The Autobiography of Ōsugi Sakae

Translated with an Introduction by Byron K. Marshall

"Not only an important literary work but one of the major documents dealing with the development of the left-wing movement in modern Japanese politics." —Fred G. Notehelfer, author of *Kotoku Shusui*

Voices from Asia

\$30.00 cloth, \$11.00 paper

The Promise of the Land

The Inheritance of the Land of Canaan by the Israelites

MOSHE WEINFELD

"This book is very important, not only as technical biblical criticism but also for its treatment of one of the most pressing and controversial issues of our own time."

—David N. Freedman, co-editor of

UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY LOS ANGELES NEW YORK

HISTORY

NEW FROM CALIFORNIA

Magic Lands

Western Cityscapes and American Culture After 1940

JOHN M. FINDLAY

This first book-length study of the urban West after 1940 explores four intriguing cityscapes—Disneyland, Stanford Industrial Park, Sun City, and the 1962 Seattle World's Fair.

\$35.00 cloth, illustrated

Environment and Experience

Settlement Culture in Nineteenth-Century Oregon

PETER G. BOAG

Boag takes issue with the image of the settler against the frontier, arguing that settlers viewed their new surroundings positively and attempted to create communities in harmony with the landscape.

\$35.00 cloth, illustrated

Women of the Klan

Racism and Gender in the 1920s

KATHLEEN M. BLEE

New in paper—"Probably no future history of the Ku Klux Klan will be written without reference to this ground-breaking work."—*Publishers Weekly*

A Centennial Book

\$12.00 paper, illustrated

A Passion for Polka

Old-Time Ethnic Music in America

VICTOR GREENE

In this story of American ethnic music, with its countless entertainers performing never-forgotten tunes in hundreds of small cities around the country, Greene revises our notion of how many Americans experienced cultural life.

\$28.00 cloth, illustrated

A Scientist's Voice in American Culture

Simon Newcomb and the Rhetoric of Scientific Method

ALBERT E. MOYER

This first full-length study of Newcomb, nineteenth-century America's most celebrated scientist, traces the development of his faith in science and ranges over topics of great public debate in the Gilded Age.

\$40.00 cloth, illustrated

Lives Together/ Worlds Apart

Mothers and Daughters in Popular Culture

SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS

"A bold and exciting book examining the complex relationship between American mothers and their daughters."

—Elaine Tyler May, author of *Homeward Bound*

Walters shows that since World War II, mainstream culture has generally represented the mother/daughter relationship as one of never-ending conflict and thus promoted an "ideology of separation" as necessary.

\$25.00 cloth, illustrated

Containing the Atom

Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Environment, 1963-1971

J. SAMUEL WALKER

The late 1960s saw an extraordinary growth in the American nuclear industry just as public concern and suspicion increased dramatically. *Containing the Atom* is the first scholarly history of nuclear power regulation during those tumultuous years.

\$50.00 cloth, illustrated

At bookstores or order toll-free
1-800-822-6657.

UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY LOS ANGELES NEW YORK

HISTORY

NEW FROM CALIFORNIA

From Fascism to Libertarian Communism

*Georges Valois against
the Third Republic*
ALLEN DOUGLAS

This is the first study of Valois to take his entire life and work as its focus, explaining how certain basic assumptions and patterns of thought took form in strikingly different ideological options.

\$40.00 cloth

The Enlightenment against the Baroque

*Economics and Aesthetics in
the Eighteenth Century*
RÉMY G. SAISSSELIN

Saisselin describes the development of our modern taste, ultimately the successor of the more spiritual and grand baroque *goût*.

An Art Quantum
\$32.00 cloth

Preachers of the Italian Ghetto

DAVID B. RUDERMAN, ed.

This eloquent collection reveals the important role of these preachers: men who served as a bridge between the ghetto and the Christian world outside.

\$22.00 cloth, illustrated

Court and Culture

Dutch Literature, 1350-1450

FRITS PIETER VAN

OOSTROM

*Translated by Arnold J. Pomerans
Foreword by James H. Marrow*

Our common image of the Middle Ages is of a period when cultural activity in Europe came to a standstill. Van Oostrom challenges this notion by presenting evidence of a lively medieval court culture in the northern Netherlands.

*Funded in part with a grant from
the National Endowment for the
Humanities.*

\$45.00 cloth, illustrated

France at the Crystal Palace

*Bourgeois Taste and Artisan
Manufacture in the Nineteenth
Century*

WHITNEY WALTON

Walton approaches the nineteenth-century French industrial development from a new perspective—that of consumption—to illustrate how bourgeois consumers influenced France's distinctive pattern of industrial development.

\$40.00 cloth, illustrated

Reissued—Fernand Braudel's classic three-volume work

CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH CENTURY

Translated by Sian Reynolds

"An extraordinary achievement, which will give historians matter for discussion for years to come. . . . Braudel's range of information is fantastic, his curiosity insatiable, his speculations endless."

—*New Statesman*

The Structures of Everyday Life

Volume I

The Limits of the Possible

\$22.50 paper, illustrated

The Wheels of Commerce

Volume II

\$22.50 paper, illustrated

The Perspective of the World

Volume III

\$22.50 paper, illustrated

At bookstores or order toll-free 1-800-822-6657.

UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY LOS ANGELES NEW YORK



The Constitution, Law, and American Life

Critical Aspects of the Nineteenth-Century Experience

Edited by Donald G. Nieman

The eight essays collected in this volume explore the interrelationship between law and society in nineteenth-century America. The issues addressed include slavery and the legal system, the uses made of the law by women and blacks, the law and social deviance, and the relation between law and urbanization. \$35.00 cloth

The New Deal and American Youth

Ideas and Ideals in a Depression Decade

Richard A. Reiman

This book examines the goals and thinking that went into the formation and management of one of the key agencies of the New Deal: the National Youth Administration. Richard Reiman shows how the NYA's designers sought to make it a reform agency that would advance and protect democracy by countering totalitarian appeals to young people and by equalizing educational opportunities for rich and poor. \$35.00 cloth

Women, Writing, History 1640-1740

Edited by Isobel Grundy and Susan Wiseman

The years 1640-1740 were a time of rapid social and political change in England—a period that saw the emergence of the first professional women writers. This collection of ten essays offers fresh perspectives on the effects of such changes on literary genres, politics, and the perception of the "place" of women in society. \$40.00 cloth, \$18.00 paperback

Islanders in the Stream

A History of the Bahamian People

Volume I: From Aboriginal Times to the End of Slavery

Michael Craton and Gail Saunders

The first comprehensive chronicle of the Bahamian people, this book is also the first work of its kind and scale for any Caribbean country. In addition to telling the full history of all the people who have ever inhabited the archipelago, *Islanders in the Stream* also describes and explains the evolution of a Bahamian national identity within the comparative framework of neighboring territories in similar circumstances.

16 pages of illus., \$60.00 cloth

At better bookstores or from
The University of GEORGIA Press
 Athens, Georgia 30602

HARVARD

Horse Power

A History of the Horse and Donkey in Human Societies

Juliet Clutton-Brock

If not for a horse, would Alexander have been the Great? William, the Conqueror? Richard, the Lionhearted? It is hard to comprehend how far horse power has carried us, difficult to imagine, in our era of mechanical wizardry what role the horse has played in shaping human history. This is the challenge Juliet Clutton-Brock takes up in her book, a splendid blend of natural and social history that recounts the horse's story as it has figured in—and transfigured—our own. *Natural History Museum, London*

22 color illus., 91 halftones, 48 line illus. \$29.95 cloth

Perry of London

A Family and a Firm on the Seaborne Frontier, 1615–1753

Jacob M. Price

The establishment of English colonies in North America and the West Indies in the seventeenth century created new opportunities for trade. Conspicuous among the families who used these opportunities to gain mercantile and social importance was the Perry family of Devon, who created the most important London firm trading to the Chesapeake and other parts of North America.

Jacob Price traces the family from Devon to Spain, Ireland, Scotland, the Chesapeake, New England, and London. The Perrys' story reveals the interrelatedness of social, commercial, and political history.

Harvard Historical Studies, 111

\$30.00 cloth

Idolatry

Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit

Translated by Naomi Goldblum

This book examines the meaning and nature of idolatry—and, in doing so, reveals much about the monotheistic tradition that defines itself against this sin.


The authors consider Christianity and Islam, but focus primarily on Judaism. They explore competing claims about the concept of idolatry that emerges in the Hebrew Bible, as a "whoring after false gods." The authors show how this debate, over idolatry as practice or error, has taken shape and has in turn shaped the course of Western thought—from the differentiation between Jewish and Christian conceptions of God to the distinctions between true and false belief that inform the tradition of religious enlightenment.

\$39.95 cloth

New Worlds, Ancient Texts

The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery

Anthony Grafton



Describing an era of exploration during the Renaissance that went far beyond geographic bounds, this book shows how the evidence of the New World shook the foundations of the old, upsetting the authority of the ancient texts that had guided Europeans so far afield. What he recounts is in effect a war of ideas fought, sometimes unwittingly, by manners, scientists, publishers, and rulers over 150 years. He shows us explorers from Cortez and Columbus to Scaliger and Munster, laden with ideas gathered from ancient and medieval texts, in their encounters with the world at large.

Belknap 75 halftones/ \$29.95 cloth

Adventures in Chaos

American Intervention for Reform in the Third World

Douglas J. Macdonald

Can—or should—the United States try to promote reform in client states in the Third World? This question, which reverberates through American foreign policy, is at the heart of *Adventures in Chaos*. A faltering friendly state, in danger of falling to hostile forces, presents the U.S. with three options: withdraw, bolster the existing government, or try to reform it. Douglas Macdonald defines the circumstances that call these policy options into play, combining an analysis of domestic politics in the U.S., cognitive theories of decision making, and theories of power relations drawn from sociology, economics, and political science. He examines the conditions that promote the reformist option and then explores strategies for improving the success of reformist intervention in the future.

\$39.95 cloth

HARVARD

Reinscribing Moses

Heine, Kafka, Freud, and Schoenberg in a European Wilderness

Bluma Goldstein

Heinrich Heine, Franz Kafka, Sigmund Freud, Arnold Schoenberg—all were Jews who considered themselves more European than Jewish. Yet their experience of anti-Semitism undermined a full commitment to their native German or Austrian heritage. Their writings about Moses are Bluma Goldstein's focal point in her eloquent book about Jewish identity and assimilation, tradition and cultural allegiance. Skillfully blending textual interpretation, historical context, and biography, Goldstein is able to illuminate the particular meaning of these works as well as their political significance.

\$32.50 cloth

Getting Work

Philadelphia, 1840–1950

Walter Licht

How did working people find jobs in the past? How has the process changed over time for various groups of job seekers? Walter Licht uses intensive primary source research on a major industrial city for a period of over one hundred years to tackle these questions. He looks at when and how young people secured first jobs, the influence of agencies on the hiring process, schools and work, apprenticeship programs, unions, the role of firms in structuring work opportunities, the state as employer and as shaper of employment conditions, and the problem of losing work—the job search as a seemingly perpetual activity.

\$39.95 cloth

Making the Empire Work

London and American Interest Groups, 1690–1790

Alison Gilbert Olson

Alison Olson reveals a source of the influence of networks of interest groups working cooperatively in England and America. Between 1640 and 1790 voluntary interest groups emerged in English politics. They began in London and gradually formed loose connections with smaller but similar interests in the English and American provinces. When the London groups became capable of lobbying the national government, they were willing to use their influence on behalf of the provincials as well. This "representation" of the Americans, though never official, was crucial to keeping the colonists content within the empire.

\$39.95 cloth

Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism

The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 1790–1800

Frederick C. Beiser

In a rich narrative history of ideas that proceeds from his highly acclaimed *The Fate of Reason*, Frederick Beiser shows how the French Revolution, with a rationalism and an irrationalism that altered the world, transformed and politicized German philosophy and its central concern: the authority and limits of reason.

34 halftones/\$45.00 cloth

When Time Shall Be No More

Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture

Paul Boyer



Millions of Americans take the Bible at its word and turn to like-minded local ministers and TV preachers, and periodicals for help in finding their place in God's prophetic plan. And yet, the belief in biblical prophecy remains a little understood popular mystery. *When Time Shall Be No More* offers for the first time an in-depth look—-from antiquity to the present—-at the subtle, pervasive ways in which prophecy belief shapes contemporary American thought and culture.

Studies in Cultural History

Belknap 36 halftones/\$29.95 cloth

Lost Comrades

Socialists of the Front Generation, 1918–1945

Dan S. White

Lost Comrades follows the Front Generation socialists from their questioning of Marxist orthodoxies in the 1920s into their confrontations with the twin challenges of fascism and world depression in the early 1930s. Responding to these dangers, they devised—with little success—counterpropaganda against the fascists and planning blueprints for the economy. In tracing these unfulfilled careers, White brings a new clarity to the hopes and limitations of European socialism between the two world wars.

10 halftones/\$34.95 cloth

HARVARD

NEW IN PAPERBACK

Press Gallery

Congress and the Washington Correspondents
Donald A. Ritchie

Winner of the 1992 Richard W. Leopold Prize of the Organization of American Historians

"[*Press Gallery*] is sometimes startling, sometimes dismaying, and constantly illuminating. Ritchie's intelligent idea, deftly executed, is that a history of Washington journalism, organized around sketches of emblematic correspondents from particular epochs, can reveal the slow transformation of journalism from a craft into a profession. It also can help explain the evolution of America's democratic values and practices, and the struggle for supremacy between the legislative and executive branches . . . [Ritchie] is a scrupulous historian whose fine book brings back the powerful aroma of a past too raw to be romanticized."

—George F. Will, *New York Times Book Review*
18 halftones, 4 line illus. \$14.95

The Letters of the Republic

Publication and the Public Sphere in
Eighteenth-Century America
Michael Warner

"Michael Warner captures better than anyone else I know the way a new technology and the practices related to it can enable a new social formation to crystallize." —Charles Taylor

"Arguing the inseparableness of print and culture, this is one of the most engaging books about eighteenth-century American publishing in decades."

—Hazel Dicken-Garcia, *Journal of the Early Republic*
\$14.95

From the Old Marketplace

Joseph Buloff

Translated by Joseph Singer

"Buloff creates a Chagallesque vision of Vilnius by blending hyperbole, sarcasm and sweetness...What is most charming about this tale is the way it blends the coming of age and the coming of history...Buloff summons a vanished epoch."

—Richard Loune, *New York Times Book Review*
\$12.95

The Huguenots in America

A Refugee People in New World Society
Jon Butler

Winner of the Gilbert Chinard Prize and the Theodore Saloutos Memorial Book Award in American Immigration History

"An important, well-wrought book on the Huguenot experience . . . [that relates] the story of [Huguenot] exiles and their failure to maintain religious and social distinctiveness in diaspora."

—Stephanie Graumann Wolf, *American Historical Review*
\$14.95



A History of Private Life

Philippe Anès and Georges Duby, General Editors
Volume I: From Pagan Rome to Byzantium
Edited by Paul Veyne

Translated by Arthur Goldhammer

"Private life has always been a matter of public conjecture. This admirable book brings it intelligently into the web of social history and is a model for historians and readers alike. Beautifully produced, it adds apt and rare illustrations to a text by experts who presuppose human curiosity, but no undue knowledge. Its range and level of argument will intrigue anyone who has wondered about past attitudes to such matters as sex and the family, households, social inferiors, dress and even undress."

—Robin Lane Fox, *Washington Post Book World*
16-page color insert, 417 halftones, 33 line illus.
\$18.95

**Harvard
University
Press**

Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-2480

& Culture

Technology

ENGINEERING AND THE MIND'S EYE



Eugene S. Ferguson

"Like many a 'little book' by a master, the reader will find it overflowing with ideas and insights. It is a book that will reward many rereadings."

— Henry Petroski, Duke University

Eugene Ferguson takes a probing look at the process of engineering design. Despite modern technical advances, good engineering is still as much a matter of intuition as of equations and computation.

256 pp., 106 illus. \$24.95



ELECTRIFYING AMERICA Social Meanings of a New Technology

David E. Nye

"Mr. Nye succeeds not simply because he knows his technology, but also because he understands the complexity of American culture... [He] weaves observations into the very armature of his argument that electricity transformed not only American life but the American self."

— John R. Stilgoe, *New York Times Book Review*

496 pp. \$15.95 paper

Now in paperback

NOTES ON THE UNDERGROUND An Essay on Technology, Society, and the Imagination

Rosalind Williams

"What are the consequences when human beings dwell in an environment that is predominantly built rather than given? An uncommonly astute and provocative array of answers are examined through the metaphor of living underground, literally and in literature."— J. Baldwin, *Whole Earth Review*

265 pp., 17 illus. \$14.95 paper


Now in paperback

To order call toll-free 1.800.356.0343 or 617.628.8569. Mastercard and Visa accepted.

THE MIT PRESS

55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142

NEW BOOKS IN HISTORY





DISASTER IN THE PACIFIC **New Light on the Battle of Savo Island** *by Denis and Peggy Warner, with Sadao Seno*

A dramatic and exhaustively researched account of the August 1942 attack on U.S. and Allied naval ships by a Japanese task force that sank four cruisers and killed more than 1,000 sailors. In examining every aspect of the disaster, Denis and Peggy Warner tell a tale of Japanese mastery of surprise, night fighting, and unbelievable unpreparedness and bungling on the part of the Allies. Stalking the facts relentlessly in the official records of the United States and Australia, in unofficial reports and interviews, and in Japanese documents with the help of Commander Sadao Seno, they have written what will remain for the foreseeable future the definitive history of the Battle of Savo Island. 320 pages. 30 photos. Bibliog. Index. 6 maps. #0-2567/\$26.95

SEA OF GLORY: A Naval History of the American Revolution *by Nathan Miller*

This is naval history at its best: illuminating, human, and readable. Unlike other histories of the revolution, this book recognizes the war for independence as a maritime conflict and fully explores the struggle for sea power. First published in 1973 and long out of print, this book continues to be regarded as a significant work. 592 pages. 28 photos. Bibliog. Index. #1-5772/\$34.95



MUTINY **A History of Naval Insurrection** *by Leonard F. Guttridge*

In this fascinating book, Leonard Guttridge provides a casebook of mutinies that have occurred over the past two hundred years, beginning with the mutiny on the *Bounty*. Guttridge examines the world's famous and not-so-famous mutinies – the bloody uprising aboard the *Potemkin*, the racial disturbances on the *Constellation*, the rebellion at the Nore, the hijacking of the *Storozhevoy*, to name but a few – and asks what these incidents, occurring in different navies and in different ages, have in common. His findings are both startling and illuminating. 336 pages. 56 photos. Bibliog. Index. 2 maps. #0-2818/\$26.95

THE FAST CARRIERS: The Forging of an Air Navy *by Clark G. Reynolds*

Based on official records, personal interviews, private diaries, and an impressive array of published works, this classic study offers a complete record of the heated debates that took place over the concept of the fast carrier and the U.S. Navy's metamorphosis from battleship-oriented to a carrier-centered fleet. Now, twenty-four years after its first publication, this book remains essential reading for naval professionals and historians – evidence of its strong scholarship and enduring value in the face of a naval strategy in flux. 576 pages. 28 photos. Bibliog. Index. #1-7015/\$29.95



NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS


Available at your local bookstore or direct from:

Customer Service (7221), U.S. Naval Institute, 2062 Generals Highway, Annapolis, MD 21401

Call 800-233-8764

or 410-224-3378, Monday – Friday, 8:00 am – 5:30 pm, ET

"Raul Hilberg, universally recognized as the preeminent scholar of the Holocaust, has given us yet another masterpiece."—LUCJAN DOBROSZYCKI



PERPETRATORS VICTIMS BYSTANDERS

**The Jewish
Catastrophe
1933-1945**

RAUL HILBERG

Raul Hilberg is the most widely respected historian of the Holocaust. His monumental three-volume *The Destruction of the European Jews* is recognized as the definitive work on the subject. In this new book, the fruit of a lifetime's research and reflection, he carries the reader along with the narrative flow of the best fiction. *Perpetrators Victims Bystanders* is truth, but like a novel, it focuses on people—people in all three categories of the title. We learn who they were and what they did and did not do. And what was done to them.


"Hilberg is one of the great scholars of our century. More than anyone else, he has exposed the behavior and thought processes of ordinary people carrying out a genocidal project. In this book he does something deceptively simple. He evokes for us the lives of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders in the Nazi mass murder of Jews. By juxtaposing these stories and categories, while keeping them appropriately separate, he enables us to gain new access to what took place. Hilberg has given us a profound lesson in humanity and in inhumanity."—ROBERT JAY LIFTON

AARON ASHER BOOKS

HarperCollinsPublishers 10 E. 53rd St., NY, NY 10022

Hardcover, \$25.00, ISBN 0-06-019035-3

THE BEST IN HISTORY



RUSSIA TRANSFORMED **Breakthrough to Hope** **James H. Billington**

In this unusually penetrating analysis of the political, moral, spiritual upheaval now sweeping Russia, distinguished scholar and Librarian of Congress James H. Billington draws on his personal experience in Moscow during the failed coup of August 1991 to combine dramatic reportage with a profound scholarly history and thought. This is an extraordinary tale of Russia's fateful and irrevocable push toward democracy, the popular triumph over the vestiges of reaction and the inner catharsis that followed, and the birth of what Billington calls, "an altogether new mentality among the Russian people... a politics of hope."

1992 0-02-903515-5 \$17.95


MEN OF RESPECT **A Social History of** **the Sicilian Mafia** **Raimondo Catanzaro**

"An excellent guide to the complexities of a subject which continues to exert legitimate fascination, even when deprived of its lurid halo of myth."

—Andrew Lyttleton,

Times Literary Supplement

1992 0-02-905325-0 \$22.95



SHERMAN **A Soldier's Passion for Order** **John F. Marszalek,** *Mississippi State University*

Among the towering figures of the Civil War, none is more enigmatic than General William Tecumseh Sherman. Widely denounced as fiendishly destructive for his infamous March to the Sea across Georgia, Sherman was a brilliant commander who helped bring the war to a swifter and surer end. Now, in Marszalek's full-scale definitive biography, the nature and motives of this controversial military genius are at last explored.

1992 0-02-920135-7 \$29.95

REFIGHTING **THE LAST WAR** **Command and Crisis in** **Korea, 1950-1953**

D. Clayton James,
Virginia Military Institute

Now, during its 40th anniversary, James offers a brilliant reinterpretation of the Korean War. Focusing on the critical issue of command, he shows how Korea is a key to understanding American decision-making in all military encounters since World War II.

1992 0-02-916001-4 \$24.95

THE FREE PRESS

THE LEVERAGE OF SEA POWER

The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War

Colin S. Gray,

National Institute for Public Policy

Through lively historical illustrations as well as strategic theory, Gray shows how sea power, when integrated with land and air power, increases a combatant's opportunities and choices. With dozens of examples from the Greek and Persian wars through the recent war in the Gulf, Gray systematically demonstrates the ways sea power has been used, and how it might have been used, to win battles and wars.

1992 0-02-912661-4 \$24.95

GUARDIANS OF THE GULF

A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992

Michael A. Palmer,

East Carolina University

"There is a vacuum of historical perspective in Americans' understanding of our involvement in the Persian Gulf. Palmer fills the vacuum with new material and new perspectives tightly written and ably told."

—**John Lehman**, former Secretary of the Navy, author of *Making War*

1992 0-02-923843-9 \$24.95

THE JEWS OF SPAIN

A History of the Sephardic Experience

Jane Gerber

At the time of their expulsion from Spain, Jews had lived in a thriving community for a thousand years. Gerber narrates the entire Sephardic experience, from the first Jewish settlements of Roman times to Sephardic relations with subsequent Christian and Muslim societies, the community's pinnacle in Spain's Golden Age, the tragic expulsion, and beyond.

1992 0-02-911573-6 \$24.95

AFTER TET

The Bloodiest Year

Ronald Spector,

George Washington University

In the wake of the Tet offensive in 1968, Lyndon Johnson announced the cessation of bombing against North Vietnam and America's determination to seek peace in the area. Yet the year that followed the Tet offensive saw the fiercest battles of the Vietnam War. Now, on the 25th anniversary of that bloodiest year, Spector has written a brilliant narrative account of the harrowing events that rarely reached American TV screens but largely determined the war's course and outcome—a book that will surely stand as one of the most important ever written about the American military experience in Vietnam.

1992 0-02-930380-X \$24.95

Now available in paperback—

BAD BLOOD

The Tuskegee

Syphilis Experiment

New and Expanded Edition

James H. Jones,

University of Houston

This prize-winning classic of race and medicine has been expanded to explore the Tuskegee Study's legacy in the age of AIDS.

1992 0-02-916676-4 \$14.95

FREUD, DORA, AND VIENNA 1900

Hannah S. Decker

1992 0-02-907212-3 \$12.95

YOUNG NIETZSCHE

Becoming A Genius

Carl Pletsch

1992 0-02-925042-0 \$12.95

**For Visa, MasterCard, or
American Express orders,
call toll-free 1-800-323-7445**



THE FREE PRESS

A Division of Macmillan, Inc./A Maxwell Macmillan Company
866 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022

THE BEINECKE RARE BOOK & MANUSCRIPT LIBRARY

Visiting Fellowships

YALE UNIVERSITY

The Beinecke Rare Book & Manuscript Library offers short-term fellowships to support visiting scholars pursuing post-doctoral or equivalent research in its collections. The Beinecke Library is Yale University's principal repository for literary papers and for early manuscripts and rare books in the fields of literature, theology, history, and the natural sciences. In addition to its distinguished general collections, the library houses the Osborn Collection, noted for its British literary and historical manuscripts, as well as outstanding special collections devoted to American literature, German literature, and Western Americana.

The fellowships, which support travel to and from New Haven and pay a living allowance of \$1,600 per month, are designed to provide access to the library for scholars who live outside the greater New Haven area. The length of a grant, normally one month, will depend on the applicant's research proposal; fellowships must be taken up between September 1993 and May 1994. Recipients are expected to be in residence during the period of their award and are encouraged to participate in the activities of Yale University.

There is no special application form. Applicants are asked to submit a résumé and a brief research proposal (not to exceed three pages) to the Director, Beinecke Library, Box 1603A Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-1603. The proposal should emphasize the relationship of the Beinecke collections to the project and state the preferred dates of residence. The applicant should also arrange to have two confidential letters of recommendation sent to the Director.

The following named fellowships will be among those awarded; there is no special application process for these fellowships.

The Frederick W. Beinecke Fellowship in Western Americana

The H.D. Fellowship in English or American literature

The Donald C. Gallup Fellowship in American literature

The A. Bartlett Giamatti Fellowship

The Archibald Hanna, Jr. Fellowship in American history

The John D. and Rose H. Jackson Fellowship

The H. P. Kraus Fellowship in early books and manuscripts

The James M. Osborn Fellowship in English literature and history

The Frederick A. and Marion S. Pottle Fellowship in 18th-century British studies

The Alexander O. Viator Fellowship in cartography and related fields

This announcement contains all of the information necessary to complete the application process.

All application materials must be received by January 15, 1993.

Awards will be announced in March 1993

for the period September 1993 through May 1994.



**Marcello Cervini and
Ecclesiastical Government in
Tridentine Italy**

WILLIAM V. HUDON

In this revisionist biography, Hudon presents a detailed examination of the life and times of one of the most important figures in the Tridentine reformation. He traces Cervini's career, which culminated in his appointment as Pope Marcellus II, and shows how he profoundly influenced reform before, during, and after the Council of Trent.

271 pages \$32.00

The Battle for Coal

Miners and the Politics of
Nationalization in France, 1940-1950

DARRYL HOLTER

Holter tells the story of the rise and decline of an industry and work force, tracing the "battle for coal" that took place as government, management, and labor struggled to increase production in postwar France. His analysis of labor relations and the limitations of a union-led production campaign offers insights into the paradoxical nature of state-owned industries.

280 pages \$35.00

**Police and the Social Order in
German Cities**

The Düsseldorf District, 1848-1914

ELAINE GLOVKA
SPENCER

Spencer examines the formation and development of bureaucratic police forces in cities of the Düsseldorf district, offering a detailed study of the men who joined the forces, their activities, and their relationships with citizens and government authorities. She shows how the emergence of the police as an instrument of state power reveals changing social relationships and new patterns of interaction between the bureaucracy and society.

261 pages \$32.50

World Historians and Their Goals

Twentieth-Century Answers to
Modernism

PAUL COSTELLO

Costello analyzes paradigms of world history, focusing on seven twentieth-century historians, from H. G. Wells to William McNeill. He interprets central models of the history of civilizations as responses to modernism and efforts to rescue meaningful patterns of history as a whole.

Approx. 307 pages \$30.00 January

New in Paperback

In Defense of the Indians

BARTOLOMÉ

DE LAS CASAS

Translated by Stafford Poole, C.M.

Foreword by Martin E. Marty


"A superb vindication of an oppressed people. . . . The message shines through and comes ringing down the centuries."—*New York Review of Books*

411 pages \$18.00 paper



Northern Illinois University Press

DeKalb 60115 815-753-1075



Houghton Mifflin celebrates a tradition of bringing new ideas to college history textbooks. From the social history emphasis of A People and a Nation to the unique use of primary sources in Discovering the Western Past, Houghton Mifflin books have introduced students to new ways of learning about the past.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN HISTORY

Western Civilization

NEW

Western Civilization: A Brief History Second Edition

Marvin Perry, Baruch College, City University of New York
George W. Bock

Complete Paperback Edition • 656 pages

Two-Volume Paperback Edition • 326/460 pages

Instructor's Resource Manual with Test Items • One-Volume Study Guide • Computerized Test Generator • Map Transparencies • Just Published (©1993)

This brief version of Perry's *Western Civilization* text puts his clear approach to learning about the past in a format appropriate for one-semester courses, or for use with supplements in a two-semester course.

NEW

European Intellectual History

Marvin Perry, Baruch College, City University of New York
512 pages • paperback • Just Published (©1993)

Perry texts are known for clarity that doesn't compromise accuracy; this important new text is no exception. Covering the major thinkers of Western Civilization from the French Revolution to the present, *European Intellectual History* gives students an in-depth, accessible introduction to the complexities of the Western intellectual tradition.

NEW

Discovering the Western Past: A Look at the Evidence, Second Edition

Merry E. Wiesner, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

Julius R. Ruff, Marquette University

William Bruce Wheeler, University of Tennessee - Knoxville

Two-Volume Paperback Edition • 320/416 pages

Instructor's Resource Manual • Just Published (©1993)

Discovering the Western Past introduces students to original evidence from a wide variety of visual and written sources. A flexible supplement to any Western Civilization textbook, this is a fascinating introduction to the excitement of discovering history.

A TRADITION *of* INNOVATION

Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics, and Society
Fourth Edition

Marvin Perry, Myrna Chase, James R. Jacob, Margaret C. Jacob, and Theodore H. Von Laue

A History of Western Society, Fourth Edition
John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill, and John Buckler

Sources of the Western Tradition, Second Edition
Marvin Perry, Joseph R. Peden and Theodore H. Von Laue

World History

A History of World Societies
Third Edition

John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill, and John Buckler

The Human Record: Sources of Global History
Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield

American History

Present Tense: The United States Since 1945

Michael Schaller, Virginia Scharff, and Robert Schulzinger

A People and a Nation: A History of the United States, Third Edition

Mary Beth Norton, David M. Katzman, Paul D. Escott, Howard P. Chudacoff, Thomas G. Paterson, and William M. Tuttle, Jr.

Also available in the **Brief Edition, Third Edition.**

Discovering the American Past: A Look at the Evidence, Second Edition

William Bruce Wheeler and Susan D. Becker

A More Perfect Union: Documents in U.S. History, Third Edition

Paul F. Boller, Jr. and Ronald Story

Latin American History

A History of Latin America, Fourth Edition
Benjamin Keen

To request examination packages, contact your Houghton Mifflin regional office.



Houghton Mifflin

13400 Midway Rd.
Dallas, TX 75244

1900 S. Batavia Ave.
Geneva, IL 60134

925 E. Meadow Dr.
Palo Alto, CA 94303

101 Campus Dr.
Princeton, NJ 08540



NEW FROM

PRAEGER

**FDR and the Bonus Marchers,
1933-1935****By Gary Dean Best**

This oral and documentary history of the tragedy of 256 bonus marchers killed by a hurricane after being moved to "rehabilitation camps" by the FDR administration is designed for a general audience as well as for those interested in the 1930s.

1992. 168 pages. 0-275-93715-1. \$42.95.

Spying on America**The FBI's Domestic****Counterintelligence Program****By James Kirkpatrick Davis**

"an informative account of the FBI's domestic surveillance activities. . . . The author summarizes five COINTELPRO operations, giving clear pictures of the crude but apparently effective techniques used against the American Communist Party, the Socialist Workers' Party, white hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, radical African American organizations like the Black Panther Party, and the New Left movement."

—Publishers Weekly

1992. 208 pages. 0-275-93407-1. \$21.95.

The Salem Witch Crisis**By Larry Gragg**

Rather than seeing the people of Salem Village and the surrounding communities as being swept along by the forces of historical change, Gragg makes a very strong case that the people involved were active participants who made decisions that shaped the outcome of events in 1692.

1992. 248 pages. 0-275-94189-2. \$45.00.

**The United States and
Somoza, 1933-1956****A Revisionist Look****By Paul Coe Clark, Jr.**

Based solidly on the the diplomatic record, the work takes a strong revisionist stance, arguing against the commonly accepted view that the United States created the Somoza regime and kept the first Somoza in power as its surrogate.

1992. 256 pages. 0-275-94334-8. \$47.95.

My Fellow Americans**Presidential Addresses That****Shaped History****By James C. Humes**

A former White House speechwriter, Humes studies major presidential addresses from a new angle—their construction and impact. This is a vital study of American political history seen through the prism of selected presidential addresses.

1992. 312 pages. 0-275-93507-8. \$49.95.

Alexander T. Stewart**The Forgotten Merchant Prince****By Stephen N. Elias**

This is the first major biography of Alexander I. Stewart, known during his lifetime as "The Merchant Prince" for his success in retail, wholesale, and manufacturing in New York City. Stewart's remarkable success as the "father" of the department store is examined and his great contributions to retailing are here recounted.

1992. 288 pages. 0-275-94188-4. \$45.00.

ORDER TOLL-FREE, 24 HOURS-A-DAY: 1-800-225-5800



PRAEGER PUBLISHERS

An Imprint of GREENWOOD PUBLISHING GROUP, INC.

A194

88 Post Road West, Box 5007 Westport, CT 06881 (203) 226-3571

New from Sage!

PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF WAR

edited by BETTY GLAD, University of South Carolina, Columbia

"Glad is to be congratulated for putting together a stimulating and enlightening collection of papers. . . . She (has) done a skillful job of editing, providing useful commentary on the various sections."

—Christopher C. French, *The Psychologist*

"Betty Glad and Charles Taber offer a fascinating psychological critique of the history of the use of the domino theory by the United States in the post-World War II period. Both the explanation and the techniques go beyond the usual level of discourse on the topic."

—Richard Jackson Harris, *Political Psychology*

Traditionally scholars of the international political system have assumed that wars serve national interests and that such decisions are based on rational means/ends calculations. Yet, even political realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau have admitted that psychological analysis might shed further light on how nations behave. **Psychological Dimensions of War** analyzes how psychological factors influence the origins, processes, and consequences of conventional and, possibly, nuclear war. This original and thought-provoking volume brings together leading scholars, including Anatol Rapoport and George Quester, who analyze the psychology of both motivated and unmotivated biases of war behavior.

Violence, Cooperation, Peace: An International Series
1990 (Autumn) / 384 pages / \$44.00 (c) / \$21.95 (p)

SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC.
2455 Teller Road
Newbury Park, CA 91320



SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD.
6 Bonhill Street
London EC2A 4PU, England

SAGE PUBLICATIONS INDIA PVT. LTD.
M-32 Market, Greater Kailash I
New Delhi 110 048, India

The Revolution of 1905

AUTHORITY RESTORED

Abraham Ascher

This second and final volume of the author's definitive study of the Revolution of 1905 and its aftermath focuses on the years 1906 and 1907, and in particular on the struggle over the Duma, the elected legislature that was the principal fruit of the events of 1905. Illus. \$47.50

The Life of Captain James Cook

J. C. Beaglehole

"Definitive is a word to use sparingly, but it applies to this life of Cook.... The book abounds in fresh insights and fascinating information."—*American Historical Review*. "All of us must admire the massive scholarship of this book.... For Beaglehole, this work climaxed a life that masterfully and passionately celebrated mankind's adventure in the Pacific."—*The New York Times Book Review*. Illus. Cloth, \$55.00; paper, \$19.95

The Family in Bahia, Brazil, 1870-1945

Dain Borges

This history of the changes in the Brazilian family in the 19th and 20th centuries focuses on the relationship between the informal institution of the family and such formal social institutions as medicine, law, organized politics, and the church. \$52.50

The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

Edited by Robert W. Gordon

Bringing something new and distinctive to the scholarly controversies that have surrounded Holmes for over a century, these essays reassess the legendary jurist as an intellectual, a legal theorist, and an iconic public figure and culture hero. \$42.50

Liberty Secured?

BRITAIN BEFORE AND AFTER 1688

Edited by J. R. Jones

These essays see the Revolution of 1688-89 as a conjunction or coming together of many trends, changes, and developments in the years before and after 1688 that were transforming all aspects of English life in the last decades of the 17th century. \$45.00

The Nahuas After the Conquest

A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF CENTRAL MEXICO, SIXTEENTH THROUGH EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

James Lockhart

A monumental achievement of research, synthesis, and analysis, this volume on the Nahuatl Indians (often called Aztecs) constitutes our best understanding of any New World indigenous society in the period following European contact. Illus. \$60.00

The Armature of Conquest

SPANISH ACCOUNTS OF THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA, 1492-1589

Beatriz Pastor Bodmer. Translated by Lydia Longstreth Hunt.

Focusing on certain key firsthand narratives of the Spanish conquest, this book sees them as literary expressions of the writers' experience, recording the gradual development of a critical consciousness that questions their sense of identity and the validity of European cultural models. Illus. \$42.50

Popular Anti-Catholicism in Mid-Victorian England

D. G. Paz

This book reexamines mid-Victorian anti-Catholicism in a much fuller and more inclusive context than ever before, accounting for its persistence over time, distinguishing it from anti-Irish sentiment, and explaining its social, economic, political, and religious bases. Illus. \$45.00

Land of Fair Promise

POLITICS AND REFORM IN
LOS ANGELES SCHOOLS, 1885-1941

Judith Rosenberg Raftery

This book uses a case study of education and educational reform in Los Angeles as a lens for viewing a wide range of political and cultural questions involved in urban development in the American West, notably the manner and motives of those who changed school policy. Illus. \$37.50

Curing Their Ills

COLONIAL POWER AND AFRICAN ILLNESS

Megan Vaughan

Focusing mainly on East and Central Africa from about 1890-1950, this lively and original work treats Western biomedical discourse about illness in Africa as a cultural system that constructed "the African" out of widely varying and sometimes improbable materials. Illus. Cloth, \$37.50; paper, \$14.95

The Women of Mexico City, 1790-1857

Silvia Marina Arrom

"A pathbreaking study, the first detailed social history of Mexican women across class and institutional lines. Meticulously analyzing a wide range of sources and elegantly balancing quantitative methods with other approaches, Arrom has produced a finely crafted monograph, informed in its theoretical assumptions and rich empirical data."—*The American Historical Review*. Illus. Cloth, \$47.50; paper, \$16.95

Secrets of the Kingdom

BRITISH RADICALS FROM THE POPISH PLOT
TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1688-89

Richard L. Greaves

This study examines political and religious radical activity in Britain and British exile communities on the Continent from the Popish Plot to the Revolution of 1688-89, with special attention paid to the conspiracies collectively known as the Rye House Plot. \$49.50

Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central Europe

A STUDY IN ELECTIVE AFFINITY

Michael Löwy. Translated by Hope Heaney.

This book examines how German romanticism and Jewish messianism influenced the thought of a generation of Jewish intellectuals—including Martin Buber, Franz Kafka, Georg Lukacs, and Erich Fromm—who had a profound effect on 20th-century science, literature, philosophy, and religion. \$35.00

To Love, Honor, and Obey in Colonial Mexico

CONFLICTS OVER MARRIAGE CHOICE,
1574-1821

Patricia Seed

An account of the transformation of cultural assumptions affecting parental authority and children's freedom to choose marriage partners, this book traces the changes during the colonial period in ideas about free will, love, honor, and in the views of the Catholic Church. Cloth, \$42.50; paper, \$14.95

John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive

Tom Sitton

This is a political biography of John Randolph Haynes (1853-1937)—the "father of direct legislation"—who personified the social and political reform impulse in California from the early Progressive era through the New Deal. Illus. \$39.50



Stanford University Press
STANFORD, CA 94305-2235

Chicago



Courtesy of the Yale Center for British Art,
Paul Mellon Collection

The Culture of Sensibility

*Sex and Society in
Eighteenth-Century Britain*

G. J. Barker-Benfield

In this large-scale historical study revealing the existence of a culture of sensibility, Barker-Benfield offers an innovative and compelling way to understand the transformation of British society in the eighteenth century.

Cloth \$49.95 506 pages

From Counter-Reformation to Glorious Revolution

Hugh Trevor-Roper

"[Trevor-Roper] richly deserves his reputation as the most witty, perceptive, thoughtful and brilliant historical essayist of our time, and this new collection will only serve to confirm and reinforce that judgment." — Lawrence Stone, *Times Literary Supplement*

Cloth \$29.95 320 pages

Historical Anthropology of the Middle Ages

Aaron Gurevich

Eleven of the most important essays of Aaron Gurevich, long considered one of the world's leading medievalists and a pioneer in the field of historical anthropology.

Cloth \$39.95 280 pages

Prophets in Their Own Country

*Living Saints and the Making of
Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages*

Aviad M. Kleinberg

"[Kleinberg's] book is a model of empirical analysis, and its interpretive framework throws light on the phenomenon of sainthood in Western history as well as in contemporary, non-Western societies."

— Brian Stock, University of Toronto

Cloth \$27.50 200 pages



Courtesy of Giraudon/Art Resource, New York

The Mystic Fable

*Volume One: The Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries*

Michel de Certeau

Translated by Michael B. Smith

"In this book the topics of 'the everyday,' 'belief,' what might be called 'the counter-historical,' and 'the politics of language' are coordinated and brought to bear upon a fascinating historical phenomenon, early modern mysticism, to yield profound insights into the 'mystical' underside of our own post-religious experience of the world, nature, and history." — Hayden White, University of California, Santa Cruz

Cloth \$35.00 384 pages

Religion and Postmodernism series

New Day in Babylon

The Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975

William L. Van Deburg

"Absolutely must reading for all who would understand the pervasive and enduring influence of the most culturally creative, politically dynamic, and ideologically explosive ten years in modern American race relations history." — Harry Edwards, University of California, Berkeley
Cloth \$29.95 392 pages 36 halftones



The Great Melody

A Thematic Biography of Edmund Burke
Conor Cruise O'Brien

Rather than a strict chronological rendering, this unorthodox biography focuses on Burke's thoughts, responses, and reactions to the great events and debates surrounding Britain's tumultuous relationships with her three colonies and arch-rival France.
Cloth \$34.95 672 pages

Ideas and Events

Professing History

Leonard Krieger

Edited by M. L. Brick

With an Introduction by Michael Ermarth

"[Krieger's] writings offer important insight into the interplay of ideas and events in the European past, and they provide a model of how to do intellectual history that still remains valuable." — Allan Megill, University of Virginia
Cloth \$47.50 440 pages

Revolution and Genocide

On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust

Robert F. Melson

"An impressive synthesis and illustration of the connection between crises, ideology, revolution, and major genocides of the twentieth century." — Helen Fein, Institute for the Study of Genocide, The City University of New York
Cloth \$29.95 384 pages

Esteem Enlivened by Desire

The Couple from Homer to Shakespeare

Jean H. Hagstrum

"Hagstrum's masterwork of cultural interpretation, is a kind of literary centaur: an acutely humane sensibility joined to a galloping encyclopedic force."
— Cynthia Ozick
Cloth \$36.00 536 pages 27 halftones



courtesy of New York Public Library

City of Dreadful Delight

Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London

Judith R. Walkowitz

With a foreword by Catharine R. Stimpson


"This remarkably polished, lucidly argued, long awaited work is innovative cultural history at its best." — Martha Vicinus, University of Michigan
Paper \$15.95 382 pages 15 halftones
Library cloth edition \$35.00

Women in Culture and Society series

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5801 S. Ellis Ave., Chicago, IL 60637

Chicago



The History of Cartography, Volume 2, Book 1

Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies

Edited by J. B. Harley and David Woodward

This volume offers a fascinating picture of maps used not only as practical tools but also as images symbolic of religion and culture. "Sure to be the standard reference for all subsequent scholarship."

— John Noble Wilford, *New York Times Book Review*

Cloth \$125.00 644 pages
40 color plates, 355 halftones

Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps

The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe

Edited by David Buisseret

Distinguished scholars investigate the political factors behind rapid developments in cartography and the role of mapmaking in the formation of modern European nations.

Cloth \$45.00 210 pages
8 color plates, 75 halftones

The Kenneth Nebenzahl, Jr., Lectures in the History of Cartography

The Beginnings of Western Science

The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. to A.D. 1450

David C. Lindberg

"At last we have a text in history of ancient and medieval science that my students can understand and that yet does not insult their intelligence."

... Scholars who are not specialists in the field will also benefit from this book."

— Albert Van Helden, *Rice University*

Paper \$19.95 474 pages

40 line drawings, 6 maps, 70 halftones, 1 table
Library cloth edition \$57.00



A Taste of Ancient Rome

Ilaria Gozzini Giacosa

Translated by Anna Herklotz

With a Foreword by Mary Taylor Simeti

Here is the real food of Rome—the rustic and the refined—in more than 200 recipes adapted for today's kitchen. Giacosa's fascinating book offers historians of cuisine, adventurous cooks, and interested specialists some basic principles of ancient Roman cookery.

Cloth \$29.95 224 pages 19 color plates

From Market-Places to a Market Economy

The Transformation of Rural Massachusetts, 1750-1850

Winifred Barr Rothenberg

"One of the most important books ever written about the economic history of early America." — Gordon S. Wood, *Brown University*

Cloth \$37.50 296 pages



Marvelous Possessions

The Wonder of the New World

Stephen Greenblatt

"A marvelous book. . . . Nothing so original has ever been written on European responses to 'The wonder of the New World.'" — Anthony Pagden, *Times Literary Supplement*

Paper \$10.95 224 pages
16 halftones

Making America Corporate, 1870-1920

Olivier Zunz

Zunz examines how the growth of corporations changed the middle class and why so many Americans became involved in creating our modern work culture.

Paper \$12.95 280 pages
23 halftones, 1 map

Free Spaces

The Sources of Democratic Change in America

Sara M. Evans and Harry C. Boyte

With a new Introduction

"As a brief, popularly written synopsis of social movement history, the book is excellent and unique." — Michael Kazin, *The Nation*

Paper \$12.95 258 pages

NEW IN PAPER

The Constitution in the Supreme Court

The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888

David P. Currie

"A thoughtful synthesis of constitutional law and constitutional history." — Francis N. Sides, *Journal of American History*

Paper \$24.95 520 pages
Winner of the Benchmark Book Award

Winner of the Supreme Court Historical Society Triennial Book Prize

The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber

Collected Essays

Wolfgang J. Mommsen

"An important contribution to social theory in general and to the debate surrounding Weber's political and methodological writings." — George E. McCarthy, *Social Science Quarterly*

Paper \$13.95 240 pages

The Last Days of Hitler

Hugh Trevor-Roper

"An incomparable book, by far the best written on any aspect of the second German war. . . . No words of praise are too strong."

— A. J. P. Taylor, *New Statesman*
Paper \$10.95 288 pages

Islamic Spain, 1250-1500

L. P. Harvey

A richly detailed account of Muslim life throughout the kingdoms of Spain, from the fall of Seville to the Christian reconquest.

Paper \$15.95 400 pages

Quetzalcoatl and the Irony of Empire

Myths and Prophecies in the Aztec Tradition

David Carrasco

With a new Preface

"A must for both professional and serious non-professional students of Mesoamerica."

— William R. Fowler, Jr., *Queens Quarterly*
Paper \$14.95 248 pages



Much Maligned Monsters

A History of European Reactions to Indian Art
Partha Mitter

With a new Preface

"Full of ideas that have important political implications. . . . Mitter is a first-rate historian." — Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, University of Chicago

Paper \$17.95 384 pages
123 illustrations

Cosmopolis

The Hidden Agenda of Modernity

Stephen Toulmin

"Simply the best discussion of modernity and post-modernity available today." — Robert N. Bellah, co-author of *Habits of the Heart*

Paper \$13.95 240 pages

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5801 S. Ellis Ave., Chicago, IL 60637

Sources and Studies in World History

Kevin Reilly, Series Editor

NOW AVAILABLE IN PAPER—

Lifelines from Our Past: A New World History

L.S. Stavrianos

An extraordinary interpretation of world history: "This book summarizes fifty thousand years of human history in a way that will help us all face the historical choices that confront us." —Immanuel Wallerstein 4-031-9 \$14.95

Native Americans before 1492

The Moundbuilding Centers of the Eastern Woodlands

Lynda Norene Shaffer

Studying this little-known—and highly advanced—culture opens an entirely new perspective on "American" history. "Delightful and very instructive."

—William H. McNeill

Hardcover 4-029-7 \$32.90 / Paper 4-030-0 \$12.90

The Alchemy of Happiness

Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali

Translated by Claud Field

Revised and annotated by

Elton L. Daniel

"*The Alchemy of Happiness* answers a need for important primary sources in the study of world history [and] introduces us to the rich spiritual world of Islam."

—Kevin Reilly

Hardcover 4-004-1 \$35.00 / Paper 4-005-X \$11.95

ALSO OF INTEREST—

Structure, Process, and Party Essays in American Political History

Peter H. Argersinger

These essays by a prize-winning historian challenge traditional approaches to American political history and establish the significance of the institutional framework of elections.

Hardcover 2-798-5 \$39.95

Vietnam Documents: American and Vietnamese Views of the War

Edited by George Katsiaficas

"An intelligent selection of documents ... [that] will prompt discussions and debates and thereby make this history come alive for a new generation of students."

—Paul Joseph, Tufts University

Hardcover 2-896-5 \$45.00 / Paper 2-897-3 \$16.50

The Quest for Utopia

Jewish Political Ideas and Institutions through the Ages

Edited by Zvi Gitelman

"Both original and synthetic ... an important scholarly benchmark."

—Jehuda Reinharz, Brandeis University

Hardcover 4-061-0 \$39.95 / Paper 4-062-9 \$15.95

China's Bitter Victory

The War with Japan, 1937–1945

Edited by James C. Hsiung

and Steven I. Levine

"... analytical studies like this are scarce and welcome. ... essays by Western and Chinese writers plumb a wealth of recent Chinese-language sources from both Taiwan and the mainland to look at a wide range of subjects that ... go far beyond traditional inquiries into the conflict's military dimensions."

—*Library Journal*

Hardcover 2-708-X \$39.95

Modernization and Revolution in China

June Grasso, Jay Corrin,
and Michael Kort

The great episodes of China's struggle to modernize, from the Opium War to Tiananmen.

"Fills the gap between textbooks that are too lengthy or detailed in their coverage of the imperial period and those which ... are incomplete in their treatment of the all-important 19th-century background."


—*Reference & Research Book News*

Hardcover 2-538-9 \$39.95 / Paper 2-539-7 \$13.95

To order call toll free 800-541-6563 or fax 914-273-2106 Dept. 223AHR
American Express, MasterCard, and VISA accepted • Free catalogue on request

M.E. Sharpe Inc.

80 Business Park Drive/ Armonk, NY 10504



PAUL KRAUSE



"The River Ran Red"
HOMESTEAD 1892



Making Sense of the Sixties

The Battle for Homestead, 1880-1892

Politics, Culture, and Steel

Paul Krause

"An important contribution to the study of American history, this book is highly recommended."—*Library Journal*

\$39.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3702-6

\$19.95 paper / ISBN 0-8229-5466-4

"The River Ran Red"

Homestead 1892

*Edited by David P. Demarest, Jr.,
with an afterword by David Montgomery
and coordinated by Fannia Weingartner*

"An excellent collection of eyewitness accounts, newspaper, reproductions, contemporary photos, etc., woven together with commentary by several scholars."

—*Kirkus Reviews*

\$39.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3710-7

\$19.95 paper / ISBN 0-8229-5478-8

Of Kennedys and Kings

Making Sense of the Sixties

Harris Wofford, U.S. Senator, Pennsylvania

*With an introduction by Bill Moyers
and a new afterword by the author*

\$29.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3832-4

\$16.95 paper / ISBN 0-8229-5808-2

Dead Laws for Dead Men

**The Politics of Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Legislation**

Daniel J. Curran

\$39.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3733-6

The Longrifles of Western Pennsylvania

Allegheny and Westmoreland Counties

*Richard F. Rosenberger and
Charles Kaufmann*






\$34.95 cloth / ISBN 0-8229-3727-1

**University of
Pittsburgh Press**

To order: CUP Services
Box 6525, Ithaca, NY 14851
1-800-666-2211



SMP puts World History



St. Martin's Press ♦ College Division
 175 Fifth Avenue, Dept. JR, New York, NY 10010



in Your Hands

THE WEST AND THE WORLD SINCE 1945

Third Edition

GLENN BLACKBURN ■ A concise, synoptic survey organized around four themes: The superpowers, the wealthy nations, the poor nations, and intellectual and spiritual issues ■ Emphasis on intellectual and social history throughout ■ Fully revised to reflect the most recent changes in contemporary history

Paper/176 pp.(approx.)/November 1992

MAKERS OF WORLD HISTORY

Volumes I and II

J. KELLEY SOWARDS ■ Takes a biographical approach to the study of world history by examining the careers and impact of 28 figures (14 in each volume) who have either significantly influenced world history or embody much that is significant about the periods in which they lived ■ Each chapter also focuses on one important interpretive issue basic to an understanding of that person's place in history

Volume I • Paper/302 pp./1992

Volume II • Paper/334 pp./1992

READINGS IN WORLD CIVILIZATIONS

Second Edition

Volumes I and II

KEVIN REILLY ■ Contains both primary and secondary sources, all chosen for their historical importance and their accessibility to the reader ■ Students follow world development and the immense variations in civilizations from the ancient world through the present day ■ 58 readings in Volume I, 13 of which are new; 68 readings in Volume II, 13 of which are new

Volume I: The Great Traditions • Paper/368 pp./1992

Volume II: The Development of the Modern World • Paper/384 pp./1992

PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Second Edition

CHARLES D. SMITH ■ Provides a thorough, balanced history of Israeli and Arab political goals and social movements ■ Emphasizes both the history of Palestine and the period before Israeli independence in 1948 ■ Reflects the most recent scholarship, and includes a final chapter on the Intifada and the Gulf Crisis


Paper/320 pp./1992

St. Martin's Press • College Division

175 Fifth Avenue, Dept. JR, New York, NY 10010



From 1492 to 1992,



Second Edition

The Tyranny of Change

America in the Progressive Era
1890-1920

John Whiteclay Chamberlain



Second Edition

The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order

A History of the American People and Their Institutions
1917-1933



Ellis W. Hawley

Second Edition

The Crucial Era

The Great Depression and World War II
1929-1945



Gerald D. Nash

St. Martin's Press • College Division
175 Fifth Avenue, Dept. JR, New York, NY 10010



SMP Rediscovered America

AMERICA FIRSTHAND

Second Edition

Volumes I and II

Edited by ROBERT D. MARCUS and DAVID BURNER ■ Brings the history of America to life through personal, eyewitness accounts, from the first journeys of Columbus to the present ■ 24 of the 81 primary source readings are new to these editions

Volume I: From Settlement to Reconstruction • Paper/310 pp./1992

Volume II: From Reconstruction to the Present • Paper/326 pp./1992

In The St. Martin's Series in 20th-Century U.S. History

THE TYRANNY OF CHANGE

Second Edition

JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II ■ Describes and analyzes America's transformation into a modern, urban, industrial society during the Progressive Era ■ Focuses on the forces that engendered political, economic and social change

Paper/333 pp./1992

THE GREAT WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR A MODERN ORDER

Second Edition

ELLIS W. HAWLEY ■ Evaluates the "era between the wars" ■ Views this "New Era" not as a frivolous interlude but rather as an innovative period that led U.S. citizens to search for a new liberalism ■ Offers expanded treatment, in this edition, of labor, education movements as well as the quest for gender, racial equality

Paper/224 pp./1992

THE CRUCIAL ERA

Second Edition

GERALD D. NASH ■ Examines how the period during the great depression and World War II created an unprecedented evolution of political, social, economic and cultural life in America ■ New concluding chapter explores the impact of 'the Crucial Era' on the postwar period up to 1991

Paper/213 pp./1992

St. Martin's Press • College Division
175 Fifth Avenue, Dept. JR, New York, NY 10010


New From NYU

Bad Habits

**Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs,
Gambling, Sexual Misbehavior and
Swearing in American History**

JOHN C. BURNHAM

Burnham traces the growth of a vice-industrial complex driven by a coalition of economic and social interests allied with bohemian rebelliousness. November/ 400 pp. 53 illustrations/ \$35.00 hardcover



Immigrants in Two Democracies

French and American Experience

Edited by DONALD L. HOROWITZ and GÉRARD NOIRIEL

An American Academy of Arts and Sciences Book

This social history comprehensively portrays the dilemmas immigrants present and face. "If we are to better understand [ethnicity], and I contend we must, we shall look to important works such as *Immigrants in Two Democracies*."—Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
507pp./ \$55.00 hardcover

On the Sources of Patriarchal Rage

**The Commonplace Books of William
Byrd II and Thomas Jefferson and
the Gendering of Power in the
Eighteenth Century**

KENNETH A. LOCKRIDGE

Reveals startling evidence of misogyny in the journals of Byrd and Jefferson, and places these texts in the wider historical context of gender and power. January/ 160 pp./ 12 illustrations
\$35.00 hardcover

Campus Wars

**The Peace Movement at
American State Universities
in the Vietnam Era**

KENNETH HEINEMAN

This engaging book recreates the origins of 1960s student radicalism at state universities, and traces its development into a national movement.

February/ 368 pp./ \$40.00 hardcover

The Modern Christmas in America

Gifts and Mass Culture

WILLIAM B. WAITS

Explores the evolution of the American Christmas since 1880 into the multi-billion dollar industry it is today. November/ 272 pp. 77 illustrations/ \$40.00 hardcover

Righteous Lives

**Narratives of the New Orleans
Civil Rights Movement**

KIM LACY ROGERS

A compelling new oral history of the New Orleans civil rights workers who successfully fought to deter the racial terrorism that scarred much of the South in the 1950s and 1960s.

February/ 336 pp./ 23 photographs
\$35.00 hardcover



New York University Press

Elmer Holmes Bobst Library
70 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012

Tel: (212) 998-2575

Fax: (212) 995-3833

Pioneer Commercial Photography The Burgert Brothers, Tampa, Florida

Robert E. Snyder and Jack B. Moore



These vintage photographs comprise a rich and rare reservoir of imagery on industry, urbanization, architecture, recreation, race relations, and popular culture in the deepest South in the first half of this century.

"The Burgerts had great eyes . . . the book beautifully weaves the fabric which shows the Burgerts truly as a 'photo family,' with photography really 'in their blood.' . . . No book has yet been written that attempts to work with a commercial photo collection in this way. . . . It will become a model for others working with similar collections around the country." —David Horvath, University of Louisville

Through full-service bookstores or order with VISA or M/C toll free: 1-800-226-3822.
312 pp. 9-5/8 X 7. 216 b/w photos. Cloth \$39.95

University Press of Florida

Gainesville, Tallahassee, Tampa, Boca Raton, Pensacola, Orlando, Miami, Jacksonville

KENTUCKY

JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN

The Last Whig Justice

LOREN BETH. "A richly detailed biography of an important jurist"—*Publishers Weekly*. "Satisfies a long-standing need in the literature on the Supreme Court and its justices"—*Grier Stephenson, Jr.* 328pp \$37

COMMON WHITES

Class & Culture

In Antebellum North Carolina

BILL CECIL-FRONSMA. A broad examination of the issues involving nonslaveholders or small slaveholders before the Civil War. "Extends far beyond anything now in print and will advance our knowledge of the largest single category of antebellum southerners"—*Paul D. Escott*. 216pp \$30

TEXAS DIVIDED

Loyalty and Dissent

In the Lone Star State, 1856-1874

JAMES MARTEN. "Convincingly portrays a complex society whose disparate parts reacted differently to the strain of sectionalism and war"—*Civil War*. 256pp \$25

DUBIOUS VICTORY

The Reconstruction Debate In Ohio

ROBERT D. SAWREY. Examines the post-Civil War attitudes of a representative northern state, Ohio, in relation to two crucial issues of Reconstruction—the terms of readmission and the fate of former slaves. 256pp \$29

IN ENEMY HANDS

A Prisoner in North Korea

LARRY ZELLERS. "Zellers compelling portrayal of his comrades and their experiences is a unique tale of civilians trapped in war"—*Library Journal*. 240pp \$24.95

GENTRY AND COMMONFOLK

Political Culture

On a Virginia Frontier

ALBERT H. TILLSON, JR. "This book should be widely consulted, not merely for its contents, but also for the revisionist interpretation of Virginia frontier life in the years leading to and during the American Revolution"—*Richmond News-Leader*. 248pp \$30

RELIGION AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT, 1860-1870

VICTOR B. HOWARD. "An encyclopedic narrative of Protestant involvement in key moral and political issues during the Civil War Era....A valuable book"—*American Historical Review*. 296pp \$32

Back in Print!

LAURA CLAY & THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT

PAUL E. FULLER. With a new foreword by A. Elizabeth Taylor. "Of interest to all concerned with the social and political history of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, for it sheds light on one of the most significant movements of that era"—*Historian*. 248pp \$15t paper

YELLOW FEVER AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE NEW SOUTH

JOHN H. ELLIS. A complete examination of the impact the yellow fever epidemic of 1878 had on the lower Mississippi Valley and the South's tentative, troubled response to it. 248pp \$28


BOUGAINVILLE

The Forgotten Campaign

HARRY A. GAILEY. "A wonderful narrative history.... Future historians must consider Bougainville when assessing the causes for the defeat of the Japanese in World War II"—*Southern Historian*. 237pp \$27

Inquiries and major credit card orders, call toll-free 1-800-666-2211. Send mail orders to:
The University Press of Kentucky, P.O. Box 6526, Ithaca, NY 14851

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY



The Democrats' Dilemma

Walter F. Mondale and the Liberal Legacy

Steven M. Gillon

This timely study of American liberalism in the context of Mondale's career uses classified documents, private papers, and extensive interviews to reveal a party beleaguered by profound generational and ideological disputes.

468 pp., 42 photos, \$34.95

The Vietnam War and American Culture

Edited by John Carlos Rowe and Rick Berg

"Leaves the reader with the impression that the literature of the war, in different cultural forms, will overcome the after-the-fact interpretations of high-level military and political personalities."

—New York Times

320 pp., \$14.95 • Now in paperback!

The Writing of History

Michel de Certeau

Translated by Tom Conley

"The crowning work of the late Michel de Certeau is this volume on historiography...A brilliant, disjointed, baffling work, brimming with complex metaphors."

—American Historical Review

368 pp., \$15.50 • Now in paperback!

Adapting to Abundance

Jewish Immigrants, Mass Consumption and the Search for American Identity

Andrew R. Heinze

With extensive analysis of consumption as a part of American identity, Heinze casts new light on how immigrants assimilated into American society at the turn of the century. Daily concerns such as dressing, shopping, advertising and the celebration of holidays are shown to have tremendous significance in developing a new cultural identity.

**276 pp., 17 photos, \$14.50
Now in paperback!**

The Failure of Illiberalism

Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany


Fritz Stern

Stern argues that from 1878 to the end of World War II, German society embraced the impulse toward totalitarianism in resistance to liberal concessions to democracy. A new preface addresses changes in Germany since the war.

"As the best creative historians have always done, Stern has integrated the intellectual and the emotional experiences of his life... A cogent and stimulating book."

—American Historical Review

300 pp., \$14.50 paper, \$39.50 cloth



HISTORY: PAST & PRESENT



Masks of Conquest

Literary Study and British Rule in India
Gauri Viswanathan

Viswanathan shows how literature, by presenting a mirror of the English ideal, served as a subtle means of colonial governance in nineteenth-century India. *Masks of Conquest* demonstrates English literature's pivotal role in the politics of Empire while challenging today's assumptions about canon formation.

206 pp., \$14.50 • Now in paperback!

The Tso chuan

Selections from China's Oldest Narrative History
Translated by Burton Watson

From a classic of early Chinese prose, Watson presents a narrative rich with details of the diplomatic and military affairs, as well as the economic and cultural developments, of this period of transition from feudalism to unification.

267 pp., \$15.00 • Now in paperback!


Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts

Volume II:
The Marriage of Philology and Mercury
William Harris Stahl
with E.L. Burge

"A detailed compendium of late Roman learning in each of the seven liberal arts, set within an amusing mythological-allegorical tale of courtship and marriage among the pagan gods. Basic to understanding Medieval allegory as well as the curriculum of Medieval education."

—Joan M. Ferrante, *Columbia University*

389 pp., \$12.50 paper
\$55.00 cloth



The Papacy

Bernhard Schimmelpfennig
Translated by James Sievert

This is a unique history of the institution of the papacy, rather than the lives of individual popes. Schimmelpfennig examines the liturgical, political, and cultural evolutions of the Catholic Church from the Roman Empire to the Middle Ages.

288 pp., \$20.00 paper
\$60.00 cloth

EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS


distributed in the U.S., Canada, and Latin America

The Dundas Despotism

Michael Fry

Fry's comprehensive history of Scottish rule under the Dundas Viscounts rebuffs the general conception of this regime as corrupt and ineffective, showing that Dundas rulers implemented good government and managed the 1707 Union with England.

480 pp., \$79.00





Cane and Labour

The Political Economy of
the Queensland Sugar Industry, 1862-1906

Adrian Graves

Graves examines the indentured labor plantation system, its beginnings, struggles, and working conditions, that brought Pacific Islanders to the Australian mainland.

256 pp., \$55.00

One Moldavian Summer

Ionel Teodoreanu

Translated by Eugenia Farca

From a leading Romanian novelist, *One Moldavian Summer* is a classical novel about life in Romania in the pre-World War II period.

200 pp., \$28.00

Our Kingdom Come

The Counter-Reformation, the Republic of Dubrovnik, and the Liberation of the Balkan Slavs

Zdenko Zlatar

Zlatar provides the first study to combine analyses of Dubrovnik's support of Slavic independence with the impact of the Counter-Reformation in abetting the decline of the Ottoman Empire.

300 pp., \$42.00

Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent

The Republic of Dubrovnik and the Origins of the Eastern Question, 1667-1699

Zdenko Zlatar

By examining the role of Dubrovnik in the conflict between the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires, Zlatar demonstrates the ability of a small republic to preserve its independence from larger powers.

350 pp., \$49.00

North of Gallipoli

The Black Sea Fleet at War 1914-1917

George M. Nekrasov

Drawing on the writings of former officers, Nekrasov provides a rare account of the Russian Imperial Navy's operations in the Black Sea during World War I.

200 pp., \$28.00

Women in Polish Society

Edited by Rudolf Jaworski

This first scholarly study of women brings together Polish, German, and American scholars to examine the historical evolution of women in Poland.

200 pp., \$28.00

Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution

A Political Analysis

John Bradley

The fall of communism in November, 1989 was Czechoslovakia's most recent "velvet" revolution. Bradley analyzes the event itself and the political strategies of revolutionaries and communists, putting the peaceful return to democracy in the context of previous Czech revolutions.

180 pp., \$25.50

Folk Cultures and Little People

Aspects of National Awakening in East Central Europe

Peter Brock

Based on a series of biographical case studies of East Central Europeans, Brock examines the awakenings of national consciousness.

250 pp., \$35.00

Serbia's Historical Heritage

Edited by Alex N. Dragnich

Dragnich documents how Serbian society has developed culturally since the Middle Ages, and the role it has played in international events in the twentieth century.

180 pp., \$25.50

Victorious Battles—Lost Wars

Adam Reviczky

Based on personal and official documents, this biography of General Imre Reviczky describes the experience of an Hungarian Jew during World War II.

384 pp., \$54.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

To order, call or fax. Credit cards accepted. Tel: (800) 944-UNIV • Fax: (800) 944-1844 • Dept. 576 • 136 South Broadway, Irvington, NY 10533

Oxford

New edition!

A History of Russia

Fifth Edition

NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

The best one-volume history of Russia available now has a chapter on the Gorbachev years from the initiation of glasnost and perestroika to the failed coup of August 1991, and an updated bibliography.

December 1992 768 pp.; 30 maps,
60 illus \$35.00

Modern Latin America

Third Edition

THOMAS E. SKIDMORE and
PETER H. SMITH

The new edition examines the implications of the end of the Cold War on U.S.-Latin American relations, and the ongoing trend away from authoritarian regimes towards civilian leaders and elected governments.

1992 464 pp.; 47 illus.
paper \$19.95 cloth \$39.95

A New History of India

Fourth Edition

STANLEY WOLPERT

"Clearly the best one-volume history of India."—John E. Wood, *James Madison University* (on the previous edition). The fourth edition covers the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, escalating violence in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam, and the ascension of three new central governments to power.

1992 512 pp.; 14 illus. 10 maps
paper \$17.95 cloth \$39.95

Natives and Strangers Blacks, Indians, and Immigrants in America

Second Edition

LEONARD DINNERSTEIN,
ROGER L. NICHOLS,
and DAVID M. REIMERS

"Will serve to broaden the scope of inquiry....Stimulates students to consider events from different perspectives."

—R.E. Fauber, *California State University*
1990 382 pp.; 38 illus. paper \$12.95

New edition!

A Concise Economic History of the World

Second Edition

RONDO CAMERON

The second edition of this comprehensive economic history of the world offers new material on the non-European world and includes a new chapter on the world economy since the first oil crisis of the early 1970s.

January 1993 464 pp.; 77 photos, maps
paper \$19.95 cloth \$44.95

Old World Encounters Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times

JERRY H. BENTLEY

This innovative text examines cross-cultural encounters before 1492, exploring the conditions—political, social, economic, or cultural—that enable one culture to influence, mix with, or surpass another.

1992 256 pp.; 6 maps
paper \$14.95 cloth \$35.00

Peasant Icons

**Representations of Rural People
in Late Nineteenth-Century Russia**

CATHY A. FRIERSON

Frierson examines the revealing images and stereotypes of the Russian peasant created by Tolstoy, Dostoevsky and others as the peasant became an integral component in the future of Russia envisioned by liberal reformers and conservatives alike.

December 1992 288 pp.; 20 illus.
paper \$17.95 cloth \$35.00

The Twentieth-Century World

An International History

Second Edition

WILLIAM R. KEYLOR

"Solid, up-to-date summary, good insights and interpretation, especially on World War I and II. Well-written." —T.E. Smuck, *University of Hawaii, Honolulu*

1992 560 pp.; 10 illus.
paper \$16.95 cloth \$39.95

Prices and publication dates are subject to change.

To request an examination copy, write on school letterhead giving full course information, including course name, level, expected enrollment, and your decision deadline, to

A History of Our Time **Readings in Postwar America**

Third Edition

Edited by WILLIAM H. CHAFE and
HARVARD SITKOFF

"The best reader on post-World War II
U.S. history."—Walter A. Jackson, *North
Carolina State University*

1991 544 pp. paper \$13.95

The Unfinished Journey **America Since World War II**

Second Edition

WILLIAM H. CHAFE

"Unquestionably the finest history of the
post-World War II era."—Lewis H.

Carlson, *Western Michigan University*

1991 560 pp.; 25 illus.

paper \$17.95 cloth \$38.00

American Vistas

Sixth Edition

Volume 1: 1607-1877

Volume 2: 1877 to the present

Edited by

LEONARD DINNERSTEIN and

KENNETH T. JACKSON

"An excellent collection, easy to inte-
grate into classroom discussions."

—David Sloane, *Dartmouth College*

Volume 1: 1991 384 pp. paper \$14.95

Volume 2: 1991 416 pp. paper \$14.95

Women's America

Refocusing the Past

Third Edition

LINDA K. KERBER and

JANE SHERRON DE HART

"A marvelous collection of readings.

Should be required reading for any

women's history course."—Janet

Allured, *McNeese State University*

1991 608 pp.; 13 illus.

paper \$18.95 cloth \$45.00

The Divided Nation

A History of Germany, 1918-1990

MARY FULBROOK

"Highly superior....A very full treatment
of the post-1945 era and the best brief

but detailed general introduction to the
GDR we have."—Geoff Eley, *University*

of Michigan

1992 424 pp.; 18 illus., 10 maps

paper \$15.95 cloth \$39.95

New edition!

The American **Intellectual Tradition**

Volume I: 1633-1865

Volume II: 1865 to the Present

Second Edition

Edited by DAVID A. HOLLINGER

and CHARLES CAPPER

The new edition offers additional selec-
tions from George Santayana, W.E.B.
Dubois, John Crowe Ransom, Betty
Friedan, Ralph Ellis, Adrienne Rich,
and others.

Volume I: January 1993 412 pp.

paper \$17.95 cloth \$35.00

Volume II: January 1993 384 pp.

paper \$17.95 cloth \$35.00

New edition!

Workers in Industrial **America**

Essays on the Twentieth Century
Struggle

Second Edition

DAVID BRODY

The second edition of this highly
acclaimed collection of essays includes a
new chapter on the crisis of the labor
movement under Reagan.

January 1993 288 pp.

paper \$13.95 cloth \$29.95

New in paperback!

In Joy and in Sorrow **Women, Family, and Marriage in** **the Victorian South, 1830-1900**

Edited by CAROL BLESER

"Valuable....A number of pieces make
important contributions."—*The Journal*

of American History

1991 (paper 1992) 384 pp.; 27 illus.

paper \$14.95 cloth \$29.95

Liberalism and Its **Challengers**

From FDR to Bush

Second Edition

ALONZO HAMBY

"Nicely updated....Gets at the complexi-
ties of liberalism and those forces which
challenge it."—Michael Schnabel,

Bemidji State University

1992 448 pp. paper \$16.95 cloth \$38.00

Oxford University Press

ATTN: College Sales Coordinator

200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

Dutch Pamphlets

1486-1750

on microfiche

Knuttel Collection, Royal Library, The Hague

These pamphlets cover many subjects such as politics, church and religion, colonization, the economic situation, and the latest "mixed news". They were opinionmakers, and in this respect constitute unique material for the researcher of today who is more interested in the concerns of ordinary people than was the case in the past. The pamphlets form an invaluable link between the official level and the masses.



Part 1: 1486-1648

5,815 pamphlets on 2,097 microfiche

Price: 10,525 Dutch guilders

Part 2: 1649-1750

12,470 pamphlets on 3,574 microfiche

Price: 18,125 Dutch guilders

Free brochures available on request



Microform Publishers

IDC bv, P.O. Box 11205, 2301 EE Leiden, The Netherlands Fax 31-71-13 17 21

Dealer in the USA:

Norman Ross Publishing Inc., 330 West 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019
or call toll-free 800 648-8850

Bayonets before Bullets

The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914


Bruce W. Menning

"... a highly professional, original, and objective study of the Imperial Russian army from the reform era of the 1860s to the eve of World War I. Well-informed, lucid, and readable, it offers a balanced, sophisticated analysis of a large range of significant problems."

—John L. H. Keep

Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian & East European Studies

Available November
Illustrated, cloth \$35.00



Reform and Regicide

The Reign of Peter III of Russia

Carol S. Leonard

Portrayed as "a libertine, a halfwit, and a drunkard" by his wife, Catherine the Great, Peter III has received short shrift from historians.

Carol S. Leonard challenges these interpretations and argues that his policies were firmly rooted in the traditions of Russian absolutism and the intellectual climate of his times.

Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies

Available December
cloth \$35.00

Now in paperback!

The Union Army, 1861-1865: Organization and Operations

Volume II: The Western Theater

Frank J. Welcher

Volume II of this magisterial reference work on the Union Army, as does Volume I, provides a complete and continuous account of the organization of all Union military divisions, departments, armies, army corps, divisions, brigades, and numerous special commands.

Acclaim for *Volume I: The Eastern Theater*:

"... a classic of Civil War historiography. ... A fundamental reference work."

—*Library Journal*

"... an indispensable reference work."

—*Choice*

Available December
cloth \$75.00

The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare

Ideas, Organization, and Field Command

Edward Hagerman

"... this fine book deserves a place on the shelves of all military historians in this country and abroad."

—*American Historical Review*

"... a first rate book ... impressive ... an imposing work ..."

—*Journal of American History*

paper \$12.95 cloth \$37.50

Into the Wilderness with the Army of the Potomac

Revised and Enlarged Edition

Robert Garth Scott

"A brisk, authoritative history of the Wilderness Campaign." —*Southern Partisan*


In a new chapter for this revised edition, Scott provides a concise analysis of the conflict which demonstrates that the Battle of the Wilderness was one of the five major turning points of the Civil War.

illustrated, cloth \$29.95 paper \$14.95

**INDIANA
UNIVERSITY
PRESS**

Dept. A2SJ
Bloomington, IN 47404
Orders may call: 1-800-842-6796

AMERICAN HISTORY POLITICS



NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY

**A Chronicle of Indian-White Relations
from Prophecy to the Present, 1492-1992**

Peter Nabokov, editor

Foreword by Vine Deloria, Jr.

"For anyone interested in American history or in American Indian culture, *Native American Testimony* is essential reading."—*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*. Photographs. 512 pp.

Penguin paperback 0-14-012986-3 \$15.00

THE PORTABLE BEAT READER

Ann Charters, editor

"The first definitive anthology of a much-mythologized literary movement."—*San Francisco Chronicle*. 608 pp.

Penguin paperback 0-14-015102-8 \$12.00
Available October 1992



A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIES


Bartolomé de Las Casas

Translated by Nigel Griffin

Introduction by Anthony Pagden

A succinct, eyewitness record of the Spanish atrocities against the Indians, contrasting sharply with Columbus's early evangelizing visions for the region. 192 pp.

Penguin Classic 0-14-044562-5 \$9.95



J. EDGAR HOOVER

The Man and the Secrets

Curt Gentry

"Awesomely researched and elegantly writtenAn absolutely fascinating study."—*Los Angeles Times*. Photographs. 848 pp.

Plume paperback 0-452-26904-0 \$15.00

KLANWATCH

Bringing the Ku Klux Klan to Justice

Bill Stanton

"This is a real-life detective story, as gripping as fiction."—Julian Bond. Photographs. 288 pp.

Mentor paperback 0-451-62855-1 \$5.99

WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?

Trying to Be for Labor

When It's Flat on Its Back

Thomas Geoghegan

"Quirky, brilliant... unparalleled in the literature of American labor."—*New York Times Book Review*. 320 pp.

Plume paperback 0-452-26891-5 \$11.00

LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO WAR

December 7, 1941

Stanley Weintraub

"A superb look at the events which led to America's entry into World War II."—Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator, Hawaii. Photographs. 720 pp.


Plume paperback 0-452-26917-2 \$15.00

Available November 1992

NEW from PENGUIN USA

Academic Marketing Department, 375 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10014-3657

historical markers



➤ **Franchising in America**

The Development of a Business Method, 1840–1980
by Thomas S. Dicke
216 pp., 12 illus., \$32.50 cloth, \$12.95 paper

➤ **The Emergence of David Duke and the Politics of Race**

Edited by Douglas D. Rose
296 pp., \$29.95 cloth, \$12.95 paper
Tulane Studies in Political Science

➤ **British and American Commercial Relations with Soviet Russia, 1918–1924**

by Christine A. White
360 pp., 22 tables, 3 maps, \$39.95




➤ **An Unwanted War**

The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895–1898
by John L. Offner
320 pp., 11 illus., \$39.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper

➤ **Republics Ancient and Modern**

Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution
by Paul A. Rahe
1216 pp., \$49.95



➤ **Citizenship in the Western Tradition**

Plato to Rousseau
by Peter Riesenberg
348 pp., \$42.50

➤ **The Botanizers**

Amateur Scientists in Nineteenth-Century America
by Elizabeth B. Keeney
220 pp., 12 illus., 7 tables, \$34.95

at bookstores or by toll-free order _____

the university of north carolina press chapel hill

Phone (800) 848-6224 FAX (800) 272-6817


NEW FROM OXFORD

THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH

Life After Reconstruction

EDWARD L. AYERS

"Forty years after the appearance of C. Vann Woodward's *Origins of the New South*, we have a work of comparable depth, breadth, strength, and power"—Joel Williamson. "Ayers has a marvelous eye and ear for recreating the voices, the landscapes, and the human emotions of the past.... This is a book that will long be studied, debated, borrowed from, and imitated. It is a book that will make a significant difference"—David Brion Davis. \$30.00, 554 pp.



AMERICAN HOLOCAUST

Columbus and the Conquest of the New World

DAVID E. STANNARD

"In a thoroughly documented narrative, David Stannard demolishes a score of historical myths...a searing account of what happened in the Americas after the arrival of Columbus. It is a stirring and troubling book"—Dee Brown, author of *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*. "The book to read to understand the last 500 years"—Vine Deloria, author of *Custer Died for Your Sins*. \$25.00, 345 pp.



ELLIS ISLAND TO EBBETS FIELD

Sports and the American-Jewish Experience

PETER LEVINE

"A wonderfully evocative combination of sports and Jewish cultural and athletic life"—W.P. Kinsella. "An excellent overview of the historical progression of the Jewish people who have played such an important role in the American sports world.... Thoroughly researched and well documented"—Howard Cosell. \$25.00, 352 pp.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960

The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy

MORTON J. HORWITZ

"For anyone seriously interested in studying American legal history, this insightful and persuasive account...is required reading"—*Library Journal*. This is the sequel to *The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860*, which won a Bancroft Prize. \$30.00, 352 pp.

BOUND TO EMPIRE

The United States and the Philippines

H.W. BRANDS

"This thoughtful, well conceived, and superbly written volume is perhaps the best in the string of books on the US role in the Philippines"—*Library Journal*. "Far and away the best history we have of America's controversial experiment with Asian empire"—Michael Schaller, author of *Douglas MacArthur*. \$25.00, 378 pp.



THE AMERICAN PACIFIC

From the Old China Trade to the Present

ARTHUR POWER DUDDEN

"Dudden brilliantly chronicles America's relationships with the highly diverse societies of the Pacific, from our early fixation with China, through our fear of Communism, to our present state of anticipation and bewilderment. The book is marked by a sense of balance and conviction; Arthur Dudden's synthesis is a model of clarity and compression"—Robin Winks. \$27.95, 314 pp.

**At better bookstores. To charge, call 1-800-451-7556 (M-F, 9-5 EST)
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS**



RENAISSANCE RITES AND WRITERS

DEATH AND RITUAL IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE

Sharon T. Strocchia

Sharon Strocchia shows how death rites—especially civic funerals—reflected Florence's quick rise to commercial wealth in the fourteenth century and steady progression toward displays of princely power in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

\$42.50 *hardcover*

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE MANUSCRIPTS IN THE WALTERS ART GALLERY

VOLUME 2: FRANCE, 1420-1540

Lilian M.C. Randall

*assisted by Christopher Clarkson and
Jeanne Krochalis*

The second of four volumes that will catalog the rich collection of manuscripts at the Walters Art Gallery in Baltimore describes 113 manuscripts produced in France and includes 50 color and 214 black and white illustrations.

\$135.95 *two volumes*

VENETIAN SHIPS AND SHIPBUILDERS OF THE RENAISSANCE

Frederic Chapin Lane

Originally published in 1934, this major study by Frederic Lane tracks the rise and decline of the great shipbuilding industry of Renaissance Venice, from the process of ship construction to rivalries between shipbuilders.

\$15.95 *softcover*

DOCUMENTARY CULTURE

FLORENCE AND ROME FROM
GRAND-DUKE FERDINAND I TO
POPE ALEXANDER VII

**edited by Elizabeth Cropper,
Giovanna Perini, and
Francesco Solinas**

In this multilingual volume prominent scholars investigate issues of documentation and taxonomy in fields ranging from the natural history of birds and citrus fruits to academic *imprese*, from the art of memory to the art of fortification.

Villa Spelman Colloquium Series, 3

\$45.00 *hardcover*, 195 illustrations

The Johns Hopkins University Press

701 West 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, Maryland 21211

To order, call 1-800-537-5487.

AHA PAMPHLETS

Essays on Global and Comparative History

edited by Michael Adas

This series explores the origins of major civilizations, preindustrial empires, modern revolutions, and recent power struggles. The use of current scholarship demonstrates a greater sensitivity to variations in cultures, social systems, and political economies. These essays are especially useful to college and secondary-school teachers who are engaged in teaching courses on world history or courses with a comparative format.

Interpreting the Industrial Revolution

by *Peter N. Stearns*

74 pp. 1991 ISBN 0-87229-049-2

\$4.00 AHA members \$6.00 nonmembers

The Tropical Atlantic in the Age of the Slave Trade

by *Philip D. Curtin*

60 pp. 1991 ISBN 0-87229-048-4

\$4.00 AHA members \$6.00 nonmembers

Islamic History as Global History

by *Richard Eaton*

51 pp. 1990 ISBN 0-87229-046-8

\$4.00 AHA members \$6.00 nonmembers

The Age of Gunpowder Empires, 1450-1800

by *William H. McNeill*

49 pp. 1989 ISBN 0-87229-043-3

\$4.00 AHA members \$6.00 nonmembers

The Columbian Voyages, the Columbian Exchange, and their Histories

by *Alfred W. Crosby*

29 pp. 1987 ISBN 0-87229-039-5

\$4.00 AHA members \$6.00 nonmembers

American Historical Association

Publications Sales Office, 400 A St., SE, Washington, DC 20003
(202) 544-2422 FAX (202) 544-8307

NEW AMERICAN HISTORY ESSAYS

Edited for the AHA by Eric Foner

This series of 13 essays utilizes the "new history" to reexamine themes and time periods of United States history. Each issue uses recent scholarship to demonstrate the vitality and diversity of our nation's past and reveal the changeable nature of historical inquiry. High school teachers, college professors, and anyone concerned with the current study of American history will gain knowledge and insight from these thought-provoking works. Pamphlet titles include:

*Beneficiaries of Catastrophe:
The English Colonies in America*
by John M. Murrin

*Public Life in Industrial America
1877-1917*
by Richard L. McCormick

*Prosperity, Depression, and War,
1920-1945*
by Alan Brinkley

America since 1945
by William H. Chafe

Social History
by Alice Kessler-Harris

*The Revolutionary Generation:
Ideology, Politics, and Culture in the
Early Republic*
by Linda K. Kerber

U.S. Women's History
by Linda Gordon

African-American History
by Thomas C. Holt

American Labor History
by Leon Fink

Ethnicity and Immigration
by James P. Shenton

*Liberty and Power: U.S.
Diplomatic History, 1750-1945*
by Walter LaFeber

*Society, Politics, and the Market
Revolution, 1815-1848*
by Sean Wilentz

*Slavery, the Civil War,
and Reconstruction*
by Eric Foner

Cost per essay: \$3 members \$5 nonmembers

Contact: American Historical Association, Publications Sales Office, 400
A St., SE, Washington, DC 20003; (202) 544-2422; fax (202) 544-8307.

All orders must be prepaid.

Index of Advertisers

American Historical Association	58–59, Covers 2 & 3	Northern Illinois University Press	27
The Beinecke Library	26	Oxford University Press	4–5, 50–51, 56
Cambridge University Press	6–12	Penguin USA	54
Columbia University Press	47–49	Princeton University Press	Cover 4
Cornell University Press	13	Sage Publications, Inc.	31
Greenwood Publishing	30	St. Martin's Press	40–43
Harper Collins	23	Stanford University Press	32–33
Harvard University Press	18–20	University of California Press	14–16
Houghton Mifflin	28–29	University of Chicago Press	34–37
IDC	52	University of Georgia Press	17
Indiana University Press	53	University of North Carolina Press	55
Johns Hopkins University Press	57	University of Pittsburgh Press	39
Macmillan	24–25	University Press of Florida	45
M.E. Sharpe	38	University Press of Kentucky	46
MIT Press	21	Yale University Press	3
Naval Institute Press	22		
New York University Press	44		

AHA Pamphlets

Essays on the Columbian Encounter

edited by Carla Rahn Phillips and David Weber

This AHA series, presented in celebration of the Columbus Quincentennial, is designed to assist secondary-school educators in introducing the era of Christopher Columbus as one of mutual discovery between radically different cultures.

Imagining the Other: First Encounters in North America

by James Axtell

The author provides readers with vivid scenes of first encounters among Europeans and Native Americans. Descriptions of the very different customs and cultures, the language barrier, and the conflicting expectations and aims are presented in a highly readable, informative style.

Before 1492: Christopher Columbus's Formative Years

by William D. Phillips, Jr.

Calling upon the variety of works written since the fifteenth century on Columbus's life, the author discusses the possible and probable events of the enigmatic explorer's lesser-known early life. Rumor, conjecture, evidence, and myth regarding Columbus's motives and methods are given thoughtful attention. Available spring 1992.

The Exploration of North America

by James P. Ronda

In an essay that presents a thoughtful overview of the exploration of North America from the era of Columbus to the present, the author discusses the motivations and agendas of explorers and their backers. These "great men" are depicted in a more believable, realistic vein in an attempt to understand the truth behind many of the heroic myths. Available summer 1992.

North America and the Beginnings of European Colonization

by Karen Ordahl Kupperman

In this final essay in the AHA's Essays on the Columbian Encounter, Karen Ordahl Kupperman discusses the strategies, conditions, and repercussions of European colonizers' attempts to settle several regions of North America. Available fall 1992.

Cost per pamphlet: \$5 AHA members; \$7 nonmembers

American Historical Association

Publication Sales Office, 400 A Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003
(202) 544-2422; fax (202) 544-8307

Princeton

**THESE WOMEN ARE
DOING THEIR BIT**



**LEARN TO
MAKE
MUNITIONS**

Persuasive Images

Posters of War and Revolution from
the Hoover Institution Archives

**Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis,
and Paul Paret**

With powerful, often shocking immediacy, the posters reproduced and discussed in this volume document the political and military conflicts of our century. Drawn from Russia, Central and Western Europe, and the United States, from the turn of the century to the aftermath of the Second World War, the posters form a bridge between the claims of ideology and the state on the one hand and the support or submission of millions of men and women on the other.

How can men be persuaded to fight for their country, and how can women be convinced to enter the workforce in wartime and retreat to the home when their men return? What is the most effective way to dehumanize the enemy? These are only some of the issues that the posters in this volume lay bare and begin to explain.

Over 300 color illustrations.

Cloth: \$35.00 ISBN 0-691-03204-1

The Apotheosis of Captain Cook

European Mythmaking in the Pacific
Gananath Obeyesekere

In January 1778 Captain James Cook "discovered" the Hawaiian Islands and was hailed by the native peoples as their returning god Lono.

On a return voyage Cook was killed by the same people in what modern anthropologists and historians interpret as a ritual sacrifice of the fertility god.

Questioning the circumstances surrounding Cook's so-called divinity—or apotheosis—and his death, Gananath Obeyesekere debunks one of the most enduring myths of imperialism, civilization, and conquest: the notion that the Western civilizer is a god to savages. Obeyesekere rewrites an important segment of British and Hawaiian history in a way that challenges Eurocentric views of non-Western cultures.

Cloth: \$24.95 ISBN 0-691-05680-3

The Apotheosis of Captain Cook

European Mythmaking in the Pacific

Gananath Obeyesekere

Princeton University Press

41 WILLIAM ST., PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • ORDERS: 800-777- 4726 • OR FROM YOUR LOCAL BOOKSTORE